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ABSTRACT
When can the international community build strong state institutions - such as security forces or
electoral institutions - in post-conflict societies? An influential technical perspective argues that
authority, resources, and expertise enable the international community to build its preferred
institutions. In Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo, the international community established
international administrations with executive powers and a state building mandate. Each
international administrations had extensive authority, resources, and expertise, which make them
crucial test cases for the technical perspective. I examined seventeen reform efforts in these
societies related to security, representation, and revenue. While some institution-building efforts
succeeded, many failed and provoked violence or undercut political development.
To explain this variation, I propose a theory that specifies the mechanisms of the reform process.
The theory is based on the interaction between the international administration, local elites, and
the mass public of the post-conflict society. The mass public will protest when demands threaten
nationalist goals, such as independence. Local elites, on the other hand, will privately obstruct
reform to protect their informal patronage and corruption networks. International officials are
ideologically committed to human rights and bureaucracy, which lead them to make
overambitious demands. Moreover, competing goals and political friction among international
organizations causes disagreement about which demands to make to local elites. The theory
predicts that reform efforts only fully succeed when the international administration is unified
and its demands threaten neither nationalist goals nor informal networks.
I test the theory by conducting causal process tracing in the seventeen reform efforts. The case
studies draw from fieldwork in each of these societies, as well as primary and secondary sources.
Within these seventeen efforts, I identify fifty-seven stages of reform. Of these, forty confirm the
theory's predictions and thirteen partially confirm the predictions. The case studies also
demonstrate that the technical perspective, and other alternative hypotheses, cannot consistently
explain state building. The dissertation has implications for broader state building efforts by the
international community, and urges the adoption of an incremental approach to institution
building that takes account of the realities of local politics and the corresponding limits of
international authority.
Thesis Supervisor: Roger D. Petersen
Title: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The international community is actively engaged in building state institutions - such as police,
tax, or electoral institutions - in post-conflict societies. Creating strong state institutions is the
international community's central strategy for establishing peace, democracy, the rule of law,
and development in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,' Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. This dissertation examines when and why the international community is able to
achieve its state-building objectives in post-conflict societies.
Existing work on state building by the international community has argued that success
depends on a strong mandate and vast resources, following well-established best practices, or
rapidly building institutions prior to democratization. 2 From these arguments, a technical
perspective on state building has emerged that believes the international community has the tools
necessary to achieve state building, and that success is likely given the application of Western
authority, resources, and expertise. This technical perspective is highly influential in
contemporary state building efforts.3 Others claim that efforts by the international community to
build democratic states are contradictory or impractical and that the international community
should simply intervene less in post-conflict societies.4
Hereafter Bosnia.
2 See, respectively, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations
Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); James Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-
Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007); Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil
Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3 Jason Brownlee writes that there is a "prevailing thesis of effort and technical competence." "Can America Nation-
Build?," World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 339. See also Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, Can Intervention Work? (W. W. Norton
& Company, 2011), xvii-xviii, 129-157; David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics ofState-Building
(London: Pluto, 2006), 5-8.
4 David Chandler argues that there is little potential for state building without the freely expressed desire by
individuals within the post-conflict society. David Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise ofPost-Liberal
Governance (New York: Routledge, 2010); Chandler, Empire in Denial; David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking
Democracy After Dayton (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 193-199. Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus also describe
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In Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo, the international community established international
administrations. These international administrations had executive authority, great resources, and
significant expertise, which make these societies crucial test cases for the technical perspective.
Indeed, the Transitional Administrator in East Timor, Sergio Vieira de Mello, argued that the UN
mission in East Timor presented a "pretty perfect petri-dish" for demonstrating the ability of the
international community to build strong and democratic state institutions.5 I examine seventeen
efforts to reform state institutions drawn from three international administrations. Some efforts
did leave strong state institutions, while other efforts provoked mass protest, encouraged political
radicalization, and delegitimized future action by the intemational community. These findings
demonstrate that while the international community does have some ability to build strong state
institutions, mustering greater authority, resources, and expertise is not sufficient to achieve its
objectives.
I develop a theory that explains this variation by describing institutional reform as a
political process. While international organizations seek reform, there may be resistance from
within the post-conflict society. The theory makes detailed predictions about the mechanisms
and outcomes of institution building based on two variables: whether the international
administrations' demands threaten nationalist goals or elites' informal patronage and corruption
networks, and whether the intemational administration is unified in its demands. In short, the
theory claims that reform efforts are only fully successful when the international administration
is unified and its demands threaten neither nationalist goals nor informal networks.
"futility" school of intervention, which claims that intervention is inherently impractical and unwise. Can
Intervention Work?, xxvii, 157-171.
- Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira De Mello and the Fight to Save the World (New York:
Penguin Press, 2008), 303, 305. James Traub in Foreign Affairs called East Timor a "laboratory" and noted that an
"A-team of international technocrats" had arrived and the outcome of their efforts would demonstrate the ability of
the international community to pursue "nation-building." James Traub, "Inventing East Timor," Foreign Affairs 79,
no. 4 (July 1, 2000): 82.
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The theory is based on empirically supported assumptions about post-conflict societies
and international administrations. The assumptions about post-conflict societies relate to the
longstanding importance of nationalism and informal patronage and corruption networks. Civil
wars are often fought for nationalist goals, such as autonomy or independence. Nationalism,
defined as the belief that the nation and state should be congruent, remains popular long after the
end of the war. The mass public will protest demands threatening nationalist goals, which
constrains elites to oppose such reforms and enables them to leverage public opposition. Reforms
threatening nationalist goals consistently fail because the international administration respects
popular sovereignty and cannot overlook public protest.
Furthermore, local elites form informal networks during the war, which evolve and
remain important after the end of the war. These networks enable local elites to engage in
activities beyond their official powers including attacking competitors, providing patronage, and
using criminal activity to achieve their ends. Informal networks are relatively unpopular, so elites
cannot leverage public dissent to protect them and must use private obstruction. International
administrations can limit the effectiveness of private obstruction by making certain demands
conditional for the transfer authority to local elites. However, if international organizations
within the administration disagree about demands, local elites can play international
organizations against one another and avoid difficult reforms. Hence, the international
administration can only make progress against elite obstruction if there is internal unity about its
demands.
It may be surprising that international administrations are not able to reform institutions
given their authority, resources, and expertise. In addition to disunity, international
administrations are limited by their ideology. International organizations believe in building
9
organizations that follow a minimum standard of human rights and follow formal bureaucratic
procedures. These objectives, though desirable, grossly underestimate the importance of post-
war nationalism and the role of informal networks and lead to demands that are infeasible or
counterproductive.
The dissertation therefore offers three major contributions to our understanding of
institution building by the international community, both in international administrations and in
other post-conflict societies where the intemational community has less authority. First, pursuing
technocratic institution building is insufficient to achieve success. Martialing authority,
resources, and expertise cannot overcome certain forms of local resistance. Successful reform
therefore depends on designing demands to take account of the political constraints of the target
society. Second, the international community should avoid demands that threaten nationalist
goals, since such demands are likely to provoke public protest and be counterproductive. Third,
because of the longstanding impact of the war, existing elites cannot be replaced with moderates
through international action.6 There is strong public support for nationalism, which forces
candidates to align themselves with controversial wartime achievements. Furthermore, existing
elites' informal networks enable them to prevent reforms that would weaken their position.
This chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section explains the importance of
studying institution building by the international community. The second section examines the
literature on institution building, intervention, and peace building. This section surveys the major
theories related to international intervention and then describes the technical perspective on state
building. The third section defines the concept of an international administration and explains
why international administrations are ideal for studying state building. A fourth section
concludes and outlines the rest of the dissertation.
6 See especially Paris, At War's End, chap. 10.
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I. Institution Building in Post-Conflict Societies
The international community's main objective in post-conflict societies is the prevention of war.
However, the goals of the international community are typically far more extensive than simply
separating the sides and preventing the return of violence. Indeed, the prevention of violence in
the long term may require the creation of a strong state, the rule of law, economic development,
or democratization.8 Furthermore, some argue that the international community has an obligation
to not only prevent the return of conflict but to address the deeper roots of conflict or pursue a
positive conception of peace.9
The construction of strong state institutions is perhaps the most important tool to secure
peace, the rule of law, democracy, and economic development in the long term.' 0 The state is
often defined as the organization with a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a
defined territory." However, the literature has gone from a singular focus on the state's coercive
capacity to its provision of basic services - including security, education, revenue,
7 I define the international community as the states and organizations that cooperate to provide assistance to post-
conflict and developing societies. The most prominent members of the international community for many operations
include the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia; and organizations such as the UN,
EU, NATO, and the OSCE. The international community may form ad hoc or informal organizations to pursue its
goals, such as the Contact Group in the Balkans. See, for example, Krishna Kumar, Postconflict Elections,
Democratization, and InternationalAssistance (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 1998), 5; Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (November 1, 2002): 99-110.
8 See, inter alia, Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, xxiii; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,
"Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43; Michael Barnett,
"Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War," International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 87-112.
9 Michael Barnett et al., "Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?," Global Governance 13, no. 1 (2007): 35- 58; Lise
Morjd Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7.
10 There is an extensive literature that suggests that the strength of the state is fundamental to peace, democracy, and
economic development. On the association between state institutions and peace, for example, see Stephen John
Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation ofPeace
Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Charles Call, Vanessa Wyeth, and International Peace Institute.,
Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008); Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew
Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park,
Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Monica Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil
Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); Philip G. Roeder and Donald S. Rothchild, Sustainable
Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); The Quest for Viable
Peace: International Intervention and Strategiesfor Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2005).
" H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press (Galaxy
imprint), 1958), 78.
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representation, and so forth.' 2 In this dissertation, I evaluate the strength of the state by
considering the activities of various formal institutions comprising the state. These institutions
include organizations such as the police, military, and tax collection agencies as well as formal
rules such as the constitution and laws.' 3 The ability of the state to provide for it citizens is a
function of the existence of strong legal frameworks and strong organizations. Hence, below I
use the terms state building and institution building interchangeably, with both referring to
efforts to reform and improve state institutions. I also use the term reform effort to refer to a
specific effort to reform a state institution, which is identified through the specification of
international preferences for the design or functioning of that institution.
Many authors, especially in the United States, use the term nation-building to describe
these activities.'4 For example, Jason Brownlee defines "nation-building" as "a deliberate
process of democratization administered through foreign intervention." 5 I do not use the term
nation-building, since the term nation refers to a mutually recognized people or imagined
12 This view of the state, and of state building, is elaborated in Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and
World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed
States.
" An institution is "a system of rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social)
behavior." Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 30. Some literature differentiates between institutions as rules and
organizations as actors. Such a perspective is useful for understanding the impact and evolution of rules. My concern
is the overarching functioning of parts of the state, as determined by changes in both the rules and functioning of
organizations. Hence, I use a definition that includes organizations and rules as institutions. See Douglass Cecil
North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), 3; Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 1 St
ed. (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 450, 530-1 (fn 15).
" The RAND nation-building series, for example, explains that "nation-building, as it is commonly referred to in the
United States, involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms
with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors."
See James Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003);
James Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008);
James Dobbins, The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005);
Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, xvii.
"5 Brownlee, "Can America Nation-Build?," 316.
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community rather than to the organization of the state. The terminology is especially confusing
in the Balkans where the term nation consistently refers to a people, and many states contain
multiple nations. Some literature does treat the specific question of the construction of a nation
as a people,' 7 but this is a separate question from the reform and construction of institutions in
post-conflict societies.
II. Literature Review
There is an extensive literature that examines when and how the international community can
successfully intervene in post-conflict societies. By and large, this literature examines the
determinants of peace and conflict in these societies. However, various works in the literature
consider a number of different measures of success, including the prevention of violence, the
likelihood of peace continuing without further international involvement, the creation of a
minimum standard of democracy or human rights, and the implementation of the international
community's mandate.' 8
In this review, I first discuss three main categories of theories that explain the success or
failure of state building. These theories are drawn from the literature on state building and
intervention. In the next chapter I draw on this review to develop alternative explanations for the
trajectory of reform efforts.
I then describe the technical perspective, which claims that the international community
has all the techniques necessary to succeed at state building, so failure is due to a lack of
16 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1-7; Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
17 See, for example, Harris Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-Building: The Making of Co-Nationals, Refugees, and
Minorities, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
1 See, respectively, Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 8; Paris, At War's End, 55-57; Doyle and Sambanis, Making
War and Building Peace, 72-75; Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 6-8.
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authority, resources, or expertise. In addition to several theories from the broader intervention
literature, this perspective includes a wide swath of the policy literature on institution building,
especially works on security sector reform.
Explaining Success
This section analyzes the prominent works on intervention and state building, and draws out
three categories of theories that are most relevant to institution building. These are the structure
and level of development of the target society; the character, size, and mandate of the
international intervention; and the dynamics of democratization in the society.
First, many argue that state building depends on the structure and level of development of
a society. The literature on state building examines the formation of the modem state, largely in
Westem Europe. This literature finds that state building is rare and historically contingent, but in
some circumstances, due to the need to make war against neighboring societies or address
internal political unrest, elites have an incentive to build a strong state.19 However, these theories
may be of limited relevance to post-conflict societies, since elites rarely seek to build state
institutions on their own and the pressure for state building largely comes from outsiders, such as
representatives from the international community.2 0
The literature on intervention similarly claims that the societies that were more developed
prior to the war are the most likely to achieve better post-conflict outcomes. For example,
Dobbins et al. emphasize that the most successful cases of 'nation-building' took place in
societies that were highly developed before the war, such as Germany and Japan.' Michael
19 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); Daron
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Douglass C. North and Bany R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal ofEconomic History 49,
no. 4 (December 1989): 803-832.20 Fukuyama, State-Building, 32-36.21Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-Building, xix.
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Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis also argue that UN intervention in post-civil war societies is most
likely to succeed if there is greater "local capacity" - measured as prewar economic
development.2 2 More recently, Louis-Alexandre Berg argues that the success of security sector
reform depends on the structure of informal networks within post-conflict societies. He argues
that reform is relatively easier when there is fragmented political cohesion and dispersed sources
23
of revenue.
The nature of the target society is undoubtedly important for the outcome of intervention
and state building. However, identifying the characteristics that are more or less advantageous
for success has limited benefit for understanding what the international community should do
once it is deployed in a post-conflict society. The international community rarely has the luxury
of deciding not to intervene in a society that it cannot help - indeed, existing research shows the
international community is most likely to intervene in societies that are the worst off. 24 Hence, it
is critical to understand how the decisions and policy of the international community influence
the trajectory and outcome of intervention.
Second, other theories claim that the size and mandate of international organizations in
post-conflict societies influences the outcome of interventions. The size of an intervention could
range from several hundred observers to tens of thousands of soldiers. The mandate of
peacekeeping missions may also vary from observation, to supporting a peace agreement
negotiated between the combatants, to actively enforcing the peace. The mandates of
22 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 63-68. Similarly, Lise Morjd Howard cites "situational
factors" such as the consent of warring parties, the existence of a peace treaty, and the support of neighboring states.
UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 8-11.2 3 Louis-Alexandre Berg, "Local Networks and the Limits of External Influence: Security Sector Reform in Liberia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina," Paper presented at the International Studies Association in San Diego, April 3 2012,
16.2 4Fora, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 45.
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international organizations with civilian authority may also vary from running elections, to
executive authority over selected institutions, to full sovereign authority.
In general, the literature argues that the larger the international intervention, and the more
extensive its mandate, the more likely that the international community will achieve its goals.
Most prominently, Doyle and Sambanis demonstrate statistically that the strength of the UN's
mandate is correlated with peace and democracy. They also claim that greater international
financial assistance is beneficial. Finally, Doyle and Sambanis use several case studies, most
notably the province of Brcko in Bosnia, to demonstrate that extensive international authority is
more effective for achieving the international community's goals.26
Third, a substantial subset of the literature deals with the relations between democracy
and political development. One commonly cited argument, known as the liberal peace, claims
that liberalization, including elections and marketization, will lead to positive outcomes.27 These
theories offer the international community the opportunity to simultaneously pursue stabilization
with the normative goal of democratization. However, several critiques of the liberal peace
argument have emerged. Most prominently, Roland Paris argues that the institutions necessary to
support full liberal and democratic development - such as civil society, independent electoral
institutions, and a free media - do not exist in post-conflict societies. Without these institutions,
2 5 There are many different ways of classifying UN peacekeeping missions and international interventions. Doyle
and Sambanis code peacekeeping operations as observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimentional
peacekeeping, and enforcement missions. This coding is based in part off of descriptions of different "generations"
of peacekeeping missions. Michael Doyle separately classifies different types of transitional authority as
supervisory, executive, or administrative. Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 10-18, 84;
Michael Doyle, "War Making, Peace Making, and the United Nations," in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflit (Washington, D C: US Institute of Peace, 2001), 551; Simon Chesterman, You, the
People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 56-57.
26 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 230-243. Page Fortna uses a related dataset and makes a
similar argument that greater resources and authority leads to greater success. Does Peacekeeping Work?. Barbara
Walter observes that even the presence of a third-party can help secure civil war settlements by providing a credible
guarantee. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization 51, no. 03 (1997): 335-364.
27 See Paris, At War's End, 20; Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation ofPeace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007); Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011).
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rapid elections and democratization often have negative and unanticipated consequences,
especially enfranchising the nationalist elites that fought the war. Paris proposes that the
international community should pursue "institutionalization before liberalization," which calls on
the international community to rapidly build the institutions necessary for liberal democracy
prior to holding elections.28 These changes, in his view, would enable the election of moderate
elites who would be more likely to implement the international community's goals for the
society.
The problem with institutionalization before liberalization, and other arguments that seek
to encourage the election of moderate elites, 2 9 is that these arguments do not recognize the
challenges posed by the post-conflict society. First, and most problematically, proponents of
rapid institutional change appear to believe that Western institutions can be grafted onto the post-
conflict societies. However, the theory chapter will explain how post-conflict societies pose
unique challenges. While some individuals in the society may prefer moderate elites, there are
many who prefer nationalist leaders, even if a level playing field could be created. Second,
proponents of rapid institutional change underestimate the interests and ability of incumbent
elites to prevent reform. Incumbent elites recognize that the reforms the international community
calls for could be dangerous for their continued political control.
2 8 Paris's strategy of institutionalization before liberalization calls on the international community to "1. Wait until
conditions are ripe for elections; 2. Design electoral systems that reward moderation; 3. Promote good civil society;
4. Control hate speech; 5. Adopt conflict-reducing economic policies; 6. The common denominator: Rebuild
effective state institutions." Paris, At War's End, 187-188.
29 See also the literature on spoilers, Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International
Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 5-53; Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling: Civil War
Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," International Security 31, no. 3 (2007): 7-40.
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Technical Perspective on State Building
The technical perspective is defined by the belief that the international community has methods
that are universally applicable and consistently sufficient to build strong state institutions.30 State
building, therefore, can be achieved by the application of sufficient authority, resources, and
expertise to a society. Works from this perspective identify the techniques that are required or are
helpful for state building and therefore often provide a useful resource for practitioners.
However, the technical perspective overestimates the ultimate capacity of the international
community to overwhelm opposition within the post-conflict society. Indeed, according to the
technical perspective, the failure of state building is ultimately due to the lack of international
authority, resources, or expertise rather than to the inherent difficulty of reforming post-conflict
societies. This is not to say that the technical perspective does not recognize that local politics
may make state building difficult or that it claims that techniques do not have to be adapted to
varying circumstances. Instead, the technical perspective argues that is always possible for the
international community to leverage greater authority, resources, and expertise to enable state
building success.
To illustrate the technical perspective, I consider three sets of work. First, there is a broad
literature on bureaucratic procedures, lessons learned, and best practices for international
intervention. Some work takes for granted that bureaucratic practices are effective and focuses
on when international organizations are able to "learn" - that is, to adapt their formal structure or
functions according to the challenges they face. Organizational learning becomes almost
30 Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus identify two separate schools of thought: a "'planning school'...which prescribes
a clear strategy, metrics, and structure, back by overwhelming resources;... and a 'liberal imperialist school'...
which emphasizes the importance of decisive, bold, and charismatic leadership." The technical perspective
identified here blends these two related schools of thought, since the liberal imperialist school draws on the
availability of technical resources and the technical perspective requires substantial political acumen and leadership.
Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, xvii-xviii.
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synonymous with success in some accounts.' Other works analyze previous missions in order to
suggest "lessons learned" or "best practices."3 While the identification of mistakes or lessons is
no doubt useful, this literature often fails to identify the particular conditions that might make
these practices or lessons more or less applicable to different societies.
Second, Dobbins et al.'s Beginners' Guide to Nation-Building "presents a doctrine for
conducting effective nation-building operations."33 The book draws from sixteen case studies
from three previous books studies, on America's, the UN's, and Europe's,3 4 efforts at nation-
building. Dobbins et al.'s book provide a useful starting point for any intervention, with
guidelines such as the proper sizing of military and police relative to the population, the cost
associated with state building efforts, and the proper management of government finances after
conflict.3" However, Dobbins et al. tend to minimize the agency of local elites and role of local
politics. They write that local "resistance can be overcome, but only through the application of
31 Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, The New World of UN Peace Operations:
Learning to Build Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 14-
20.
3 2 Howard, for example, argues that "organizational learning" is an overlooked determinant of peacekeeping
success. She identifies first-level learning as "the increasing ability to engage in multidimensional peacekeeping,"
which includes a variety of technical skills that are associated with mandate implementation. These skills include
gathering information, coordinating among different organizations, engaging with the environment, and leadership.
She also identifies second-level learning as a "change in the organization's overall means, structures and goals, in
response to new understandings of problems and their causes." She claims that peacekeeping is more likely to
succeed when the peacekeeping institutions have been restructured based on previous missions. Howard, UN
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 14-20. It is also common for accounts of specific missions to identify specific lessons.
In East Timor, for example, see Nassrine de Rham-Azimi and Li Lin Chang, eds., The United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference (Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003); Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, "The United Nations and East Timor:
From Self-Determination to State-Building," International Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 141-143; Paulo
Gorjao, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor," Contemporary
SoutheastAsia 24, no. 2 (2002): 313-336.
3 Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, ix.
3 The author was a contributor to the Europe's Role in Nation-Building volume. See Dobbins, America's Role in
Nation-Building; Dobbins, The UN's Role in Nation-Building; Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building.
3 Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building.
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personnel and money employed wisely over extended periods of time." 36 This observation
describes the essence of the technical perspective.
Third, there is a growing literature on technical security sector reform, such as the
handbook by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Co-
operation Directorate (OECD-DAC). The handbook emphasizes the importance of technical
processes such as planning, financial management, and training. While the handbook recognizes
that security sector reforms "are inherently political processes," the handbook urges international
organizations to adopt best practices to overcome political opposition. For example, the
handbook suggests that organizations refer to "reform" as "development" or
"professionalization" to decrease local elites' objections. Furthermore, while the handbook
recognizes that local obstruction can block reform, it seems to equate "local ownership" with
consultation with local elites.3 The handbook fails to recognize that security sector reform will
rarely be truly locally owned, meaning that elites will not pursue the reform without international
pressure.38
III. International Administrations as Test Cases for the Technical Perspective
This section explains that based on the technical perspective, international administrations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor were best-case scenarios for successful state building, which
makes these cases crucial test cases for the technical perspective. International organizations in
36Ibid., 4.
3 7 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System
Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD, 2007), 13-19, 28-36. Quotes on 32-33.
3 See, inter alia, Timothy Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding Processes," Peace & Change 34, no. 1 (January 2009): 6-14; Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake,
"Unknotting Local Ownership," PfP Consortium Working Group "Security Sector Reform " (n.d.). Michael Brzoska,
"Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
the Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper No. 4, November 2003; Gordon Peake, "A Lot of Talk But Not a Lot
of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in Timor-Leste," in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel ed., Security
Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, Geneva: DCAF, Chapter 9.
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these societies had executive authority, significant resources, and substantial expertise. Richard
Caplan calls international administrations the "Rolls Royce of conflict-management strategies,"
which recognizes the expense and capacity of these missions. 39 Whatever led to the failure of
institution building in these societies, it was not the absence of authority, resources, or expertise.
Consequently, these societies are excellent opportunities to study the inherent limits of the
technical perspective and thereby better understand how the international community can more
effectively build state institutions in all developing societies.
Below, I define and describe the nature of international administrations. I then justify the
study of Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo as the only societies, since 1990, with an international
administration that extensively exercised its authority and mandate. Third, I discuss how these
international administrations had extensive authority, resources, and expertise, which makes
them crucial test cases for the technical perspective.
Definition of International Administrations
I define an international administration as an organization created by the international
community to administer a post-conflict society with executive control and a state building
mandate.40 An intervention must therefore meet four criteria to be identified as an international
administration. First, it must occur in a society emerging from civil war, defined as an internal
conflict between a state and armed opposition group, with more than 1000 battle deaths on each
side.' Second, an organization that will administer the society must be created by the
international community, which means that there must be widespread agreement and
3 9 Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 256.
40 Simon Chesterman defines a transitional administration as an operation that pursues state-building "by assuming
some or all of the powers of the state on a temporary basis." Richard Caplan focuses on transitional character of
international administrations and does not require that international administrations pursue state building.
Chesterman, You, the People, 5; Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories, 3.
41 This is the standard definition of civil war in the broader literature. See Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and
Building Peace, 31.
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participation by major Western states and international organizations. Third, the administration
must have executive authority, which is defined as authority that is ordinarily held only by the
sovereign state. Executive powers in international administrations include vetoing laws,
removing local officials from power, running specific functions of government such as the police
or elections, or even full sovereign control. To be considered an international administration, an
organization must do more than simply monitor the society, provide aid, or run elections - it
must have legalized authority to rule. Fourth, the administration must have a mandate to pursue
state building. By building the state, the international administration gives the society the
capacity for responsible self-government. Organizations that have executive power, but that do
not seek to reform the state in the target society, therefore do not fit the scope conditions.
Case Selection
The dissertation examines Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo, since these are the only societies
since 1990 in which an international administration was present that extensively exercised its
authority and mandate. Each of these societies experienced a civil war, after which the
international community created an administration that exercised executive control and a state-
building mandate. Other post-conflict societies with an international intervention lacked one of
these elements.
Simon Chesterman gives a complete list of eleven peace operations with civilian
administrative functions from 1990 to 2004: Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Somalia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Iraq (See Table 1.1).4 Of these cases, five did not have legalized executive powers - Namibia,
42 Chesterman, You, the People, 258-9. Other cases of UN missions without executive powers include Angola, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Mozambique. Macedonia is commonly cited in the literature but had no civil war. This list
has been crosschecked with the cases in Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace.
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Western Sahara, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan.43 In two others, there were executive
powers, but they were not used extensively to build a state. In Eastern Slavonia, the UN mission
had extensive powers, but because Croatia would take over sovereignty over the territory
following the mission, the mission did not engage in substantial state building. 44 Similarly, in
Cambodia, the UN mission had the mandate to control and supervise Cambodia's civil
administration in order to provide a "neutral political environment" for "free and fair elections."
However, the mission's activities in the civil administration field were very limited and in in
practice it did not challenge the existing governance by the Cambodian Peoples' Party (CPP). 45
In Iraq, the civil war followed the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) administration.
Furthermore, the US, rather than the broader international community, led the mission.4 6 Liberia
is another example of a peace operation with civilian administrative functions, which started in
2003, but like Sierra Leone there were no organization with legalized executive powers.47
43 International officials Sierra Leone did have defacto control over the police through the appointment of officials
to local organizations, and a judicial mandate to run the Special Court. There was no mandated organization that
took over the main functions of the state, however. See UN resolution 1270 (1999).
44 The Erdut Agreement in 1995, implemented by UN resolution 1037 (1996), specified the powers of the UN
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). See Christine Coleiro, Bringing Peace to the Land of
Scorpions and Jumping Snakes: Legacy of the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia and Transitional Missions
(Clementsport, NS: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002); Derek Boothby, "The Political Challenges of
Administering Eastern Slavonia," Global Governance 10 (2004): 37; Judith Large, "Kafka Meets Machiavelli: Post-
war, Post-Transition Eastern Slavonia," Development in Practice 9, no. 5 (1999): 569-578.
45 Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1995), 27-29, 34-45; Benny Widyono, Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the
United Nations in Cambodia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Quote in Doyle, 28.
4 6 James Dobbins et al., Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Santa Monica CA:
RAND Corporation, 2009).
47 See UN resolution 1509 (2003). The international efforts in Liberia focused on security sector reform and had a
non-executive mandate. See Mike McGovern, "Rebuilding a Failed State: Liberia," Development in Practice 15, no.
6 (2005): 760-766.
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Table 1.1: Selection of International Administrations
Country Year Mission Mandate Reason why not International
selected assistance per
capita in first
two years
Namibia 1989- UNTAG Elections Weak mandate $132
1990
Western 1991- MINURSO Referendum Weak mandate
Sahara present
Cambodia 1992-3 UNTAC Executive power to enable Limited effective $28
free and fair elections executive control;
state building
limited to elections
Somalia 1993- UNOSOM II Creation of secure Weak mandate,
1995 environment limited effectiveness
Bosnia* 1995- Various Various, including secure $679
present organizations environment, free and fair
specified in elections, EU accession, and
Dayton implementing Dayton
Agreement Agreement
Eastern 1996- UNTAES Transitional administration Limited state $290
Slavonia 1998 building due to
Croatian sovereignty
East 1999- UNTAET Transitional administration $233
Timor* present and later
missions
Sierra 1999- UNAMSIL Security sector reform No executive $25
Leone present mandate
Kosovo* 1999- UNMIK, Transitional administration; $526
present post- various following
independence independence including
organizations security sector and
supervisory administration
Afghanistan 1999- UNAMA, Secure environment, No executive $57
present ISAF security sector reform mandate
Iraq 2003- CPA, Various, including Executive mission $206
2004 UNAMI executive control by CPA was not run by
and a limited UN mandate. international
Also later security sector community; no civil
reform. war prior to
I intervention
Each of the remaining three cases in Chesterman's list met the scope conditions of the
theory - there was an administration created by the international community with executive
powers and a state building mandate. I examine state-building efforts in these societies in depth
4 1 In fixed 2000 US$. Dobbins, The UN's Role in Nation-Building, 239.
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in the following chapters.4 9 I summarize the mandates of these missions here to establish the
applicability of these cases. In Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Accords created an administration, led
by the Office of the High Representative, which had executive authority over the country. This
authority was reinforced in 1997, when the Bonn Powers gave the High Representative the
specific authority to remove politicians and to pass or veto laws. In East Timor, the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) had full sovereign control from 1999 to
2002, while later UN mission retained varying executive powers in the security sector.' In
Kosovo, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had "all legislative and
executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary," meaning that UNMIK had
executive control even though Yugoslavia retained sovereignty over the territory. In all three
societies, the international administrations extensively used their authority to alter state
institutions.
International Administrations as Crucial Test Cases for the Technical Perspective
The technical perspective implies that given authority, resources, and expertise, the international
community should be able to build its preferred institutions. To evaluate the technical
perspective, it is necessary to analyze societies where the international community had maximum
authority, resources, and expertise. This section claims that international administrations had the
greatest authority, resources, and expertise that the international community could effectively
4 See also Caplan's description of the UN missions. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories,
17-21.
50 See the Dayton Peace Accords, available at http://vww.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content id=380. See also
Chesterman, You, the People, 129-13 1; Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj," Journal of
Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 60-74.
51 See UN resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1704 (2006). See also Anthony Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight: The
Peculiarities of Politics in an Incomplete State," Global Governance 10, no. 1 (January 2004): 83-98.
52 Quoted in "Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo," S/1999/779 12 July 1999,
para 35. See UN resolution 1244 (1999) and Marcus Brand, The Development ofKosovo Institutions and the
Transition ofAuthority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government (Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International
Negotiations, 2003), 8-9.
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provide in post-conflict societies, which makes them crucial test cases for the technical
perspective. If state building is unsuccessful in these societies, there must be factors that limit the
ultimate effectiveness of the technical perspective. These factors are likely to limit the
effectiveness of state building in other societies.
International administrations' legal authority was practically unconstrained. International
administrations could impose laws or remove elected officials in order to pursue its objectives.
Its decisions were not subject to appeal or review and the international administration was also
the final arbiter of its own mandate. Indeed, several works criticize the apparent contradiction of
using executive authority to build democracy: Simon Chesterman calls international
administrations "benevolent autocracies," Jarat Chopra describes East Timor as a "UN
Kingdom," and Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin call Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia the "European
aj."53
Furthermore, international administrations had extensive resources. The three
international administrations studied here, Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo, received the highest
international assistance per capita of post-conflict societies in the first two years (See Table 1.1
above).14 Budgets for these operations were substantial. In just the fiscal year from July 2001 to
June 2002, for example, the UN appropriated $458 million for UNTAET and $400 million for
UNMIK.55 The resources of the missions are particularly remarkable in comparison to the
relatively small size of the post-conflict societies - Bosnia had a population of approximately 4
million, Kosovo 2 million, and East Timor 1 million.56 While it is certainly true that the
5 Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," Survival 42, no. 3 (2000): 27-40; Chesterman, You, the
People, 127; Knaus and Martin, "Travails of the European Raj."
54 This account is echoed by using other metrics. See Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons,
110.
* See UN documents A/57/678 and S/2002/4365 6 Dobbins, Europe's Role in Nation-Building, 243-44.
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missions' budgets were constrained, it is difficult to imagine how the international community
could have fielded better-resourced missions.
Finally, there was substantial international expertise deployed to these societies. In East
Timor, for example, one Foreign Affairs article describes the deployment of an "A-team of
international technocrats."5 7 There were certainly critiques of the personnel deployed, especially
with regard the UN Civilian Police. 8 Nevertheless, international officials in these societies were
generally highly educated and the leadership often had substantial experience in previous
missions. In the later reform efforts, senior officials were often well aware of previous "lessons
learned" and sought to adjust their efforts accordingly. Prior to his appointment as High
Representative in Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown carefully considered the efforts of his predecessors. 9
Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Transitional Administrator in East Timor, had extensive experience
in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. He brought some staff members with experience from these
missions and even promised East Timorese leaders that he would not repeat the same mistakes
from Cambodia. 0
To be sure, international administrations did have limits in their authority, resources, and
expertise. The leaders of these missions were accountable to UN headquarters or other
international organizations. Their resources were not unconstrained and not all officials
appointed to these missions were as skilled as might be desired. International organizations faced
practical limits in recruitment. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine how the international
community could have provided more to these societies. In theory, by arbitrarily increasing the
5 7 Traub, "Inventing East Timor," 82.
58 The missions were often rapidly planned and had limited time to recruit staff. Jose Ramos-Horta in East Timor
observed, "I know many of them have no experience, no expertise, no academic qualifications at all. I asked one of
them - an American lady - what her qualifications were, and she said only that she had worked in Yosemite National
Park." Power, Chasing the Flame, 309. Interviews with international officials and local analysts.
59 Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 2007), 216-231.
6 0 Power, Chasing the Flame, 301-309. Interviews with international officials, Dili and Pristina, 2009-2010.
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budget of international administrations or positing increasingly knowledgeable international
officials, one could conceive of a mission with greater potential for success. The international
community could not afford such a mission in the past and is highly unlikely to pursue one in the
future.
Other Reasons to Study International Administrations
While the focus of the dissertation is to develop lessons for international state building efforts
more broadly, studying international administrations is valuable for other reasons. There are
several works that analyze international administrations and examine the dilemmas and
contradictions associated with these missions. While these works do not provide generalizable
theories of success or failure, many of their observations are relevant to understanding state
building. Furthermore, studying international administrations is important for supporting
ongoing international administrations and planning better for future ones.
The literature on international administrations closely considers that international
administrations use autocratic means to build a democratic society. Indeed, international
administrations have some characteristics of colonial administrations, including their unlimited
authority and their claim of benevolent intentions. 6' Some works criticize international
administrations for violating the democratic principles they are trying to establish and thereby
undermining the development of local capacity, 62 while others note that international
administrations have limited accountability to the society they are administering.6 3 Taking some
61 In James Traub's book on the evolution of the UN, the chapter on Kosovo and East Timor is entitled "The
exquisite ironies of benevolent colonialism." See James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the
Era ofAmerican World Power (Macmillan, 2007), 122-127. See also Kimberly Marten Zisk, Enforcing the Peace
(Columbia University Press, 2004), chap. 1. David Chandler is a particular critic of the colonial character of
international administrations. Chandler, Empire in Denial.
62 Dominic Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 241-242; Oisin Tansey, Regime-Building: Democratization and International
Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 215-217.
63 Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories, chap. 9; Chesterman, You, the People, chap. 4.
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of the critiques of international administrations seriously would imply that the international
community should not engage in state building using executive authority. However, I argue there
are important differences from previous colonial efforts, especially that international
administrations do not seek to extract resources and that they plan for their own exit.64 Indeed, as
Chesterman writes, "the problem... is not that transitional administration is colonial in character;
rather, the problem is that sometimes it is not colonial enough." 65
While the number of active international administrations has diminished since the early
2000s, international administration remains a potential tool for the international community. As
of the writing of this dissertation, the international community continues to have some amount of
executive authority in each of the societies studied below - Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.
International administration was a possible solution for Haiti following the earthquake in 2010 or
for Libya following the civil war in 2011. International administrations could be deployed in the
future following secession, civil war, or natural disaster.
IV. Conclusion and Plan for Rest of the Dissertation
This dissertation examines the question of when the international community is able to build
strong institutions in post-conflict societies. The introduction surveyed the literature, and
explained the technical perspective of state building. I claimed that international administrations
have great authority, resources, and expertise, which make them crucial test cases for the
technical perspective. Finally, I identified Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor as the only
international administrations since 1990 that actively used their executive authority to build the
state.
64 On the desire of the international conmunity to exit and the challenges associated with exit, see Fearon and
Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," 36-41.
65 Chesterman, You, the People, 12.
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There are many works on intervention and state building, some of which even examine
these three cases in detail. Nevertheless, this dissertation provides new insight for three main
reasons. First, the dissertation provides evidence that the most common belief among policy-
makers - the technical perspective - has important limits. This finding urges a reevaluation of
how the international community pursues state building. Second, much of the literature is written
from the perspective of the international community and emphasizes international policy-making
over the dynamics of local politics. Some of the work is written by or funded by organizations
taking part in the state-building mission. These organizations have an incentive to hide their
failures or ignore evidence that contradicts their point of view. This dissertation avoids these
biases and seeks to examine all relevant reform efforts undertaken by international
administrations. At several junctures below I note where the existing literature has ignored
particular developments that question the efficacy or wisdom of previous international efforts.
Third, unlike most of the work on international administrations, this dissertation provides a
testable theory explaining the success or failure of reform efforts. The literature contains
excellent case specific material and there are several empirically rich comparative studies of
international administrations, but there are few theories that make falsifiable claims about the
process of institutional reform.
The rest of the dissertation proposes and tests a theory of institution building. The next
chapter describes the theory and its predictions. The theory makes predictions about the
mechanisms and outcomes of reform efforts based on the balance between international unity
and the threat of international demands to nationalist goals or informal networks. The chapter
then discusses alternative explanations and explains how the seventeen case studies in the
remainder of the dissertation test the theory.
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The next three chapters consider reform efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor,
respectively. Each of the chapters provides background on the war, international administration,
and local politics as necessary to understand the case studies. The chapters then trace reform
efforts drawn from these societies to test the theory's predictions. The conclusion of each chapter
evaluates to what extent the reform efforts therein verify the theory's predictions.
The conclusion considers policy implications based on the theory and the empirical
chapters. It examines the explanatory power of the theory as compared to the alternative
explanations, and emphasizes that the empirical record of international administrations provides
important reasons to doubt the ultimate effectiveness of the technical perspective. Finally, the
conclusion lists the general and specific policy implications derived from the theory and record
of institution building in the three international administrations.
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Chapter 2
Theory: "We're Trying to Make Their Lives Better - Why Don't They Get It?"
This chapter offers a theory of institution building by international administrations. I argued in
the previous chapter that international administrations had the greatest authority, resources, and
expertise that the international community could reasonable be expected to provide. This makes
international administrations crucial test cases for the technical perspective. However, the
international community was only successful in seven out of seventeen reform efforts in these
societies, and failed reform led to violence and prevented future state building. The theory
presented in this chapter explains this variation, demonstrates why the technical perspective is
insufficient, and thereby sheds light on the broader limitations of state building by the
intemational community.
The theory explains that the reform process is inherently political. While the international
community may desire major reforms, the post-conflict society often resists reform. The mass
public remains attached to the nationalist goals of the war, which leads them to publically protest
and block demands that threaten these goals. The local elites use informal patronage and
corruption networks to maintain their office and privately obstruct demands that threaten their
networks. Despite its expertise, the international administration cannot consistently optimize its
demands to achieve success. Because of their beliefs in human rights and bureaucracy,
international officials often make demands that threaten either nationalist goals or informal
networks. International administrations also have internal disunity about demands, which
prevents them from implementing robust reform since local elites can select the easiest demands
made by different organizations.
Two variables therefore predict the trajectory and outcome of reform efforts: the relative
unity of the international administration and the threat of the internationals' demands to
32
nationalist goals or informal networks. International administrations have the greatest success
when they are unified and avoid threatening nationalist goals, and have only partial success if
they are unified and only threaten informal networks. The theory therefore implies that the
international community should not try to transform post-conflict societies through ambitious
reforms that attempt to alter the structure of society, but instead should pursue incremental and
gradual improvements in state institutions.
This chapter proceeds in five sections. The first section describes the framework for
evaluating reform efforts. The second section presents the theory. It describes the actors in post-
conflict societies - international organizations, the mass public, and local elites. The second
section also describes how I measure the two variables in the theory - the unity of the
international administration and the threat of demands. The second section then describes the
predictions of the theory, including the mechanisms of the reform process and the outcome
predictions. The third section lists three alternative hypotheses drawn from the literature review
in the previous chapter. The fourth section explains the research design for testing the theory as
well as discussing sources and methodology. The fifth section briefly summarizes the findings of
the dissertation and concludes.
I. Reform Efforts
The previous chapter defined a reform effort as an individual attempt to alter a given state
institution. The theory explains both intermediate steps throughout the process of reform and the
overall outcome of the reform effort. The theory evaluates the success of a reform effort based
on whether the international community's preferences are implemented into the design or
practices of the target institution. To discuss reform efforts in more depth, it is first necessary to
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describe an overall framework for political progress under international administration and the
reform process.
In addition to its broader goals of achieving democracy, economic development, and the
rule of law, international administrations seek to build a strong state in post-conflict societies so
that the society can become self-governing and the international administration can exit. The
international community established an international administration because the society was not
able to have democratic governance that met international standards. Consequently, for the
international community, the international administration's mission is not complete until it
reforms institutions to fulfill international standards. As institutions are reformed, the
international administration can gradually turn over authority to local elites, culminating with the
end of the international administration and the assumption of full sovereignty by the target
society.
Some post-conflict societies also seek to join regional organizations in addition to
assuming full sovereignty. In Eastern Europe, for example, joining the European Union was
perceived to be critical to the future of post-conflict societies.66 To join these regional
organizations, there is a clear road map of reforms that must be met. International
administrations often play a key role in pursuing these reforms, especially since regional
organizations are often one part of international administrations.67
I refer to the end of the international administration or accession into the relevant regional
organizations as political progress. The international administration pursues political progress by
engaging in reform efforts. The reform efforts are each conditional for achieving political
66 See Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2006). European Connission, "EU-Western Balkans - Declaration," Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/03/163 (Accessed April 24, 2012)).
67 In Bosnia, for example, beginning in 2002, the High Representative was dual-hatted as the EU Special
Representative. In Kosovo, the EU was one pillar of UNMIK. See respective chapters below.
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progress - indeed, conditionality is the main tool the international community has for ensuring
the cooperation of local elites. Note, however, that the achievement of political progress and the
actual fulfillment of the reforms are independent. The international community retains the power
to grant political progress regardless of whether the reforms are completed - the connection
between the reforms and political progress is a political decision by the international
administration.
Local elites and the broader mass public share an interest in achieving political progress,
but often seek to achieve it without major reform. The theory specifies how nationalism and
informal networks provide incentives to avoid certain types of reforms. As such, local elites
negotiate with the international administration about what reform must actually be accomplished
to secure political progress.
The theory makes predictions about these negotiations. It conceptualizes reform efforts as
an iterated process of negotiation between the international administration, which is composed of
sub-organizations and officials and supervised by the international community; and the local
elites, who are constrained by the broader post-conflict society. The reform process is composed
of five steps (see figure 2.1). First, the international community develops preferences for what it
wants a given institution to become. Second, the international administration formulates the
preferences into particular demands. Third, the local elites react to the demands by accepting the
demands, opposing the demands publically, or obstructing the demands privately. Public
opposition involves the elites leveraging mass public support to block the reform whereas private
obstruction involves elites using their own informal networks to block the reform. Fourth, the
demands may be fully, partially, or not implemented, or not implemented. Fifth, the reform
either ends, or new demands are made and the process will return to the second step above.
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Figure 2.1: Reform Process
Local elites Demands Reform ends, orInternational Demands accept, oppose 
_,fully, partially', 
- demands are
preferences >publically, or or not reformulated
obstruct privately implemented
H1. Theory
The theory describes the trajectory and outcome of reform efforts based on a model of the
interaction between the international and local actors. 68 The model is based on several
assumptions about the post-conflict society and international administrations. While the real
world deviates from the model's expectations - as with any model in social science - the model
is still useful for understanding institution building and for improving policy-making by the
international community.
From the assumptions about the actors, the theory describes two types of expectations
about reform efforts. First, the theory makes predictions about the observed causal effect, or
outcome of reform efforts. The outcome of a reform effort is whether international preferences
are ultimately reflected in the design and practice of the target institution. Second, and more
importantly, the theory makes statements about the process of reform efforts. The process refers
to the intermediate steps (or mechanisms) by which a particular outcome comes about. Reform
processes may be described in varying levels of detail, ranging from a summary of the original
objectives and outcome of the reform, to a specific day-to-day account of the activities of
intemational and local officials.69 In this theory, the main mechanisms are the different stages of
68 For one formal model of institution-building, with a focus on sub-national elites, see Michael Barnett and
Christoph Zuercher, "The Peacebuilders' Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood," in The
Dilemmas ofStatebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge,
2009), 23-52.
6 9 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett note that "The acceptable level of generality of causal mechanisms will
vary depending on the particular research question and research objectives.. .No matter how far down we push the
border between the observable and the unobservable, some irreducibly unobservable aspect of causal mechanisms
remain." Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, 2005), 142-3.
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the reform process, including the formulation of demands, the elite response, implementation,
and the reformulation of demands. The theory also describes the sub-mechanisms through which
the stages relate to one another.
Below, I first detail the assumptions and variables related to the actors in the post-conflict
society and international administration. I then describe the predictions and key mechanisms of
the theory.
Post-Conflict Society
The post-conflict society can broadly be understood as composed of local elites, defined as the
leaders of the main political parties;70 and the mass public, which is the broad electorate that
votes between the main political parties. The local elites can be understood as rational actors
seeking to maintain their own position, which they gain through the support of the mass public
and key interest groups. The preferences and attitudes of the mass public and the elites' networks
throughout society both constrain and facilitate elites' responses to reform efforts. In particular,
the war plays an important role in the politics of the post-conflict society in two ways - through
the continuing importance of nationalism and through elites' control of informal patronage and
corruption networks. This subsection first defines and explains the importance of nationalist
goals, and then discusses the origin and role of informal networks.
Nationalist Goals
Nationalism is defined as the belief that the state and the national unit should be congruent.7 1 The
groups contesting the civil war often fight to achieve nationalist goals, including independence or
7 0 Local is contrasted with international following common usage in post-conflict societies. Local does not mean
village level in this context - indeed the local elites referred to here operate at the central state level.
71 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.
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autonomy. Nationalism here specifically refers to the political disposition of the nation and the
state, not the rank or status of a particular national group or any other objective. For example,
according to this definition, Serb nationalist goals during the Bosnian war were limited to Serb
control of the Republika Srpska (RS).
There is an extensive literature about the relative importance of nationalism in civil war
onset, and many prominent works claim that nationalist conflict was rarely the main cause of
civil violence or war.7 Regardless of the role of nationalism in the onset or conduct of civil
wars, nationalism becomes deeply ingrained within the population during the war, and remains
important in politics long after the war has ended. The population is therefore likely to mobilize
in opposition to demands that threaten nationalist goals. Furthermore, leaders from the civil war
gain recognition for their nationalist achievements during the war and become the leaders of
post-conflict parties. These political parties compete with one another in the post-war political
arena based on their achievement of, or ability to pursue, nationalist objectives. Hence, elites
engage in nationalist outbidding to convince the mass public that they are the strongest defender
of nationalist achievements. Elites are therefore both constrained to oppose reforms that threaten
nationalist goals and are able to take advantage of public opposition to block such reforms.
72 Civil wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor were each fought about nationalist issues. On East Timor see
Caroline Hughes, Dependent Communities: Aid and Politics in Cambodia and East Timor (Ithaca N.Y.: SEAP
Publications, 2009). On Bosnia, see inter alia, Sabrina P Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and
Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 418-27. On Kosovo, see Henry
H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story ofan Insurgency (University of Illinois Press, 2008), 1-35.
73 See especially, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90; Paul Collier and World Bank, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003); Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Others argue that ethnicity and nationalism do play a strong role in
the onset of civil war. See, for example, Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000); Lark-Erik Cedernan and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping
Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," American Political Science Review 101, no. 1 (2007): 173.
7 4 Carrie Manning instead argues wartime appeals may be more or less effective in different post-conflict societies.
In examples she gives, wartime appeals are ineffective because all competing parties have similar association with
nationalist goals, rather than because such appeals are less important or inherently ineffective in a given society.
38
Nationalism remains popular among the mass public and politically important in post-
conflict societies for four main reasons. First, once mobilized, nationalism is difficult to
demobilize. Stuart Kaufman explains that nationalist politicians create a "myth-symbol complex"
that is both "powerful and ubiquitous" and can provoke individuals to fight and die for a
particular ethnic or nationalist cause. Leaders become dependent on the nationalist symbols they
developed, and these leaders become trapped by the popularity of the nationalist discourse.
Second, in the case of ethnic conflict, the literature on the ethnic security dilemma explains how
once groups begin to fear one another, they will continue to fear one another until their security
can be assured.76 Third, the experience of violence enables local elites to use emotional appeals
to nationalism." Finally, local elites maintain the importance of nationalism in the discourse
through their control of media and education.
The theory sees nationalism as a valence issue for politicians in post-conflict societies,
meaning that the entire electorate views nationalism positively. Politicians are not differentiated
on policy with regard to nationalist goals, but compete to become the most associated with
nationalist objectives. 79 Hence, nationalist goals become the "motherhood and apple pie" of
post-conflict societies. If nationalist goals were fully achieved, a politician may try to claim
"Party-building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique," Democratization 14, no. 2
(2007): 253-272.
7 Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics ofEthnic War (New York: Cornell University Press,
2001), 24-25; Stuart J. Kaufman, "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict
Resolution in Ethnic Wars," Journal ofPeace Research 43, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 205-6.
7 6 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 27-47; Chaim
Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 136-
175.
" Roger D. Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (Cambridge
University Press, 2011), chap. 1 and 3.
7 8 Naomi Levi, "Learning National Identity: Schooling Effects in Post-Conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia"
(University of California, Berkeley, 2009).
7 See Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," The American Political Science Review 57, no. 2
(June 1, 1963): 373. See also Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and
Outbidding," Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (April 1, 2004): 61-88.
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credit by referring to his or her wartime record.80 In societies where at least some nationalist
goals remained unachieved, leaders can blur the line between advertising their wartime
achievements and promising to achieve nationalist goals in the future.8 ' In some societies,
especially where there is ethnic conflict that ended with a peace treaty, there may be multiple
electorates with competing nationalist objectives. In such cases, outbidding on nationalist goals
can become particularly dangerous, as outbidding may reinforce ethnic divisions.82
Some scholars and practitioners argue that nationalism is not desirable. They claim that
nationalist leaders are not representative of the underlying society, and that moderate (i.e. non-
nationalist) elites should replace them.83 They also claim that allowing nationalist elites to lead
post-conflict societies is unnecessary, since peacebuilding, reconciliation, and other efforts can
reduce the political importance of nationalism.8 4 The case studies demonstrate, however, that
even parties that the international community supports as moderates face pressure to appear to
become nationalists. Furthermore, peacebuilding or reconciliation efforts are rarely successful in
reducing the importance of nationalism in the political discourse, at least in the time frame in
which international administrations are present.
80 For example, in East Timor, "party candidates failed to convey coherent appeals to East Timorese voters. They
were consumed instead with attacking one another's past political records, while exaggerating their own
contributions to the country's liberation. Leaders of FRETILIN even demanded that the people vote for them or risk
being wiped out." Francisco da Costa Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor" (Ph.D., Griffith
Business School, 2006), 196-7.
81 In Kosovo, for example, political leaders simultaneously campaigned on their role in moving Kosovo towards
independence during the war and their continuing efforts to achieve independence in the future. See Perritt, Kosovo
Liberation Army, chap. 10.
82 Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991), 342-364.
83 See the manipulative leader theory described by Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 5-7. See also Stedman, "Spoiler
Problems in Peace Processes."
4 Kaufman, "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap," 212-214; Anthony Oberschall, Conflict and Peace Building in
Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 28-40. See also USIP,
"Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconciliation," Section 10 http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-
stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/social-well-being
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To measure the threat to nationalist goals, I specify the goal related to making the state
congruent with the nation for each society in Table 2.1. Elites often try to argue that demands
threaten nationalist goals even if the demands are not objectively threatening. However, the
theory claims that mass protest occurs only if the demands directly threaten nationalism - elites
can take advantage of nationalist sentiment, but cannot create it where it does not apply. Note
that in Bosnia, multiple competing wartime groups participated in the post-war government, so
there were multiple sets of incumbent elites with competing nationalist goals. In Kosovo and
East Timor, secessionist movements were relatively successful, so there was only one set of
nationalist goals relevant in the post-war period. 85
Table 2.1: Nationalist Goals
Society Group Post-war parties8 6  Nationalist goals
Bosnia Bosniaks SDA, SBiH, SDP Unified state structures and elimination of ethnic group
representation
Serbs SDS, SNSD Autonomous RS, Serb representation in state institutions
Croats HDZ, HDZ-1990 Croat representation in state institutions, local autonomy
in Croat-dominated areas
Kosovo Albanians PDK, LDK, AAK Independence
East Timor N/A 8 7  FRETILIN, CNRT Independence
Informal Networks
Informal patronage and corruption networks, defined as connections between elites and groups
outside of the elites' official job description, are vital for elites' political power. Informal
networks involve licit and illicit associations with businesses, interest groups, and criminal
organizations that enable local elites to gather resources, compel voters, and to limit opposition.
Unlike nationalist goals, which apply to all parties competing for an electorate in the same way,
informal networks frequently vary across different parties. While control of informal networks
8 5 While the Serbs in Kosovo were still present, they were never a key player in the PISG or post-independence
governments.86 These are the parties that represented the combatant groups in post-war elections. I limit this to parties that at one
point participated in the government at the state level.
Because East Timor was a case of successful secession, there were no group divides in the post-conflict political
arrangement.
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may indirectly further collective goals by strengthening particular parties, informal networks
provide benefits to relatively few individuals. The theory claims that local elites' control of
informal networks is unpopular within the society, which means that local elites cannot take
advantage of popular support to block reforms that threaten informal networks.88
Informal networks play an important part in politics in nearly every society, but are
particularly important in in post-conflict societies for three reasons. First, post-conflict
politicians were wartime leaders and built informal networks over the course of the war to gather
resources and exercise control. Informal networks persist after the war and become an integral
part of the political culture of the society. 89 Second, many scholars have observed that patronage
is more common in ethnically divided societies. In both Bosnia and Kosovo, post-war patronage
networks were directly tied to different ethno-nationalist movements. 90 Third, post-conflict
societies have other characteristics that encourage the development of clientelism and patronage,
including lower levels of economic development, weak rule of law, and a legacy of a communist
or authoritarian political economy. 91
Informal networks serve three general political functions for incumbent elites. 92 First,
informal networks provide resources to politicians and dominant political parties. Parties can
88 Surveys indicate widespread disapproval with elite corruption. On Bosnia, see UNDP, "The Silent Majority
Speaks," 2007, 46-48. On East Timor see, NDI, "Government within Reach: A Report on the Views of East
Timorese on Local Government." http://www.ndi.org/node/13125, 13-15. On Kosovo, see Gallup, Balkan Monitor
Insights and Perceptions: Voicesfrom the Balkans, 2009, http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/BalkanMonitor-
2009_Summary_of_Findings.pdf, 14.
89 Manning, "Party-building on the Heels of War," 257. This phenomenon is most thoroughly described in Bosnia.
See Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2008); Timothy Donais, The Political Economy ofPeacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia
(London: Routledge, 2005).
90 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns ofDemocratic Accountability
and Political Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 27, 33-34; Andreas, Blue Helmets and
Black Markets; Michael Pugh, "Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's Transformation," in Kosovo Between War and
Peace (New York: Routledge, 2006), 116-134.
91 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies, 44-45.
92 See also Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 27-28.
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gain resources from informal networks in many ways, including kickbacks from government
contracts, funding from illegal smuggling operations, and corruption from government
appointments. So long as incumbents control the police and justice system, it is unlikely that they
will be arrested and prosecuted for their illegal activities.93 Second, informal networks can
distribute resources to individuals who help the party. Resource distribution includes patronage
in the sense of a "direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing
access to employment, goods, and services." Not all of these exchanges are illicit. The payments
may be to a broader group of voters, such as veterans or pensioners. 94 Third, the networks can be
used to attack opponents. Parties and politicians may use their local networks to monitor,
intimidate, or physically harm politicians, parties, and voters that oppose incumbents. 95
To determine the threat of reform demands to informal networks, I first identify the
parties' wartime informal networks and connect these networks with particular state institutions.
I also identify informal networks that are believed to be central to the financing or political
success of particular political parties. Reforms that attack these informal networks are
threatening because if these networks were dismantled, parties would be likely to lose future
elections. For each reform relevant to one of these networks, there is a potential for the demands
to threaten informal networks. I then evaluate whether the demands posed a real threat.
Measuring the specifics of elites' informal networks is more difficult than nationalist goals, since
elites have an incentive to keep the details secret. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of
93 On Bosnia, see, Miroslav Ajder, "Corruption Claims Hold Back Bosnia," BusinessWeek: Europe, March 17,
2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2009/gb20090317_535188.htm. In Kosovo, Ilir Deda of
KIPRED argues that the 2010 government of Kosovo is "a joint criminal enterprise." "Time to Go Straight: The EU
and America Are No Longer Prepared to Tolerate Graft in Kosovo," The Economist, March 18, 2010. In East Timor,
Xanana Gusmao awarded a major rice contract to a company owned by his daughter. Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Timor-
Leste in 2009: Cup Half Full or Half Empty?," Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (February 2010): 236.
9 4 Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies, 2-19.
95 On Bosnia, see Timothy Donais, Division and Democracy: Bosnia's Post-Dayton Elections (North York, ON:
Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1999), 16.
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knowledge about elites' informal networks, including journalistic reports and accounts from
well-placed individuals. 96
International Administrations
International administrations are mandated to pursue state-building, exercise extensive formal
authority, and are composed of highly educated and experienced international officials. One
might expect that international officials would have sufficient expertise to ensure that the
international administration only makes demands that are likely to succeed. However,
international administrations have two characteristics that prevent them from making effective
demands. First, international administrations tend to demand too much, because they believe in
minimum institutional standards based on human rights or bureaucratic procedures. These
demands often threaten nationalist goals or informal networks. Second, international
administrations are sometimes internally divided in the demands they make to local elites, which
I refer to as international disunity. Unity enables the international administration to make
demands truly conditional for political progress, and to monitor and punish local elites' non-
compliance. Without unity, elites can play international organizations against one another and
avoid implementing threatening demands. Below, I explain three characteristics - ideology,
multiple organizations, and principal-agent problems - that lead international administrations to
make overambitious demands and to not be unified. I then describe how I measure international
unity.
Ideology
International officials within an international administration have shared beliefs about the
organization and its mission, which is defined in the literature as an organizational ideology. 97
9 6 On the use of narratives about informal networks, see Andreas, Blue Helmets and BlackMarkets, xii-xii.
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These beliefs lead international officials to have preferences for particular objectives outside of
their mandate and to prefer particular strategies for achieving their goals. While the broad
ideology is shared across organizations, there may be differences among officials or sub-
organizations.9 8 The international administrations tend to have two sets of beliefs - in human
rights and in bureaucratic rules and procedures - that constitute the their ideology and frequently
inform their demands for reform.99
First, international organizations in general, and intemational administrations in
particular, have a deeply embedded commitment to human rights. The commitment to human
rights is specified in the foundational documents of prominent organizations, and specifically
mentioned in each of the mandates that created the four international administrations examined
below.100 The essence of the human rights agenda is to universally secure individual rights.
Rights can range from "basic" rights such as "everyone has the right to life, liberty and the
security of person," and to broader rights such as education, political self-determination, and
social security.' 01 The scope of human rights treaties is so great that human rights
implementation in post-conflict societies is necessarily partial. While violations of certain rights,
especially the security of person, take clear precedence, international administrations have some
flexibility in deciding which human rights issues to address.
97 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1949), 8-12, 256-7.
98 James G. March and Chip Heath, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (Simon and Schuster,
1994), 61-63; Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2010).
99 The concept of ideology here draws from Severine Autesserre's description of a "dominant international
peacebuilding culture" that shapes "ideologies, rules, rituals, assumptions, definitions, paradigms, and standard
operating procedures." The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11.
'See for Bosnia, Annex 6 of the Dayton Agreement; for Kosovo, UN Resolution 1244, Clause 11j; for East Timor,
UN Resolution 1272.
101 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 3, 22 and 26; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1; http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm. For an in depth discussion of
the origins of human rights theory, see Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell
University Press, 2003), chap. 1, 2, 5, 11, 13.
45
The belief in human rights is associated with two preferences for specific institutional
forms. First, it requires democratic institutions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections." 0 2 The belief in human rights therefore adds to a
consensus view within the international community that any society that international
organizations rebuild has to be democratic.103
The requirement for democracy also poses specific limits for international
administrations. International administrations are inherently undemocratic, since international
officials, who are not directly accountable to the population, have executive authority. While the
international community justifies international administrations as necessary and benevolent,
international administrations still have an obligation to transfer power to local authority as soon
as feasible through elections or other types of popular consultation. Furthermore, if there are
clear signs that international administration is acting counter to the desires and interests of the
local population, the international administration has an obligation to change its behavior. 04
The second preference for institutional form related to human rights is that international
administrations prefer integrative over consociational institutions to manage ethnic conflict.
Consociational institutions accept the development of ethnic parties and include institutions that
protect ethnic groups' political rights, such as ethnic vetoes, reserved positions, and local
autonomy. Alternatively, integrative approaches hope to break down the political salience of
10 2 UDHR, Article 21.3.
103 See especially Paris, At War's End, 6-7, 40-42; Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 103-105; Marina
Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices," International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 3
(August 1, 2003): 314-322.
104 On the accountability of international administrations, see Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in
Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations," Journal ofIntervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1
(2007): 6-7; Chesterman, You, the People, chap. 4; Richmond, The Transformation ofPeace, 113, 175; Zaum, The
Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, 58-7 1; Caplan, International
Governance of War-Torn Territories, chap. 9.
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ethnicity and to encourage the development of inter-ethnic political parties.105 A belief in human
rights emphasizes individual rights, which is contrary to the group rights required by
consociationalism.10 6 However, while the international administration might prefer integrative
approaches to consociationalism, the international administration recognizes that diplomatic
agreements and popular sovereignty take priority over its ideology.
Second, international organizations believe that bureaucratic practices, meaning formal
rules and procedures, are both desirable for institutions in post-conflict societies and are effective
means for achieving. International administrations have a clear preference for building
institutions that operate using formal rules and bureaucratic procedures. Marina Ottaway writes
that "For the international community, rebuilding institutions in collapsed states means
organizing government departments and public agencies to discharge their functions both
efficiently and democratically, following models found in Weberian states," where Weberian
means that the state has "an effective administrative apparatus and is characterized by the rule of
law."i 0 7 Bureaucratic institutions agree with a growing academic consensus that Weberian
institutions governed by formal rules lead to positive outcomes such as peace democracy, and
development.108 Furthermore, most senior international officials are from developed countries
0 5 Benjamin Reilly offers a good short summary of these competing views. Ben Reilly, Democracy in Divided
Societies: Electoral Engineeringfor Conflict Management (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
20-2 1. See also Roberto Belloni, "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and
Herzegovina," International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 334-353; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural
Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, A Democratic South
Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society.
16Michael Freeman argues "liberalism has, however, generally had an uneasy relationship with nationalism,
because liberalism is strongly individualistic and rationalistic, and often perceives nationalism to be, by contrast,
collectivist and irrational." "The Perils of Democratization: Nationalism, Markets, and Human Rights," Human
Rights Review 2, no. 1 (October 2000): 40. See also Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy," Journal of
Democracy 3, no. 4 (October 1992): 9-11.
107 Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," Development and Change 33, no. 5
(November 1, 2002): 1003-4.
1 Peter Evans and James E. Rauch, "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of
'Weberian' State Structures on Economic Growth," American Sociological Review 64, no. 5 (October 1, 1999):
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with complex bureaucratic institutions. Officials tend to suggest the institutions with which they
are most familiar as best practices, even if complex bureaucratic institutions are inappropriate for
a particular context.
International administrations also believe that formal procedures are sufficient for
achieving their reform objectives. The literature emphasizes that international organizations are
bureaucracies and work through formal impersonal procedures themselves.109 They tend to
believe that establishing committees, planning processes, or other rule-based procedures will be
effective in enabling institutional reform. Several works on organizational learning within the
international community provide evidence for the claim that bureaucratic adaptation increases
effectiveness." 0
While formal procedures are typically dominant in the functioning of large organizations
and developed societies, they may not be appropriate in post-conflict societies. Keith Krause and
Oliver Jutersonke, for example, criticize international peacebuilding efforts as "piecemail social
engineering" that
"follow a donor-driven, bureaucratic- institutional logic that conjures into existence a
social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local
knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of
society and social change. These can in some circumstances have unintended or perverse
outcomes, beyond just representing a waste of energy and resources.""11'
Furthermore, informal processes are often the dominant mode of governance in underdeveloped
post-conflict societies. As I explained above, civil wars force rebel movements to develop robust
informal networks in order to govern their groups and fight the war. Informal networks remain
748-765; Elhanan Helpman, Institutions and Economic Performance (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press,
2008); North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
109 Michael N Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004), 17-29.
"
0 Benner, Mergenthaler, and Rotmann, The New World of UNPeace Operations, chap. 2; Howard, UN
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 14-20.
" Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, "Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments," Security
Dialogue 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 459; Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition?," 8.
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prominent after the end of the war and limit the effectiveness and desirability of bureaucratic
methods.
Multiple Organizations
International administrations are differentiated into multiple organizations. There are either
multiple organizations with different mandates that comprise the international administration, or
there is a single organization composed of sub-organizations. Multiple organizations with
different mandates can increase the resources and legitimacy of the international administration,
but it is difficult to coordinate policy across them." 2 However, in some cases, the entire
international administration is contained within a single organization. In these international
administrations, there is a hierarchy that specifies the final authority of the leader of the
international administration and that ensures effective delegation among component
organizations. While a hierarchical organization has advantages in term of coordination,
hierarchy does not eliminate disagreements.
Principal-Agent Relationship
The mandate of an international administration comes from a supervisor, which is either an ad
hoc group of states (such as the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia) or an international
organization such as the UN. The relationship between the international administration and the
supervisor is that of an agent to its principal." 3 The international administration pursues state
building on behalf of its supervisor, while the supervisor appoints and manages the international
administration. While the international administration may have a great deal of discretion, it is
subordinate and ultimately responsible to the supervisor. The supervisor selects the leadership of
1 2 Julian Junk observes that the incentives of international actors often lead them to suboptimal mission mandates.
Julian Junk, "Designing Mulitdimentional Peace Operations: The Cases of International Interim-Administrations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East-Timor" (Universitat Konstanz, 2006), 1-2.
113 See Gary J Miller, "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models," Annual Review ofPolitical Science 8,
no. 1 (2005): 205-6.
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the international administration, who must make regular reports of its activities, obtain
permission for major policy initiatives, and obey the supervisor's direct orders.
The relationship between the international administration and its supervisor can be
problematic for institution building for three reasons. First, the supervisor may have different
ideology, information, or incentives from the international administration. Even if the
international administration might be willing to make compromises on human rights or
bureaucracy for the sake of greater effectiveness, the supervisor might limit the international
administration's freedom of action. The supervisor might not have knowledge of the true
situation on the ground, or might be under different political constraints. For example, in the case
of Kosovo, the broader international community was unwilling to accept the independence of
Kosovo, which meant that UN headquarters prevented UNMIK from transferring certain
authority to local elites, to the detriment of the broader state-building mission. " 4 Second,
officials have an incentive to be risk averse when it comes to state building. Officials have an
incentive to pursue clearly observable short-term goals to the detriment of long-term, less
tangible goals. Officials typically have a two-year or less term of office. The prevention of
violence is the most easily observable short-term outcome, while state-building success usually
takes longer to develop. Third, the multiple organizations that comprise an international
administration may have an incentive to compete with one another for resources. International
organizations within international administrations may have overlapping mandates and will seek
prominence within the administration with the goal of gaining resources and prestige." 5
114 Dominik Zaum, "States of Conflict: A Case Study on Statebuilding in Kosovo," Institute for Public Policy
Research, October 2009, 12. http://www.ippr.org/publications/55/1735/states-of-conflicta-case-study-on-
statebuilding-in-kosovo
115 The competition between international organizations is similar to the competition between different government
agencies in Allison and Zelikow's model of governmental politics. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 255-258.
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International Unity
International unity, defined as agreement across the international administration about what
demands to make, was one of the key determinants of successful reform. The broader literature
on international development and institution building often cites the lack of donor coordination
as a major constraint. 11 Several assumptions noted above lead to disunity, including the
presence of multiple organizations, varying ideology, and the principal-agent relationship.
Measuring the relative international unity independently of the success of the reform
effort may be difficult, however, since international officials may retroactively agree on a
successful policy. I therefore measure international unity by considering several characteristics
that enable unity prior to the start of the reform effort. International unity is considered high if at
least one of three conditions is met. First, the international administration has an effective
hierarchical structure. A hierarchical structure enables the leadership of the international
administration to ensure that all officials and organizations make similar demands. Second,
responsibility for the reform effort is effectively delegated to a particular organization. The
problems of multiple organizations are minimized when there is a division of labor and one
organization takes sole responsibility for a particular reform effort. Third, strong leadership can
ensure effective coordination between multiple organizations. Strong leadership may be difficult
to identify ex ante, but it is clearly important in the function of international administrations.
Even if there are multiple organizations with overlapping mandates, if one organization has
effective leadership, the international administration can overcome these limitations. Leadership
11 6 See Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman, "Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients,"
Journal ofDevelopment Economics 83, no. 1 (May 2007): 176-197; Roland Paris, "Understanding the
'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding," in The Dilemmas ofStatebuilding: Confronting the
Contradictions ofPostwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 53-78.
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may lead to greater unity through delegating responsibility or through generating pressure from
the supervisor onto different international organizations.
Predictions and Mechanisms
Figure 2.2: Mechanisms of the Reform Process
Threaten Mass Elites will use Popular
nationalist public will (potential) sovereignty makes Nonatioalistprotest to int. administration implementation
goals protest block reform back down
Deads
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goals not protest high Punishment il
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The theory makes two types of predictions about reform efforts: process predictions and outcome
predictions. The process predictions consist of statements about the mechanisms of how one
stage of the reform process leads to another. The main mechanisms are the main stages of the
reform process: how the threat of demands determines the behavior of elites and the mass public,
how the behavior of elites and the mass public, in combination with international unity,
determine the implementation of demands, and how the presence of violence and international
unity determine the strength of demands in the next stage of reform. There are also sub-
mechanisms that specify the connections between the intermediate stages of the reform process.
For the theory to be confirmed, the mechanisms and sub-mechanisms must be observed in the
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relevant case studies below." 7 The absence of the correct mechanisms, even if theory correctly
predicts the outcome or trajectory, indicates that the theory has less explanatory power. Below, I
explain the various mechanisms and sub-mechanisms of the reform process, which are
graphically represented in Figure 2.2 and summarized with the outcome predictions in Table 2.2.
Threat to Nationalist Goals
When demands threaten nationalist goals, the demands will be blocked through a combination of
elite public opposition and the mass public's protest.
The mass public is willing to protest international demands only if the demands threaten
nationalist goals. To be sure, certain members of the public may be willing to protest lesser
threats, but only with a clear threat to the nationalist goals such as independence and autonomy
will a sufficiently large segment of the population engage in protest. Protest may include
demonstrations, riots, or large rallies. Mass protests can effectively block reform because they
indicate to the international administration that it is violating popular sovereignty. The
international administration is constrained by its belief in democracy, so if a substantial set of the
population is clearly opposed to its demands, the international community must back down.
The public's opposition to reforms threatening nationalist goals both constrains elites to
block reform and makes it easier for elites to do so. Because elites must gain votes through
associating themselves with nationalist goals, they must oppose reforms that threaten these goals.
The willingness of the mass public to demonstrate makes it feasible for elites to effectively block
reform, however. Elites often emphasize the threat to nationalist goals in their rhetoric and can
play a role in instigating particular protests. Given a threat to nationalist goals, elites can also use
the threat of public protests to convince the international administration to weaken its demands.
117 On the methodological utility of mechanisms, see Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 35; Henry E.
Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Rowman & Littlefield,
2004), 252-255.
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Elites can then gain credit in the next election for their efforts in protesting nationalism. Elites
may attempt to bluff and publically oppose reforms even if there is no clear threat to nationalist
objectives, with the hope of convincing the international community that there is strong
opposition to the demands. Without the backing of public protest, however, this strategy will not
be effective.
Threat to Informal Networks
Elites consider the potential threat of nationalist goals prior to other considerations because of
the political importance of nationalism in elections. If there is no threat to nationalist goals, elites
then consider whether there is a threat to informal networks. If there is a threat to informal
networks, elites engage in private obstruction, which is described in this subsection. If there is no
threat, elites accept the reform, which is described in the subsequent subsection.
If there is no threat to nationalist goals, elites cannot leverage mass protest to block
reforms that threaten informal networks. Elites can attempt to publically oppose the reform
without the possibility of mass protest, but this bluff will only have limited effectiveness. Elites
can more consistently block reform using private obstruction, which involves preventing the
practices of the target institutions from changing in accord with international demands.
Techniques of private obstruction including not attending meetings, privately telling local
officials not to attend trainings, using criminal networks to block reform, or continuing with
existing practices despite orders to change. Private obstruction is independent from public
opposition - an elite may for example vote for a law and then use her influence to prevent the
law from impacting the target institution. Without international unity, private obstruction is
effective at preventing reform.
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International unity can enable the international administration to improve implementation
of demands through three mechanisms. First, unity is necessary for monitoring non-compliance
with demands. Monitoring implementation is costly, especially for changes in informal practices,
and organizations that do not believe that a demand is necessary are unlikely to expend the
necessary resources. Second, once non-compliance is noted, unity is necessary to punish elites.
Punishment, especially removing a politician from office, is effective because it directly
challenges elites' main goal - maintaining office. However, removing an official for failing to
implement international demands often means removing a democratically elected official without
due process. Since removing elected officials is counter to democratic principles, broad
agreement from within the international administration is required. If any organization within the
international administration disagrees that particular demands are necessary, the international
administration will not be able to remove an elite for failing to implement those demands. Third,
unity is required to make political progress conditional on the implementation of particular
demands. If the organizations that comprise the international administration disagree about what
demands are necessary for political progress, elites will be able to implement the least arduous
demands and still expect political progress to happen.
However, these three mechanisms are insufficient to fully overcome private obstruction.
International organizations are outsiders, which makes it difficult for them to fully reform the
society. Ultimately, reform requires individuals from within the post-conflict society to change
their behavior. Elites recognize that the international administration is leaving in the near future
and that intemational officials have even more rapid turnover. Even with punishment and
conditionality, the intemational administration's toolkit is limited.
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Elite Acceptance
If the local elites accept the reform, high unity leads to full implementation while low unity leads
to partial implementation. Full implementation of demands may be costly, even if it does not
threaten elites' political survival. The three mechanisms associated with international unity also
encourage local elites to fully implement the demands when they accept the reform. Without
international unity elites will only be able to partially implement the demands and expect to reap
the benefits of political progress.
Table 2.2: Process and Outcome Predictions
Demands threaten nationalist Demands do not threaten nationalist goals
goals High threat to informal Low threat to informal
networks networks
High Process Process Process
international e Possible mass protest, elite s No mass protest, elites e Elite acceptance
unity public opposition privately obstruct - Full implementation
- No implementation - Partial implementation
Outcome
Outcome Outcome Success
Failure Partial success
Low Process Process Process
international - Possible mass protest, elite - No mass protest, elites - Elite acceptance
unity public opposition privately obstruct - Partial implementation
e No implementation - No implementation
Outcome
Outcome Outcome Partial success
Failure Failure
III. Alternative Explanations
The introductory chapter presented a literature review of international intervention after civil
wars. Several theories from that review, with some modification, are applicable to institution
building in international administration. I list three existing hypotheses about state-building
processes and explain how these hypotheses might be expected to influence the reform process.
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Resources andAuthority
There are several works that argue that the success of state building is largely a function of the
authority, resources, and expertise of the international community. According to these works,
which are linked to the technical perspective, when the international community has more
authority, greater resources, and more experience, state building should be more successful.
According to this hypothesis, even if elites publically or privately block reform, international
administrations should be able to wield their authority, buy off elites, or use best practices to
successfully implement their demands.
Democratic Institutions
This alternative hypothesis draws both from the liberal peace argument and critiques of the
liberal peace argument. Proponents and critics of the liberal peace disagree about how the
international community should encourage the election of elites the international community
identifies as moderates. Both, however, agree the election of moderate elites is possible and that
moderate elites are more likely to accept international demands for reform. I test these claims in
two ways. First, I consider whether the election of moderate elites was feasible or likely. The
election of moderate elites, according to Roland Paris, should be especially likely if there were
efforts to build liberal institutions prior to elections.119 Second, I consider the behavior of parties
identified by the international community as moderates. These parties ought to be significantly
more likely to implement reform than their nationalist counterparts.
Key Donors and Regional Organizations
Many observers have argued that the support of particular states or regional organizations can
lead to successful institutional reform. Though these states or regional organizations often
"" See Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace., especially the Brcko case study, 234-243. Dobbins,
America's Role in Nation-Building; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?.
"9 Paris, At War's End, 187-199.
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participate in the international administration, they may also have independent influence on the
local elites. For example, when the EU makes progress with accession specifically conditional on
a given reform, implementation of the reform is said to be especially likely.12 0 The impact of the
EU is likely to be greater than that of other organizations because of the impressive benefits of
membership, but other organizations such as NATO or ASEAN may also be relevant.
Additionally, a reform effort may have a better chance of succeeding if a key donor country
backs it. The United States played a major role in Bosnia and Kosovo after the end of the war, as
did Australia in East Timor. This prediction therefore expects elites to accept reforms that are
conditional for the EU or NATO, or backed by the key state, regardless of whether the demands
threaten nationalist goals or informal networks.
IV. Research Design and Methodology
In this section I describe the research design for testing the theory and address several
methodological concerns. First, I define the universe of cases. The universe of cases includes
reform efforts that were conditional for political progress and were relevant to three issue areas:
security, representation and revenue. Second, I explain the methodology of the case studies and
why process tracing is the only appropriate method for testing the theory. Third, I describe the
sources and data collection procedures. Fourth, I address a potential problem for causal
inference.
120 See Judith Green Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power ofNorms and Incentives (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2004); Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NA TO: Ordering
from the Menu in Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Universe of Cases
Each of the international administrations studied below pursued a wide variety of efforts to
reform state institutions. I limit the relevant cases to reforms that were conditional for political
progress and relate to three issue areas - security, representation, and revenue.
I examine only reform efforts that were explicitly conditional for political progress,
including either the end of the international administration or accession into regional
organizations. Both internationals and locals had a stake in the outcome of conditional reforms.
The international officials hoped to use the offer of political progress to build a strong state,
while local incumbents sought to achieve political progress while protecting their position.
I limit the case selection to reform efforts targeting state institutions in three issue areas:
security, representation, and revenue. Security sector institutions are critical for reestablishing
basic law and order, vital for preventing the outbreak of war, and a useful resource for local
elite's political control. I focus especially on the police and military since these are the largest
and most essential components of the security sector. 2 1 In representation I include elections and
the constitution. Electoral reform has the potential to affect local elites' political viability.
Similarly, since the constitution specifies the basic structure of the state, the development of the
constitution is essential for positive political development. Revenue is the final necessary
component of the state. Greater revenue can help strengthen the state and provide resources for
elites' informal networks, while changes in how revenue is collected can have major political
consequences.
121 The reform of the justice sector is another key part of the security sector. Justice has some different
characteristics from these other issues. Other researchers have focused on justice in more depth and it will remain an
area for future research. See especially Carolyn Gardner Bull, No Entry Without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law
Under UN Transitional Administration (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008).
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I examine these issue areas because they are vital to the political development of post-
conflict societies. The international community sees strong institutions in these issue areas as
critical for peace, democracy, the rule of law, and economic development. Incumbent elites focus
on these issue areas because they are most likely to affect their ability to rule in the future. No
reform in these issue areas is expected to be easy, straightforward, or uncontested. Restricting the
universe of cases to reforms in these issue areas therefore makes comparisons between reform
efforts within and across societies more meaningful. There are certainly many other important
efforts to reform institutions in other issue areas, including health, education, justice,
infrastructure, and so forth. Many of the insights raised in the theory could also be used to
understand these reform processes.
Case Studies and Theory Testing
The dissertation tests the theory by examining the trajectory of the reform process in seventeen
case studies. For each reform effort, I provide a detailed narrative of the reform process through
each stage of demands, actors' response, and implementation. Based on three methodological
principles, I argue that these case studies provide a compelling test of the theory. Furthermore,
alternative methodologies would be ineffective.
First, the case studies are structured, focused comparisons of institutional reform efforts.
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue that structured, focused comparisons of case
studies can be used to test theories. 2 3 I ask a similar set of questions about each reform effort.
Who were the main players in the reform effort, both on the international and local sides? What
were the international preferences for the institution and where did they come from? How were
the preferences made into demands and how did these demands change throughout the process?
2 2 Examples of accounts of reform efforts of these types are cited in the empirical chapters.
123 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chap. 3 and 6.
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Which demands were implemented and why? What were the political concerns of local elites?
How did these local elites react to the reform? How did the mass public respond to the reform
effort and were they willing to publically protest? Were the assumptions laid out in the theory,
such as the international administration's ideology or the political importance of nationalism,
borne out in the reform efforts? Were there other factors that I did not theorize that influenced
the reform process?
Second, the case studies use causal process tracing to describe why the reforms happened
the way they did. For each reform, I trace the chain of events throughout the reform process,
from the expression of international preferences to the final outcome of the reform. At each
stage, I consider what determined the actors' decisions and caused intermediate outcomes. I
compare the causal process observations with the mechanisms suggested by the theory and
alternative explanations, and judge which of the theories, if any, the evidence from the reform
effort supports. Causal process tracing is essential because it is the only method that can
differentiate whether the hypothesized mechanisms were applicable or not.'2 4
Third, using the variation in the seventeen reform efforts, I make at least two sets of
comparisons between different reform efforts that help to eliminate competing explanations.
First, I compare several reform efforts, with different outcomes, within a given international
administration. While constitutional reform in Bosnia may fail, military reform succeeds. This
variation is a puzzle for existing theories that only consider cross-country variation. Comparing
reform efforts within a society also means that variables that change across international
administrations - such as the structure of the administration, the level of pre-war development,
and so forth - are held constant. Second, I compare reforms in the same issue area, or with
124 Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, 277-278; James Mahoney, "After KKV: The New Methodology of
Qualitative Research," World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 128-9; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences, 214-218.
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similar characteristics, across different international administrations. The three post-conflict
societies vary across different historical, economic, and political contexts. If similar tendencies
are observed across cases from different contexts, we can have greater confidence in the theory's
validity.
Finally, alternative methods, including experimental and statistical analysis, are
impractical. While statistical methods might be useful for evaluating the outcome predictions
across a wide range of reform efforts, statistical analysis would also be difficult due to data
limitations, identification challenges, and non-independent observations. An experimental design
would require randomly varying the demands posed by the international administration, or their
unity. This would be impractical, and most likely immoral, given the importance of these reform
efforts for the target society and the negative consequences of failure.
Data Gathering and Sources
To construct the reform narratives, I conducted fieldwork in each of the four post-conflict
societies and cross-referenced my findings with primary and secondary sources.
The fieldwork consisted of interviews with international officials, local politicians, and
analysts. These interviews were necessary for developing complete and accurate reform
narratives. To the extent possible, I sought to speak with individuals representing different actors
to make sure that my reform narratives incorporated all of the different viewpoints. I completed a
total of 171 interviews over the course of ten months of fieldwork across all four international
administrations, as well as five additional interviews with US-based experts (see table 2.3).
Because of the need to protect interviewees' confidentiality, I identify them only by their general
position, and wherever possible provide a published source to confirm their account.
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Table 2.3: Interviews and Fieldwork
Location Total Interviews (171) Dates of Fieldwork
Bosnia 64 6-8/2008; 10-11/2009
Cambodia 13 6/2009
Kosovo (and Serbia) 46 11/2009-2/2010
Timor Leste (and Indonesia) 43 7-8/2009; 8/2010
Additional US interviews 5 Various
The difficulty with interviews, however, is that individuals may have a biased view of the
events, may selectively describe events to protect themselves or their organization, or may
simply have forgotten what happened. To deal with this limitation, I triangulate between
interviews and cross-reference all interview data with evidence from primary or secondary
sources. Relevant primary sources include publically released documents by international
administrations, such as UN resolutions, progress reports, and press conferences. These
documents are essential for determining the timing and content of reform efforts. There is also a
substantial secondary literature, including think tank and NGO reports, academic articles, and
books, which provides political context and sometimes detailed accounts of certain reform
efforts. In each chapter, I discuss in depth the sources used.
Inferential Problem
I evaluate the success and failure of reforms based on whether or not international demands for
the institution were eventually implemented. If there were a confounding variable that influenced
both the selection of international demands, international unity, and the success or failure of
reforms, the theory would have less explanatory power. For example, a critic of the theory might
claim that there is a selection problem: Consider an example in which the international
administration decided that it wanted an easy victory in a given reform. The international
administration would select demands that were not very different from the status quo, which
would lead all international organizations to rally behind these demands and ensure high unity.
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Such a reform would be fully implemented. The critic would correctly claim that the theory
would not have much explanatory power in such an example.
To address this concern, the case studies examine the origin of international demands and
preferences. The case studies show that administrations rarely select preferences to achieve
greater success. Instead, preferences typically originate from three other sources. First,
preferences are often specified in the state-building mandate. Mandates emerge from peace
negotiations, in which the negotiators have an incentive to come to an agreement to end the war
rather than to make the post-conflict administration easier.' 25 Second, preferences are often
derived from the international administration's ideology. Just as the ideology leads to
overambitious demands, it can lead to a preference for unachievable institutions. Third, the
international administration's supervisor often sets reform preferences without knowledge of
whether or not these preferences are achievable. The principal-agent dilemma posits that agents
have different information from their principals. The supervisors' decisions may be based on
flawed information about the society, or may be based on day-to-day policy concerns rather than
the long-term state-building goals.126
Furthermore, the measurement criteria described above is carefully designed to avoid this
critique. International unity is determined and measured prior to the beginning of the reform
effort, so it is not possible for unity to be increased through the selection of easy demands.
Similarly, the threat to nationalist goals or informal networks is measured independently of the
outcome of the reform.
125 The negotiation of Dayton Peace Accords about Bosnia is a good example of this dynamic. See Caplan,
International Governance of War-Torn Territories, 17-2 1; Chesterman, You, the People.
12 6 Reo Matsuzaki, for example, argues that foreign officials are far more effective at developing appropriate and
long-lasting local institutions when they have autonomy from headquarters. "Institutions by Imposition: Colonial
Lessons for Contemporary State-Building," forthcoming.
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Finally, there are good reasons to evaluate reforms based on the achievement of
international preferences rather than other metrics. Using fixed metrics for success at the societal
level - such as a specific level of GDP or polity score - means that societies that have the
greatest level of prewar development are more likely to achieve success. 1 27 Analyzing state
building using these metrics is therefore biased against countries with worse prewar development
levels. Evaluating success based on these metrics also emphasizes the preexisting conditions in
the society and provides little insight into which policies the international administration should
adopt if it is in a society with poor preexisting development.
V. Summary of Findings
To summarize the findings of the individual reform efforts, I code the stages of reform efforts
based on what extent the mechanisms specified by the theory agree with the causal process
observations in the case study. If the causal process observations indicate that the mechanisms
and sub-mechanisms specified by the theory are directly applicable, the stage of the reform effort
is coded as fully confirming the theory. If the causal process observations within the stage of the
reform effort indicate that at least some of the mechanisms of the theory were applicable, even if
the sub-mechanisms were not precisely correct, then the stage of the reform effort is coded as
partially confirming the theory. If the causal process observations indicate that the mechanisms
and sub-mechanisms offer no explanatory power about a stage of reform, that stage is coded as
not confirming the theory. I list the summary of the results of this coding in Table 2.4.
I also aggregate the results of the different stages of reform to consider whether the
trajectory of an entire reform effort confirmed the theory. I code the reform effort as confirming
the theory if most of the stages of the reform effort fully confirm the theory's predictions, and no
127 See especially Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 86-93.
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stages do not confirm the theory. I code the reform effort as partially confirming the theory if
most of the stages only partial confirm the theory, and no more than one stage of the reform
effort does not confirm the theory. I code the reform effort as not confirming the theory if more
than one stage of the reform does not confirm the theory. I listed the reform efforts, organized by
the initial coding of variables, in Table 2.5.
Table 2.4: Theory Testing Summary
Stages of Reform Efforts Confirmed Partially Confirmed Not Confirmed
Bosnia 17 4 0
Kosovo 15 4 1
East Timor 8 5 3
Total 40 13 4
Aggregate Reform Efforts 12 4 1
Table 2.5: Reform Effort Sumiary128
Demands threaten Demands do not threaten nationalist goals
nationalist goals High threat to informal Low threat to informal networks
networks '
High Expectation is Failure Expectation is Partial Success Expectation is Success
international - Bosnian Police - Kosovo UNMIK Police (C) - Bosnia Military (C)
unity Reform (C) - East Timor UNTAET e Bosnia VAT/ITA (C)
- Kosovo Standards Police (PC) - Kosovo Basic Representative
before Status (C)* - East Timor UNTAET Institutions (C)
Military (C) - Kosovo Elections (PC)
e East Timor Elections (C) e Kosovo KPC (C)
- Kosovo Customs (C)
- East Timor UNTAET
Representative Inst. (C)
- East Timor Revenue (NC)
Low Expectation is Failure Expectation is Failure Expectation is Partial Success
international - Bosnian Entity - Bosnia Elections (PC) e Bosnia April 2006 Constitution (PC)
unity Constitutional
Reform (C)*
VI. Conclusion
This chapter has presented a deductive theory of institution building by international
administrations. The theory argues that the interaction between international officials and local
28 Key: Successes are in bold typeface, partial successes are in plain text, and failures are in italics. C is Confirm
theory, P is Partially Confirm, and NC is Not Confirm.
Notes: *While the outcome predictions expected failure, demands were rapidly weakened, so the theory accurately
predicts the reform effort.
Abbreviations: UNPOL is UN Police, VAT/ITA is Value Added Tax/ Indirect Taxation Authority, PISG is
Provision Institutions of Self-Government, KPC is the Kosovo Protection Corps, and UNTAET is the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor.
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incumbents explains the process of institution building. The ideology and organizational
incentives of administrations lead them to not be unified and to make overambitious demands.
Local incumbents seek to maintain power, which leads them to oppose or obstruct demands that
threaten nationalist goals or informal networks. International administrations therefore only fully
succeed when they are unified and their demands do not threaten nationalist goals. The next
chapters demonstrate and test the theory across the seventeen reform efforts in three international
administrations - Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.
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Chapter 3
Institution Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Promise of Peace
"After nearly four years, two hundred and fifty thousand people killed, two million refugees, and
atrocities that have appalled people all over the world, the people of Bosnia finally have a chance
to turn from the horror of war to the promise of peace."
- President William Clinton 129
"One of the most frightening aspects of my job was that, in order to get things moving, I often
had to challenge the opinions of elected representatives - and sometimes use my powers to
overrule them... This is, on the face of it, an undemocratic thing to do... It is also a very scary
thing to do. Because, when a politician representing an ethnic interest threatened that his people
would be out on the streets if we did X, we had to have sufficient confidence in our own
judgement about what the people of Bosnia really wanted, or at least were prepared to tolerate, to
be able to push ahead nevertheless."
-High Representative Paddy Ashdown13 0
The Dayton Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 The agreement created a
highly decentralized state that recognized the legitimacy of ethnic politics and enabled wartime
ethnic elites to quickly consolidate control over the country. Elites of all three major ethnicities -
Bosniak,13 2 Croat and Serb - continued to pursue many of the goals they fought for in the war
through peaceful political means. To oversee peace implementation, the Dayton Agreement also
created an international administration, which had extensive authority including the ability to
remove politicians and pass laws. The international administration sought to reform state
institutions in order to prevent future violence, encourage the creation of a multiethnic society,
and build a more effective central state.
This chapter systematically analyzes six reform efforts that were at the heart of the
international state-building effort in Bosnia. Following the theory, the chapter asks why some
succeeded, incrementally strengthening the state and advancing political development, and others
129 Quoted in Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 309.3 0 Paddy Ashdown, A Fortunate Life (London: Aurum, 2009), 352-353.
131 I refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina hereafter as Bosnia. The formal name of the Dayton Agreement is the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
132 Refers to Bosnians of Muslim descent. See Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public
Sector Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xv.
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failed, delaying international exit, unintentionally reinforcing ethnic divisions, and
delegitimizing future international efforts.
The six reform efforts traced below largely confirm the theory and offer significant
evidence against the technical perspective and the three competing theories of institution
building. The international administration frequently justified its reforms as technical
requirements, but local elites recognized the political consequences of these reforms and blocked
them accordingly. There is also little support for the argument that a strong mandate or extensive
resources will achieve success. In Bosnia, the international administration frequently used its
authority to intervene into local politics, but these interventions had decidedly mixed results. The
international community may have had authority, but power remained largely in the hands of the
local elites. This chapter further questions the effectiveness of EU conditionality - parties were
willing to forgo EU integration to protect their nationalist goals. Finally, few internationally
recognized moderate parties were able to win elections. Those moderate parties that were elected
often campaigned on nationalist goals and sometimes pursued more radical policies than their
competitors.
While there is a great deal of literature on post-war Bosnia, few works compare across
reform efforts to develop and test theories about the success and failure of institution building.
Much of the existing work on Bosnia consists of evaluations of the overall success of the
'peacebuilding' effort, 3 3 single case studies of particular institution-building efforts,13 4 or
normative arguments about particular institutional strategies for state building in Bosnia.135
"3 For example, Paris, At War's End, 97-107.
34 See a number of studies on individual reform efforts cited below, including those by Sofia Sebastian, Donald
Hays, Ric Bainter, Gulner Aybet, and Thomas Muehlman, as well as several International Crisis Group (ICG)
reports. See also, Levi, "Learning National Identity." Brian Scholl, "Electricity Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
Utilities Policy 17, no. 1, 2009: 49-64.
135 There have been a large number of policy papers advising particular strategies for the international community in
Bosnia. See, inter alia, Kurt Bassuener, "An Agenda for Bosnia's Next High Representative," Democratization
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Analysts who claim that the intervention in Bosnia has been a success note continued peace,
economic improvements, and progress towards European integration. Critics argue that
reconciliation is limited, politicians use fear to mobilize voters, high-level corruption is
unprosecuted, political parties question the basic integrity of the state, and the possibility for a
return to war remains. Unlike many of the existing accounts that judge international efforts based
on politicized expectations about what the country should be, and I instead evaluate different
institution-building efforts by what the international administration's goals were in each case.
The chapter has nine sections. The first section briefly introduces the history of the war,
the debates within the international administration, and the nature of local politics in Bosnia. The
second section introduces the reform efforts and describes the sources used. The third through
eighth sections describe the six reform efforts: electoral reform, entity constitutional reform,
defense reform, police restructuring, the VAT/ITA tax reform, and the April 2006 constitutional
reform. A final section concludes by evaluating the theory's predictions in Bosnia and discussing
implications for future state-building efforts.
I. War, Intervention, and Political Context
This section describes the context of the international administration and local politics in Bosnia
based on a review of the literature and insights from the interviews. This context is helpful for
understanding the international post-war state-building efforts in Bosnia and confirms the
assumptions in the theory chapter. This section first briefly describes the war in Bosnia and the
Dayton Agreement that ended it. It then explains the structure, ideology, and internal divisions of
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Policy Institute, May 1, 2002; James Lyons, "Overcoming Ethnic Politics in Bosnia? Achievements and Obstacles to
European Integration," in Martina Fischer (ed.) Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Years
after Dayton, Minster: Lit-Verlag, 2006, 49-68; and various International Crisis Group reports.
the international administration. Finally, it describes the local politics of Bosnia after the war,
with a focus on the divisions between and within the three major ethnic groups.
Bosnian politics before, during, and after the war were highly complex. Accounts of these
events are also inevitably politicized. For space constraints and because of the high quality of the
existing literature, this section only summarizes the context of the war and the intervention that
ended it. I strive to avoid describing the war or the post-war context from the perspective of any
side or political agenda. A depoliticized account may be impossible, however, since any
statement about the war may imply some normative goal for the post-war society.
The War in Bosnia - 1992 to 1995
The war and international intervention in Bosnia fits the theory's scope conditions of an
international administration. The international community intervened to end to a bloody civil
war, after which the international community established a powerful international administration
to enforce the peace agreement and build the state.
Bosnia was one of the constituent republics of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia following World
War II. The war in Bosnia developed out of the breakup of Yugoslavia. While the literature
identifies a number of causes of the war, one key cause was the reemergence of aggressive
ethno-nationalist political movements.136 In particular, the Serbian nationalist movement, led by
Slobodan Milosevic, sought to reunite all Serbs within a Serb-controlled state. These desires
directly conflicted with nationalist movements in the rest of Yugoslavia, and lead to declarations
of independence by Slovenia and Croatia. 3 7
136 Other causes of the end of Yugoslavia identified in the literature include including the fall of the Soviet Union,
growing economic problems, and the death of Tito. For a detailed description of the rise of Serbian nationalist and
the fall of Yugoslavia, see, inter alia, Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death ofa Nation (Penguin Books,
1997); Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias; CIA Office of Russian and European Analysis, Balkan Battlegrounds: A
Military History ofthe Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995 (Washington, D.C., 2003).
37 For details on Milosevic's platform and developments in the rest of Yugoslavia see Silber and Little, Yugoslavia,
31-91; Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 342-362.
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In Bosnia, which was largely comprised of three major ethnic groups who were dispersed
throughout the territory, inter-ethnic relations quickly became acrimonious and the territory
spiraled into ethnic war. Three nationalist parties - the Bosniak SDA, Serb SDS, and Croat
HDZ 38 - won the elections in December 1990. On March 3, 1992, the Bosnian government,
which was led by SDA,139 declared independence. In response, Bosnian Serb leaders declared the
independence of the Repulika Srpska (RS), or Serb Republic.140 The war between the Bosnian,
RS, and Bosnian Croat armies would continue for the next four years. Ethnic cleansing, or the
effort to make a particular area ethnically homogenous, was central to the conduct of the war,
and involved tactics such as violent expulsion, rape, and murder.141 According to initial
estimates, 278,000 persons were killed or missing and 2.3 million became refugees or displaced
persons, though later research has indicated that only approximately 97,000 people died in the
conflict.142
The war in Bosnia ended with the Dayton Agreement, which specified the constitution of
the new Bosnian state and created an international administration to implement the peace
agreement. The constitution was a carefully negotiated compromise between the international
community and the three warring groups. Bosnia would be an intact and independent state, but
highly decentralized. The Dayton Agreement created a consociational political system that
39 SDS stands for the Serb Democratic Party, HDZ for the Croatian Democratic Union, and SDA for the Party of
Democratic Action.
139 1 refer to the 1992 government as the Bosnian government since even though the supporters of the government
were mainly Bosniaks, its official title was the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 0 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 414-418; CIA Office of Russian and European Analysis, Balkan Battlegrounds,
123-9.
14 For detailed accounts of the war, see, inter alia, CIA Office of Russian and European Analysis, Balkan
Battlegrounds; Steven L. Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Silber and Little, Yugoslavia.
14 2 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 29; Lara Nettlefield, "Research and Repurcussions of Death Tolls: The Case of the
Bosnian Book of the Dead," in Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010), 165.
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encouraged individuals to vote based on their ethnic identity.14 3 Several measures were created at
the state level to protect the vital interests of the ethnic groups and most authority was given to
two "entities." The first entity, the RS, comprised 49% of the country, and was predominantly
Serb. The second, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), comprised 51% of the
country, was predominately Bosniak and Croat, and had its own decentralized system of ten
cantons.14 4 The agreement did include measures to reduce the dominance of ethnic parties, such
as encouraging refugee return, but these measures would prove to be difficult to implement. The
constitution has been particularly criticized due to the size and complexity of the government it
created. Bosnia has the "highest number of presidents, prime ministers and ministers in the entire
world."' 4 The international administration, discussed in the next section, would play a major
role in the political development of Bosnia.
InternationalAdministration - Organizations, Mandates, and Strategies
The international administration in Bosnia closely follows the depiction of international
administrations in the theory chapter. The international administration in Bosnia was composed
of several organizations with overlapping mandates to implement the peace agreement (known as
"peace implementation") and pursue state building. Many officials within these organizations
had strong beliefs about pursuing ethnic integration in Bosnia and thereby enfranchising human
rights. The complexity of the international administration, combined with officials' varying
beliefs and objectives, led to frequent and often debilitating internal disagreements. Below, I first
143 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 40-46; Roberto Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia (New
York: Routledge, 2007), 44.
"4 The system was further complicated by the status of Brcko district, which was self-governing, had its own
international administrator, and was formally part of both districts. The Dayton Agreement is accessible on OHR's
website at http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content id=380. For commentary and description of the Dayton
constitution, see Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 60-89; Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, chap. 4. On Brcko, see Matthew Parish, A
Free City in the Balkans: Reconstructing a Divided Society in Bosnia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).
'
4 5 Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 44.
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explain the structure of the international administration in Bosnia and then discuss two key
strategic debates: how much the international community should seek to ethnically integrate
Bosnia, and to what extent the intemational administration ought to use its authority to intervene
in Bosnian politics. I demonstrate, following the theory, how the organizational and strategic
disagreements facilitated overambitious demands and disagreement about demands.
While the Dayton Agreement mandated a variety of organizations to participate in the
peace implementation efforts,146 four main organizations were most influential in the reforms
discussed below. First, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was the lead organization
for the civilian aspects of peace implementation. OHR was led by the High Representative, who
was always a senior statesman from a European country. While OHR was nominally the lead
organization for the civilian implementation efforts, it had the formal authority only to
coordinate among the other organizations. 147 OHR was supervised by the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC), an ad hoc body of states, led by a Steering Board of eleven influential countries
and organizations.148 At the 1997 meeting in Bonn, the PIC gave the High Representative the
explicit authority to legislate or remove politicians from office if peace implementation was
4 Other relevant organizations include the UN Mission in Bosnia, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and
World Bank. For a detailed description and diagram of the various organizations empowered in the immediate post-
conflict period, see Elizabeth M. Cousens and Charles K. Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton
Accords (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 37-42; James Dobbins and Carnegie Corporation of New
York., After the War: Nation-buildingfrom FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security
Research Division, 2008), 69.
147 Dayton Annex 10; Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, chap. 2; Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, chap. 4.1 4 8 Technically, the OHR was supervised by the entire PIC, which included 55 countries. The PIC Steering Board is
composed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the
European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is
represented by Turkey. See http://ww-w.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#6 (accessed May 26, 2012) as well as Annex 10 of
the Dayton Agreement. Note that the last time the entire PIC met was in May 2000 and that the PIC Steering Board
regularly issues instructions to OHR.
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obstructed.149 OHR's use of these powers varied greatly from 1997 to 2008, depending in large
part on who was the High Representative.150
Second, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was
responsible for a variety of different tasks, most prominently running elections. The OSCE's
functions would also eventually include human rights, education, democratization, civil society,
and security cooperation. Many of these functions were duplicative of OHR's responsibilities,
though after 2002 OHR and the OSCE more clearly delineated their respective responsibilities.
While OHR was led by a European, the Head of Mission of the OSCE mission was always an
American.is2
Third, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deployed a military force to help
implement the peace. The force was initially approximately 60,000 strong, but its size rapidly
decreased after the end of the war. In 2004, the European Force (EUFOR) took over
responsibility, and by 2011 there were only 1,600 troops deployed.153 NATO would play a lead
role in military reform, as NATO specified the conditions necessary for Bosnia to become a
member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and eventually NATO itself.
149 The precise wording of the Bonn Powers was: "The Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use
his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace
Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on
the following issues: a. timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions; b. interim
measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency
or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned; c. other
measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as
well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding
public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its
implementation." OHR, "PIC Bonn Conclusions," December 12, 1997, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?
contentid=5182 (accessed April 23, 2012).
"0 Mateja Peter, "The Shifting Contours of Intemational State-Building Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in
Eldar Sarajlic and Davor Marko (eds.) State or Nation Building? Visions, Controversies and Perspectives of
Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: CIPS, University of Sarajevo, 2010, 21-43.
151 OSCE BiH - What We Do, http://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id= 1&lang=EN (accessed June 10, 2011)
152 Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 46.
"3 Julie Kim, "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping,"
Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2008.
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Fourth, the European Union (EU) gradually became one of the most important
international actors in Bosnia when the country began the process of European integration. In
2002, Paddy Ashdown became the first High Representative to be double-hatted as the EU
Special Representative. Starting with the EU Feasibility Study in 2003, the requirements for
accession to the EU began to guide many reform efforts.' 5 4
The existence of multiple organizations, combined with their overlapping mandates and
lack of hierarchical organization, led to serious problems of disunity from 1995 to 2002. When
Paddy Ashdown took over as High Representative in 2002, he greatly improved the coordination
between the various international organizations, and unity improved. However, as the EU
integration process took greater prominence, a new tension within the international
administration developed. The international administration had begun to seek two types of
political progress - the completion of the peace implementation phase, and accession to the EU.
The international administration had to decide whether to prioritize the state-building
requirements stated in or implied by the Dayton Agreement, or the EU's acquis communautaire.
Officials and organizations also had ideological disagreements about what to strategy to
adopt. While some officials believed in aggressively pursuing the implementation of human
rights, others emphasized the importance of local popular sovereignty. There were two of the
especially prominent policy debates. The first debate considered whether to seek to (re)establish
an integrated multiethnic society. According the integrationist school of thought, Bosnia's
ethnically divided politics were inherently anti-liberal,155 delayed reconciliation, and predisposed
5 4 Gerald Toal, "Embedding Bosnia-Herzegovina in Euro-Atlantic Structures: From Dayton to Brussels," Eurasian
Geography and Economics 46, no. 1 (2005): 51-67. Megan Chabalowski and Michael Dziedzic, "Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Parsing the Options," USIP Peace Briefing, September 2009.
"5 Sabrina Ramet offers an elaboration and critique of the integrationist and liberal agenda before the war, after the
war, and in the scholarly literature. See Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 424-427, 471-5, 491-495; Sabrina P. Ramet,
ThinkingAbout Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 8. See also Paris, At War's End, 105-6.
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a return to war.156 Integrationists argued for substantial reforms to Bosnia's institutions,
including strengthening the central state at the expense of the entities, eliminating group-based
political rights in favor of individual rights, and consequently weakening the dominance of
ethnic nationalist parties.157 The pursuit of ethnic integration derived in part from the
international administration's belief in the universality of human rights, since the institutions
proposed by the integrationists were based on individual rather than group rights. Those who
opposed an active integrationist policy tended to argue that peace could be maintained without
substantial changes, that creating a multiethnic society was infeasible, and that Bosnia's ethnic
parties had been democratically elected.1 8
The second key debate considered the means the international administration should use.
Interventionists supported the aggressive use of the Bonn Powers to intervene in Bosnian
politics. They argued that intervention was essential given the power and obstructionist attitude
of the nationalist wartime parties. 159 Paddy Ashdown, High Representative from 2002 to 2006,
best exemplifies the interventionist approach. For example, Ashdown made 447 official
decisions, far more than his predecessors Wolfgang Petritsch, who made 250, and Carlos
Westendorp, who made 76. While Ashdown acknowledges, "by any standard [the Bonn Powers],
which are not subject to appeal or review, are extraordinary," he emphasizes that exercising them
15 6 See, for example, Paddy Ashdown and Richard Holbrooke, "A Bosnian Powder Keg," The Guardian, 22 October
2008; Patrice McMahon and Jon Western, "The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart,"
Foreign Affairs, October 2009. See also, Andrew Radin, "Bosnia on the Brink?: To the Editor" Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65883/michael-b-humphreys-andrew-radin-obrad-
kesic-steven-e-meyer/bosnia-on-the-brink.
15 7 See, for example, Kurt Bassuener, "An Agenda for Bosnia's Next High Representative," Democratization Policy
Institute, May 1, 2002; Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton; Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble,
"Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding," Journal
ofPeace Research 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 28. A wide variety of early reports from the International Crisis
Group made these arguments in depth.
158 Interviews with analysts and international officials, Sarajevo and Washington DC, Summer 2009 and 2011.
159 See Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, 141-157.
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required both the agreement of the PIC Steering Board and public consent. 160 On the other side, a
number of analysts critique the interventionist approach as undemocratic and ineffective. Gerald
Knaus and Felix Martin compare the relationship of OHR to Bosnia with "that of an imperial
power over its colonial possessions," and argue that international intervention will not be
effective at changing the society.16 1 High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who took
over from Ashdown, adopted the anti-interventionist perspective and explained, "I may have the
authority to impose legislation, but I cannot impose reconciliation, and I cannot impose
prosperity. That is up to you and the leaders you will elect."1 62 Schwarz-Schilling's anti-
interventionist policies, however, would prove as controversial as Ashdown's interventionist
policies.
The organizational disagreements and strategic debates are interconnected, but distinct.
International organizations in Bosnia tended to adopt strategies based on their mandate and
available tools. The EU was more inclined to use demands that were conditional for progress
with EU accession, while OHR was often inclined to use the threat of imposing a reform or
removing a politician. Similarly, holding an interventionist perspective was often tied to
integrationist agenda. However, it was perfectly consistent for an international official to pursue
integration while not believing that intervention could bring it about, or to adopt interventionist
means without trying to achieve integrationist goals.
The organizational structure and strategic disagreements of the international
administration in Bosnia confirm the assumptions in the theory. The international administration
1 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 219; Ashdown, A Fortunate Life, 3 52-3.
161 "The illusion shared by a large international human rights and democratisation community has been that laws of
power - including the tendencies of institutions to pursue self-interest - somehow do not apply in the case of
international state-building missions." Knaus and Martin, "Travails of the European Raj," 59, 66. Knaus would later
extensively criticize the "liberal imperial" approach in his work with Rory Stewart. See Stewart and Knaus, Can
Intervention Work?, 141-157.
16 2 OHR, "High Representative's TV Address to Citizens of BiH," January 1, 2006, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content-id=36501
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had strong beliefs about integrating Bosnian society in accord with human rights. International
organizations had an incentive to compete over "implementation market-share,"' 6 3 and disagreed
based off their varying mandates.164 Consequently, the international administration was
frequently limited by overambitious demands and disunity, as the theory would predict.
Local Post-War Politics - Or War by Other Means?165
Post-war politics in Bosnia also supports the theory's assumptions about the importance of
nationalism and elites' use of informal networks.
Table 3.1: Main Political Parties 166
Party Ethnicity Wartime? Orientation State Presidency Prominent Leader/
Other Notes
SDA Bosniak Yes Bosniak nationalist 1996-2000, 2002-
2006
SBiH Bosniak No Bosniak nationalist/ 2000-2001, 2006- Harris Silajdzic
integrationist
SDP Bosniak No Former communist Zlatko Lagumdzija
HDZ Croat Yes Croat nationalist 1996-2010
HDZ-1990 Croat No Anti-HDZ/ Croat None Created 2006
nationalist
SDS Serb Yes Serb nationalist 1995-2006
SNSD Serb No Serb nationalist, social- 2006- Milorad Dodik
democratic
Bosnian politics was dominated by ethnic parties167 associated with the three
"constituent" peoples - Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. These ethnic parties mainly competed with
other parties associated with the same ethnicity, so three ethnic party subsystems were formed
(see Table 3.1). 168 The wartime parties - SDA, SDS, and HDZ - dominated the early
163 That is, organizations sought to achieve the greatest role in the peace process. Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace
in Bosnia, 45-6.
164 While a focus on bureaucratic procedures was mentioned in the theory, did not play a prominent role in Bosnia
due to Bosnia's post-communist history. Local officials had great experience with complex formal processes, and
were often more eager than international officials to implement bureaucratic processes. Interviews with analysts and
local and international officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008, Fall 2009.
165 The description of politics in the post-conflict Bosnia as "war by other means" turns around the Clauswitzian
statement that "war is politics by other means." See Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia,
78.
166 For a more complete list, see Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 49, 152.
167 The literature identifies parties as ethnic when they pursue an agenda that champions the goal of one particular
ethnic group. Kanchan Chandra, "What Is an Ethnic Party?," Party Politics 17, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 151 -169.168 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 148.
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elections.169 These parties were successful in part because following the wartime ethnic
cleansing post-war Bosnia was divided into three largely ethnically homogenous territories. The
Dayton constitution reinforced ethnic politics by politically dividing the country along the ethnic
territorial lines.o70 The wartime parties were eventually replaced by parties such as SNSD (Serb)
and SBiH (Bosniak) that had initially been identified as moderates by the international
community.171 However, these so-called moderate parties had similar ideologies to the wartime
parties they replaced - they also campaigned based on nationalism and sometimes pursued even
more hardline stances than their competitors.
In post-war Bosnia, political office was largely contested by referencing nationalist
goals.172 The violence of the war created deeply seated fear, and parties used their control over
the education system and the media to instill nationalist rhetoric after the end of the war. 73 In
this context, parties used nationalist rhetoric gained the parties votes. Though the international
community was reluctant to admit it, nationalism clearly remained popular in post-conflict
Bosnia.14
For Bosniak parties, the key nationalist goals were the integrity of the Bosnian state, the
eventual centralization of the state, and the elimination of ethnic political rights. During the war,
Bosniaks focused on preventing the secession or segregation of territory along ethnic lines.
169 For the sake of brevity, I refer to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats as Serbs and Croats, respectively. The only
possible non-ethnic party winning an election is Social Democratic Party (SDP), which led the government from
2000-2002. SDP however gains the vast majority of its vote share from Bosniaks, and pursues a unifying agenda
similar to that of other Bosniak parties. Ibid., 41.17 0 Ibid., 29-30.
171 SNSD stands for the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, and SBiH stands for the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. On the transition from moderates to nationalists in the eyes of the international community see the
reform efforts described below, and compare ICG, "Bosnia's Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the
Paradoxes of State Building," Balkans Report No 146, 22 July 2003, 25-27 and Tihomir Loza, "Cardboard
Nationalists," Transitions Online, September 23, 2010.
172 For other similar analyses, see Carrie Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and
Herzegovina," Democratization 11, no. 2 (April 2004): 67-8.
73 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 480-482; Levi, "Learning National Identity."
174 See the reform efforts below, and Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and
Herzegovina," 72-75; Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 41-43; Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 491-493.
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However, at Dayton, Bosniak parties compromised and accepted the entity structure.
Nevertheless, they retained the goal of creating a centralized state with no specific political rights
for different ethnic groups.175 Hence, reforms that prevented this goal from being reached in the
future threatened Bosniak nationalist goals. Bosniak parties pursued their nationalist goals during
the post-war period by trying to move authorities delegated to the entities to the central state, and
to deconstruct the group rights guaranteed in the Dayton constitution. 17 6
For Serb parties, the key nationalist goals were the autonomy of the RS, the Serb
character of the RS, and the protection of political rights for Serbs at the state level. Bosnian
Serbs had fought the war in order to ensure that all Serbs were within a Serb state. 7 7 Following
Dayton, Bosnian Serbs recognized that union with Serbia was not feasible and eventually
accepted, and later even embraced, their autonomy within the RS. Serbs' key goal in the post-
Dayton environment, therefore, was to protect the autonomy and Serb character of the RS. To
protect the RS, it was essential that the state government remain weak and unable to unilaterally
assume entity authorities. Furthermore, Serbs need to ensure that political rights were based on
ethnicity in order to protect the Serb character of the RS.17 9 Reforms that eliminated the political
rights of ethnic groups or attacked the RS's autonomy therefore threatened Serbs' nationalist
goals.
For Croat parties, nationalist goals were the Croats' political control over Croat-majority
areas and the protection of political rights for Croats at the state level. During the war, the Croat
army had fought to bring all Croatians together within a greater Croatia, but these goals were
15 See Holbrooke, To End a War, 97.
176 Interviews with international and SBiH officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008, Fall 2009. See also Bieber, Post-War
Bosnia, 41; Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," 74-75, 77.
"7 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 419-421. The nature of the Serbian nationalist goals is controversial, but the
establishment of an ethnically dominated Serbian state by military means is a fundamental goal. For a historiography
on this issue, see Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia, 13-14.
78 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 41-2. ICG, "The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska," 8 October
2001; Interview with analysts and Serb politicians, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall 2009.
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largely abandoned at Dayton. Croatian politicians emphasized to Bosnian Croats that they were
Bosnian citizens and would have to seek governance from the Bosnian state. At times, however,
Bosnian Croat politicians were strongly nationalist and sought the creation of a third entity or
self-government. 179The creation of a third entity, however, did not mobilize large-scale public
support. Croats in general played a smaller role in the reform negotiations than the Bosniaks and
Serbs. The smaller role for Croats came in part from the declining proportion of Croats in the
overall population - from 17.3% before the war to an estimated 13% after the war - and in part
from the Croats' position inside of the Federation rather than having their own entity.' 0
Bosnian politicians off all ethnicities used informal criminal, patronage, and corruption
networks to gain support and resources. These networks were initially developed to fight the war,
but politicians continued to use them after the war to maximize their political power.' 8 1
Politicians engaged in corruption, including by manipulating government contracts and
appointments. Parties also used their control of economic assets to distribute resources to their
supporters, through mechanisms such as paying off key interest groups and offering government
jobs for supporters. Finally, parties used violence against returning refugees and political
opponents to secure their position. 8 4 Elites' informal networks were particularly present in
179 Interviews with analysts and international officials, Sarajevo, Mostar, Fall 2009. Florian Bieber, "Croat Self-
Government in Bosnia - A Challenge for Dayton," ECMI Brief #5, May 2001, 7.
180 Interviews with international and local officials, Summer 2008, Fall 2009; Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 29, 32.
181 Ibid., 34-5; Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 483-485. Andreas, Blue Helmets and BlackMarkets. Michael Pugh,
"Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace," Global Governance 8, no. 4
(October 2002): 467; Michael Pugh, "Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in
Bosnia and Kosovo," Problems of Post-Communism 5 1, no. 3 (June 2004). Donais, The Political Economy of
Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia.
182 Ramet, for example, describes how a company owned by Karadzic was found to be smuggling cigarettes and oil,
and how the HDZ was using the Hercegovacka Banka to embezzle money intended for veterans. Bakir Izetbeogic,
the son of the wartime SDA president, was also reportedly involved in corruption. The Three Yugoslavias, 484.
183 See Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," 68. See also sources cited
in footnote 53.
8 4 See, for example, the attacks against Bosniaks trying to return to the RS in 1996 described in Gerard Toal and
Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal (Oxford University Press, 2011), 167-9. And
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electoral, military, police, and tax institutions, which meant that there was a potential threat to
informal networks in reform efforts related to these institutions.
Elites and the mass public also sought political progress in terms of the transfer of
authority from the international administration to local institutions and accession into the EU and
NATO. While the international community had mainly supervisory rather than executive
authority, local elites typically sought to accelerate the transfer of what limited executive
authority the international administration did have. The desire to join the EU was particularly
widespread, cutting across individuals of different ethnicities and echoed by the political elite.' 8 1
II. Introduction to Reforms: Selection and Sources
The reform sections below establish the history of the reform, trace the trajectory of demands
and implementation in detail, and thereby test the theory's predictions. Recall that theory
predicts that international unity and the threat to nationalist goals or informal networks explains
the trajectory of reform. Following the six case studies, the conclusion summarizes the extent to
which the six cases confirmed the theory.
I selected the six reform efforts - electoral reform, entity constitutional reform, defense
reform, police restructuring, the April 2006 constitutional reform, and the VAT/ITA tax reform -
based on four criteria First, as the theory specifies, these reforms were all conditional either for
transferring power from the international administration to local institutions, or forjoining the
EU or NATO. Second, these reforms targeted state institutions and were in the issue areas of
representation, security, and revenue. The exception is the entity constitutional reform, which
attacks against political opponents described in Timothy Donais, Division and Democracy: Bosnia's Post-Dayton
Elections, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, 1999, 16.
"' According to one survey, for example, the EU also had the highest level of trust of any international organization.
UNDP, "The Silent Majority Speaks," July 2007, 31, (http://europeandcis.undp.org/cpr/show/1619AC57-F203-
1EE9-B7D02E9FEA6E48C1 (accessed April 24, 2012)).
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only altered the entity constitutions, but was fundamental to the basic relationship between the
state and the entities. Third, these reforms occurred after 1997, which is when the full scale state-
building effort began. Fourth, according to participants and analysts, these were the reforms that
were most important for the functioning of the state. Because of space limitations, and the large
number of reforms in Bosnia, there were additional reforms, such as the UN-led police reform
and the creation of State Information and Protection Service, which could have been considered,
but will have to be left to future work.
To develop these case studies, I make use of interviews, released documents and other
primary sources, as well as secondary sources. The main sources are 65 interviews I conducted
over four months of fieldwork in Summer 2008 and Fall 2009 in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar,
Belgrade, and Pristina. I interviewed international officials who worked for OHR, the EUPM, the
European Commission, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the American embassy, and the UN. I also
interviewed members of local think-tanks, politicians, and local officials in various state
institutions. I also conducted five additional interviews in Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC
in 2011. In general, I used the interviews to better understand different actors' interests and
perspectives, and relied on primary documents, particularly the online OHR archive, for the
content and timeline of reforms. I also use the secondary source literature, such as academic
articles or NGO reports, especially when these sources focus on specific reform efforts.
III. Electoral Reform
The international administration sought to use its executive authority over elections to weaken
the dominance of wartime parties and encourage the election of moderate parties. The
international administration's attack on wartime elites in the electoral reform was unique in its
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transparency. Initially, the international administration sought to weaken the wartime parties by
running large number of elections and carefully managing electoral rules. Bosnia became "the
world leader in number of internationally administered elections,"1 86 but the multiple elections
did not reduce the dominance of the wartime parties. By 2000, the international administration
adopted a new strategy of creating a permanent election law that would transfer authority to a
local election administration and simultaneously pass new rules that would make it harder for the
wartime parties to win. While the international community attempted to claim that these were
technical demands, local elites recognized and responded to the demands' political ramifications.
I summarize the failure of the early efforts on elections and then trace the permanent
election law in depth below. While a law was eventually passed that did successfully transfer
authority to a competent local institution, it failed to achieve the most ambitious international
goal of encouraging the election of moderate parties.187 This reform effort was a partial success
that largely confirms the theory, since it demonstrates how international disunity enabled local
elites to block implementation and forced the international administration to accept a weaker
reform. The theory does not, however, expect the international administration to transparently
attack incumbent elites, so predictions are only specified for reforms that threaten nationalist
goals or informal networks. These threats did not apply to the electoral reform. Nevertheless, the
threat to incumbent elites' electoral prospects was effectively similar to a threat to informal
networks, since the demands threatened particular parties rather than the broader electorate's
preferences. Interpreting the reform in this way, the theory explains the elites' private
obstruction, the initial failure of the reform, and the eventual implementation of significantly
weakened demands.
" Carrie Manning and Miljenko Antic, "The Limits of Electoral Engineering," Journal ofDemocracy 14, no. 3
(2003): 51.8 7 Tansey, Regime-Building, 182-196.
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The electoral reform case study proceeds in five parts. The first part briefly describes the
early international efforts on elections in Bosnia, explains the origins of the permanent election
law reform, and codes the variables. The second part explains the drafting and negotiation of the
permanent election law and the initial failure to pass the draft law. The third part discusses the
use of the draft law's provisions in the 2000 elections. The fourth part explains how a law was
eventually passed, and local electoral administrative institutions formed, and how these
institutions do not fulfill the international administration's initial goals. A fifth section concludes.
Origins ofPermanent Election Law
The intemational administration in Bosnia had full authority over the running of elections, but
could not prevent wartime elites from dominating the early elections. The international
community's original plan was that the first election would happen within six to nine months,
after which the newly elected local authorities would take over, and the international
administration could be concluded. 188 The OSCE, which was mandated to run the elections,
voiced fears that the election would become a "pseudo-democratic legitimisation of extreme
nationalist power structures and ethnic cleansing," but accepted the proposed time frame.189
When the general elections were held in September 1996, the OSCE's fears were borne out. The
wartime parties - HDZ, SDA, and SDS - won at both the entity and state levels.' 90 The wartime
parties won in part by campaigning on nationalist goals and in part by using their informal
188 This policy was particularly supported by the Clinton administration due to congressional opposition to the US
intervention in Bosnia. One joke among international staff was that OSCE stood for "Office for Securing Clinton's
Election." Manning, "Elections and Political Change in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," 64. Interviews with
former OSCE officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
189 Quoted in Pugh and Cobble, "Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections," 28.
1
" In the FBiH election for the state House of Representatives, SDA took 57.1% and HDZ took 28.6, while in RS
election SDS took 64.3% and SDA took 21.3% of the vote. Bieber writes that as a result of the elections "the three
national parties could control all key positions in both entities and at the state levels." Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 91-
93.
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networks to take advantage of the electoral rules.191 Following the first elections, the
international administration reconsidered its exit plan, since many officials believed that the
victory by the wartime parties was contrary to human rights and could lead to a return to war.
The international administration also shifted its approach to more integrationist approach that
directly challenged the wartime parties.192
The international administration, led by the OHR and OSCE, pursued this new
integrationist approach in two ways, neither of which was effective due to the popularity and
power of the wartime parties. First, the international administration believed that the victory of
the wartime parties was contingent on the ethnic homogeneity of different regions within Bosnia,
and sought to restore the pre-war ethnic distribution by getting refugees to vote in, and
eventually return to, their pre-war homes. However, refugee voting and return was not very
successful. Many people preferred to vote and stay in the current residence, especially given the
encouragement of the wartime parties and violence against returning refugees.' 9 3
Second, the international administration used its executive authority as election
supervisors to directly attack the wartime parties. The OSCE tried to limit the use of the media
by wartime parties, tried to reduce their control of illegal property, and even removed candidates
from the election list.'9 4 Some analysts began to criticize these efforts as undemocratic, as the
191 In particular, the nationalist parties used the regulations urging refugee to vote in their pre-war homes to enable
individuals to vote multiple times. The ICG estimated that turnout was greater than 100%, based on calculations of
the total number of registered voters and subtracting the voters who were physically unable to vote. ICG, "Elections
in Bosnia & Herzegovina," Bosnia Report No 16, 22 September 1996, 57; Donais, Division and Democracy.
192 The ICG notes that the OSCE was "actively involved in the international community's efforts to unseat the SDA,
HDZ and the Serb nationalist block, most notably the SDS and SRS," "Is Dayton Failing?: Bosnia Four Years After
The Peace Agreement," Balkans Report N*80 Sarajevo, 28 October 1999, 15.
193 On refugees voting in their prewar homes, see Annex 3 of the Dayton Agreement and Cousens and Cater,
Toward Peace in Bosnia, 114-115; Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 75. On refugee
return, see Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement; Toal and Dalman, Bosnia Remade, chap. 6; Cousens and Cater,
Toward Peace in Bosnia, 72-79; Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, chap. 6.9 4 Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, 117-8; Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 120-1,
130-1. IFES, "Technical Election Advisors to the Provisional Election Commission - Bosnia and Herzegovina," 15
July 1999, 23-24. Interviews with former OSCE officials, Fall 2009.
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international administration appeared to be stating that it did not believe the wartime parties
could be elected legitimately.' 9 5 These interventionist policies were also ineffective. Despite
some small victories in municipal elections, the wartime parties remained in control of the state
level.196 Influential analysts, such as the International Crisis Group, began to argue that only "a
fundamental redesign of the electoral system," could deal with the "vicious cycle of hatred and
fear" that enabled the wartime parties to continue winning elections.197
The international administration therefore began focus on the permanent election law,
which is the main reform effort examined here. The goals of the reform were to transfer authority
for running elections away from the OSCE to Bosnian institutions and to establish electoral rules
that encouraged the election of moderate parties. These goals did not specifically threaten
nationalist goals or informal networks, but clearly threatened the ability of the wartime parties of
all ethnicities to win elections. I argue that the threat was more similar to a threat to informal
networks than to nationalist goals, since the threat was to particular parties rather than the
political status of the central state or entities. The one exception was for the Croats. At one point,
the OSCE demanded changes to the rules goveming the selection of the Federation House of
Peoples, which would have weakened the ability of Croats to block legislation in the Federation.
This in turn would have threatened Croat autonomy within the Federation, which was a key
nationalist goal. I therefore analyze the reform based on the predictions relevant for a threat to
informal networks, except in the case of the Croats, for whom the reform threatened nationalist
goals.
195 David Chandler offers an extensive critique of the contradictions of attempting to promote democratization
through arbitrary authority in Bosnia. See Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 2000), chap. 5.
196 Note that even once elected, local officials from minority groups often had difficulty even going to work.
Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 116.
19 7 ICG, "Dayton: Two Years On, A Review of Progress in Implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia,"
Europe Report 27, November 19, 1997, 8-9. See also the ICG's recommendations for the new electoral system,
which were influential with the OHR and OSCE. "Breaking The Mould: Electoral Reform In Bosnia And
Herzegovina," Europe Report N0 56, March 4, 1999.
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International unity about the demands was low. There was no clear division of labor
between the between the OHR and OSCE and overlapping mandates encouraged them to make
different demands and disagree openly with one another. Neither was there clear leadership from
either organization. Given low unity, the theory therefore expects the elites to privately obstruct
the reform and the reform to not be implemented. Once the reform weakens to the point that it no
longer threatens informal networks, the theory expects the reform to be partially implemented.
Negotiation of the Permanent Election Law
Initial negotiations about the reform began in 1998 between the OHR, the OSCE, and the
Council of Europe. Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative, formally launched the effort in
August 1998, with an OHR decision that created a "Permanent Election Law Working Group"
(PELWG) composed of local experts. At the December 1998 PIC meeting, and in remarks by
Westendorp, the international administration articulated the goal of weakening the monoethnic
nationalist parties.198 A second working group, composed of several scholars, was later created to
provide an alternative set of suggestions for the electoral system.199
The content of the draft law derived from the preference for consociationalism among the
local members in the PELWG and combined with disagreement within the international
administration. The local members of the PELWG, of all ethnic groups, accepted the existing
proportional representation voting system, and believed any electoral system in which members
of different ethnicities competed against one another would lead to conflict. While the
198 Tansey, Regime-Building, 188. The PIC specified that "the principles of the Election Law should: promote the
concept of a multi-ethnic state; promote the respect of democratic principles by candidates, elected representatives
and political parties; establish the independence of the Election Commissions from political influence; encourage
candidates, parties and coalitions to seek a broad base of support amongst all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
preserve the rights of refugees and displaced persons to vote in the municipalities of their pre-war homes; favour
political pluralism; reinforce the accountability of the elected representative to the electorate and to all citizens of
Bosnia and Herzegovina;" PIC Steering Board, "Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia And Herzegovina - The Way Ahead,"
Madrid, 16 December 1998. http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?contentid=5191
199 The group included Professors Jorgen Elklit, Pere Vilanova, and Donald L. Horowitz. Interview with
international official, Fall 2009, Summer 2011.
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international community preferred an electoral system that would encourage moderation,
international officials worked at cross-purposes. OHR- and OSCE-appointed officials disagreed
within the PELWG about the draft law, which delayed progress.200 Eventually, the OSCE
became frustrated by the PELWG's lack of headway. With OHR's consent, the PELWG was
revamped in spring 1999. The OSCE took over greater responsibility and a new international
chair of the committee was appointed.2 01
According to one participant, Westendorp was aware that the draft law was too weak to
achieve international preferences. Furthermore, Westendorp allowed the OSCE to take over the
process because he believed that the OSCE would bear the blame for the failure. 202 Inter-
organizational disagreement thereby led to the international administration's failure.
Later, the PELWG would finally develop a draft law, but one that was unlikely to
challenge the incumbent wartime parties or to lead to the election of moderate parties. The draft
made four major changes intended to encourage moderation. First, in elections to the state and
entity parliamentary chambers, the draft created a system of multi-member districts and
compensatory mandates. Second, the draft specified that the alternative vote (AV) would be used
for the elections of the entity and state presidency.2 03 Third, an open list system was created for
legislative elections so voters could select which candidate from the party list they preferred.
204Fourth, at least one-third of the party's list of candidates would have to be women.
2 0 0 Interviews with analysts and international officials, Fall 2009 and Summer 2011, Sarajevo and Washington, DC.
See also "Dossier: Election Law in B&H, Part One," AIM Sarajevo, February 2, 2000,
http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200002/00209-005-trae-sar.htm.
201 Robert Barry, as head of mission of the OSCE, chaired the PELWG until the appointment of Francois Froment-
Meurice in May 1999. IFES, "Technical Election Advisors to the Provisional Election Commission - Bosnia and
Herzegovina," 15 July 1999, 82-85.
202 Interview with international official, Fall 2009. One article notes, there was "a silent war between OHR and
OSCE was fought for a long time about who would have jurisdiction over [the PELWG's] work." "Dossier: Election
Law in B&H, Part One." AIM Sarajevo.
203 For details on the compensatory mandates and alternative vote, see Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 95-8.
20 See "Draft Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 28 July 1999, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1999/
CDL%281999%29044-e.asp (accessed May 26, 2012).
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However, these changes did not substantially reduce the electability of nationalist parties.
The draft kept many the existing characteristics of the electoral system, including homogenous
voting districts and proportional representation. The academic group argued that the multi-
member districts would make it difficult for smaller parties to win seats, even with the
compensatory mandates, and that the open lists gave incentives for candidates to compete against
one another on the basis of nationalism. 25 The ICG claimed that the draft "is not likely to
achieve the international community's aims," and that parts of the draft "legalise ethnic
discrimination." 206
The draft law was presented to the state parliament for ratification in October 1999. The
state parliament rejected the law twice, in January and February 2000, based on opposition from
Bosniak and Croat parties. Consistent with the theory, to justify their opposition, these parties
cited a threat to nationalist goals, even though the real threat of the law was more similar to
informal networks. The SDA objected that the law would make it easier for displaced persons to
vote in their new homes, while the more multi-ethnic SDP objected that the law continued to
recognize political rights based on ethnic groups. The Croat nationalist party, HDZ, "alleged that
the law would threaten the very existence of the Croats in Bosnia." 207 The international
administration did try to connect the passage of the law with accession to the Council of Europe,
and strongly lobbied for the law's passage. However, the inter-organizational disputes between
the OHR and OSCE made it impossible for the international administration to punish elites for
failing to implement the demands.208
205 Letter to Wolfgang Petritsch from Professors Elklit, Vilanova, and Horowitz, undated.2 0 6 ICG, "Is Dayton Failing?" 18.2 0 7 Tansey, Regime-Building, 191.2 0 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
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The 2000 Elections and the Draft Law
After the failure to pass the draft, in May 2000 the PIC instructed the OSCE, which was still
running the elections, to incorporate the draft law into the rules and regulations for the 2000
elections. 209 The international administration hoped that the changes would encourage the
election of moderates that would prove more willing to implement the demands.
At the behest of Robert Barry, the Head of Mission of the OSCE, one additional measure
was added to the rules and regulations for the 2000 elections.210 The so-called "Barry Rule"
changed the election of members of the Federation House of Peoples so that all members of the
Cantonal legislature would vote for the delegates to the House of Peoples rather than having
members of a particular ethnicity elect their coethnics. 211 The measure was intended to hurt the
Croat party HDZ by enabling Bosniaks to select which Croats would be elected to the reserved
seats for Croats. The Barry Rule thereby threatened Croat nationalist goals, since it challenged
the ability of the Croats to veto legislation in the Federation, and thereby attacked the autonomy
of Croat-dominated areas within the Federation.
Overall, the outcome of the 2000 elections did not fully achieve the international
community's goals of substantially weakening nationalist parties. Still, internationally
recognized moderate parties did have some success. With the support of the British and
American ambassadors, a coalition of non-wartime "moderate" parties called the "Alliance for
Change" took over the state and FBiH government. The election of moderate parties is contrary
to the predictions of the theory, though the weakness of the Alliance and the character of the
component parties mitigate the failed prediction. The three wartime parties still won
2 0 9 Tansey, Regime-Building, 190-2.2 1 0 Belloni, "Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 344.
211 ICG, "Bosnia's November Elections: Dayton Stumbles," 18 December 2000, 4-5.
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"approximately half their community's votes,"m' which meant that the Alliance was only barely
able to control a majority government. Additionally, many of the moderate parties elected did not
act as the international administration would have liked. Several parties within the Alliance for
Change continued to justify their actions based on nationalism because of continuing competition
with the wartime parties.
Furthermore, two of the new integrative electoral rules adapted from the draft election
law failed to achieve their objectives. First, in the initial stage of a broader dispute between the
HDZ and international community, the Barry Rule provoked heavy opposition and widespread
public protest among Croats. The HDZ held a referendum on Croat rights simultaneous with the
election, which the OSCE declared illegal and removed ten HDZ officials from the Cantonal
assemblies.2 1 4 When Croat institutions declared themselves self-governing in March 2001, OHR
dismissed the Croat member of the Bosnian state presidency. The crisis would culminate with
violence around the NATO takeover of the Herzegovacka Banka, which the HDZ leadership was
accused of using for a variety of illicit activities. 215 In the wake of this controversy, the Barry
2 12 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 105.213 The ICG colorfully criticizes the Alliance for Change: "Theirs, however, was a marriage of convenience between
parties of disparate size, ideological hue, history and national composition. It was also a shotgun wedding, presided
over by the importunate British and American ambassadors, who also did most of the courting of the coquettish but
indispensable bride, Haris Silajdzic. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Alliance's ability to hang together was to depend
more on its parties' relish of office than on their shared determination to push through coherent reforms." ICG,
"Bosnia's Alliance for (Smallish) Change," Balkans Report N*132, August 2, 2002, 3.
214 70% of registered Croat voters participated, in the referendum, of which 98.6% voted in favor of self-government.
Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 85. See also, Bieber, "Croat Self-Government in
Bosnia - A Challenge for Dayton," 2; http://www.ce-review.org/00/37/bosnianews37.html; Tansey, Regime-
Building, 193.
215 In particular, the HDZ was accused of money laundering and fraud surrounding the Croatian government's
payments to war veterans. East European Constitutional Review, Volume 10, No. 2/3, Spring/Summer 2001; OHR,
"Decision removing Ante Jelavic from his position as the Croat member of the BiH Presidency," March 7, 2001,
http://www.ohr~int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content id=328; Bieber, "Croat Self-Government in Bosnia,"
2.
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Rule was eventually dropped, which demonstrates how violent public opposition leads to failed
reform. 2 16
Second, the preferential voting system for the RS presidency did not make a substantial
difference in the outcome of the election. Sumantra Bose demonstrates that the SDS candidate
won a near majority and thereby was not affected by the switch to a preferential voting
system.m The system did not even encourage the minority Bosniak voters to prefer the moderate
Serb candidate - 98% of the voters that selected a Federation-based party that came in last-place
gave their votes to other Bosniak parties rather than to moderate Serb parties. The failure to elect
moderates in the RS presidency election led the international administration to drop the AV
entirely from the election law. In sum, the international administration failed to implement
strong demands due to disunity in the negotiation of the draft law, imposed the negotiated
changes in the 2000 elections, and these weakened changes failed to substantially achieve the
international community's objectives.
Passage ofthe Electoral Law
Following the 2000 election, the Alliance for Change government did pass a permanent election
law in August 2001. The law was similar to the 1999 draft, but a number of provisions that were
intended to encourage moderation were removed, including the Barry Rule, the alternative vote
for entity presidency, as well as other measures regarding voters living in illegal housing and
219
requirements for parties to gather signatures from both entities. The threat of the law thereby
diminished, since the content of the law no longer effectively challenged the election of the
wartime parties. To encourage the parliament to pass the law, the international administration
216 Election Law of BiH, Article 10.11; Manning and Antic, "The Limits of Electoral Engineering," 53; Belloni,
"Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 343-345.
217 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention, 230-234.
218 Election Law of BiH, Chapter 12. See also Bieber, Post-War Bosnia : Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector
Governance. 96-98.
219 Eastern Europe Constitutional Review, Volume 10, Number 4, Fall 2001; Tansey, Regime-Building, 194-5.
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used both the threat of imposing the law and the conditionality of Bosnia's entry into the Council
of Europe. Even though the law would not substantially challenge their electability, the wartime
parties voted against the law and criticized the supporters of the legislation for being soft on
nationalist goals.2 20
While the law did not achieve the international community's goal of challenging the
control of nationalist parties, it did achieve the other goal of transitioning control to local
electoral institutions. By and large, the local takeover of the election administration was
seamless. The massive reduction in OSCE election staff did not weaken the execution of
elections on the ground. Local and international election observers remained confident that
subsequent elections were free and fair.22 ' The theory explains the successful transfer of
authority to local institutions, since the transfer of authority did not threaten either nationalist
goals or informal networks.
Conclusions
The international administration in Bosnia failed in its effort to use electoral authority to weaken
nationalist parties, or to create electoral institutions that would do so in the future. The electoral
institutions established were quite similar to the electoral institutions in place before the
beginning of the reform. While the international administration did succeed in getting different
parties elected, these parties pursued similar policies as the wartime parties. For example, the
parties that won elections in 2006, SBiH and SNSD campaigned based on nationalism, and were
criticized by the international community as nationalists, even though the international
220 For example, the SDS "accused the PDP [a smaller Serb party and member of the Alliance for Change] of
betraying Serb interests, lead to speculation that the SDS was preparing to dump Ivanic and his party. Ivanic
promptly pledged that he would stray no more." ICG, "The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska,"
Balkans Report N* 118, October 8, 2001, 4.
221 Interviews with OSCE staff, Sarajevo, Summer 2008.
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administration recognized these parties as moderates in 2000.m Nevertheless, the international
community was able to establish permanent election institutions in Bosnia, making the reform a
partial success.
Table 3.2: Electoral Reform
Preferences Transfer electoral institutions to locals Change rules so moderate parties elected
Phase of reform Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
Early Elections Weaken Low Direct threat to Failure: Confirmed:
nationalists parties a threat Nationalists win Wartime parties block
to informal international efforts
network
Law negotiations Weaken Low Direct threat to Failure: Confirmed:
nationalists parties Locals negotiate Disunity weakens demands
and transfer law weakening and does not force passage of
institutions demands, and then law
do not pass it
2000 Elections Weaken Low Direct threat to Failure: Partially confirmed:
nationalists parties, except AfC elected, HDZ Moderates are elected though
and transfer Barry Rule violent protests, they do not abide by
institutions threats Croat ineffective new international desires, Croat's
nationalist rules protest blocks demands.
goals However, election of AfC
unexpected
2nd law Transfer Low Low Partial success: Confirmed:
negotiations institutions Law passed Highly weakened law passed
Implementation Transfer Low Low Partial success: Confirmed:
of law Institutions Law implemented, Highly weakened demands
Bosnian authorities implemented
run elections
The mechanisms specified by the theory largely explained the trajectory of the reform
effort (see Table 3.2). Ambitious demands were undermined by disagreements between key
intemational actors and were blocked by local elites. A law was ultimately passed, but only after
all threatening measures had been dropped. The law threatened nationalist goals for the Croats,
who used public protest to block the reform. For other elites, the main reason for opposing the
law was that the measures specifically attacked their future electoral prospects. While the theory
2 2 2 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009. Dodik and Silajdzic have both gone from being
perceived moderates to "cardboard nationalists." See Tihomir Loza, "Cardboard Nationlists," Transitions Online,
September 23, 2010.
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does not specifically mention electoral rules, the reaction by elites makes sense in the context of
the theory, and so the reform largely confirms the theory's predictions.
The electoral reform effort is particularly relevant as many scholars have used the
electoral reform in Bosnia as a "lesson learned" for future international management of elections.
A commonly cited lesson is that elections should be delayed to avoid empowering nationalists.2 23
While it is clear that the wartime parties took advantage of the early elections, this case study
provides evidence against the claim that delaying elections will increase the likelihood of
electing moderates. The wartime elites continued to retain their dominance long after the election
and it is unlikely that they would not have won even if elections were delayed. Furthermore,
parties that challenged the wartime parties quickly adopted a nationalist ideology. The long-term
salience of nationalism in the Bosnian politics further indicates that there is little advantage in
delaying elections. Finally, the electoral reform effort speaks to the literature on designing
institutions to manage ethnic conflict. Several scholars have used the international management
of elections in Bosnia to adjudicate between the two competing theories for managing ethnic
conflict: Lijphart's consociational theory vs. Horowitz's integrative theory. This section does
not answer the typical question in the literature on electoral institutions, which is what
institutions best moderate ethnic conflict. Instead, electoral reform in Bosnia demonstrates in
detail that the international community has a limited ability to implement electoral rules of its
choosing and that elites can successfully fight against institutions that threaten their future
political success. While replacing elites may be desirable, it is often not possible given the local
political context.
2 2 3 Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-Building, 107.
2 See for example Nina Caspersen, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation
Strategies in Postwar Bosnia," Journal ofPeace Research 41, no. 5 (2004): 569 -588; Belloni, "Peacebuilding and
Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
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IV. Entity Constitutional Reform
"I simply cannot accept the continuing obstruction on the side of these nationalistic
dinosaurs."
-Wolfgang Petritsch22 s
Florian Bieber, in his book on post-war Bosnia, calls entity constitutional reform "the most
substantial reform effort relating to post-war institutional arrangement in Bosnia." 226 With
hindsight, the reform effort is perhaps more remarkable for what it might have done than for
what it eventually accomplished. Many international officials hoped that the reform would
diminish the prominence of ethnicity in the Bosnian political discourse. However, the
international administration was internally divided about what to demand, and the early demands
threatened nationalist goals. Consequently, the reform ended up further entrenching ethnicity
within Bosnian politics.
I trace the reform in four sections. First, I describe the origins of the reform and explain
the coding of the relevant variables. Second, I trace the efforts of the constitutional commissions,
composed of local officials, to negotiate an agreement. Third, I discuss OHR's imposition of the
agreement and the implementation of that agreement. Fourth, I evaluate the reform effort in
terms of the theory and its impact on Bosnian society.
Origins of the Reform
In 2000, the Bosnian Constitutional Court ruled that the constitutions of the two entities, the RS
and FBiH, were both in violation of the state constitution. While Dayton had effectively accepted
that each of the entities would be dominated by the leading ethnic groups, the court ruled that
"ethnic separation through territorial delimitation does not meet the standards of a democratic
2 2 Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 64.2 26 Bieber also notes that one journalist compared the discussion about the reform to "medieval discussions on the
number of angels able to dance on the head of a pin." Bieber, Post-War Bosnia. The quote in the text is from page
121, and the quote in this footnote from page 131.
98
and pluralist society." By the court's observation, Serbs were not effectively represented in the
Federation, Bosniaks and Croats were not effectively represented in the RS, and people who
were not a member of any of the three main constituent people - commonly referred to as Others
- were not effectively represented anywhere. The court also insisted on the recognition of the
Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian language, which are all essentially the same language, at all
levels of government. The decision was passed by the two Bosniak justices with the three
227internationally appointed justices, and opposed by the two Croat and two Serb justices.
The Court, with the support of many in the broader international administration, hoped
that the decision would alter the basic consociational framework in Bosnia. The goals of the
reform, therefore, were to reform the entity constitutions in order to weaken the dominance of
ethnicity in Bosnian politics. 22 8 The Court and other commentators used the language of human
rights and the equality of individuals to justify the reform, in accordance with ideology described
in the theory.22 9 The ruling also set the additional goal of improving representation for non-
dominant ethnic groups in the entities. Indeed, prior to the reform, individuals that were not
Bosniaks and Croats from the Federation or Serbs from the RS could not be elected to many
posts and were generally not represented in the entity governments.
The goal of weakening the political importance of ethnicity was directly threatening to
the nationalist goals of the Serbs and Croats. For the Serbs, the goal of reducing the ethnic
character of politics threatened nationalist goals since it would implicitly attack the Serb
2 27 Bieber analyzes the decision in more detail. Ibid., 121-128. The quote is on page 124. See also ICG,
"Implementing Equality: The 'Constituent Peoples' Decision in Bosnia & Herzegovina," Balkans Report N* 128,
April 16, 2002, 2-5.2 2 8 Interview with Wolfgang Petritsch, Washington, DC, June 28, 2011. One ICG report explains: "Therefore, if the
ruling is fully implemented, it will be both a major step towards realising the constitution's guarantees to citizens of
freedom from discrimination and the right to return and an enhancement of the authority of the state."
"Implementing Equality," 2.
229 See ICG, "Implementing Equality," 2-5; Valerie Pery, "Constitutional Reform and the Spirit of Bosnia and
Herzegovina," ECMI Brief #7, February 2002.
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character of the RS. While Serb parties preferred to avoid any changes to the RS constitution,
some increased minority representation was acceptable so long as Serbs remained in control of
the entity. For the Croats, nationalist goals were connected to the explicit recognition of Croat
rights. Hence, demands reducing Croat control over Croat-dominated Cantons, or eliminating
reserved positions for Croats in the state government, threatened nationalist goals. For the
Bosniaks, the elimination of ethnic group rights was consistent with nationalist goals, so the
reform posed little threat. Indeed, Bosniak parties desired weakening the RS and strengthening
the position of minorities within the RS. The threat to informal networks was minimal for all
sides, since the reform of the constitutions was largely a legal matter.
International unity for the entity constitutional reform was low. Different analysts and
organizations had different perspectives over how much to pursue the goals of weakening the
salience of ethnicity. These disagreements stemmed from differences in international officials'
perspectives on ethnic integration and human rights. These disagreements were compounded by
the inability of OHR to exercise leadership and coordinate the relevant international
organizations.
The international administration was under similar constraints as in the electoral reform,
so unity remained low. The theory therefore predicts no implementation so long as the demands
threatened nationalist goals. Once the reform is weakened to the point that it no longer threatens
nationalist goals, the reform should be partially implemented.
Constitutional Commissions
The entities initially did little to address the Constitutional Court's decision. In January 2001,
Petritsch created two commissions to study the entity constitutions and provide amendments for
reforms. While previous reform efforts had involved a prominent international role, Petritsch
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decided to encourage "local ownership" by creating committees composed of local politicians
and experts. To ensure a broad range of opinions, each commission was composed of sixteen
members, four from each of the three main ethnicities, and four members from other ethnic
230communities. Petritsch did not instruct the commissions to implement the Court decision in
any particular way, in part because there was no clear international consensus about what to
demand. Disunity, combined with local ownership, enabled the local officials to draft
constitutional amendments that suited the their interests, rather than the international
administration's preferences.
The commissions focused on the recognition of minority groups rather than on reducing
the importance of ethnicity. The local parties, by and large, were not interested in the
international community's vision of civic representation, and preferred representation based on
group rights. In their negotiations, the commission therefore ignored the goal of weakening the
salience of ethnicity, which effectively weakened the reform.m The debate turned instead to the
details of how minorities would be represented in the entities, in particular whether the RS and
the Federation would have symmetric institutions or not. Serb representatives favored minimal
changes, and an allowance for asymmetric institutions, while Federation representatives wanted
to make the structure of the RS match the complexity of the Federation. Petritsch, with the
support of the PIC, supported "symmetry in form," which meant that the entities could have
different structures but had to provide identical protections for minorities.m Other international
230 Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 128-129.
231 "The decision is neither intended as, nor shall it in any manner or at any time be treated as an indication, express
or implied, as to the way in which the said partial Decision of the Constitutional Court shall be implemented by way
of constitutional amendment" OHR, "Decision establishing interim procedures to protect vital interests of
Constituent Peoples and Others, including freedom from Discrimination," January 11, 2001, paragraph 12.2 3 2 Tansey, Regime-Building, 178.
233 The discussion included whether there would be a House of Peoples added to the RS and whether group
representation would be based on the status quo or pre-war population. See Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 128-9. ICG,
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observers insisted on more ambitious fully symmetrical reform, in part with the idea of
weakening the autonomy of the RS.23 4 Since the international administration was not unified in
its demands, Serb and other local officials sought to implement the least ambitious demands.
After intensive negotiations in March 2002, eight parties signed the Sarajevo Agreement
specifying a series of changes to the two entity constitutions. The agreement would 1) create a
Council of Peoples and Vice Presidents in the RS to ensure representation of non-Serbs, 2)
expand representation to include Serbs and Others in the Federation, and 3) protect the "vital
interests" of the different constituent peoples through a second parliamentary chamber in both
entities.23 ' The negotiations did represent successful international mediation, since the
international administration had found a compromise, even if it did not meet international
preferences. Acceptance of the agreement, however, was not universal. Serb parties PDP and
SDS representatives signed only with "reservations," while the Bosniak SDA rejected the
agreement for not going far enough, and Croat HDZ supported stronger minority veto rights. 236
The proposed amendments did provide some opportunities for increased minority
participation in the RS. However, the amendments would not substantially reduce the Serb's
control over their entity, and therefore were not threatening to nationalist goals. For the Serbs,
the RS National Assembly would still dominate decision-making, and the new second
parliamentary chamber, the RS Council of Peoples, would have only limited ability to block
legislation.m Nevertheless, some Serb elites did claim that the agreement threatened the
"Implementing Equality,"5-7; Valerie Perry, "Constitutional Reform and the Spirit of Bosnia and Herzegovina," 3-
11.
234 See for example Ibid, 12.235 For full details, see OHIR, "Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples' Decision of the
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina," March 27, 2002, http://www.ohr.int/print/?content id=7274; and
ICG, "Implementing Equality."2 36 Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 64; Tansey, Regime-Building, 180.
237 See OHR, "Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples' Decision of the Constitutional Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina," Articles 4 and 5; interviews with international officials, Fall 2009, Summer 2011.
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autonomy of the RS in order to attack their opponents. For example, a veterans group in the RS
argued that the agreement represented "the destruction of results achieved during the fight for the
fatherland," and SDS leader Mirko Sarovic argued that the "measures achieved no less than the
abolition of the RS through the back door."238 These pressures led the RSNA to adopt
constitutional amendments that did not fulfill the Sarajevo Agreement. Likewise, SDA criticized
other Bosniak parties, and the international community, for accepting too little reform. The
Federation parliament also rejected the Sarajevo Agreement following the RSNA's actions.23 9
In response, Petritsch used the Bonn Powers to impose the Sarajevo Agreement in April
2002. He argued that "I simply cannot accept the continuing obstruction on the side of these
nationalistic dinosaurs" and that "this is an imposition, but... the largest part of the job was done
by the domestic authorities." Petritsch's imposition of the agreement has been criticized as
"probably unwarranted," and "in contradiction with self-govemment."240 Still, the parties largely
accepted the imposition without major protest, in large part because the agreement had already
been weakened and did not threaten the parties' nationalist goals. 2
The Sarajevo Agreement was only partially implemented. It did increase the official
representation of minorities, though not to the extent legally required. By the account of one
official, fully implementing and monitoring the ethnic distributional requirements of the
amendments was impossible given the lack of qualified individuals and complexity of the quota
requirements. Furthermore, the increase in minority representation did not change the way the
entities were ruled. Forty-five percent of ministerial positions in the RS were reserved for non-
2 3 8 Quoted, respectively, in ICG, "Implementing Equality," 9 fn; and Belloni, State Building and International
Intervention in Bosnia, 64. Belloni and the ICG disagree with my interpretation, and argue that the nationalist
response demonstrates that the Constituent Peoples' decision was indeed highly threatening to the Serb nationalist
goals.2 3 9 ICG, "Implementing Equality," 8-11.2 40 Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 64, 65, 67.241 OHR, "BiH Media Round-up," April 22 and 24, 2002, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-
ups/2002.asp (accessed May 26, 2012).
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Serbs, for example, but the actual power of non-Serbs within the RS was extremely limited.
Minorities within the RS could not effectively block legislation and could not influence the way
the entity was ruled.242
The greatest impact of the reform was that the entity governments became even less
efficient. The cost of governance in Bosnia increased because of the added layers of entity
government and the need to translate documents into three languages. Proponents of the reform,
including Petritsch, argued that the added complexity from the reform would encourage the
entities to eventually simplify their institutions. However, the simplification did not occur, and as
I discuss below in the account of the April 2006 constitutional reform effort, further
constitutional reform remained unlikely. 24 3
Conclusion
The entity constitutional reform largely confirms the predictions of the theory for a reform with
low unity and a threat to nationalist goals. The international administration developed the highly
ambitious goal of reducing the prominence of ethnicity, which threatened Serb and Croat
nationalist goals. Divisions within the international administration about what to demand enabled
local parties to negotiate an agreement that removed the threat to nationalist goals. After the Serb
parties refused to implement the agreement, because of intra-elite nationalist outbidding, OHR
imposed the agreement. Despite the outbidding, the content of the imposed agreement did not in
fact threaten the key Serb nationalist goal - autonomy of the RS - so the imposed agreement was
partially implemented. With the implementation of the agreement, the reform did succeed at the
lesser goal of greater legal enfranchisement for minorities within both entities. However, given
2 4 2 Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 66. Interviews with international officials and
analysts, Sarajevo and Washington DC, Fall 2009 and Sunmer 2011.2 4 3 Ibid.. Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo and Washington, DC, Fall 2009, Sununer 2011.
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the weakness of the negotiated agreement, the reform was ultimately counterproductive for the
broader and more important goal of reducing the importance of ethnicity in Bosnian politics.
Table 3.3: Entity Constitutional Reform
Preferences Weakening the political importance of ethnicity Protecting the position of minorities
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Court Decision Weakening the Low Nation- Failure: Confirmed:
salience of alist No implementation International administration
ethnicity and goals selects difficult goals due to the
protect the human rights ideology; locals
position of do not implement demands due
minorities to threat to nationalist goals
Constitutional Weakening the Low Low Partial Success: Confirmed:
Commissions salience of Agreement negotiated, Disunity leads to
ethnicity and recognizes ethnicity, implementation of weakest
protect the encourages minority demands
position of representation in
minorities entities
Negotiation and Protect the Low Low Partial Success: Partially confirmed:
imposition of position of Serbs refuse to Theory expects elites to
Agreement minorities implement agreement, partially implement demands
so Petritsch imposes it, but elites do not; Nationalist
no local opposition to outbidding despite no threat;
imposition. implementation comes only
from imposition
Implementation Protect the Low Low Partial Success: Confirmed:
of agreement position of Reform partially Theory expects partial
minorities implemented, position implementation
of minorities in
entities is little
changed
V. Bosnian Defense Reform
Defense reform, which consisted of the unification of the two entity militaries into a single state-
controlled military, represents one of the most successful reform efforts in post-war Bosnia. The
success is particularly impressive given the close connection between the military and nationalist
achievements. While local elites sought to weaken the reform to fulfill their political interests,
international demands were substantially achieved in two different sets of defense reform
negotiations. The reform confirms the theory, since the reform succeeded because of
international unity and because the demands did not threaten any party's nationalist goals.
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I analyze the reform in four stages. First, I discuss the origins of the reform and code the
relevant variables. Second, I discuss the Defence Reform Commission's (DRC) first set of
negotiations and the successful creation of state defense institutions. Third, I discuss the DRC's
second negotiations, in which the parties accepted the creation of a unified state military. Fourth,
I evaluate the overall effort and discuss alternate explanations for the success of the reform.
Origins of Defense Reform
Richard Holbrooke called the continued existence of two entity militaries the "the most serious
flaw" of the Dayton Agreement. 244 Bosnia was perhaps the only peaceful country in the world to
have multiple independent militaries under the same state. 24 While there had been a substantial
decrease in the size of the entity militaries since the end of the war, the militaries still retained
large numbers of personnel and obsolescent equipment, and were perceived as costly and
inefficient.24 6 By 2001, international officials had decided to address the problem of multiple
militaries, but needed a way to start the process.
High Representative Paddy Ashdown used Bosnia's desire to join NATO's Partnership
for Peace (PfP), combined with a political scandal, to begin the defense reform process. In
October 2002, it was found that the Orao arms company, which was closely associated with the
RS government, had been selling weapons to Iraq in violation of a UN arms embargo. OHR
traced the blame for the scandal to the senior leadership of the RS, and Ashdown forced the
2
" Holbrooke, To End a War, 361.
2 4 5 While there was some disagreement about whether the state presidency had ultimate official command, the
entities governments retained effective control over each of the entity militaries. The setup at the time of the first
reform is described in depth in Chapter 5 of the First Defense Reform Commission's report. The exact lines of
command were not quite resolved prior to the reform. See DRC, "The Path to Partnership for Peace," Sarajevo,
September 25, 2003, Chapter 5; DPA Annex 4, Article 5, Paragraph 5.
2 4 6 interviews with international and NATO officials, Summer 2008, Fall 2009. Ashdown, Swords and
Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century, 246
106
resignation of the Serb member of the State Presidency, Mirko Sarovic, in April 2003.247 During
the same period, with some international urging, Bosnia pledged its desire to join the PfP and to
reform defense institutions as necessary to achieve that goal. 248
The international community's preferences for this reform were the establishment of
effective state command and control over the entity militaries. For NATO, effective state
command and control was a critical accession requirement. State command and control would
also address the fundamental problem of multiple militaries and the rule of law problems
revealed during the Orao scandal. The initial demands to achieve this goal were the creation of a
state ministry of defense, parliamentary oversight over defense, and the subordination of the
entity militaries to state decision-making. 249
State control of the entity militaries did not threaten the nationalist goals or informal
networks of either the Bosniaks or the Serbs. For the Bosniaks, the key nationalist goal was the
continuing strengthening of the central state, which would not be threatened so long as the
reform left open the possibility of continued reform. Some Bosniak politicians believed that a
reform eliminating conscription would be threatening so long as an RS army existed. According
to the theory, and to most Bosniak politicians, however, conscription was not in fact necessary to
protect the Bosnian state. During the war, conscription enabled the less well-armed ARBiH to
fight the RS army. As a consequence of the Dayton Agreement, the RS army became smaller
2 47 Gulnur Aybet, "NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Problems ofPost-Communism 57, no. 5
(September 2010): 27; Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 281-2.2 48 The pledge was made in January 2003 by the Secretary General of the Standing Committee of Military Matters
(SCMM), which was the state body that coordinated between the two entity militaries. See the full pledge in Annex
10.4 of DRC, "The Path to Partnership for Peace." Interviews with OHR officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009; Graeme P.
Herd and Tom Tracy, "Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A New Paradigm for
Protectorates?" Conflict Studies Research Centre, November 2005, Available at:
kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/ 39247/.../2005_Nov.pdf (Accessed July 2011), 9-11; Aybet, "NATO
Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 26-27.
2 4 9 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century, 248-250, 277, 283. OHR, "Decision
Establishing the Defense Reform Commission" May 9, 2003,
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?contentid=29840 (accessed May 26, 2012).
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than the Federation's, and a train and equip program substantially strengthened the Federation
army. By the time of the defense reform, the RS army could not actually threaten the integrity of
Bosnia, especially given the NATO security guarantee. Conscription still had an emotional and
political significance among the Bosniak elites, and could be used for ethnic outbidding.2 so With
respect to informal networks, the veterans were a more important source of support for the
Bosniak parties than the military, and since veterans had been provided for, the reform did not
threaten informal networks.m
For the Serbs, the main concern was the political impact of the reform rather than the
existence of the RS military. Serb politicians, analysts, and international officials repeatedly
emphasized in interviews that the political guarantees of Dayton, and the weakness of the RS
army, made the army more of a financial burden than a political asset.2 52 While the Serb
population did have some lingering political attachment to the RS military due its role in the war,
the RS army was more important as a symbol than as a real tool for protecting RS autonomy.
Consequently, the reform would only threaten Serb nationalist goals if it created a precedent that
that would change the balance between the entity and the central state, or if it eliminated the
Serbian character of the entity and its military. As described below, the international
administration avoided demands that posed such a threat. With respect to informal networks,
military reform was not threatening because earlier international efforts had diminished elites'
250 The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) was the mainly Bosniak military during the war.
The Serbs had an equipment advantage during the war, so Bosniak leaders believed they need to maintain a large
manpower base if war returned. Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008.
251 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
252 Interviews with Serb politicians, international officials, and analysts. Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Washington DC,
Summer 2008, Fall 2009, Summer 2011.
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informal networks within the army, and Bosnian Serb elites were more concerned that factions in
Serbia proper informally controlled elements of the RS military.2m3
The international administration was unified about its demands. Ashdown closely
coordinated the defense reform process with NATO and the key Western states. The US took
leadership of the process by funding the effort and suggesting US Assistant Secretary of Defense
James Locher chair the DRC. The EU and the rest of the international administration effectively
delegated responsibility to the DRC.2 s4 Ashdown declared early on that he would not use the
Bonn powers to impose the agreement, which meant that the Bosnian politicians would have to
pass the necessary legislation.
The theory therefore predicts that defense reform will be accepted by elites and
implemented, due to the combination of unity and the lack of threat to nationalist goals or
informal networks. The theory further expects that the key to successful implementation will be
the flexibility of international demands to the political concerns of Serb and Bosniak officials.
The account of the first and second Defence Reform Commissions largely bears out these
predictions.
First Defence Reform Commission
The first stage of the defense reform process was formally launched in May 2003, with
Ashdown's decision creating the first Defence Reform Commission (DRC). The key initial
2 5 3 Louis-Alexandre Berg writes, "After the force resignation of the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, Mirko
Sarovic, RS President Dragan Cavic delivered a dramatic speech to a special session of the RS National Assembly
accusing senior army officers of greater loyalty to Belgrade than to Banja Luka, saying 'it is time for the Serb
Republic Army officers to realize that their fate is here in the Serb Republic. ""Local Networks and the Limits of
External Influence: Security Sector Reform in Liberia and Bosnia and Herzegovina," Paper presented at the
International Studies Association in San Diego, April 3 2012, 40. Interviews with SDS politicians and international
officials, Summer 2008, 2009.
2 Ric Bainter, who was a legal counsel to the DRC, writes "The international members of the DRC presented a
unified front in their insistence on meaningful defense reform." See "The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in
Bosnia and Herzegovina," in Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and Rule ofLaw in Postwar Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Burlin: Ashgate, 2008), 254. Interviews with international and local officials, Summer 2008.
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demands of the first DRC were to reform state and entity defense institutions to create central
255
state command and control over the entity militaries. Other possible demands, such as the
elimination of the entity militaries or the ethnic integration of the militaries, would have
threatened nationalist goals and led to a less successful reform.
The initial debate within the commission focused on the legal basis for reform. Locher
and other international officials claimed that the state, without the need for entity consent, had
the right to take authority over defense since defense was "necessary to preserve the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality of Bosnia and
Herzegovina." 256 Serb officials, concerned that defense reform would become a precedent for
further unilateral transfer of entity authorities, insisted that the entity parliaments would have to
vote on the DRC's agreement before it could be adopted.
As the negotiations continued, local elites of all three ethnicities eventually accepted the
creation of central state command and control, but sought to adjust the reform to pursue their
ethnicity's particular interests. Serb negotiators focused on ensuring continued symbolic
recognition of the RS and the continued medium-term existence of the entity militaries. Croat
officials sought to maintain an equal distribution of positions for the different ethnic groups in
the new state military institutions. Bosniak officials opposed the end of conscription and sought
to shift the entity militaries under state control as much as possible. Sulejman Tihic, the Bosniak
member of the Presidency, at one point insisted that the reform eliminate the entity militaries. He
255 The High Representative's decision also emphasized compliance with standards necessary to join the PfP,
democratic oversight, interoperability, and reducing the size of the military. OHR, "Decision Establishing the
Defense Reform Commission."
256 Dayton Annex 4 Article III.5a; interviews with OHR officials. See also James Locher and Michael Donley,
"Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defense Institutions," NATO Review (Winter 2004).
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only backed down after being assured by the US and Turkey that defense reform would continue
and that conscription would only be ended once the entity militaries were eliminated.25 7
By September 2003, the DRC came to an agreement that substantially fulfilled the initial
demands 258 while making some concessions to the various ethnic interests. The state presidency
would have operational command over the entity militaries, through a new state Ministry of
Defense, and the state parliament would have oversight. The entity militaries and ministries of
defense would be preserved, and each of the entities would be responsible for "manning,
training, and equipping" its military. Entity presidents would also retain the ability to use the
entity military forces for short-term natural disasters and accidents within the entity borders.25 9
The report also required reducing the size of the entity militaries, which would substantially
reduce their cost.260 Maintaining the existence of the entity militaries enabled Serbian politicians
to claim that they were protecting the Serbian character of the military while simultaneously
fulfilling international demands.
The legislation to implement the agreement was passed by December 2003. To protect
their ability to subsequently decide which powers the state would assume, the Serb
representatives used their veto to block progress at the state level until the RS had approved the
261relevant legislation. In November 2003, NATO issued fourteen benchmarks necessary for
joining the PfP. By late 2004 Bosnian officials had implemented the DRC's first report and the
257 These two countries are key allies for Bosniak politicians. Bainter, "The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform
in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 248. Interviews with OHR officials, Fall 2009.
258 The state would take over ultimate "operational and administrative command and control of all armed forces of
BiH." Defense Reform Commission, "The Path to Partnership to Peace," Sarajevo, September 2003, 8.2 59 Ibid, Chapter 2. See also, James Staples, "Defence Reform and PfP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RUSIJournal
149, no. 4 (August 2004): 35.
260 Defense Reform Commission, "The Path to Partnership to Peace," Sarajevo, September 2003, 24-25; Locher and
Donley, "Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defense Institutions.".261 Bainter, "The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 250.
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NATO benchmarks, with the exception of full cooperation with the ICTY.262 Failure to fully
cooperate with the ICTY, especially the failure to capture Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic,
would lead NATO to not allow Bosnia's entry into the PfP in 2004.
The Second DRC
In December 2004, Ashdown announced a new round of defense reform based on the "systemic"
weaknesses in the RS security institutions.263 In addition to the problems with the ICTY, it had
also been found that the RS Army had been secretly paying Mladic before 2003.264 Ashdown
promulgated decisions removing a number of RS officials from office, creating a Police Reform
Commission, and issuing a new mandate for the DRC.
The DRC's new mandate explicated a new set of goals and demands for reform: the
elimination of the entity militaries and their incorporation into a new unified state military. The
goal of eliminating the entity militaries, while it had been in the minds of policy-makers, was not
attempted during the first round of defense reform, and emerged only out of the process of the
first DRC's effort. 265 The new goal of eliminating the entity militaries included several specific
demands including strengthening of the state ministry of defense, eliminating the entity militaries
and ministries of defense, and restructuring the military to be more compatible with NATO.266
Although the new goal was more ambitious, the threat to the parties remained limited. For the
Serbs, so long as the elimination of the entity militaries did not become a precedent for further
262 Aybet, "NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 27-8. Interview with OHR official, Sarajevo, Fall
2009.
263 See OHR, "Statement by the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown at today's Press Conference," December 16
2004; OHR, "We Must Now Turn NATO's No into a Yes," June 29, 2004. See also ICG, Bosnia's Stalled Police
Reform: No Progress, No EU (Sarajevo/ Brussels, September 6, 2005), 2-4.
264 Note that paying Mladic a salary before 2003 did not specifically justify an additional defense reform, since the
previous reform had ended the problem. See DRC, "AFBiH: A Single Military Force for the 21" Century," Sarajevo,
September 2005, 187-188.
265 Interview with international official, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
266 See OHR, "Decision Extending the Mandate of the Defense Reform Commission," December 31, 2004.
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shiffing of entity authorities to the state, and the Serbian character of the military was somehow
preserved, the demands would continue to not threaten Serb nationalist goals.
The second stage of the DRC's negotiations also successfully achieved the international
demands. Local participants had gained experience during the first stage of negotiations that
enabled them to understand each other's redlines. The negotiations therefore focused more on
technical issues than on disputes about nationalism.267 With the elimination of the RS military,
Bosniak officials agreed to end conscription, which would professionalize the military and make
it more capable to participate in NATO operations.268
The main point of controversy, however, was how to continue to recognize ethnicity
within the new unified military. With international assistance, parties negotiated a substantial
reorganization to create a unified military while recognizing the desire amongst the Serbs and
Croats to retain the ethnic character of the military. The military would be organized into three
brigades, three regiments, and nine battalions. The brigades were each composed of three
battalions following the standard NATO structure. The regiments had no operational role and
were instead intended to "maintain a military heritage and identity." 269 Effectively, the three
regiments, corresponding to the three constituent peoples, preserved the ethnic character of the
military. Each brigade was composed of one battalion from each of the three regiments to ensure
integration and interoperability. While the regiments were generally associated with a particular
ethnicity, there was no specific ethnic identification and individuals of any ethnicity could join
any unit.270
2 6 7 Interviews with OHR officials, Sarajevo, Sununer 2008, Fall 2009.2 6 8 Bainter, "The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 252; Aybet, "NATO
Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 29-30.
269 Defense Reform Cornmission, "AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 2 1" Century," Sarajevo, September 2005,
25.2 7 0Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
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After the negotiation of each defense reform, the parliament passed the appropriate laws
and the laws were largely implemented, though NATO membership was delayed pending further
reform. Bosnia was admitted to PfP in 2006, and even deployed forces to Iraq in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.27 In April 2010, Bosnia was granted a NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP), which will eventually bring Bosnia closer towards NATO membership, with the
caveat that Bosnia could only begin the plan once defense property had been accounted for.
Another benefit of defense reform was that since the military was partially integrated along
ethnic lines, it would more be difficult for the military to play a major part in future war.
Conclusions andAlternative Explanations
Table 3.4: Defense Reform
Initial Preferences State command and control of entity militaries
Later Preferences Eliminating entity militaries
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
DRC 1 State High None Success: Confirmed:
command General elite acceptance; Flexibility of demands avoids
and control Negotiated agreement threatening nationalist goals
establishing state control;
Generally implemented
agreement
DRC 2 Elimination High None Success: Confirmed:
of entity General elite acceptance; Flexibility of demands enables
militaries Negotiated agreement for military structure
complicated restructuring accommodating ethnic interests
Implement- Elimination High None Success: Confirmed
ation of entity Military reform largely
militaries, implemented, but NATO
join NATO requires progress on
defense property
As predicted, defense reform was one of the most successful reforms in post-war Bosnia. The
reform largely confirms the theory, as the major demands of the reform were all implemented. In
particular, the specific objectives and compromises of the reform negotiations were
271 Interviews with OHR and NATO staff members July 30, 31, and August 1, 2008, Sarajevo.
272 "NATO Agrees to Launch Bosnia Membership Plan," Reuters, April 22, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/22/us-nato-bosnia-idUSTRE63L5H420100422
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accomplished because the demands did not threaten nationalist goals and the international
administration was unified.
There are two main alternative explanations for the success of defense reform in the
literature - NATO conditionality and the nature of the personal interaction in the defense reform
process. First, Guilner Aybet argues that NATO conditionality, especially the "clarity of NATO
benchmarks,"27 3 had important advantages over EU-led reforms, such as the police restructuring
effort described below. 274 The clarity of NATO demands did encourage greater implementation,
but the clarity of the demands was largely a function of the unity of the international
administration. Furthermore, if NATO had made demands threatening nationalist goals, as the
EU did in the case of police reform below, it is probable the Serbs would have opposed NATO
accession in the same way they opposed police reform.
Second, analysts have made three arguments about how the specific context and
individual interactions determined the outcome of the reform. Aybet highlights "the particular
culture of the military profession," and argues that the military professionals understood the
demands and pushed reform more effectively than their civilian counterparts would have.2 7 A
related argument was made by one participant, who claimed that senior officers may have
preferred a smaller and more professional military that gained the respect of their regional and
276NATO colleagues over the existing entity militaries. Finally, Ric Bainter argues that Serb
representatives had difficulty opposing reform because they were unable to point to another
2 73Aybet, "NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 23.
27 The ICG makes a related argument that the success of defense reform "stem[s] from NATO having a strong
mandate to begin the reforms; NATO giving no hint it would leave before the job was finished; and the NATO
inducement (at least the PfP portion) being far closer to hand than the promise of eventual EU membership."
"Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy," Europe Report N*180, 15 February 2007,
15-17
27 Aybet, "NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 23, 31-2. Quote on 23.2 76 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008 and Fall 2009.
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country or model where two militaries existed. 2 77 Contrary to these arguments, the behavior of
Serb officials in police restructuring below demonstrates that Serb officials would have found a
way to block defense reform if they believed it threatened RS autonomy, even at the cost of
delaying NATO integration or risking embarrassment in front of other professionals. The
absence of a threat to nationalist goals was necessary to enable greater inter-ethnic cooperation.
Two additional factors, which were not part of the theory also contributed to success.
While it was not part of the initial strategy, the fact that the international community pursued
defense reform in two stages was highly beneficial for gaining local acceptance. Furthermore,
negotiations with local elites forced the international administration make significant
modifications that ultimately benefited the achievement of international goals. For example, the
international administration would not have initially suggested that the entities retain emergency
powers in the first stage of the reform, nor would the international administration have demanded
retaining recognition for ethnic groups in the form of the regimental system in the second stage.
International flexibility thereby turned out to be essential for the success of the reform.
VI. Police Restructuring in Bosnia
The effort to restructure the police in Bosnia would prove to be one of the longest lasting and
least successful reform efforts. OHR hoped to strengthen the central state by moving authority
over policing away from the entities to the central state. Even though the EU made accession
conditional on the completion of police restructuring, local elites blocked the reform during each
stage, and forced the international community to eventually accept an effectively cosmetic
reform. Police restructuring is particularly useful for testing the theory because of over the
course of reform there was variation in international unity and the threat to nationalist goals and
27 7 Bainter, "The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 243-250.
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informal networks. The ultimate failure of the restructuring also demonstrates the dangers of
failed reform, including the development of a more radicalized party system and the
delegitimation of the EU accession process and Bonn Powers.
I describe and evaluate the police restructuring effort in five sections. First, I describe the
policing status quo in 2004, trace the origin of the international preference for police
restructuring, and code the relevant variables. Second, I trace the efforts by the Police
Restructuring Council during the tenure of Paddy Ashdown and explain its lack of success based
on the threat to nationalist goals. Third, I discuss the police restructuring effort under Ashdown's
successor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who adopted a less interventionist approach, and under
whose leadership the international administration lost its unity. Fourth, I discuss the failed effort
by Miroslav Lajcak, Schwarz-Schilling's replacement, to achieve police restructuring through
the aggressive use of the Bonn powers. A final section concludes and explains in depth how the
failure of police restructuring hurt political development in Bosnia.
Origins ofPolice Restructuring
The Dayton Agreement made policing the responsibility of the entities, and established an
International Police Task Force (IPTF) to help improve the police. In the RS, a centralized and
Serb-dominated police force was created. In the Federation, each canton had its own police
force, which meant that most of the cantons had mono-ethnic police forces, though a few had
ethnically divided and contentious police forces. The IPTF had a weak mandate, but did ease the
transition from the wartime paramilitary police to a more democratic police. Their activities
included training large numbers of police, vetting the police force, and reducing the overall size
of the entity police forces. Still, at the completion of the IPTF mandate, observers argued that
117
Bosnia's police force remained ethnically divided, controlled by political interests, and failed to
arrest war criminals.
While police restructuring developed out of Ashdown's tenure as High Representative, it
was not part of his initial plan. While Ashdown did focus on the rule of law, his initial ideas
about police reform focused more on improving the quality of the police rather than changing its
organization. By 2004, however, Ashdown set into motion an ambitious effort to shift policing
away from the entities to the state. The motivation for the restructuring is somewhat contested.
Ashdown and the European Union officially noted the continuing freedom for ICTY indictees
and the high politicization of policing. However, many analysts claim, and as Ashdown to some
extent admits in his memoir, OHR was pursuing the highly integrative and contentious goal of
weakening the autonomy of the RS. The success of defense reform and other earlier efforts
offered some evidence that a more aggressive challenge of the entities, in a highly politicized
issue area such as police, was likely to succeed.2 79
The international community's preferences for the police restructuring were the transfer
of policing competency to the state level and the simultaneous weakening of the RS.
International unity for achieving these preferences was initially high. Ashdown had dramatically
improved the coordination between the different international organizations, both because of his
experience as a British politician and his contacts with the leaders of other organizations.
278 See Cousens and Cater, Toward Peace in Bosnia, 59-64. ICG,"Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform," Europe Report
163, September 16 2005, 2; ICG "Is Dayton Failing," 43-49.2 7 9 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 20 10. Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 293-295;
Thomas Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Problems of Internationally-Led Security Sector
Reform," Journal ofIntervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1 (2008): 41. Thomir Loza, "Police Reform Held Hostage,"
Transitions Online, March 2, 2007.
280 OHR publically argued that this was not the case in "5 Common Misconceptions about Police Restructuring"
(Available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/default.asp?contentid=34263_: "MYTH ONE:
Police restructuring is a step towards abolishing the Entities. Fact: No it isn't. Police re-structuring is only about
establishing a professional police service and will not abolish the Entities. There is no plan to abolish the Entities."
In private, international officials claim "the entity's key institutions would be either abolished or divested of all
meaningful powers and Republika Srpska would end up an empty shell." Loza, "Police Reform Held Hostage,"
Transitions Online, March 2, 2007.
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Coordination between OHR and the EU was particularly good not only because Ashdown was
dual-hatted as the EU Special Representative, but also because of his good relationship with
European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten. 2
The preferences were explicated into demands in the form of three conditions: "i) All
legislative and budgetary competencies vested at the State level; ii) no political interference with
operational policing; iii) functional local police areas determined by technocratic policing
criteria."282 The condition about functional local police areas was interpreted by the international
administration to mean that police boundaries could no longer be coterminous with the inter-
entity boundary line (IEBL). Moving budgetary and legislative competencies to the state level
would further diminish entity control. Based on the requirement for police reform in the 2003 EU
Feasibility Study, the European Commission made these three conditions requirements for
Bosnia's progress with EU accession.
However, these demands threatened the autonomy of the RS and hence the Serbs'
nationalist goals. Unlike the military, control of the police within the RS was viewed as a critical
to the entity's autonomy. The importance of police in the minds of Serbs derived in part from the
greater role of the police and paramilitaries during the war. There was fear that non-Serb police
might abuse their position and discriminate against the Serb citizens of the RS. Hence, the
existence of RS police and Serb control over the police within the RS territory was essential for
the autonomy of the RS. The demand for cross-entity boundaries was therefore particularly
threatening, since it would weaken Serb control over the territory of the RS. The international
demand for cross-entity boundaries is also an excellent example of how "technical" demands by
281 "Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform," International Crisis Group, Europe Report 163, 16 September 2005, 5-8.2 8 2 Letter from Olli Rehn to Adnan Terzic, October 6, 2005, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/prc-
letters/default.asp?content id=36194; See also Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 43.
28' Letter from Olli Rehn to Adnan Terzic, October 6, 2005.
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the international community may in fact seek to achieve political goals. Any party that accepted
cross-entity boundaries, or that the state or other ethnicities would take over the RS police,
would be seen as a weak protector of Serb national interests and would be vulnerable in the next
election. Furthermore, as in the case of military reform, Serb politicians were concerned about
the precedent of transferring entity authorities to the state level.
Even if the threat to nationalist goals were avoided, the police reform would continue to
threaten Serb politicians' informal networks. Policing was highly politicized, which enabled
politicians to use the police as a tool to attack their opponents and protect their allies. Some Serb
politicians were also corrupt, and used their position to distribute state resources to supporters.
Maintaining entity control over the police would thereby become essential for these politicians to
protect themselves from prosecution.
For the Bosniaks, demands for moving policing to the state and weakening the entities
accorded with nationalist goals. A potential threat of insufficient reform did exist, however. The
RS police was a particularly despised organization among Bosniaks, especially after the
International Court of Justice ruling in February 2007 that the RS was a genocidal organization.
While the continued existence of the RS police did not in itself interfere with the key Bosniak
goals of unifying the state, Bosniak politicians would be able to use the existence of the RS
police to inflame ethnic tensions and speak against the reform, even if they could not count on
widespread public protest. As Bosniak politicians' informal networks were not as closely tied
with their illicit control of state resources, the restructuring of policing would not threaten their
informal networks.
2 8 4 Interviews with international officials, Fall 2009, Sunner 2011; Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 294-5.
Allegations of corruption, and of using control over the RS police to prevent prosecution, were particularly
prominent in the case of Milorad Dodik. See, for example, Dan Bilefsky, "Bosnian Serb Leader Accused of
Corruption," New York Times, 24 February 2009.
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The theory therefore predicts that Serb officials would block police restructuring in the
initial stage. So long as the demands remained strong, Bosniak support should be expected, but
weakened demands that legitimize the RS police are likely to provoke ethnic outbidding and
opposition to police reform by Bosniak parties.
Ashdown and the PRC Process
The official reform process was launched with the creation of the Police Reform Commission
(PRC). The PRC was included as part of the attempt in December 2004 to strengthen the rule of
law following Bosnia's inability to capture various individuals indicted by the ICTY. 28 5 The
PRC's mandate was to develop proposals for "a single structure for policing in Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the overall political oversight" of the state, and Wilfred Martens, a former
Prime Minister of Belgium, was appointed as chairman. 286
The greatest contention within the PRC was whether or not the boundaries of police
districts should cross the IEBL. Senior international officials took the position that the reform
required boundaries crossing the IEBL by focusing on technical criteria such as population, size,
and traffic patterns. While some Serb officials may have acknowledged that these boundaries
would be more technically efficient, they argued that unlike in the case of military reform, there
were few examples of countries where political and police boundaries were different. The Serb
parties maintained a unified front that policing should not cross the entity boundary line, and the
287Martens Commission could not achieve consensus.
Martens nevertheless issued a report of the PRC's work, which offered several options
for the new structure of policing, with the options specifying various ways for the policing
2 8 5 Serb politicians emphasize that Ashdown mainly used this as an excuse, as the RS was in full compliance with
ICTY investigations and few inductees turned out to be in the RS. Interview with SDS official, Banja Luka, Fall
2009.
286 Martens was believed to be a particularly good choice because of Belgium's ethnically divided institutional setup.
See Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 42.2 7 Ibid., 43-4. ICG, "Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform," 8.
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regions to cross the IEBL. The international efforts to encourage Serb agreement continued, with
a large public campaign and pressure from the EU insisting that Bosnia would be left behind if it
failed to accept the EU conditions. OHR also attacked the SDS by removing its members and
freezing of its funds for failure to help arrest war criminals. 288 Negotiations continued throughout
2005, moving from Mount Vlasic to Sarajevo to Banja Luka. At times, the SDS seemed willing
to bend to international pressure and accelerate EU accession. However, Serb politicians were
obliged by the repeated votes by the RSNA to oppose any agreement that specified that police
regions cross the entity boundary line or that required amendments to the RS constitution.28 9
Ashdown could not impose the demands since he had already stated that he would impose any
requirements for EU accession. Some observers do note that Ashdown's ability to compel the
Serbs to agree may have been limited by the Serbs' increasing cooperation on the ICTY.290
Dragan Cavic, the leader of the SDS, eventually pushed an agreement through the RSNA
in October 5, 2005 to move the police reform forward and thereby progress with the EU
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). The agreement formally accepted the international
demands, but did not specify how the demands would be implemented. The agreement did not
state that new policing boundaries should cross the IEBL and sought to avoid having the police
reform taken as precedent for other reforms. The agreement's lack of specificity meant that it did
not threaten Serb nationalist goals. 291
The international administration accepted the agreement even though it did not fully
implement international demands. Thomas Muehlman argues that the international
2 8 8 Anes Alic, "For Love of Karadzic," Transitions Online, 6 July 2004; Interviews with international and SDS
officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall 2009.2 8 9 Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 46-49.
290 Interview with OHR and SDS officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall 2009.
291 For full text see OHR, "Agreement on Restructuring of Police Structures in BiH," October 5, 2005,
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/prc-key-doc/default.asp?content id=36200. See Ashdown,
Swords and Ploughshares, 295.
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administration accepted the agreement because Serb opposition risked the entire EU accession
process in Bosnia. If the Serb elites rejected the EU to keep the RS police, and the Serb elites had
public support for their actions, it would imply that EU demands were not legitimate and would
question the entire EU integration effort in the whole region.292 Serb refusal thereby forced the
hand of even a unified international administration, which also demonstrates how the threat to
nationalist goals outweighs international unity.
Ashdown's tenure as High Representative finished with the creation of the new
commission, the Police Reform Directorate (PRD), which would continue negotiations about
police restructuring and continue to try to implement the international community's
preferences.293 While the PRD's mandate was vague, the potential for strong reform remained.
Police Reform under Schwarz-Schilling: A Return to Local Ownership?
Over the course of 2006 and 2007 police restructuring negotiations continued. However,
international unity decreased, which enabled elites to implement weaker demands. Christian
Schwarz-Schilling replaced Ashdown as High Representative. While Ashdown pursued an
aggressively interventionist strategy and closely coordinated the various organizations
comprising the international administration, Schwarz-Schilling was avowedly anti-
interventionist.294 The EU instructed Schwarz-Schilling to finish the police reform process, but
the European Commission was no longer fully behind the demands. The Commission began to
recognize that there was little precedent for policing boundaries crossing political boundaries in
the rest of Europe, and hints of disunity began to appear in meetings with local officials. Greater
2 9 2 Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 49-61.
293 OHR, "Decision Establishing the Directorate for Police Restructuring Implementation," December 8, 2005,
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/prc-key-doc/default.asp?content id=36481; Interviews with
international officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008, Fall 2009.
294 Schwarz-Schilling stated that "Bosnia and Herzegovina must be fully sovereign. That means I must step back"
and "I won't impose laws." ICG, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy," Europe
Report No180, February 15, 2007, 6-7, quotes on page 6.
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disunity was therefore the product of Schwarz-Schilling's different ideology, his failure to
command a consensus among the different organizations in Bosnia, and the change in the
295European Commission's perspective.
On the local side, two parties took over in the 2006 elections that were less willing to
compromise about police reform.296 On the Serb side, Milorad Dodik (SNSD) took over
leadership of the RS from Dragan Cavic (SDS). The fall of SDS was accelerated by the
perceptions of corruption and strong international sanctions, as well as by perceptions that Cavic
had given away too much on police reform in his negotiations with Ashdown.297 On the Bosniak
side, Haris Silajdzic (SBiH) took over from Adnan Terzic (SDA). Silajdzic was far more inclined
than Terzic to make greater demands for stronger reform and the elimination of the RS police.298
While the PRD met and produced a report in late 2006, Serb parties boycotted the PRD
negotiation process and had little confidence in the group's report. 2 9 9 The international demands
effectively weakened during this period, since the international administration no longer insisted
that the restructuring include policing districts that crossed the IEBL. This shift in demands
substantially weakened the threat to Serb nationalist goals.
In March 2007, Dodik made a one-day temporary offer to fulfill the rest of the demands
and accelerate EU accession. Dodik's offer would put control of the RS police under the state
level, while maintaining some level of RS influence through the appointment of Serb officials to
29 5 Muehlman cites the origins of disunity to the end of Ashdown's tenure, but according to my interviews the public
disagreement became much more problematic from the beginning of Schwarz-Schilling's tenure. The Commission's
hesitation was apparently in part based on hesitation about the European Council (via the EUSR (whose office was
dual hated as High Representative) dominating accession policy. Muehlmann, "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-
Herzegovina," 60-61. Interviews with OHR and EUPM officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008 and Fall 2009.
296 See also the description of these parties in the account of the April 2006 Constitutional Reform below.29 7Daniel Lindvall, "The Limits of the European Vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the Police
Reform Negotiations" (Stockholm University, 2009), 195, http://su.diva-
portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:276829.2 98 ICG, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future," 19-20; TOL "Shades of Yugoslavia" and "Bosnian Serb Leader on Top";
Interviews with analysts, international officials, and SBiH and SDS officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Summer
2008 and Fall 2009.
299 Interview with senior EUPM and OHR officials, Summer 2008 and Fall 2009.
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the state policing agency. Silajdzic rejected the offer, apparently because the RS police would
retain their name, and which would mean that the reform would recognize the continued
existence of a genocidal organization. Schwarz-Schilling and other international leaders did not
pressure the two leaders to come to a deal, and from the perception of participants no senior
international official had leadership over the international reform effort. Dodik's willingness to
come to an offer was in part based on the perception that the international administration was
unified and strong. The incident would lead Dodik to question the strength of the international
administration and would diminish his willingness to compromise in future negotiations.300
Police Reform Under Lajcak: An Aggressive Approach Ends in Failure
In July 2007, Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajcak replaced Schwarz-Schilling as High
Representative. Lajcak argued that Bosnia was at a "standstill" 301 and urged the local parties to
address the main existing obstacle to EU integration - police reform. With the PIC's support,
Lajcak also adopted a more interventionist approach than his predecessor. To put pressure on the
parties, Lajcak set a deadline of September 30 for approving his draft on police reform.
Negotiations in September and October between the local parties failed to arrive at a
compromise. While the SDA accepted Lajcak's draft, Slijdzic and Dodik continued to reject it,
even after Lajcak extended the deadline.302
Lajcak then began a "shock and awe" or "step-change" approach to convince the parties
to comply, which ended up backfiring. Lajcak instructed the parliament to amend the rules of the
state government, and stated that he would continue to impose new measures until the parties
300 There are a variety of theories about Dodik's offer. Some claim that Silajdzic apparently ignored the fact that the
offer specified that the name of the police could be changed later, while others claim that the offer was never meant
seriously, especially given the one day time interval. Interviews with senior OHR and EUPM officials, Sarajevo,
Summer 2008 and Fall 2009.
301 OHR, "High Representative's and EU Special Representative's TV Address to Citizens of BiH," 2 July 2007,
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?contentid=40108302 ICG, "Bosnia's Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe," Europe Report 198, 9 March 2009, 11-14.
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began to cooperate.3 03 In response, Serb officials boycotted state institutions, and a standoff
between OHR and the RS officials developed. International unity for imposing the demands,
however, was weak. The US was engaged in Kosovo's upcoming declaration of independence,
while the EU increasingly sought to avoid controversy about police reform. OHR also soon
realized that it did not have the military force to impose its decision if the RS continued to resist.
In December, OHR backed down, and negotiated a compromise about the new parliamentary
rules. 304
After OHR backed down from its "shock and awe" campaign, it accepted highly watered
down reform that made only cosmetic changes, as specified by the Mostar Declaration of
October 2008.305 The declaration specified that police would be brought under state control, but
only after constitutional reform. Constitutional reform was unsuccessful in 2006, and it remained
unlikely afterwards. This meant that the Mostar Declaration was largely meaningless with
respect to OHR's original demands for police reform. Despite the weakness of this agreement,
the EU agreed that it met the standards for police restructuring, and Bosnia soon signed the SAA.
Conclusions
Police restructuring largely confirms the theory's predictions. The various stages of the reform
are good test for the theory because the reform involved several combinations of international
unity and threats to nationalist goals or informal networks. Under Ashdown, there was
international unity and a threat to nationalist goals, which led to no implementation but no
303 See Lajcak's press conference on October 19 for details: OHR, "Press Conference Statement by the High
Representative Miroslav Lajik," October 19, 2007, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/
default.asp?contentid=40693
30 4 Inteview with former OHR official, Summer 2011. See also ICG, "Bosnia's Incomplete Transition: Between
Dayton and Europe," Europe Report N*198, March 9, 2009, 12-14; Philippe Leroux-Martin, Diplomatic Counter-
Insurgency forthcoming.
305 The Declaration is available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/prc-key-
doc/default.asp?contentid=40748
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weakening of the reform. 306 Under Schwarz-Schilling, unity decreased, and with the subsequent
weakening of the reform the threat to nationalist goals decreased as well. Threats to the informal
networks remained, 30 7 however, and Bosniak officials began to reject compromises. The result
was weakened reform and no implementation. Under Lajcak, international unity remained low
and the reform weakened further after the shock and awe campaign. The cosmetic changes in the
Mostar Declaration did not threaten nationalist goals or informal networks and were necessary
for the EU to save face, which led to the completion of the reform.
Table 3.5: Police Restructuring Reform
Preferences Move policing to state level Weaken RS
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
PRC & Move High Serb Failure: Confirmed:
Post PRC policing to (Ashdown) nationalist Serbs oppose reform; Serbs oppose police reform
negotia- state, goals International because of nationalist goals
tions boundary maintain strong despite EU conditionality
cross IEBL demands; No
implementation
PRD Move Low Serb Failure: Confirmed:
policing to (Schwarz- informal Elites accept International disunity enables
state level Schilling) networks principal of police elites to block reform despite
& Bosniak reform but cannot decreased threat
outbidding agree on specifics
Lajcak Move Low Serb Failure: Confirmed:
shock policing to (Lajcak) informal OHR tries to impose Theory expects failure of
and awe state level networks reforms; Dodik Lajcak's imposition
& Bosniak forces OHR to
outbidding weaken demands
Mostar Implement Low Low Partial Success: Confirmed
Agree- cosmetic Mostar Agreement
ment agreement signed, EU accepts
Police restructuring in Bosnia is also a counterexample for each of the alternative
explanations for institutional reform specified in the theory chapter. First, police restructuring
36 This argument is also made by Muehlman. See "Police Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina."307 Raffi Gregorian explains, "it now seems clear that neither man wanted to give up the control of police they
currently exercise through their parties' participation in government." See Gregorian, "Testimony to Helsinki
Commission," Available at http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewWitness&
ContentRecordid=893&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID=18849146&CFTOKEN
=53
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demonstrates the limits of international authority to compel reform. Neither the Bonn Powers,
nor OHR's attack on the SDS, convinced the Serb parties to cooperate, because the reform
threatened nationalist goals. Second, police restructuring represents the best counterexample for
the effectiveness of EU conditionality. Dodik, for example, stated that he would block
restructuring "even if that means giving up the SAA negotiations,"308 which is specifically
contrary to the prediction that EU conditionality should lead to compliance by local elites. Third,
so-called moderate parties such as SNSD and SBiH were even less inclined to accept the reform
than their wartime competitors.
Finally, police restructuring demonstrates three negative consequences of failed reform.
First, the failure of police reform delayed EU accession and thereby hurt Bosnia's economic and
political development. Second, the reform discredited the international community and
diminished the possibility for future reforms. For the EU, the police restructuring process made
clear that the EU would back down on reforms that it had previous said were conditional for
accession. For OHR, the reform discredited the Bonn Powers. In the course of the shock and awe
campaign, Lajcak was forced to negotiate with Dodik about the enforcement of the High
Representative's demands.309 Third, police restructuring is closely connected with the rise of the
uncooperative and entrenched local elites, Dodik and Silajdzic. The unwillingness of Schwarz-
Schilling to compel an agreement in 2007 helped both of them recognize that they could gain
local political support by opposing the international agenda and that the international community
had no tools to force them to compromise.31 The police restructuring reform thereby
3 0 8 ICG, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future," 19.
3 0 9 ICG, "Bosnia's Incomplete Transition," 13; Interview with international official, 2011.
310 On the dynamic between Dodik and Silajdzic see especially Thomir Loza, "Cardboard Nationalists," Transitions
Online, September 23, 2010, Tihomir Loza and Christophe Solioz, The Two-Step Program, 22 October 2009,
Transitions Online, and other articles in the same publication.
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demonstrates how less ambitious earlier demands would have had a more positive long-term
effect on political development in Bosnia.
VII. Indirect Tax Administration (ITA) and Value Added Tax (VAT) Reform
The ITA/VAT tax reform, which Ashdown believed to be "our biggest reform,"m created a
single rate, country-wide added value tax, and a state-controlled indirect tax administration. The
tax reform is also an example of a fundamentally different type of political interaction, in which
the local political elites cooperated to achieve mutual aims instead of competing over zero-sum
nationalist goals. Indeed, the reform dramatically increased government revenue both for the
state and the entities. However, after the creation of the tax, RS politicians began to threaten to
block implementation as they recognized that further progress would diminish the RS's share of
revenues.
I describe the reform in four sections. First, I discuss the status quo of the tax system
prior to the reform, the origins of the reform, and the potential for a threat to nationalist goals and
informal networks. Second, I discuss the negotiations about the creation of the VAT Commission
and the Commission's work. Third, I discuss the passage of the VAT and ITA legislation, and
the implementation of the reform. A fourth section concludes.
The Origins of the Reform
Prior to the reform, Bosnia's tax system hindered economic and political development.
According to the Dayton Agreement, the state government was dependent entirely on
contributions from the entities - two-thirds from the Federation and one-third from the RS.
Differences between the entity tax systems also led to a geographically divided economic
311 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 268.
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space. Furthermore, high tax rates and low collection rates encouraged the creation of large
grey sector economy. While a series of internationally sponsored technical assistance projects
did increase tax collection, many believed that the country's economic situation could only be
improved by a fundamental change to the tax system.3 3
Ashdown proposed just such a change after his arrival in Bosnia, as part of the broader
"Jobs and Justice" campaign. Ashdown argued that the high tax rates and lack of a single
economic space was a drain on Bosnia's economic growth, and he included tax reform in his first
Mission Implementation Plan. The international community's goal for the reform, therefore,
was to create a country-wide VAT that was administered at the state level.m OHR pursued this
goal by making two key demands: the creation of an Indirect Tax Administration at the central
state level and the creation of EU-compatible VAT with a single rate.
The international administration was unified about these demands, in large part due to
Ashdown's close coordination with European Commissioner Chris Patten. The goals for the
VAT were included in the 2003 EU Feasibility Study, which meant that EU accession was
explicitly conditioned on tax reform. A division of labor between the US Treasury, who would
work on direct taxation, and the EU CAFAO316 team, who worked on indirect taxation, avoided
further disagreements.m
312 Jan Werner, Laurent Guihdry, and Ognjen Djukic, "Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years
After the Dayton Treatment and Still Not in a Steady Condition", January 2006,
http://ideas.repec.org/p/lpf/wpaper/01-2006.html.
313 For a discussion of the earlier efforts see William Fox, "Destination Based Indirect Taxation: The Case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina," European Journal ofLaw and Economics 16, no. 1 (July 2003): 5-22.
314 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 222-224.; OHR, "OHR Mission Implementation Plan," January 30, 2003,
3.2; EU 2003 Feasibility Study, 33.
m The Mission Implementation Plan called for "the introduction of BiH-wide, EU-compatible Value Added Tax
(VAT)" because of the "current inefficient and ineffective sales tax regime." OHR, "OHR Mission Implementation
Plan," January 1, 2003, http://www.ohr.intlohr-info/ohr-mip/default.asp?contentid=29145.
316 Customs and Fiscal Assistance Offices
31 Interviews with current and former OHR, IMSF, EU CAFAO, and ITA officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall
2009.
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These demands did not threaten the nationalist goals or informal networks of the
Bosniaks or Serbs. For the Serbs, the potential threat was that the RS would become reliant on
the state for its budget instead of state being reliant on the RS. However, as one Serb politician
explained, the entities retained direct taxation authority, and the indirect tax reform would
provide additional revenues that would strengthen the entities. The Bosniaks supported the
reform, as it would strengthen the state and thereby achieve nationalist goals. With regard to
informal networks, the reform might have hurt politically connected grey-sector businesses on
both sides. However, the benefit of increasing government spending outweighed this risk, since
incumbents could use the increase in spending to support other informal networks. Unlike other
reforms, the VAT reform meant increasing the size of the pie, rather than arguing over the how
the pie was divided.319
The theory therefore predicts, given international unity and no threat to nationalist goals
or informal networks, that the demands should be accepted and fully implemented.
The VAT Commission
After Ashdown's arrival in Bosnia, negotiations began between various international and local
actors about the basic framework of state-level indirect taxation. OHR eventually established
consensus, though there were some initial disagreements from both international and local actors.
On the international side, the US Treasury Department, and later the IMF, argued that two entity-
based tax systems were sustainable. Unity about the demand for a single state-wide tax was
eventually achieved in part due to EU financing for the reform and the resulting delegation of
leadership to EU CAFAO. On the local side, additional opposition came from Mladen Ivanic,
who "knew there would be political advantage in outflanking the Serb nationalist SDS Party by
3 18 Interview with Dragan Cavic, Banja Luka, Fall 2009.
319 The pie metaphor was offered by an international official. Interviews with leaders of several political parties,
OHR officials, local analysts, Summer 2008, Fall 2009.
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opposing VAT. Ivanic could not successfully argue that the international demands threatened
nationalist goals, so he sought to claim that intemational demands for tax reform were excessive.
Ashdown "arranged for the Bosnian Muslims to attack me viciously for having given too much
to the Serbs in the negotiations - and then went ahead as planned," thereby circumventing
Ivanic's objections.3 21 Ashdown also stated that he would not impose the tax reform, since the
demands were conditional for EU accession.
After achieving local agreement for the reform, Ashdown issued a decision creating the
Indirect Tax Policy Commission (ITPC). The Commission's work was largely technical, as the
decision contained the basic framework for what the indirect tax system would become. The
decision called for the creation of a "single State-wide value added tax" administered by a state-
controlled indirect tax administration (ITA). Revenues would be placed in a "single account."
From the single account, the state budget would be paid first, then the state's debt payments, then
the ITA's costs, then the Brcko district, and only after that would funds be distributed to the
entities based on the amount of final consumption - and hence taxes paid - in each entity.32
Two laws were presented to the Bosnian parliament over 2003 and 2004, and were adopted,
which achieved the international demands. 3
3 2 0 Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares, 268.
321 Ibid.
322 OHR, "Decision Establishing the Indirect Tax Policy Commission," February 12, 2002
323 The first was the Law on Indirect Taxation System, which passed the parliament on December 29, 2003, and
created the Indirect Tax Administration (ITA) and based in the RS capital Banja Luka. The second was the Law on
VAT, which established a country-wide 17% added value tax. Many European countries have multiple tax rates for
different types of goods, but Ashdown had insisted on a single tax rate for all goods and services in Bosnia, and
European Commission supported this interpretation. The fear was that allowing any exemptions for goods such as
medicine or books would lead to a slippery slope where a variety of societal actors would demand further
exemptions. See Anes Alid, "A Tax Reform for Bosnia," Balkan Reconstruction Report, no. 01/12 (2004). Rajko
Tomas, "Bosnia: Percentage Game," Transitions Online, no. 01/11 (2005).
132
Implementing the Indirect Tax Reform
Implementation of the laws on the VAT and ITA was a partial success, since the ITA and VAT
were quickly established, but distribution of revenues became contested. By 2007, the ITA was
successfully established, and sales tax/VAT revenue jumped from 10.8% of GDP in 2005 to
14.2% in 2006 and 13.4% in 2007. 24The increase in revenue helped finance a variety of state
and entity institutions and activities.
In 2006, however, RS politicians began to realize that further implementing the
agreement might lead to a loss of revenue for the RS. The distribution of VAT revenues to the
entities was supposed to be based on the proportion of final consumption in each entity as
determined through a technical process. Whenever the coefficients changed in favor of, for
example, the Federation, the RS's share of revenue would diminish. However, for the
distribution to fund to the entities to go forward, the ITA Governing Board needed to approve the
coefficients on a quarterly basis. RS members of the Board recognized that they could threaten to
refuse to accept the coefficients and block distribution of the tax revenues. The result of these
incentives was that the Governing Board agreed only to temporary coefficients from 2006 to
2008, and there continued to be fears that the allocation of the revenues would be frozen.m2
At the same time, RS officials became more aware that for two reasons, any increase in
the state budget would decrease their own share of tax revenues. First, the state budget was paid
out of the single account first, so the amount remaining for the entities would decrease the larger
the state budget became. Second, most state consumption happened in the Federation, so the
RS's share of final consumption would decrease as the state took over greater authority.
Consequently, following the tax reform, RS officials had a financial reason to oppose moving
324 IMF, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2007 Article IV Consultation," IMF Country Report No. 07/268, August 2007, 6,
24.3 2 5 Interviews with international and local officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall 2009.
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authority to the state, in addition to the need to protect the RS's autonomy as a nationalist
goal. 326
Conclusions
Table 3.6: VAT/ITA Reform
Preferences Country-wide single-rate VAT State administration of indirect taxation
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Pre-ITA Country-wide High Low Success: Confirmed:
Commission single-rate VAT; Elite acceptance of International unity forces
and ITA State demands except for PDP; implementation of
Commission administration of Elites negotiate agreement demands; expansion of pie
indirect taxation and pass law establishing ensures elite agreement
state ITA and single VAT
ITA Country-wide High Low Success: Confirmed:
implement- single-rate VAT; ITA created; VAT Unity and low threat lead to
ation 1 State dramatically raises implementation
administration of revenues
indirect taxation
ITA Country-wide High Low Partial Success: Partially Confirmed:
implement- single-rate VAT; Serbs recognize that Unexpected failure of
ation 2 State specific structure of ITA international administration
administration of can reduce their revenues, to anticipate Serb
indirect taxation threaten to obstruct, but incentives to obstruct
otherwise implemented
The indirect tax reform is often cited with defense reform as two of the most successful reform
efforts in Bosnia. The international community met its goal of establishing a state-wide VAT
administered by an institution at the state level. The state found a secure source of funding and
the entities' revenue substantially increased. Bosnia met the EU's standards for taxation, and EU
conditionality helped accelerate state building. For the theory, the reform indicates the
importance of international unity and the possibility of ambitious reform in Bosnia. When
compared with defense reform, tax reform also indicates that reform can succeed when the EU,
rather than US, is in the lead.
326 Interviews with international and local officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, Fall 2009.
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Two issues, however, are remarkable. First, the EU insisted on a single tax rate, while
many European countries have multiple tax rates. Few local officials were knowledgeable about
taxation, which made it easier for the EU to insist on such a condition. Second, the difficulties
related to the distribution of revenues to the entities are also telling. My interviewees claim that
the reform was completed with such speed that the international community did not fully realize
that the tax system would establish a conflictual fiscal relationship between the entities. 2 7
VIII. April 2006 Constitutional Reform
Ten years after the Dayton Agreement, the international administration turned its attention to
addressing the inefficiencies if the central state. Their attempt, in April 2006, to make the state
more functional by amending the Dayton constitution failed. Disagreements within the
international administration about the importance of the reform effort made it easier for local
elites to oppose the reform. Bosniak and Croat parties engaged in ethnic outbidding, despite
relatively unthreatening international demands, and blocked the reform. The failure of
constitutional reform therefore largely confirms the theory. The result of the failed reform was
the continuing inefficiency of the Bosnian state, the delegitimation of the international
community, and the continued polarization of ethnic politics.
I describe this reform in four. sections. First, I explain the origin of the reform and code
the key variables. Second, I describe the negotiation of the reform. Third, I discuss the failure of
the reform in the central state parliament. A fourth section concludes.
327 Interviews with international officials, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
3I summarize the negotiations since much of the detail is well described in the secondary literature. See in
particular the papers cited below by Don Hays, Bruce Hitchner, and Sofia Sebastian.
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Origins, Unity, and Threat
The international administration began the 2006 constitutional reform based on ongoing
observations about the inefficiency of the state government in Bosnia. A report by the Venice
Commission identified two main problems. 329 First, in the state executive and legislative process,
ethnic elites had "too many possibilities of blocking the taking of any decision."33 0 For example,
Serb politicians could block the state institutions through the vital national interest veto, the
entity veto, the House of Peoples, and the Serb member of the Presidency. Second, in violation
of the European Convention on Human Rights, certain political offices were not open to all
citizens. In particular, Others - defined as people from none of the three main ethnic groups -
were excluded from the state House of Peoples and state presidency. Addressing these two
problems, making the state more efficient and enabling individuals of any ethnicity to be elected
to any office, became the goals of the reform effort. These goals were posed as international
demands during negotiations in April 2005.
The unity associated with these demands was low, because of disagreements about the
content, advisability, and importance of the reform. As Sofia Sebastian explains in depth, the EU
was deeply divided about the constitutional reform. Key actors, such as former High
Representative Ashdown and Javier Solana, believed constitutional reform was unwise.m While
the US favored an aggressive internationally-led approach, many in the EU favored a more
329 Don Hays and Jason Crosby, "From Dayton to Brussels: Constitutional Preparations for Bosnia's EU Accession"
USIP Special Report 175, October 2006, 3-4.
330 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the
Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative, March
11-12, 2005, <www.venice.coe.int/docs/2005/CDL-AD(2005)004-e.asp> (accessed December 4,
2005), Paragraph 42.R. Bruce Hitchner, "From Dayton to Brussels: The Story Behind the Constitutional and
Governmental Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30 (2006): 127.
33 Sebastian quotes Solana and explains "I do not think it would be good time to open Dayton again at this
moment.. .I very much hope that as time goes by you will have the discipline and the energy to do this alone,
without the need for pressure and impulse from the international community. Sofia Sebastian, "The Role of the EU
in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Ethnopolitics 8, no. 3 (2009): 343-4, 348-50.
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locally owned approach, since they believed that it was inappropriate to make demands about
Bosnia's constitutional development. The EU was also ambiguous as to whether the reform was
required for EU accession.33 2 Finally, during Schwarz-Schilling's tenure as High Representative,
coordination with the international administration weakened. Indeed, Schwarz-Schilling created
an alternative group to work on constitutional reform that did not coordinate with the main
international effort, and he apparently even fell asleep in Parliament while the reform was being
debated.3 "
The goals of the reform - making the state more efficient and enabling individuals of any
ethnicity to be elected - threatened neither the nationalist goals nor the informal networks of the
Bosniaks, Croats or the Serbs. However, particular parties did use the apparent threat of the
demands to engage in nationalist outbidding. For the Serbs, the greatest threat was the
elimination of the entity veto, 4 which they believed was necessary to prevent the state from
attacking the RS autonomy and other Serb interests. So long as the entity veto was not part of the
package, the autonomy of the RS would be protected. For the Croats, the demands did not affect
Croat nationalist goals of ruling Croat majority areas or Croat representation in the state. Instead,
the reform was politically salient among Croats since it legitimized the RS and reminded Croats
of their desire for their own entity. For most Bosniak parties, so long as constitutional reform
strengthened the state and was expected to continue, the reform accorded with nationalist goals.
For SBiH, however, the International Court of Justice's decision that the RS military was guilty
of genocide altered the potential threat of international demands. SBiH argued that any reform
that legitimized the RS was unacceptable, thereby engaging in nationalist outbidding even on
332 Ibid., 347-8.
33 Interview with international official, Sarajevo, Summer 2008. On Schwarz-Schilling falling asleep in meetings,
see also ICG, "Ensuring Bosnia's Future," 7.
33 The entity veto was the requirement for a majority of representatives from the RS to pass legislation in the state
House of Representatives.
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demands that were not objectively threatening. Informal networks were not a concern for any of
the parties, since the measure was entirely a legal and constitutional matter.
Since the unity was low and there was no threat to nationalist goals or informal networks,
the theory expects the reform to be partially implemented. However, the ability of Bosniak and
Croat parties to engage in ethnic outbidding on these issues was more extensive than the theory
would predict and led to the failure of the reform.
Negotiations
Negotiations began in early 2005 and were led by former Principal Deputy High Representative
Don Hays and a US-based NGO, the Dayton Project. Representatives of the major parties met in
Washington, DC to try and develop a draft to meet the reform goals. Leaders of the different
ethnic groups predictability argued for their preferred institutions, as Sofia Sebastian explains:
"Bosniak leaders, for example, asked for the establishment of a majority-based government, a
parliament with no entity voting and the abolition of the entities... Serb parties [sought] a rotating
collective Presidency, the maintenance of entity voting and no change to the status of the RS...
Croats showed a great deal of ambivalence, [though] there were voices in favor of a third entity
or a three-tier structure for all levels of authority."335 By December 2005 the negotiations were
close to failure.
At this point, the US Embassy in Sarajevo took over leadership of the project, and shifted
to bilateral meetings rather than multilateral discussions. The US, EU member states, and various
NGOs tried to pressure the parties, and by March 2006 an agreement was reached. The key
elements of the agreement were that the Presidency would be elected by the state House of
Representatives rather than directly, the House of Representatives would be doubled in size and
would have nominating authority for the House of Peoples, and the areas of competency for the
3 Sebastian, "The Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 343-4.
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state would be expanded to include, among others, the requirements for European integration.336
By shifting nominating power for the Presidency and House of Peoples to the House of
Representatives, the agreement would enable individuals of any ethnicity to be elected to any
position. However, in practice the parties would continue to elect members of their respective
ethnicities to the positions. By enabling the state to fulfill the requirements for EU accession, the
agreement addressed the failure to adopt the legislation necessary for EU accession, even as the
agreement failed to address the overall inefficiency of the central state legislature. Consequently,
the agreement partially implemented international goals, as the theory would predict given low
unity and low threat to nationalist goals and informal networks.
SBiH refused to cooperate with the process after January 2006 since the agreement did
not include the elimination of the entity vote. Following the March 2006 agreement, the Croat
HDZ splintered, and a new party was formed. This party, which ran as HDZ-1990 in the next
elections, also insisted that the reform go further towards eliminating the entity veto and
weakening the RS. These parties claimed that the demands threatened to nationalist goals and
engaged in ethnic outbidding because of that threat, even though according to the theory the
demands did not objectively threaten their nationalist goals.
Parliamentary Failure
Despite last minute lobbying by the US, EU, and finally Schwarz-Schilling, the constitutional
reform failed in parliament in April 2006. The reform required a two-thirds majority in the state
parliament and failed because two parties - SBiH and HDZ-1990 - opposed the reforms. The
international administration also made promises that constitutional reform would continue after
336 Hays, "From Dayton to Brussels: Constitutional Preparations for Bosnia's-Eu
Accession," 6-10, (Venice Commission) European Commission for Democracy Through Law, "Draft Amendments
to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina," (Strasbourg: 2006). Interview with former OHR official,
Washington DC, Summer 2007.
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April 2006, but were unsuccessful in convincing the parties to vote for the reform. Both SBiH
and HDZ-1990 used their opposition of the constitutional reform to campaign in the October
2006 elections. Both parties vote share increased, which demonstrates that their reframing of
nationalist goals was at least partially accepted by the population.337
Conclusion
Table 3.7: April 2006 Constitutional Reform
Preferences Increasing state legislative efficiency All individuals can be elected to all positions
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Negotiation Increasing state Low Low Partial Success: Confirmed:
legislative Elites push for their General elite acceptance,
efficiency, particular goals but International disunity leads to
All individuals eventual reach an partial implementation
can be elected to agreement partially
all positions implementing
international goals
Parliamentary Increasing state Low Low Failure: Partially Confirmed:
process legislative SBiH and HDZ-1990 SBiH and HDZ-1990 were
efficiency, invoke nationalist goals able to invoke nationalist
All individuals to engage in outbidding goals when there was no
can be elected to and block the reform objective threat
I all positions I I
The April 2006 constitutional reform confirms many of the theory's predictions, especially with
regard to international disunity. Sebastian quotes an SBiH official observation that "domestic
actors did not perceive unity. The EU was still ambivalent, and domestic actors used this to play
[the internationals off of] each other."338 As the theory predicts, the failure of unity thereby led
the actors to have more freedom to reject the reform without fear of punishment. The April 2006
reform also demonstrates that nationalist goals can sometimes be invoked by political leaders,
especially in the case of international disunity, even if there is no objective threat to nationalist
goals.
m Interviews with international and local officials, Sarajevo, Summer 2008 and Fall 2009. See also Sebastian, "The
Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-Herzegovina," 351.
338 Ibid., 350.
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The main consequence of constitutional reform was the development of an intransigent
ethnic political system. Following the negotiations, Milorad Dodik of SNSD began to take
advantage of the unwillingness of SBiH to compromise. A dynamic emerged in which each
leader took an intransigent nationalist position in order to gain support from their own ethnic
group and block further reform. The dynamic would happen again at Butmir in Fall 2009, when
the international community would attempt another round of constitutional reform. Dodik
refused any changes based on the rights of the entities, and Silajdzic refused any reform that did
not make progress towards eliminating the RS.339
IX. Conclusions
Theory Testing
The reform efforts described above largely confirm the theory. The case studies above offer
repeated verification of the mechanisms described in the theory, including elite outbidding on
nationalist goals, elites' effective use of public protest to block reforms, as well as how disunity
prevents the administration from making effective conditional demands, from monitoring
compliance, and from punishing elites. The case studies also verify the predictions about the
trajectory and outcome of the reform efforts. For all of the case studies, the outcome of the
reform generally followed the theory's expectations based on the overall level of unity and
threat. The strength of institutions, and the contribution to Bosnian political development, were
consistently higher when the international administration was unified and when the reform
avoided threatening nationalist goals or informal networks.
To be sure, the theory did not precisely explain the trajectory of all of the reforms
precisely. As a result of its relative parsimony, the theory cannot accurately predict all of the
339 Interviews with international officials and analysts, Sarajevo, Fall 2009.
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details of the case studies. However, even where the theory's specific predictions were not borne
out, elements of the theory such as nationalist goals and international ideology could explain the
general trajectory of the reform. As shown in Table 3.8 below, the theory sometimes
underestimated the willingness of the international community to engage in ambitious integrative
demands. The international integrationist ideology was particularly strong in Bosnia, in part
because of the experience of many international officials during the war and their desire to
remake the society to counter the war's effects.
Table 3.8: Theory testing
Reform Confirm Theory Unexplained events
Elections Partially confirm Direct threat to elites through the manipulation of electoral institutions;
Election of semi-moderate-Alliance for Change
Entity Confirm Partial implementation of international preferences came only because
Constitutions of imposition
Defense Confirm
Police Confirm Unexpected strong demands under Lajcak
ITA/VAT Confirm Institutional design encourages Serbs to obstruct revenue distribution
April 2006 Partially confirn Unexpected ability of SBiH and HDZ-1990 to invoke nationalist goals
to block reform
The theory also sometimes underestimated the ability of local elites to invoke nationalist
goals and engage in outbidding when the demands did not objectively threaten nationalist goals.
The ability of elites to invoke nationalist goals may be greater in Bosnia than other international
administrations, however, because the opposing sides continued to politically interact after the
end of the war. In Kosovo or East Timor, the opposing side of the civil war was less present in
politics, which may have made it more difficult for local elites to invoke nationalist goals.
Policy Implications
Based off of the account of institution building in Bosnia, the chapter offers three suggestions for
the future of international state-building in Bosnia and elsewhere. First, the chapter demonstrates
that successful international-led institutional reform requires consensus and coordination within
the international community. The key to success was not the extent of international authority, nor
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the aggressive use of that authority, but close coordination and agreement. Before attempting any
reform, OHR, or any similar organization, should first ensure that all key international actors
agree on the demands. While this might seem obvious, the record is replete with examples of the
failure of international coordination, including in the case of elections, entity constitutional
reform, the April 2006 constitutional reform, and especially police reform. There is probably no
straightforward way to consistently achieve higher unity, the leadership of the administration is
clearly important. Note that the only period of consistent unity was under the leadership of Paddy
Ashdown. The international community has sometimes been overcautious about appointing
strong and independent leaders, such as Ashdown, for fear that the mission will exceed its
authority. The caution of the international community is counter-productive to the greater goal of
achieving strong state-building.
Second, this chapter demonstrates the flaws of an ambitious integrative agenda. There are
those who argue that the international community has simply not tried hard enough in Bosnia,
and that a renewed aggressive effort to integrate Bosnia would achieve great dividends. 340 This
chapter has sought to disprove this argument by repeatedly demonstrating, though a variety of
historical circumstances, how the popularity of nationalist goals trumped any international
demands that challenged nationalist goals. The cases of electoral reform, police reform, and the
April 2006 constitutional reform clearly demonstrate how the failure of ambitious demands can
hurt the society. Furthermore, the legitimacy of aggressive international administration
diminishes as the memory of the war fades into the past.
Third, well-defined demands that were backed by international unity greatly improved
Bosnia. In the cases of defense reform and the VAT/ITA reform, for example, lingering
340 See for example Kurt Bassuener, "Comment: Bosnia Cannot Disintegrate Without Violence," Balkan Insight,
April 4 2011, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/comment-bosnia-cannot-disintegrate-without-violence
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problems from the Dayton Agreement were addressed and corrected. The account above does not
dispute the desirability of ethnic integration or of replacing wartime political objectives. Instead,
I argue that the international community's broader goals of implementing human rights,
spreading democracy and the strengthening state are often better served by working with, rather
than against, the incumbent elites.
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Chapter 4
Institution Building in Kosovo: Great Expectations
"The Security Council, in its resolution 1244 (1999), has vested in the interim civil administration authority
over the territory and people of Kosovo. All legislative and executive powers, including the administration
of the judiciary, will, therefore, be vested in UNMIK...The Special Representative of the Secretary-General
as the head of UNMIK, is the highest international civilian official in Kosovo. He will enjoy the maximum
civilian executive powers envisaged and vested in him by the Security Council in its resolution 1244
(1999), and will also be the final authority on their interpretation."34 1
The UN Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is one of the most long lasting and ambitious
efforts to construct political institutions in a post-conflict society. UNMIK was created following
the war in Kosovo, in which the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fought against Serbia for
Kosovo's independence. The UN resolution ending the war recognized Serbia's territorial
integrity and mandated UNMIK to govern the territory and to establish interim state institutions
prior to the determination of Kosovo's status. Many UNMIK officials had experience in Bosnia
or other previous interventions, and they believed that UNMIK's extensive authority, resources,
and expertise would enable successful state building. However, the success of UNMIK's
institution-building efforts was mixed. On one hand, UNMIK successfully established basic
representative institutions, a customs administration, and a civilian protection force. On the other
hand, the key effort to strengthen Kosovo's institutions as a prelude to independence, the
Standards before Status reform, provoked widespread riots in March 2004.
The theory explains the observed variation in reform trajectory. UNMIK was largely
unified throughout its administration. Based on the lessons from Bosnia, UNMIK had a
hierarchical pillar structure that placed international organizations under the formal authority of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Variation in UNMIK's success was
therefore largely determined by the relative threat of demands to nationalist goals and informal
networks. When UNMIK made demands that threatened the key Albanian nationalist goal of
341 "Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo," 12 July 1999, S/1999/779, para 35, 44
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independence, as in the case of the Standards before Status reform, mass protest occurred and
elites blocked implementation. When demands did not threaten independence but did threaten
the parties' informal networks, UNMIK was partially able to implement its demands. The
Kosovo Albanian elites developed strong links with informal criminal, patronage, and corruption
networks prior to and during the war, and these networks remained important following the war.
UNMIK was unable to diminish the importance of informal networks in the broader society, but
it was able to strengthen state institutions to some degree. When UNIK made demands that did
not threaten either nationalist goals or informal networks, international unity led to the full
implementation of the demands.
The chapter also provides evidence against the major alternative explanations. First,
scholars have written that certain reform efforts, especially the police and customs service,
demonstrate that proper bureaucratic procedures lead to positive institutional outcomes. Instead,
the chapter demonstrates that it was international unity that enabled the use of good bureaucratic
procedures and that the success of these reforms depended on the threat to local elites. Second,
the demands from major donors, such as the US or the EU, were not sufficient to cause elites to
support reforms that threatened nationalist goals or informal networks. Third, international
efforts to build liberal institutions did not strengthen moderate parties, nor were parties
recognized by the international community as moderates any more likely to accept international
demands.
This chapter examines only the reform efforts pursued by the international administration
from June 1999, when UNMIK deployed, to February 2008, when Kosovo declared
independence. While resolution 1244 remained in force after February 2008, the international
administration was reorganized and the political context changed significantly. The chapter
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proceeds in nine sections. First, I describe the context of the international administration,
including the war in Kosovo, the mandate and character of UNMIK, and the post-war domestic
context within Kosovo. Second, I briefly introduce the reform efforts and discuss the sources
used. I make use of 45 interviews with international officials, local officials, and policy analysts
conducted in Kosovo from December 2009 to February 2010. The third through the eighth
sections trace the various reform efforts - the initial establishment of representative institutions,
the Standards before Status reform, electoral reform, police reform, the creation of the Kosovo
Protection Corps, and customs reform. The conclusion summarizes the testing of the theory in
the different reform effort and discusses policy implications from UNMIK.
I. War, Intervention, and Political Context
This section describes the context for the international administration in Kosovo in three parts.
The first part examines the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s, including the origins of the
conflict, the conduct of the war, and the development of UN resolution 1244. The second part
addresses the mandate, structure, and ideology of UNMIK. The third part outlines the domestic
politics of Kosovo after war. The Kosovo Albanians, who constituted a clear majority of the
population, were the main participants in UNMIK's institution-building efforts. The major
Kosovo Albanian parties campaigned on the achievement of independence and retained
influential informal networks. While some Serbs remained in Kosovo, they by and large
boycotted the institutions UNMIK established and played little role in the effort to reform these
institutions.
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Politics before, during, and after the war in Kosovo are complex and highly contested.
Indeed, as Tim Judah notes, history for both Serbs and Albanians is "war by other means" 342 _
both sides use opposing accounts to support particular political claims. I have sought to avoid
bias in describing the war or post-war political context, although such an account may be
impossible.34 3
The War and Intervention in Kosovo
As discussed in the Bosnia chapter above, in the 1980s and early 1990s, a Serbian nationalist
movement, led by Slobodan Milosevic, rose to prominence in Serbia.344 Kosovo played an
important role in the Serbian nationalist discourse because of the long history of Serbs in the
territory, the presence of important Serbian cultural monuments in Kosovo, and the increasing
dominance of Albanians in the territory.3 4 s In the early 1990s, Milosevic's regime undertook a
campaign "designed, in the short run, to reduce the Albanians to second-class citizens and, in the
long run, to drive them from the province." 346 Kosovo's political autonomy was abolished.
Albanians' position and freedoms within Kosovo were attacked through measures including
eliminating funding for education in Albanian; purging Albanians from various government
institutions, including the police force; shutting down the Albanian language press; and passing
342 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 1.
343 There is a wide literature that examines the history of Kosovo, the war, and intervention in more detail. See
especially Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response,
Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of
Yugoslaviafrom the Death of Tito to the Fall ofMiloevi6 (Westview Press, 2002), chap. 13; Noel Malcolm,
Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Petersen, Western Intervention in the
Balkans, chap. 7, and 9; Judah, Kosovo; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army.
344 As explained in the Bosnia chapter, Bosnia refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbs and Serbian refers to the
ethnicity or nationality. Serbia throughout to the polity dominated by Serbs with its capital in Belgrade. After 1992,
the official name of this polity has included the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, and the Republic of Serbia.
345 For a discussion of the role of Kosovo in the Serbian nationalist discourse, see Malcolm, Kosovo, xxx-xxxii;
Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 342-346; Branislav Krstid, Kosovo Facing the Court ofHistory (Amherst, N.Y:
Humanity Books, 2004), chap. 3.3 4 6 Ranet, The Three Yugoslavias, 510.
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various measures to discourage Serb outmigration from Kosovo.34 7 Several accounts detail how
Kosovo Albanians were killed or arrested for resisting Serbian authority.348
In response to the political oppression, two prominent Albanian political movements
were established and eventually sought independence for Kosovo. 3 4 9 The first movement was
non-violent and organized a system of "parallel institutions" under the "Republic of Kosovo."
This movement organized a semi-secret election in May 1992, which the Serbian authorities
declared illegal. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), with Ibrahim Rugova as the
President, won 76% of the vote. LDK insisted that only non-violence would be effective and
adopted several measures to improve the life of the Kosovo Albanians and work towards
independence. 35 0 First, LDK supported the creation of parallel public services, especially in the
area of education and health. In addition to providing services to Albanians, the parallel
structures would delegitimize the Serbian authorities. 35 1 Second, a government-in-exile, linked
with LDK, created a "Three Percent Fund" that channeled money from the significant Albanian
diaspora in Western Europe and the United States to fund the parallel institutions. Finally, the
LDK sought to gain international support. The LDK had hoped that Kosovo's status would be
discussed at Dayton in 1995. When international support for the Kosovo Albanians failed to
materialize, LDK's nonviolent position became less popular.
1 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 72-80; Malcolm, Kosovo, 342-353.
348 Noel Malcolm explains, "To produce an adequate survey of the human rights abuses suffered by the Albanians in
Kosovo would require several long chapters in itself." Kosovo, 349. See, inter alia, Ramet, Balkan Babel, 308;
Heny H. Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle ofthe Ahtisaari Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 28-33.
349The specific desire for independence did not emerge for several years. See Judah, Kosovo, 65; Clark, Civil
Resistance in Kosovo, 92-3.
"
0 Judah, Kosovo, chap. 3; Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 64-69, 80-84.
351 Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 84-119.
3 2 Judah, Kosovo, 69-70, 94-98; Malcolm, Kosovo, 348-354; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 14-16; Independent
International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 45-49.
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The second political movement, which was willing to use violence, came to be called the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA (also known by its Albanian acronym UCK)). Throughout the
1990s, Albanians both within Kosovo and abroad sought to establish a more aggressive
resistance movement against Serbia. After 1995, the KLA began to attack particular Serb
officials and steadily gained popularity at home as well as resources abroad. The organization
remained secretive and few had confidence that it would be successful.3" Until late 1997, the
KLA was loosely organized and included leaders such as Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj.
In 1998, aided by funding from the diaspora and the flow of weapons from Albania, the KLA
increased their attacks against Serbian police.354
The Serbian authorities initially responded to the attacks by targeting the KLA leadership
and calling the group a terrorist organization. When the KLA's attacks persisted, Serbian police
attacked Albanian civilians in several prominent massacres, including against the Jashari clan in
March 1998. The Serbian attacks generated greater public support for the KLA, and the KLA
escalated their campaign. The Serbian police attacked the KLA-held territory in response.
Reports in August 1998 estimated that 200,000 to 300,000 Kosovo Albanians were displaced as
a result of the violence.3 "
Alarmed by the events in Kosovo, and motivated by previous disagreements with
Milosevic, the United States began to get involved. US diplomats, led by Richard Holbrooke,
began negotiating with the Albanian leadership and Milosevic. The violence continued through
February 1999, when the intemational community organized a conference at Rambouillet. At
3 Perritt quotes Lirim Greicevci observing that "before August of 1997 no one had ever seen a KLA member."
Kosovo Liberation Army, 30.
*
4 On the rise of the KLA, see especially Ibid., chap. 1 and 5. See also Judah, Kosovo, chap. 4 and 5; Ramet, The
Three Yugoslavias, 510-17; Chris Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May 1, 1999): 24-
42; Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 51-53.
3 55 Judah, Kosovo, chap. 5-6; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, chap. 5; Independent International Commission on
Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 67-82. Statistic from Kosovo Report, 74.
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Rambouillet, three Albanian leaders - Rugova, Thaci, and Rexhep Qosja of the LBD party -
created a provisional government that negotiated on behalf of Kosovo Albanians. An agreement
was negotiated that would provide Kosovo with autonomy and while the American negotiators
eventually convinced the Kosovo Albanian leadership to sign the agreement, the Serbs argued
that the agreement would allow it to be occupied by NATO and refused to sign.356
After Milosevic rejected a final ultimatum from Holbrooke, NATO began bombing
Serbia on March 24, 1999. There was no UN resolution approving the bombing, since Russia
supported Serbia and would have vetoed such a resolution. Serbian forces soon began forcibly
displacing large numbers of Kosovo Albanian and thereby created a major refugee crisis in
neighboring countries. The bombing would last for 78 days, far longer than NATO had originally
anticipated.m
The terms ending the war were formalized in UN resolution 1244, which was passed on
June 10, 1999. As the next section explains, the resolution ended the war and created an
international presence to secure the peace and temporarily govern Kosovo. However, the
resolution reaffirmed Serbia's territorial integrity and set no specific timeline for resolving the
issue of Kosovo's independence.
International Administration in Kosovo -Mandate, Structure, and Ideology
This section outlines the formal structure, informal practices, and internal divisions of the
international administration in Kosovo. I demonstrate that the international administration
closely conforms to the scope conditions specified by the theory - UNMIK was created by the
international community, and had executive power and a state-building mandate. The section
356 See Judah, Kosovo, chap. 7; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save
Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), chap. 2 and 3; Independent International Conunission
on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 72-83. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Who's Who in Kosovo," Balkans Report
N* 76, 31 August 1999, 8-9.
7 Barry R Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security 24, no. 4
(2000): 39-84; Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, chap. 4-5; Judah, Kosovo, chap. 8-9.
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discusses resolution 1244, the authority of UNMIK, the issue of Kosovo's uncertain status, the
structure of UNMIK, the overall unity of the international administration, and the international
administration's ideology.
Resolution 1244 ended the war in Kosovo, mandated an international military presence,
and established an international administration. The resolution formalized the agreement
between Milosevic and NATO that stopped the bombing. It also called for an immediate end to
violence, the withdrawal of all Serbian security forces, and the disarmament of the KLA.
Resolution 1244 further demanded full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). To enforce the agreement, an international security force of
50,000 personnel, called the Kosovo Force (KFOR), would be deployed. KFOR would be led by
NATO but several non-NATO countries, most notably Russia, would also participate.358
Resolution 1244 stated that Kosovo was still part of Serbia, but established UNMIK "to
provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy
substantial autonomy." 359 Its purpose was to temporarily govern Kosovo, build strong
democratic institutions, help determine Kosovo's final status, and transfer authority to whatever
institutions were created by the final status agreement.360 In the meantime, UNMIK had "full
legislative and executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary" and the head of
358 See UN resolution 1244 (1999), paragraph 9 for the detailed mandate. See also Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning
Ugly, 175-176; Larry Wentz, Lessonsfrom Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (DoD Command and Control Research
Program, 2002), 35-41.
3 5 9 UN resolution 1244 (1999), paragraph 10.
360 The specific responsibilities for UNMIK were detailed in Paragraph 11 of Resolution 1244: "a) Promoting the
establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full
account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648) b) Performing basic civilian administrative
functions where and as long as required; c) Organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions
for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and
supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace- building activities; e)
Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet
accords; f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions
established under a political settlement."
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UNMIK, the SRSG, was given the power to interpret his own mandate. UNMIK would there
effectively take over the power and authority of the sovereign state.36'
UNMIK's administration of Kosovo was the temporary solution to the irreconcilable
problem of whether or not Kosovo should be independent. Nearly all Kosovo Albanian political
leaders insisted on independence, while the Serbian leaders refused to accept it. Ambiguity on
independence had been necessary to secure broad agreement among the key actors, including the
US, Russia, Serbia, and the KLA. 362Furthermore, many countries, including Russia, China, and
even Spain, had ongoing secessionist disputes and were disinclined to support Kosovo's
independence for fear that it would create an international precedent supporting violent rebellion.
Resolution 1244 therefore finessed the issue by recognizing that Kosovo was part of Serbia and
by making no statement about whether Kosovo would be independent in the future. The
resolution insisted that the parties take account of the Rambouillet Agreement, but that
agreement only included vague language about the determination of Kosovo's status. 363 Hence,
there was no clear plan for when and how the final status of the territory would be determined.364
The lack of a clear plan for Kosovo's status was a hindrance to UNMIK's efforts to build
strong and democratic institutions. Any institution or governance system would have to be
"provisional," "interim," or "pending a final settlement" in order to respect Serbia's
361 Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 8-9. See also "Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo," 12 July 1999, S/1999/779, para 35-42.3 6 2 The territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and hence the independence of Kosovo, were not dispute during the
negotiations. See Judah, Kosovo, 274-285; Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 169-175.
363 See Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 59-62, 77-84; Judah, Kosovo, 206-226; Marc Weller, Peace Lost:
The Failure of Conflict Prevention in Kosovo (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers / Brill
Academic, 2009), 81-98; Carsten Stahn, "Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations
Constitutional Framework for Self-Government," Leiden Journal ofInternational Law 14, no. 03 (2001): 532-538.
3" The report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo argued, "It might be better to leave questions
about the future in limbo, since a constructive ambiguity about the political future of the province might make it
easier for all sides to overcome their reluctance to work together." The report gave the example of how process
between Israel and Palestinians has depended on postponing the fundamental status issues. The Kosovo Report
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 261.
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sovereignty. 365 At the same time, the majority of Kosovars, who were Albanian, would
consistently demand the establishment of institutions leading to independence. There was little
precedent for how to establish institutions that would fulfill standards of democracy and
governance but would not imply the independence of the territory. Sergio Viera de Mello, the
first temporary SRSG in Kosovo, and later the SRSG in East Timor, would call the situation "an
effort to combine motherhood with virginity." 366
Despite the complexities of the mandate and status issue, UNMIK was generally unified
in its demands. The UN adopted a unified, hierarchical structure for UNMIK in part based on the
lessons of Bosnia. In Bosnia, different international organizations took over the different roles in
the international administration without a clear chain of command, which led to competition and
disagreement. According to one account, one UN official observed, "We looked at the civilian
structure in Bosnia and said whatever happens, don't do that again in Kosovo." 367 Another
problem in Bosnia was the initial failure of civilian and military organizations to coordinate their
efforts. Though there were some examples of tactical coordination problems in Kosovo, KFOR
368
and UNMIK were careful to clearly delineate responsibilities and coordinate their efforts.
JNMIK was under the overall authority of the SRSG and his office. Although the SRSG
had full authority over the mission, he was required to get certain decisions, including all
legislation, approved by UN headquarters in New York. One participant explains that
international officials within UNMIK began to think of the organization as a "little country."
365 See UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
366 Power, Chasing the flame. For commentary on this point, see Stahn, "Constitution Without a State?," 538-542;
Judah, Kosovo, 298.367 William G. O'Neill, Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 37.
3 6 8 The Questfor Viable Peace, 81-88. See also the discussion of the 2004 riots and reform of the KPC below.
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UNMIK developed its own relationships with donors and other organizations and sought to
avoid consulting UN headquarters except when absolutely necessary.369
UNMIK was composed of four pillars, which were led by different organizations and
were responsible for specific elements of UNMIK's mandate. In practice, the pillars had
significant autonomy. The first pillar was initially called "Humanitarian Affairs" and run by
UNHCR. After a year, major tasks including the resettlement of refugees were largely
completed, and Pillar I was disbanded. In May 2001, a new Pillar I, "Law Enforcement and
Justice," was created and was run directly by UNMIK. The second pillar was "Civil
Administration" and was run directly by UNMIK. This pillar included functions such as health,
education, banking and finance, and telecommunications. The third pillar was "Institution
Building" and was run by the OSCE. It would include democratization, elections, and human
rights. The fourth pillar was "Economic Reconstruction" and was run by the EU. 370
In line with the ideology described in the theory chapter, international officials within
UNMIK were guided by a desire to establish human rights and build institutions that followed
bureaucratic procedures. With regard to human rights, UNMIK's efforts focused on the
protection of minorities. While UNMIK was heavily criticized for its failure to prevent violence
against Serbs and other minorities,371 UNMIK quickly adopted substantial measures to protect
the rights of minorities and establish multiethnic institutions. For example, UNMIK adopted
369 Ibid., 80-81.
70 See Ibid., 30-31. S/1999/779; Interviews with international officials, Pristina, December 2009-January 2010. One
SRSG, Michael Steiner, apparently wrote messages to UNMIK staff entitled "pillar talk." Iain King and Whit
Mason, Peace atAny Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Cornell University Press, 2006), 140-141.
371 William O'Neill, the senior advisor to the SRSG for human rights, is highly critical of the failure of the
international community to address the immediate post-war violence. He writes, "Albanians have no right to wreak
revenge, even if it is on a lesser scale or does not have the formal backing of a state. Former secretary of state
Albright misses the point when she dismissed ongoing violence against minorities in March 2000 by noting, 'after
all that has happened, we do not expect rival communities in Kosovo to immediately join hands and start singing
folk songs'...Is it 'starry-eyed naivete' or 'Western human rights-style neocolonialism' to promote tolerance and
respect for diversity? Perhaps. But if so, I think it is the lesser of two evils." O'Neill, Kosovo, 9, 53.
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human rights treaties into the Constitutional Framework, reserved seats for minorities in
parliament, encouraged the participation of minorities in the civil service, and regulated the use
of minorities' language in education and public broadcasting.3 However, efforts to establish
multiethnic institutions would be difficult given the strong ethnic antipathy between Serbs and
Albanians following the war.373
UNMIK also emphasized formal bureaucratic procedures in building institutions.
UNMIK itself was a large and complex organization with elaborate formal internal decision-
making processes. UN headquarters also tended to appoint individuals largely based on their skill
at operating within the complex formal processes that constituted the UN system. UNMIK's
actions further indicated its underlying adherence to the technical perspective. UNMIK
frequently brought in outside experts to impose 'best practices' without gathering detailed
knowledge of the situation in Kosovo. Some observers claimed that international officials were
sometimes hesitant to interact with Kosovar authorities because they believed the local elites
were too 'political,' and their demands would bias UNMIK's technical decision-making ability.
Perritt notes that UNMIK officials often rejected Kosovo's politics as "corrupt or violent or
primitive," and tended to operate as if there were no existing institutional framework. UNMIK's
bureaucratic approach would prove inappropriate for Kosovo's political and cultural context.37
3 72 Gunnar Simonsen writes, "While the international community can be criticized for many decisions over Kosovo,
and for lack of success in various endeavours, it is difficult to deny that since 1999 the interim administration has
poured much effort into securing the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo." Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Nationbuilding as
Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar," International Peacekeeping 11, no. 2 (2004): 295. King and Mason,
two participants in UNMIK, observe, "with multi-ethnicity so clearly an objective of the UN-led mission, there were
a number of deliberate efforts to combat the drift towards segregation." Peace at Any Price, 111.
3 See Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans, chap. 8-10; King and Mason, Peace atAny Price, 68-73.
3 4 Perritt writes "Because the international did not understand the informal folkways, it was easy for the
international organizations to churn out policies among themselves that had relatively impact on the way Kosovo
actually worked." The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 66.
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Post-war Local Political Dynamics
The local post-war political dynamics also align with the theory. Kosovo remained divided along
ethnic lines and political parties campaigned only to their own ethnic group. Political parties
campaigned on nationalist goals and relied on connections with informal networks. Albanian
political parties actively participated in the institution-building processes, so will be discussed in
depth, while Serbs mainly boycotted the political process.
On the Albanian side, all major parties' power was based on their achievement and
connection with the struggle for independence. As the context section explains, the two major
Albanian political movements - the LDK and KLA - sought Kosovo's independence in the
1990s. The movements developed into political parties whose main platform was achieving
independence. An adviser Thaci observed, "It is almost impossible to differentiate' among the
[various parties'] platforms. They all have three key issues: number one, independence; number
two, independence; number three, independence."3 7 5 The political parties also developed strong
informal networks before and during the war, although parties had different networks based on
their background and regional support.376 The most important division in Kosovo Albanian
politics, in line with the pre-war political cleavage, was between the non-violent LDK and the
two main successor parties of the KLA.
The LDK had gained prominence through its leadership over the "Republic of Kosovo"
parallel institutions. During UNMIK's administration, the LDK largely campaigned on its efforts
to achieve independence. In one speech, Rugova explained, "As you know, we declared
independence in 1991 and we have built our state for more than ten years. Therefore we ask for
the official recognition of Kosovo's independence by the United States, the EU, and the
3 7 5 CG, "Starting from Scratch in Kosovo" Balkans Report N* 83, 13 December 1999, 11.
376 Elton Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions: The Role of International Actors in
Kosovo" (Cornell University, 2011), 52-56.
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international community." 377 Because of its pacifist ideology, many in the international
community perceived the LDK to be a more moderate party that the KLA successor parties and
supported it accordingly. 378 The LDK's pre-war activities meant that it had one of the strongest
grassroots political networks throughout the whole of Kosovo. With regard to informal networks,
the LDK had raised money through the Three Percent Fund and had developed a reputation for
corruption and patronage associated with the parallel institutions. The party later reportedly
funded itself through smuggling networks and other criminal activities.379
Two major political parties emerged out of the KLA, which was extremely popular
among Kosovo Albanians immediately after the war. During the war, different regional KLA
groups acted largely independently of one another and the movement was divided into factions
based on loyalty to the different leaders. 380 Thaci formed a political party out of the political
wing of the KLA, which was initially called PPDK, and then later called the PDK (Democratic
Party of Kosova). Ramush Haradinaj, another KLA leader, would form an alternative KLA
oriented party in April 2000, called AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo). Observers initially
described the PDK and AAK as personalist followings behind Thaci and Haradinaj. By 2004,
however, PDK had established a far more extensive political organization. A division between
the KLA "old wolves" and the younger intellectual wing developed. 38 ' There was also a regional
variation in the parties' support - the PDK was especially popular in the Drenica region, while
" King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 120.
3 78 Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 154; Tansey, Regime-Building, 118.
3 7 9 The amount of money raised by the government-in-exile, for example, is contested. Perritt explains, "Seib
sources claim that up to $5 billion was collected through the fund. Bujar Bukoshi (who ran the fund) estimated the
correct figure to be $260 million. Intermediate figures approximate more than one billion Deutschmarks (about $500
million) by the end of the war." Perritt notes that the KLA's "Homeland Calls" fund raised perhaps ten percent as
much as the government-in-exile fund. The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 89. Interviews with local analysts,
Pristina, Winter 2010.
3
"
0 Ibid, 59-60.
381 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 156-158.
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the AAK dominated the Dukagjini region. PDK and AAK campaigned in large part on their
achievements towards independence during the war and their ability to achieve independence in
the future.383
The KLA had extensive connections with informal networks during the war, which
carried over to the PDK and AAK after the war. Indeed, the most serious problem these parties
faced was their reputations for being thuggish and corrupt.3 4 The KLA had largely been funded
by contributions, but many observers argue that the movement armed itself through smuggling
and may have engaged in other illegal activity, such as drug trafficking. 385 The KLA-associated
parties were also implicated in a number of politically motivated murders against LDK officials
in the period immediately after the war. 386 Several interviewees, both intemational officials and
local analysts, alleged PDK and AAK participation in protection rackets, corruption, election
fraud, and the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, and oil. 387 Finally, different elements of the KLA
had been recruited from different regions and retained political strength in those specific areas.
Thaci, and the PDK, had its strongest base in Drenica and would favor the region in their
382 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 54.
383 See the reform efforts below. King and Mason note, "The PDK and AAK emphasized their war records, often in
rallies where AK-47s were enthusiastically fired into the sky." Peace at Any Price, 120.3 8 4 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 152-158.
385 One USIP report explains "Criminal activities played a significant role in developing a resource base for the
political and military struggle of the KLA. Estimates vary, but up to half of the funding for the KLA may have come
from drugs." Michael Dziedzic, Laura Rozen, and Phil Williams, "Lawless Rule Versus Rule of Law in the
Balkans," USIP Special Report 97, December 2002, 10. See also Radoslava Stefanova, "Fighting Organized Crime
in a UN Protectorate: Difficult, Possible, Necessary," Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 4, no. 2 (May
2004): 261. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 93, 120-125; Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?," 36, 38. Interviews
with local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
3 In 2009, Naxim Blaca confessed to having killed 17 people on behalf of PDK, mainly during the initial post-war
period. "EULEX detains self-confessed political killer," http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-
article.php?yyyy=2009&mm= 12&dd=O 1&nav id=63417 See also, Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 153.
387 Interviews with local and international officials and analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010. For other sources on illict
activity in Kosovo, see also "Time to Go Straight: The EU and America Are No Longer Prepared to Tolerate Graft
in Kosovo," The Economist, March 18, 2010; Matthew Brunwasser, "Trial Opens for 7 Kosovars in Organ-
Trafficking Ring," New York Times, October 4, 2011; Pugh, "Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's Transformation."
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political activities. Similarly, Haradinaj, and the AAK, had their greatest support, and substantial
388
clientelist networks, in the Dukagjini area.
The theory predicts that the parties' associations with informal networks would have
consequences for their reaction to reforms efforts. The PDK and AAK would continue to have
strong associations with KLA veterans and would seek to ensure veterans' employment in the
security services. All parties, but especially the PDK and AAK, could be threatened by the
strengthening of the police and attempts to address high-level corruption and organized crime.
Similarly, parties could be threatened if the custom institutions were strengthened to address
smuggling.
While the Kosovo Albanians actively participated in UNMIK's state-building efforts to
further their goal of independence, the Kosovo Serbs largely boycotted the new Kosovo
institutions. Many Serbs rapidly left Kosovo and the position of the remaining Serbs was
precarious. The Kosovo Serbs were clearly worse off after the war and many feared for their
safety in the post-war Albanian-dominated Kosovo. Roger Petersen claims that ethnic stigma
constrained the Kosovo Serbs from cooperating with Albanians in the new institutions, and
instead led them to pursue strategies of boycott and parallel systems.389 Because of the
nationalist incentives in Serbian politics, Serb political parties based in Belgrade insisted that
Serbia retain sovereignty over Kosovo. Some Serbs, especially those in isolated municipalities in
the south of Kosovo, gradually became inclined to accept the existence of the Albanian-led
Kosovo institutions. Most Kosovo Serbs, with the support of Belgrade, were not inclined to
participate in the new Kosovo institutions and even sanctioned Kosovo Serbs who did. The
influence of the major Belgrade-based Serbian political parties also stymied the creation of
388 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 53-54; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army,
16-18, 79, 84-85. See also ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?" Balkans Report N'88, 3 March 2000, 6-18.
389 Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans, 101, 170-171.
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independent Kosovo Serbian leaders. 390 Given the boycott of UNMIK-led Kosovo institutions by
Kosovo Serbs, the case studies below focus mainly on the interaction between the various
Albanian parties and international organizations.
II. Introduction to UNMIK Reform Efforts
The case studies below examine six reform efforts undertaken by UNMIK in the areas of
representation, security, and revenue. This chapter examines only the period prior to Kosovo's
unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008.
I examine the six reforms: the creation of basic political institutions, the Standards before
Status reform, running elections, police reform, the Kosovo Protection Corps, and customs
reform. I selected these reforms surveying the literature, identifying reforms that were
conditional for political progress, and confirming the selection with international officials and
local analysts. As the theory specifies, the international community made the implementation of
international demands conditional for the achievement of political progress, which in the case of
Kosovo referred to status negotiations.39'
The case studies below draw on three types of sources. First, I conducted fieldwork in
Kosovo in December 2009 to February 2010. I did 45 interviews with international officials,
international and local analysts, local officials, and other individuals. The interviews were all
" 
0 An ICG report in August 1999 observed, "Serb organisations in Kosovo have mostly not survived recent events.
The two Serb interests represented on the Transitional Council are Mom6ilo Trajkovid's Serb Resistance Movement
(SPO), and the Serbian Orthodox Church (led by Bishop Artemije and Father Sava)." ICG, "Who's Who in
Kosovo," 7. On Serb politics in Kosovo, see Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of
Yugoslavia, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 354-357. See also ICG reports including "Kosovo:
Landmark Election," Balkans Report N* 120, 21 November 2001, 13-18; "Kosovo's Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for
a Civic Contract" Balkans Report N*143, 28 May 2003, 4-12; "Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari
Plan," Europe Report N*182, 14 May 2007, 32-38.
3 9 1 Other reform efforts commonly identified as important include the judiciary, the public administration, and the
privatization of state owned enterprises. These institutions do not fit the criteria specified in the theory, but should
be examined in future work.
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conducted in English, which was widely spoken by international officials as well as by many
local officials and analysts. My interviews included officials from all of the major international
organizations, including UNMIK, OSCE, the EU, and NATO. I also spoke with representatives
from a variety of political parties, including LDK, AAK, and Vetevendosje. My interviews with
local analysts were particularly helpful for understanding the political context. 392 Finally, I had a
large number of informal interactions with Kosovars who had worked in a number of
organizations and all of the major political parties. These interactions were invaluable for
understanding the structure and role of informal networks and better understanding the biases of
my other interviewees. To protect the interviewees, and ensure their candor, I use anonymous
source citations. Second, I used a variety of primary sources, including press releases,
regulations, and reports issued by UNMIK and other organizations. Finally, I refer to secondary
sources including policy reports, books, and academic articles. Many of these sources are
extremely detailed and some of them were even written by participants in reform efforts. This
chapter focuses on a ten-year period of intemational involvement in Kosovo, ranging from June
1999 to February 2008. I rely on the interviews most heavily for the period after March 2004 due
to the timing of the fieldwork, the replacement of international officials, and the limits of human
memory.
III. Basic Political Institutions
UNMIK's first major reform effort was the establishment of basic political institutions.
Immediately following the war, central authority broke down, which led to criminality, ethnic
cleansing against Serbs, and intra-Albanian political violence. UNMIK's initial challenge was
392 I spoke with individuals from a wide range of think tanks and NGOs, including the International Crisis Group,
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), the European Centre for Minority Issue in
Kosovo, the GAP Institute for Advanced Studies, and the Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS).
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therefore to establish itself as the interim administration specified in resolution 1244, begin to
build the institutions of self-government, and avoid implying that Kosovo was independent.
UNMIK was largely successful in these endeavors. By early 2000, UNMIK had secured
the agreement of the major Kosovar political parties was recognized as the supreme civilian
authority. UNIK then ruled Kosovo, with only minimal local participation, under the Joint
Interim Administration Structure (JIAS) until the promulgation of the Constitutional Framework
in 2001. Under the Constitutional Framework, elections were held and certain authority
transferred to a democratically elected government.
The theory largely explains UNMIK's success in establishing basic political institutions.
UNMIK's demands did not threaten Kosovo Albanians' nationalist goal of independence, since
establishing temporary representative institutions was necessary to move forward towards
independence. The major Albanian parties pressed UNMIK to make compromises towards
implying independence, but because of international unity, they eventually accepted the
proposed Constitutional Framework. Following elections, however, Albanian parties did not
participate in the newly established institutions as UNMIK had intended and continued to press
for independence.
This section proceeds in five parts. First, I discuss the period of anarchy following the
war, explain the international preferences for basic political institutions, and justify the coding of
key variables. Second, I trace the creation and implementation of the JIAS. Third, I explain the
negotiation of the Constitutional Framework. Fourth, I discuss the implementation of the
Framework. A fifth part concludes.
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After the War: Absence ofAuthority, Violence, and the Need for Basic Governance
To implement its mandate, UNMIK had to establish its own authority and basic political
institutions. The establishment of political order, however, depended on addressing the absence
of security in Kosovo immediately following the war. Though security was mainly KFOR's
responsibility, the establishment of political authority and security were interlinked.
In June 1999, Serb forces, in accord with resolution 1244, departed Kosovo. There was
no remaining state authority and the immediate post-war period was highly chaotic. According to
one UN official, Kosovo at the time was "like the Wild West now, except they didn't have
grenades and AK-47s in the Wild West."393 Albanian refugees who had been expelled from
Kosovo during the war rapidly returned. Seeking vengeance for Serb actions during and prior to
the war, many Albanians began to attack and ethnically cleanse Serbs and other minorities.
Violence included "murder, disappearances/abductions, torture, beatings, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement." Some argue that "overwhelming
evidence points to a concerted campaign to expel from Kosovo most of its ethnic minorities,
especially Serbs."394 Within a year of the mission's start, approximately 150,000 Serbs had left
Kosovo.395 As noted above, there was also politically motivated inter-Albanian violence,
especially against individuals believed to be collaborators with the Serb regime and also against
LDK officials. 396
KFOR had responsibility for establishing peace and security in the initial post-war
period, but came under heavy criticism for its failure to prevent violence. The international
intervention had been premised on protecting the Albanians from the Serbs and KFOR did not
3" Peter Finn, "Gunman Kills Serb in Cafd in Kosovo," Washington Post, December 21, 1999. See also Judah,
Kosovo, 286-296.
39" O'Neill, Kosovo, 61.
395 ICG, "Kosovo Report Card," Balkans Report No. 100, 28 August 2000, 14
396 See footnote 44 above.
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expect to have to protect Serbs from the Albanians or Albanians from other Albanians.397 Still
several units within KFOR were more effective than others. British troops, given their
experience in Northern Ireland and Malaysia, and KFOR's Multinational Specialized Unit, made
up primarily of Italian carabinieri who had trained to deal with the Italian mafia, had more
success in stopping ethnic violence and organized crime.398 By early 2000, peace and security
had largely been established.399
In this context, UNMIK had four preferences with respect to creating basic political
institutions. 400 First, UNMIK needed to establish its own authority. Kosovo Albanians retained
the primary nationalist goal of achieving independence and had not all agreed to an international
administration. Second, there would need to be some sort of constitutional document specifying
the rules of the new institutions and there would need to be Kosovo-wide elections. Third, the
international community preferred institutions that would encourage the development of a
multiethnic society. While there was no specific mention of multiethnic institutions in resolution
1244, the resolution did emphasize that UNMIK should "protect and promote human rights," and
supporting documents emphasized multiethnic institutions .401 Fourth, the institutions should in
no way imply that Kosovo was, or would necessarily become, independent.
UNMIK was largely unified about its demands throughout the reform process. The
content of basic representative institutions had been worked out in the peace negotiations and the
397 O'Neill, Kosovo, 62-73; Judah, Kosovo, 286-296.
398 Michael Dziedzic, "Policing from Above: Executive Policing and Peace Implementation in Kosovo," in
Executive Policing: Enforce the Law in Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 44-45; O'Neill,
Kosovo, 105-107; Robert M. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?: America's Search for a
Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 184-189.
399Dobbins, America's Role in Nation-Building, 118.
400 The goals for Kosovo's institutions were specified in the mandate as "provisional institutions for democratic and
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement." See resolution 1244 (1999) Clause 1la.
401The Secretary-General's report explained, "The civil administration component will establish the multi-ethnic
governmental structures essential for the sustainable delivery of public services where and as long as required."
S/1999/799, paragraph 55. See also O'Neill, Kosovo, 31, 51-73.
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key countries, including the US, France, Germany, and the UK, were largely in agreement about
how to proceed in Kosovo. The threat of these demands to nationalist goals for the Albanian
parties was generally low, but there was some ambiguity and potential for the parties to invoke
nationalism. The parties were ultimately willing to accept temporary political institutions under
UNMIK so long as these institutions put Kosovo on a path towards independence. The parties
recognized, however, that outbidding each other by demanding greater progress towards
independence could resonate with the Albanian electorate. The establishment of basic
representative institutions did not threaten the parties' informal networks since these networks
could continue to function under the proposed institutions. Given high unity and low threat to
local elites' interests, the theory predicts full implementation of international demands.
Establishing Initial Non-Democratic Governance under the JIAS
UNMIK's initial effort focused on building up its own strength, negotiating with local elites, and
creating a governance structure led by international officials.
UNMIK would require a large organization to effectively govern Kosovo. However, the
UN Secretariat had little time to plan for the mission and was slow to appoint and deploy the
necessary staff. Sergio Viera de Mello was appointed temporary SRSG in June 1999. He brought
a team with experience in Bosnia and sought to rapidly build infrastructure to support UNMIK's
administration, including appointing staff, finding premises, coordinating with other international
organizations, and commencing discussions with local stake-holders. However, aside from
creating a few temporary bodies led by UNMIK officials, Viera de Mello took little action in
terms of institution building.0 Indeed, only six weeks later, on July 15, 1999, Viera de Mello
402 For details on this period, see especially S/1999/779 and Power, Chasing the Flame. Viera de Mello did create
the Joint Advisor Council of Provisional Judicial Appointments (JAC/PJA) to quickly reestablish ajudicial system.
The JAC/PJA appointed many Albanian officials who had not served in the legal system for ten years. The various
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was replaced by the first permanent SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, a French politician and co-
founder of a major French NGO, Meddcins sans Frontibres. Kouchner issued the mission's first
regulation, which proclaimed his own authority: "All legislative and executive authority with
respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is
exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General." 40 3
From July to December 1999, UNMIK began to appoint international officials to run the
ministries and provide government services, although the Kosovar political parties exercised
strong informal authority. Kosovar political elites were included in the UNMIK-led institutions
in only an advisory capacity through the Kosovo Transitional Council.4 04 The body had little real
authority, however, and functioned largely as a "soapbox. 4 05 While Serbs initially participated
in the council, the Serbian representatives walked out when attacks on Serb civilians persisted,
and Thaci later walked out of the council as well. Kosovar-led governance structures included an
interim government established at Rambouillet, the LDK-led parallel structures, and a variety
informal governance structures that were not necessarily linked with the major political
406parties. Some mayors in some rural areas, for example, refused to acknowledge UNMIK's
authority. Albanian elites hoped to force UNMIK into giving Kosovo independence and sought
to retain as much of their informal authority as possible. UNMIK quickly began to recognize that
faults in the Kosovo judicial system were later traced to this decision. Interviews with international officials and
local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010. See also O'Neill, Kosovo, 77-78.40 Furthermore, "The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to perform functions
in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or remove such person. Such functions shall be
exercised in accordance with the existing laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations issued by UNMIK."
UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, 25 July 1999, 1.1-2.
404 The purported purpose of the body was to "ensure participation of the people of Kosovo in the decisions and
actions of UNMIK." S/1999/799, paragraph 20
405 Quote from ICG "Kosovo Report Card," 28. See also Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 10-11; Tansey,
Regime-Building, 118-119, 122-3; Matthias Ruffert, "The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the
International Community," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 03 (2001): 624-5.
40 ICG, "Who's Who in Kosovo," 8-9; Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 10-13.
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effective governance would require the participation of local elites and began extensive
negotiations with Albanian authorities. 40 7
On December 15, 1999, UNMIK and the main Albanian leaders negotiated a compromise
designed to create a new joint administrative structure and eliminate the existing parallel
structures. The agreement was beneficial for Thaci, who wanted to dismantle the LDK-led
parallel structures, and for Rugova, who sought increased recognition of the LDK in an UNMIK-
led government. UNMIK needed the participation of Thaci and Rugova to legitimate its
administration and help disband the parallel governance structures. To be sure, both local and
international negotiators also compromised. Thaci wanted the LDK-led parallel structures to
hand over remaining funds to UNMIK, while Rugova tried to delay the end of the parallel
structures. UNMIK conceded by changing the applicable Yugoslav law in Kosovo from laws
issued before 1999 to those issued before 1989, which is when Kosovo began to lose its
autonomy within Yugoslavia 408
On January 14, 2000, Regulation 2000/1 established the new political institutions, the
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). JIAS had three main principles. First, the
"representatives of political forces of Kosovo share provisional administrative management with
UNMIK." Second, other existing governance would be integrated into the JIAS or eliminated
407 Brand writes, "It was clear that UNMIK could only gain recognition by the Kosovo population, in particular its
political elite, if it shared administrative responsibility with local representatives." Ibid., 10-12. On UNMIK's
process of negotiation, see The Questfor Viable Peace, 107-110. On this period, see also King and Mason, Peace at
Any Price, 73-79; Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 54-62.
408 While Rugova did agree to disband the parallel structures in the December 15th agreement, the "Republic of
Kosovo" assembly delayed disbanding itself. After UNMIK delayed the implementation of the JIAS, however,
Rugova complied with the agreement and issued a statement saying that the "Government, the Parliament and the
Presidency of the Republic of Kosova with all its political, economic and security structures have ceased to exist as
of 1 February 2000." Perhaps unsurprisingly, the LDK-associated parallel institutions did not hand over funds to
UNMIK. Ibid.
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before January 31, 2000. Third, "all communities of Kosovo shall be involved in the provisional
administrative management." 409
The JIAS fulfilled UNMIK's demands for the period by establishing UNMIK's authority,
eliminating existing governance structures, and by being at least nominally multiethnic.
However, the JIAS did not transfer significant authority to Kosovar officials. The most powerful
body of the JIAS was the Joint Interim Administration Council, composed of the four heads of
the different UNMIK pillars and four local elites. The SRSG mainly consulted the council to
gain approval for previously drafted regulations. Although some regulations were amended
based on recommendation of the council, the SRSG did proceed with the regulations despite the
council's objections. The JIAS also consisted of twenty "Administrative Departments," each
with a local and international co-head. These departments were intended to function as
ministries, but in practice few Administrative Departments exercised much authority, and many
were created for the sake of appointing important Kosovar officials. The international co-heads
typically had parallel jobs in UNMIK's administrative structure and many important decisions
about the governance of Kosovo were made in meetings that were attended only by international
officials. 410 Albanian elites began criticizing UNMIK for failing to run Kosovo-wide elections
and transfer authority to elected officials.4 "
Negotiation of Constitutional Framework
With the establishment of the JIAS, UNMIK turned towards creating more permanent
democratic institutions. In mid-2000, Kouchner began discussions with the Contact Group and
various international organizations about a "pact" or "contract" that would specify how self-
409 There were actually four principles in the regulation, the fourth of which being that the administrative directives
would be in accordance with the applicable law. Regulation 2000/1, Section 1, available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re20O0_01.htm
410 See Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 15-27; Tansey, Regime-Building, 123-4.
4" See ICG, "Kosovo Report Card," 25.
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government in Kosovo would function. Kouchner created a Joint Working Group (JWG),
composed of both international and local experts, to discuss a document specifying Kosovo's
future governance structure. Soon, the international community sidelined the local interlocutors
and the details of the document amongst themselves. By early 2001, the international community
had secured broad agreement about a draft document. To avoid questioning Serbia's sovereignty,
the document was called a "legal framework" though in practice it would serve a similar function
as a constitution. Several observers have criticized this process as secretive and compared it to
the colonial practices of 1 9th century empires. Nevertheless, by keeping the negotiation process
within the international community, UNMIK avoided public disagreement and maintained
international unity about demands.' 2
In March 2001, Hans Haekkerup, the new SRSG, reinitiated the JWG to discuss the
internationally developed draft legal framework with local officials. In the meantime, the
Kosovar experts had developed a draft of their own. UNMIK rejected it, since in its view the
locally produced document tended too much towards giving Kosovo independence.m
Negotiations between international officials and local elites continued for the next several
months, during which the Albanian officials tried to convince UNMIK to compromise in several
areas.
The draft framework did not threaten independence, but the framework also did not
facilitate independence. The draft reiterated UNMIK's neutrality towards Kosovo's status, so it
was indeed possible that UN administration Kosovo would soon lead to independence. However,
Albanian politicians could also argue that the draft was contrary to independence, since
according to the draft there was no clear process towards status negotiations. Ultimately,
412 Ibid., Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 31.
41 Ibid., 30-31.
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independence would require the support of the international community, especially the US and
EU, and the international community was unified that the draft framework was the only way
forward. Consequently, the Albanian elites recognized that accepting international demands was
necessary for political progress. Nevertheless, PDK would attempt to outbid the other parties by
arguing the draft framework was incompatible with independence.
During the negotiations of the draft framework, international officials were able to set the
agenda and establish clear red lines, though the Albanian representatives did achieve some
compromises. The length and detail of the eventual framework reflects the Albanian negotiators'
efforts to maximize the transfer of authority to locally elected officials and thereby enable
political progress without greater reform. The negotiation of three issues demonstrate in detail
how despite UNMIK's superior formal authority, Kosovo Albanian representatives retained
significant influence on the proceedings.4 4
The first and most controversial issue discussed in the JWG was how the framework
would relate to the ultimate status of Kosovo. The international officials maintained that nothing
that might prejudice independence should be included. Albanian representatives made three
notable demands and did achieve some level of comprise. First, Albanian representatives argued
that the document should be called a constitution rather than a legal framework, since Kosovo
had already had a constitution when it was a part of Yugoslavia. The JWG eventually reached a
compromise and the document was called the "Constitutional Framework."4 15 Second, Albanian
representatives sought the creation of a Constitutional Court. UNMIK objected, since the
existence of such a court might limit the authority of the SRSG in addition to implying the
independence of Kosovo. Third, Albanian representatives pushed for a time limit for the
4 14 ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 8; Tansey, Regime-Building, 124-29.
41 Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 29-3 1; Tansey, Regime-Building, 129.
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international administration of Kosovo and for the ability to call referenda about any topic.
International officials rejected these claims since they might force final status negotiations while
Kosovo's institutions were still weak or before the international community was ready to
proceed.4 16
The second issue of contention was how minorities would be represented in the 120-seat
Assembly of Kosovo. The international draft included twenty reserved seats for minorities - ten
for Serbs and ten for other minorities - in addition to what minority parties won in elections.
Albanian negotiators believed this level of representation was excessive, and that the twenty
seats should be the minimum representation for minorities, rather than in addition to what they
won in elections. In the belief that greater minority representation in the parliament would
encourage greater participation in elections, the international officials ignored these objections
and kept to the initial draft.41
The third contentious issue was the relative powers of the different components of the
government. Different political parties sought to design the new structures to maximize their own
post-election power based on their perceptions of the relative popularity of individuals and
political parties. Rugova was widely believed to be the most likely to win the presidency, so
representatives of PDK and AAK sought a weak president who was elected by the parliament.
The international negotiators approved the weak president based on a belief that a directly
elected powerful president might imply independence. 1
416 See ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 4
4 17 Tansey, Regime-Building, 128.4 1
1 Ibid., 126-8. ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 4-7.
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The international and local interlocutors never came to a final agreement about the
Constitutional Framework.419 Thaci, engaging in nationalist outbidding, opposed the
Constitutional Framework because it would "hold hostage the aim of the people of Kosovo,
which is independence."420 Haekkerup, after gaining the approval of UN headquarters used his
executive power as SRSG to pass the Constitutional Framework over local objections as
Regulation 2001/9. The new institutions were formally known as the Provisional Institutions of
Self-Government (PISG). The structure of government was quite complicated, as the framework
detailed that certain competencies were reserved to UNMIK and others delegated to the PISG.
The Constitutional Framework did fulfill UNMIK's four goals for basic representative
institutions. First, UNMIK secured its continued authority in Kosovo. Chapter 12 stated that the
framework would not impact the SRSG's authority, and he could continue to take "appropriate
measures whenever [the PISG's] actions are inconsistent with UNSCR 1244(1999)," including
passing legislation and removing elected officials. 42 1
Second, in Chapter 5, the framework established an autonomous and democratic
government that would have authority over many areas of domestic policy in Kosovo, including
education, roads, municipal cooperation, the appointment ofjudges and prosecutors, and so
forth. Chapter 8, however, specified that UNMIK would retain final authority over fiscal and
monetary issues, including administering customs; full authority over the security institutions,
419 Sources differ as to whether local authorities signed the Constitutional Framework. According to Tansey, the
Albanian leadership was never asked not sign, and would not have if they had been. According to Brand, Rugova
and Haradinaj signed the Constitutional Framework, but Thaci refused. UNMIK's record of Regulation 2001/9
contains only Haekkerup's signature. See Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 31; Tansey, Regime-Building,
129. ; http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm
420 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 121. The ICG reports that "PDK was the most outspoken critic of the
Constitutional Framework." "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 10-11.
4 2 1 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9. For commentary see also Tansey, Regime-Building, 128-9; Stahn, "Constitution
Without a State?".
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including the Police and Kosovo Protection Corps; and exclusive authority to conduct Kosovo's
international relations.
Third, the Framework created the formal groundwork for multiethnic institutions through
several measures. Minorities were overrepresented in the parliament through guaranteed seats.
The framework also recognized an extensive list of minority's rights. Chapter 3 of the
Constitutional Framework specified that the PISG would observe eight different human rights
treaties, as well as that all refugees would have the right to return to their homes and recover
their property. Chapter 4 explicitly guaranteed rights to minority communities, including the use
of minorities' language, access to education, equal opportunity for employment in public
institutions, use of public broadcasting, preservation of religious sites, and so forth. Finally, the
SRSG would "retain the authority to intervene as necessary in the exercise of self-government
for the purpose of protecting the rights of Communities and their members."422 The belief that
human rights could help protect minorities and achieve multiethnic institutions concurs with the
theory's description of the international administration's ideology. However, in practice,
minorities found they still had little voice in the Albanian-dominated PISG, and UNMIK was
unable to ensure that all of the various rights were upheld.
Fourth, the framework also avoided recognizing, implying, or in the future necessarily
granting independence to Kosovo. The framework's only concession was to note, "Kosovo is an
entity under interim international administration which, with its people, has unique historical,
422 See Regulation 2001/9, Chapter 3, 4. The treaties specified in Chapter 3 included "the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights; The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its
Protocols; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto; The Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; The Convention on the Rights of the Child; The European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages; and The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities." Many of the rights specified in Chapter 4 overlap with the rights included in these documents.
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legal, cultural and linguistic attributes."423 The framework contained no specific process by
which the PISG could accelerate status negotiations or the end of the international
administration.
While the PISG was limited in its powers, it still represented a dramatic step forward for
Kosovo. King and Mason observe, "the Assembly could always be overruled by the SRSG. But
the SRSG was under strong pressure from New York to avoid interfering in the affairs of the
PISG except where they impinged on security, interethnic relations or Kosovo's political status.
The international community had a strong interest in seeing the PISG succeed."42 4 Albanian
elites were far from satisfied, however. Thaci had invoked nationalist goals during the
Constitutional Framework negotiations and other parties would continue to demand progress on
independence in the next stage of reform.
Implementing the Constitutional Framework
The Constitutional Framework mandated Kosovo-wide elections, which were held in November
2001. LDK won 46% of the vote, PDK won 26%, AAK won 8%, and a coalition of Serbian
parties won 11%. A broad coalition government, which included the Serbian coalition, was
formed after several months of UNMIK-mediated negotiations.42
While UNMIK recognized that the PISG's authority was limited, it hoped that the
Albanian parties would accept the Constitutional Framework. The new SRSG, Michael Steiner,
insisted that the Albanian parties follow the defined limits of the Constitutional Framework
rather than attempting to use the institutions to demand the greater transfer of authority. While
Steiner had the legal power to remove politicians for exceeding their authority, such as move
would require the support of UN headquarters. However, the UN was hesitant to take action
423 See Regulation 2001/9/1.1
424 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 119.
425 For details see the electoral reforn effort below.
175
against a democratically elected politician unless there was a major crisis. Steiner resorted to
speeches exhorting the Albanian politicians to accept the PISG and act within their powers.
Steiner's rhetoric was often paternalistic in tone.4 26
While the Constitutional Framework did not threaten independence, which prevented the
possibility of public protest, Albanian political parties would regularly invoke the goal of
independence. Indeed, over the next two years, each of the major parties would demand
independence and object to the limitations on their authority. For the first six months, the only
things the Assembly debated and passed were resolutions beyond its authority.42 The first such
resolution was related to Kosovo's boundary with Macedonia. The UN Security Council had
accepted an agreement between Serbia and Macedonia about the boundary between Kosovo and
Macedonia.42 Kosovo's elected politicians were frustrated that they had no say in the agreement
and passed a resolution that asserted the territorial integrity of Kosovo and opposed the treaty.
UNMIK, with the support of UN headquarters, overruled the resolution. Steiner argued that the
Assembly had no authority over external relations and noted that he had warned the Assembly
426 Steiner explained his view in a speech to the Assembly on May 9, 2002 (http://www.unniikonline.org/press/2002
/pressr/pr732.htm): "We are in the business of transferring step by step authorities and responsibilities from the
international community to institutions of provisional self-government. It's the simple truth that the better you
handle the authority you already have, the more authority will come and that's my program and that's what we want
all to achieve. I fully understand that the Assembly wants to discuss important issues for Kosovo - and the issues
you have discussed here are important issues for Kosovo, even if it is not your responsibility and even if the
Constitutional Framework very clearly prescribes that in these areas of reserved responsibility, there are no
resolutions or decisions which can have the quality of validity. I've listened carefully to this debate and I do not
agree with everything that has been said here. But I must say this was a very dignified and very professional debate.
So I respect that and I think that you should have the opportunity in the future to express the wishes of those who
have been elected from the people of Kosovo. But I would also urge you not be sidetracked from the urgent tasks
which are in your competence. And please, even if you don't see it in this room, don't forget there's also an
international community out there. Don't antagonize the international community whose support I'm fighting for
daily and whose support is not easy to win and keep." See also King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 162-4.
427 Kind and Mason write, "six months after it was elected, the Assembly had yet to pass, or even debate, a piece of
legislation within its competence." Ibid., 161.
428 refer here to the countries by their colloquial name. Serbia, at this point, was the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and Macedonia was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Since Serbia
believed Kosovo to still be part of it, it negotiated the treaty without consulting Kosovo.
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not to pass the resolution.429 A second resolution approved of the wartime values of the KLA,
while a third nullified all Serbian laws passed during the 1990s. UNMIK immediately declared
these resolutions null and void, but could do little to diminish the bad publicity or convince
Albanian parties to change their agenda.4 0
In late 2003, Albanian parties in the Assembly began drafting a set of amendments to
strengthen the PISG institutions. The amendments proposed many of the same structures
demanded by Albanian representatives in the initial JWG negotiations. These proposals included
changing the name of the Constitutional Framework, creating a Constitutional Court, and
instituting the ability to declare referenda. However, as the Constitutional Framework specified
that the SRSG's agreement was necessary for any amendments, UNMIK rejected these
proposals.4 3' Overall the PISG did not perform the functions UNMIK had intended - it was more
a soapbox for local elites than a functional democratic government. Furthermore, Albanian
elites' frustration with the PISG would continue and escalate during the next reform, the
Standards before Status.
Conclusions
In all, the effort to develop a basic representative structure for Kosovo was partially successful.
The reform largely follows the process and outcome predictions of the theory. UNMIK's
demands did not threaten nationalist goals, though elites did engage in nationalist outbidding
during the reform process. Given international unity, the theory expects full implementation.
Indeed, UNMIK demands for establishing the JIAS and Constitutional Framework were fully
implemented, while the implementation of the Constitutional Framework was only partially
429 KIPRED, "Administration and Governance in Kosovo: Lesson learned and lessons to be learned," June 2005,
Pristina, 11. See also http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr740.htm4 0 ICG, "Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG," Europe Report N* 148, 3 September 2003, 7;
Tansey, Regime-Building, 136-7.
431 Ibid., 137-8.
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successful. The reform also confirms sub-mechanisms specified by the theory, including that
international unity leads local elites to recognize that implementing international demands is
necessary for political progress, as well as that without a clear threat to nationalist goals public
protest will not happen.
Table 4.1. Kosovo Basic Representative Institutions Reform
Preferences UNMIK as supreme Democratic and Multi-ethnic Institutions that do not
civilian authority autonomous institutions institutions prejudice Kosovo's status
Phase of reform Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
Immediate post- UNMIK's High Low Success: Confirmed:
war authority, UNMIK establishes Temporary UNMIK
temporary authority, negotiations government believed
international- with local elites, ends necessary for independence
led governance parallel institutions
JIAS UNMIK's High Low Success: Confirmed:
authority, local HAS accomplishes Temporary UNMIK
participation, main goals. Still government believed
multiethnic dominated by necessary for independence,
institutions, no international officials, negotiations with local
independence locals protest failure to elites essential for success,
transfer authority institutionalization before
liberalization infeasible
Negotiation of Create High Low Success: Confirmed:
Constitutional framework Internal international Temporary UNMIK
Framework meeting all negotiations on government believed
preferences Framework, locals push necessary for independence,
for independence. Thaci opposes CF to outbid
UNMIK imposes other elites.
framework.
Implementation Implement High Low Partial Success: Partially Confirmed:
of Constitutional framework, Albanian parties pass Albanian parties invoke
Framework create effective resolutions beyond nationalism, but given lack
locally-elected authority, attempt to of threat to nationalist goals
governance amend PISG. UNMIK there is no public protests.
overnmles them. PISG Only partial implementation
provides limited of demands.
governance.
The effort to establish basic institutions also demonstrates that local elites can influence
international decision-making despite full international authority. Local elites' demands for
greater authority led UNMIK to more quickly develop representative institutions and to increase
the powers of the PISG. Paris's theory of institutionalization before liberalization urges the
international community to build extensive institutions prior to elections. However, this reform
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effort demonstrates that local elites exert influence over international decision-making prior to
elections and the international community's freedom-of-action in the so-called "golden hour"
after the war is limited.432
IV. Standards Before Status and the Riots of 2004
Following the establishment of the PISG, UNMIK's next steps were unclear. Once UN missions
in East Timor and Cambodia had established self-governing institutions, their mandates were
completed. In Kosovo, UNMIK's mandate would only be finished once status negotiations were
completed, but in 2002 there was little will within the international community to begin status
negotiation. UNMIK therefore developed the "Standards before Status" policy, which stated that
Kosovo's status could only be determined once its institutions had fulfilled specified standards.
By 2004, UNMIK had specified standards that were widely viewed as unachievable and
Kosovo Albanians became increasingly concerned that independence would never happen. The
Standards before Status therefore began to threaten the natioanlist goal of independence. By
2003, Albanian politicians began to make speeches against the standards policy and to encourage
public protest. In March 2004, major riots broke out and attacks against UNMIK and minorities
took place. While the Albanian elites did not orchestrate the protests, their public opposition to
the standards played a role in setting the stage for the riots, and they took advantage of the
violence to urge the beginning of status negotiations.
The riots took the international community by surprise, and forced a major
reconsideration of its policy towards Kosovo. The riots made it clear that indefinitely delaying
status negotiations was no longer feasible and lead the international community to begin status
negotiations in 2006. UNMIK also reduced its demands to a set of "priority standards" that
432 Paris, At War's End; Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, 25.
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emphasized issues of minority participation in government and were clearly linked to the status
negotiations. The implementation of intemational demands significantly improved. In February
2008, despite the objections of Serbia and Russia, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence.
The Standards before Status reform repeatedly demonstrates the proposed causal
mechanisms and confirms the theory's predictions. Because of the threat to nationalist goals,
public protest occurred and elites blocked implementation of demands. The theory also correctly
predicts that the international administration's weakened demands following the violence would
be implemented.
The case study below proceeds in seven parts. The first part discusses the origins of the
Standards before Status policy and codes the key variables. The second part traces the
development of international demands, the growing threat of the demands to nationalist goals,
and the reactions of local elites. The third part examines the March 2004 riots. The fourth part
describes the international administration's response to the riots including the reformulation of
demands and the beginning of status negotiations. The fifth part discusses the implementation of
international demands following the riots. The sixth part explains the circumstances of Kosovo's
declaration of independence in February 2008. A seventh part concludes.
Origins of the Standards before Status Policy
In early 2002, following the creation of the PISG, a debate emerged within the international
community about whether or not to begin status negotiations. Carl Bildt, the former Prime
Minister of Sweden and High Representative in Bosnia, argued that delaying status negotiations
would serve no good purpose. Bildt, writing in an op-ed in July 2002, observed that there was a
belief in the international community "that time would be a healing factor, that small steps would
pave the way for the big jump." However, he noted, "As long as the core issues are open, we see
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how expectations concerning a final settlement on one side fuel fear on the other. There is no
issue too small not to be seen, by both parties, in this perspective, and to be fought over with this
is mind." Delaying status negotiations, in his view, would impede political development and risk
violence.4 "
The SRSG, Michael Steiner, argued in response that Kosovo was not ready for status
negotiations. He wrote in response to Bildt, "Kosovo's final status cannot be considered in a
meaningful way until its institutions, economy and political culture have evolved so that it can
administer itself without extensive outside support or interference. Our philosophy, standards
before status, express a logical necessity." In Steiner's view, Kosovo did not have the capacity
for self-governance. It would be irresponsible for the international community to allow Kosovo
to either be independent or an autonomous province of Serbia before it achieved "the standards
that the international community and its own people demand." 434
The philosophy that Steiner articulated was not the only reason that UNMIK pursued the
Standards before Status policy. The policy was the only logical solution to UNMIK's strategic
challenge. The international community was still undecided about whether Kosovo should be
independent. UN headquarters was under pressure from Russia, for example, to ensure that
UNMIK's institution building efforts did not imply Kosovo's independence. Furthermore,
continued human rights violations against minorities and powerful organized crime and
corruption networks made it clear that Kosovo's institutions remained weak. Hence, the most
obvious way forward, within UNMIK's political constraints, was to attempt to improve
Kosovo's institutions in the short term and hope that status negotiations would become more
feasible in the long term.
411 Carl Bildt, "The Balkans: An Unreal Peace Process," New York Times, July 10, 2002.
434 Michael Steiner, "First Things First: Step by Step in Kosovo," New York Times, July 24, 2002. See also Perritt,
The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 75.
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The goals for the Standards before Status were initially announced in April 2002. Steiner
explained that since the time for status negotiations "has not yet come," UNMIK was
"embarking on a benchmarks process." The benchmarks included the "existence of effective,
representative and functioning institutions; enforcement of the rule of law; freedom of
movement; respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and return; development of a sound
basis for a market economy; clarity of property title; normalised dialogue with Belgrade; and
reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its mandate." 435 By
July 2002, the benchmarks were renamed the "Standards before Status" and UNMIK made clear
that achievement of the standards were conditional for status negotiations. 436 1 evaluate this
reform effort by focusing on the overall accomplishment of the standards, which I divide into
three main goals: multiethnic institutions and human rights, addressing organized crime and
high-level corruption, and the overall functioning of the government. I evaluate the Standards
reform as the general requirements for status negotiations rather than the requirements for
specific state institutions. Indeed, many of the standards related to specific institutions that are
studied below, such as elections, customs, the KPC, or police. I evaluate the specific goals listed
in the standards for these institutions in the respective reform efforts.
The international community was not unified about what Kosovo's status would be, but it
was unified about the Standards before Status. Steiner held extensive negotiations prior to
announcing the benchmarks to achieve consensus within UNMIK and with UN headquarters. In
the broader international community, there was perhaps a hope that delaying status negotiations
would bring about conditions that would make the negotiations easier, including the election of
moderates in Serbia or a reduction in ethnic hatred within Kosovo. Even if such improvements
43 http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm
4 3 6 ICG, "Kosovo: Toward Final Status" Europe Report N*161, 24 January 2005, 2.
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were not forthcoming, the policy was a convenient middle ground. So long as Kosovo's
institutions were improving, and the territory was not granted independence, broad agreement
could be achieved. Some might argue that UNMIK was aware that the policy of Standards before
Status was impossible and was simply pursuing the policy to please its undecided supervisors.
However, Steiner and others within UNMIK clearly articulated how greater institutional strength
was necessary for Kosovo's future, whatever that future might hold.4 17
The requirements for achieving the standards and the international evaluation of
Kosovo's progress changed over the course of the reform. The threat posed by the Standards
before Status to the key nationalist goal - independence - therefore varied. On one hand, if the
standards were straightforward, and the international community accepted Kosovo's progress,
the policy could facilitate independence. On the other hand, if the standards were vague,
ambitious, and unachievable, the policy would make independence impossible. Indeed, the
nature of the threat to independence varied over the course of the reform from low to high to
low. There was some potential threat to informal networks in the overarching standards reform,
even excluding the threats to informal networks related to specific state institutions studied
below. However, when this threat was realized, prior to 2004, the threat to independence took
priority to the threat to informal networks. The theory predicts that the threat to nationalist goals
will lead to public protest and the failure of the reform.
Explication of Benchmarks and the Prelude to Riots
The initial set of demands posed by Steiner and the international administration was the
achievement of the eight benchmarks listed above. Albanian elites criticized these demands in
two ways. First, they noted that there were no clear metrics in place for evaluating the
achievement of the benchmarks. Hence, the international community could indefinitely assert
4 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 70, 174; Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 75-76.
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that Kosovo had more to do before status negotiations should begin. Second, Albanian elites
noted that many of the standards referred to competencies that were under the control of UNMIK
officials, even though they had been delegated to the Kosovo Assembly in the Constitutional
Framework, or referred to competencies that were specifically reserved to UNMIK. Even a
willing Kosovo government would be impotent to make progress in these areas.43 These
critiques were compounded by UNMIK's public relations campaign. UNMIK campaigned for
the achievement of the standards with a variety of TV and print advertisements, which compared
the achieving the standards to children memorizing poems or playing basketball. 49e
campaign came off as condescending and emphasized the paternalistic character of the UN
administration.
In early 2003, the international administration recognized the extent of Albanian
opposition and tried to gain support for the standards policy in three ways. First, in January 2003,
UNMIK sub-divided the standards into thirty-two sub-goals to make them more achievable.4 40
Second, UNMIK created the Transfer Council in March 2003, which was to transfer
competencies controlled by UNMIK to the PISG. While Albanian elites sought additional
competencies that were specifically reserved to UNMIK in the Constitutional Framework, UN
headquarters blocked any further transfer of powers. 4 4 1 Third, Steiner pushed the UN to name a
date when Kosovo's progress would be evaluated. According to one account, "Steiner came to
recognize that unless the Albanian majority saw some light at the end of the tunnel, relations
between the mission and the local population would become increasingly sour."442 Without a
4 38 ICG, "Two to Tango", 18; Tansey, Regime-Building, 138-9.
4 3 9 ICG, "Two to Tango", 17. While the name and content of the Standards would shift, the patronizing quality of
the advertising remained. See especially http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/priorities.htm
440 Tansey, Regime-Building, 139.
441 ICG, "Two to Tango", 18-20
442 Indeed, Kofi Annan sent Steiner and official reprimand for not consulting with UN headquarters before
proposing a review date for Kosovo status to the Contact Group. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 172-3.
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clear date and mechanisms of evaluation, the achievement of standards would be impossible, and
the policy would become more threatening to the nationalist goal of independence. However, UN
headquarters rebuffed Steiner's request. The international community did not want to cede
control of determining when status negotiations could begin.
Throughout 2003, Albanian protests against UNMIK began to escalate. While much of
the Albanians' frustration was focused on the failure to move towards independence, weak
economic progress and continuing unemployment rates at approximately 50-60% exacerbated
the public's frustration. UNMIK's failure to begin privatizing large public companies, because of
legal complications, was especially unpopular.443 Early in UNMIK's mission, there were many
attacks by Albanians against minorities, but there had been few attacks against UNMIK or
international staff. In 2003, protests and attacks against UNMIK began to occur. The Albanian
National Army (AKSh), a small and "shadowy" nationalist group, attempted to bomb a bridge in
April 2003. However, the bombers, who included a KPC officer, bungled the operation and
ended up killing only themselves. KLA veterans also began to protest more vocally, at times
directly opposing KFOR troops. There were protests against the UNMIK-organized dialogue
with Serbia on October 14, and against UNMIK in general on November 12. A homemade bomb
was planted near UNMIK headquarters during the visit of a senior UN official. There were also
large anti-UNMIK protests related to the indictment of Albanians by the ICTY in March 2004,
days before the major riots broke out.44 4
"
3 Many interviewees specifically highlighted the failure of privatization as a major source of frustration. Serbia
was involved in the ownership of state-owned enterprises, which meant that privatization might impact status. UN
headquarters refused to gmnt the Kosovo Trust Agency staff legal immunity. This made it impossible for UNMIK to
conducted privatization and slowed the development of the local economy. Ibid., 184-188. ICG, "Collapse in
Kosovo," 22 April 2004, Europe Report N*155, 6. Interviews with international and local analysts, Pristina, Winter
2010.
* Whit Mason, "Kosovo: Unraveling the Knot," World Policy Journal 23, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 90. ICG, Collapse in
Kosovo," 8-9.
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Local elites began to increase their anti-UNMIK rhetoric. Prime Minister Rexhepi
explained his view of the October 14 demonstrations: "We don't like to see those protests or
those placards, but if UNMIK continues to ignore our needs, if it refuses to transfer more power
to us, then the internationals here will face big demonstrations and everyone will be crying
'UNMIK go home."'445 Rexhepi also took a World Bank contingent to a restaurant in Serb-
dominated Northern Mitrovica, which provoked Serb protest. Finally, according to some
accounts, Albanian elites influenced the activities of the more secretive and violent nationalist
groups.446
By November 2003, UNMIK launched a major revision of the Standards before Status
demands. The Standards before Status would be renamed the "Standards for Kosovo" and would
include 109 sub-goals under the eight original benchmarks. UNMIK also announced that
Kosovo's progress with the standards would be evaluated in mid-2005. To further specify the
steps necessary for achieving the standards, UNMIK created the Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan (KSIP). The 117-page KSIP contained 400 actions, offered a timeline, and
specified responsible institutions. While the plan was released on March 31, 2004, several weeks
after the riots, UNMIK had been negotiating the plan with the Kosovo authorities for several
months. 447
The KSIP was highly ineffective and demonstrates the dangers of the international
administration's beliefs in human rights and bureaucratic procedures. First, the KSIP adopted a
highly ambitious rights-based approach. The document was filled with vague, aspirational
4 5 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 10.
44 Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans, chap. 11.
447 Whit Mason, speaking in his official role for UNMIK, called the 2005 date a "psychological target"; see
http://www.unmikonline.org/radio/english/december03/011203.mp3. See also the "Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan," Available at
http://pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/symposi/nresources/KSIP%20final%20draft%/ 2031%20March%202004b.htm; and
Bernhard Knoll, "From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an International
Administration's Open-Ended Mandate," European Journal ofInternational Law 16, no. 4 (September 2005): 641.
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demands such as "Public figures (both centrally and in municipalities) unequivocally condemn
statements condoning or likely to incite violence, inter-ethnic hatred or any other form of
extremism... KPC [Kosovo Protection Corps] ensures that no current or potential KPC member
is discriminated against on account of his or her race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation."448
Some international critics even believed that the KSIP was so ambitious that even Western
democracies such as France could not achieve the standards, while other participants joked that
"if Kosovo met Steiner's standards, it should be immediately granted the chairmanship of the
Council in Europe, because its human rights record would surpass that of any Western European
country."449 Consequently, even if the Kosovo Albanian elites were dedicated to fulfilling the
standards, it was unlikely that they would be able to achieve the requirements in the KSIP.
Second, the bureaucratic complexity of the document was inappropriate for Kosovo. The KSIP
seemed to assume that specifying a long list of requirements would be sufficient to deal with
political objections. The document was written by a variety of different committees within the
international administration and by foreign consultants. The plan therefore paid little attention to
the attitude of locals and was long, complex, and of varying quality. 4 50 While local officials
nominally participated and approved the document, few actively contributed to, or even read, the
document. Instead, the process was "captured by the UN's mid-level bureaucrats." 45 1
44 8 Other requirements include: "Adopt and implement Anti-Corruption Strategy for Kosovo, including an Anti-
Corruption campaign... Set up, make functional and/or strengthen mechanisms for gender mainstreaming envisaged
by the Law on Gender Equality... Media criticise any form of hate speech and refrain from broadcasting or printing
it. Media encourage tolerance among the communities and report in an unbiased way, especially when dealing with
situations of inter-ethnic tension ... Ensure that an ethnic and gender awareness component is integrated in all
training provided to police officers, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and penal system managers, and that it is an
integral part of programmes for continuing professional education." UNMIK, "Kosovo Standards Implementation
Plan."
449 Perritt, The Road to Independencefor Kosovo, 75. Interview with former UN official, New York, Spring 2010.
450 Even one internal UN review noted that the KSIP was "far from uniform in character." UNMIK,
"The Kosovo Standards Process 2003-2007," UNMIK/StratCo 070420 (available at
www.unmikonline.org/standards/docs/KSP2003-2007.pdf accessed January 2, 2012), 1-2. Interview with former UN
official, Pristina, Winter 2010.
451 Interview with local analyst, Pristina, Winter 2010
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UNMIK intended the KSIP to make the standards more achievable by specifying what
had to be done to implement them, but the process instead made it clear that UNMIK"s
objectives for Kosovo were effectively unlimited. The continuing prevarication on when Kosovo
would be evaluated on its achievement of the standards, combined with the difficulty of the
benchmarks and implementation plan, meant that the Standards before Status process was
effectively threatening Kosovo's independence. Kosovo would not become independent so long
as the process continued. Elites' reaction was to begin to outbid one another on objecting to
UNMIK, as occurred in the protests in October 2003. In March 2004, this outbidding would
result in major violence.
Riots
In March 2004, the Albanian majority's frustration came to a head. On the evening of March 16,
the public television channel reported that in Northern Kosovo a group of Serbs had chased
several Albanian boys into the Ibar River. The story claimed that several of the boys were
missing and presumed drowned. While an UNMIK police spokeswoman urged calm, an
Albanian "human rights" activist called for action against the "Serbian bandits." 412 In the
morning, several newspapers repeated the story with similar outrage. Major riots throughout
Kosovo broke out the next day. Approximately 19 people were killed, 900 injured, and 36
Serbian churches and 700 homes were damaged or destroyed. 5
The theory predicts that when international demands threaten nationalist goals, public
protest becomes feasible and will enable local elites to block implementation. Examining the role
of elites in the March 2004 riots therefore provides an opportunity to evaluate the theory and
investigate the mechanisms of how elites might play a role in escalating violence. However, the
4 52 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 14.
45 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," i. Mason, "Kosovo," 89.
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history of the riots is contested and politicized. There are two competing interpretations of the
role of elites in the violence.
The first interpretation, supported by some international officials in UNMIK 454 and many
commentators on the Serb side, claims that the riots were pre-planned and executed by Albanian
elites. As evidence for close elite leadership, this school of thought notes the rapid start and
systematic targeting of the riots. They also note the reported discovery by an intelligence agency,
in November 2003, of a secret plan for Kosovo-wide riots. The second interpretation, which is
mainly on the Albanian side, argues that the elites neither instigated nor planned the violence.
Instead, the riots were a broad popular response to the report of the Serb attack on Albanian
civilians, combined-with underlying social frustration about the lack of political and economic
development. This interpretation notes that Thaci was out of the country, and that other party
leaders seemed be steadily behind the news. These leaders were also instrumental in calming and
ending the riots on March 18, 2004."'5
Neither school of thought is completely correct. Rather, in the words of one report, the
riots were "both spontaneous and organized." 456 There were elements of the riots that were
orchestrated by ex-members of the KLA, or by groups such as the AKSh, some of whom had
links to the major political parties. Many of the 50,000 rioters, however, did not riot because they
were part of a predesigned plan, or were provoked by a specific elite's call to protest. Indeed,
accounts of the protest make clear that there were a number of informally and locally organized
4 54 SRSG Harri Holkeri "stated that Albanian extremists "had a ready-made plan" for the violence." Human Rights
Watch, "Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004" Vol. 16 No. 6 (July 2004), 27.
45 These competing accounts are drawn from ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 15-31; Mason, "Kosovo," 94. Perritt, The
Road to Independence for Kosovo, 1-11, 79-80. Human Rights Watch, "Failure to Protect," 26-28.
45 6 Human Rights Watch, "Failure to Protect," 27. The ICG explains: "The two days of violence were not centrally
organised, but were a vortex which different radical, extremist, and criminal structures poured in and out of, an
impromptu market place of violence to which each brought their wares and found their niche." ICG, "Collapse in
Kosovo," 17. This evaluation was confirmed by my interviews a variety of interviews with international officials
and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
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simultaneous protests in different parts of Kosovo. Protestors communicated with each other
through text messages, for example, rather than taking orders from a central organization. 4 7
Nevertheless, elites played a substantial role in bringing about the conditions for the riots.
The major political parties - including PDK, LDK, and AAK - used rhetoric that blamed the
international community and UNMIK for the lack of progress towards independence. During the
crisis, some Albanian political leaders justified the violence based on the lack of progress with
status negotiations and the continued existence of Serbian parallel institutions. Later, however,
the main political parties did condemn the violence, and some politicians played a personal role
in calming the protestors.45
The account of the riots as partly spontaneous and partly mobilized by elite rhetoric is
consistent with the theory and further specifies the mechanisms that elites use to escalating
protest. The account emphasizes that elites rely on the mass public for their power and that elites
can shape the way that the mass public interprets international demands.
Eide Report and the Start of Status Negotiations
The theory predicts that in response to violent protest, the international administration will
recognize the illegitimacy of its demands and weaken them. Indeed, the riots showed that
continuing to delay status negotiations could have serious negative political consequences. Kai
Eide wrote a report reviewing UNMIK following the riots in mid-2004, which suggested
weakening UNMIK's demands. Eide's suggestions were largely adopted, and he would later
4 57 Perritt interviews one participant about the protest: "'How did you know about it? How did you know where to
go and what to do?'... 'That was no problem.. .We simply called each other on our cell phones or sent text messages
to each other. It wasn't too hard to agree that Caglavica was where the action should be... We were fed up and we
wanted to do something. Most of us were too young to have been part of the KLA, but we are not too young now to
show that we have some pride, and that there are limits on what the Serbs and UNMIK can do to us."' The Road to
Independence for Kosovo, 9-10.
458 Notably, Thaci was one of the first Albanian politicians to issue a statement specifically condemning violence
against the Serbs, rather than just the violence against UNMIK. Human Rights Watch, "Failure to Protect, 57-61;
ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 25.
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write a second report, in October 2005, reviewing Kosovo's achievement of the standards and
preparedness to begin status negotiations.
Eide's reports were frank assessments of the problems with UNMIK's extant approach to
Kosovo. Eide's first report argued that UNMIK lacked political "perspective." He observed that
UNMIK's insistence that status negotiations should only begin after all of the standards had been
implemented was counterproductive for the achievement of any standards at all. Eide noted that
the ambition and complexity of the standards led Kosovo Albanians to believe that the standards
were not implementable. While many international and local critics had previously argued that
the Standards before Status policy was not feasible, UNMIK and UN headquarters were only
willing to reevaluate their demands after the riots. 459
Eide made a series of recommendations about how to adjust the international approach in
Kosovo. Eide recommended prioritizing certain standards, especially those related to the
protection of minorities. The other standards would remain on the table, but would become part
of a longer-term effort to integrate Kosovo into the European Union. Eide also proposed
transferring further authority to the PISG. Finally, Eide recommended commencing the status
negotiations. He noted that while there was no good time for status negotiations, the political
situation in Kosovo would continue to degrade so long as status negotiations were delayed. In an
addendum to the report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan approved of Eide's main
recommendations. Annan proposed a comprehensive review of Kosovo's achievement of the
standards in 2005 as a prelude to status negotiations. In order to better monitor and encourage the
459 ForEide's full report, see See "Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council," S/2004/932. Several analysts have noted that Eide's reports are far more clearly
and bluntly written than typical UN reports, which is one sign that the reports accurately reflect that UN's opinion of
its own situation. See Tim Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2008), 111;
King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 209-211.
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achievement of standards, he also instructed UNMIK to begin technical evaluations of Kosovo's
achievement of the standards in UNMIK's quarterly progress reports to the Security Council. 4 60
Many of the theory's claims are echoed by Eide's report. The report recognizes that a
technical or bureaucratic approach is unlikely to succeed with reform efforts that impact
independence. Eide also observed that UNMIK could do little to change the center of gravity of
Albanian politics away from the goal of independence. Finally, one of Eide's main
recommendations for improving UNMIK's efforts in the future was to improve the unity of the
intemational community overall, and to reorganize UNMIK to improve inter-organization
coordination. 4 '
The adoption of Eide's recommendations amounted to a major weakening of the demands
related to the standards. A new SRSG, Soren Jessen-Petersen, was appointed to oversee this
change in strategy. In early 2005, UNMIK specified certain of the standards in the November
2003 document as "Priority Standards."4 62 The priority standards deemphasized multiethnic
institutions in favor of protecting minorities through decentralization and minority vetoes.
UNMIK did not completely abandon its goals beyond the priority standards, but shifted
responsibility for implementing these goals to the European Union in the long run.
Kosovo Albanian local elites reacted quite favorably to the weakened demands. General
elections in October 2004 led to the creation of an LDK and AAK coalition, with Ramush
Haradinaj, the popular leader of AAK, becoming the Prime Minister. Haradinaj was a more
enthusiastic supporter of the Standards than previous Kosovo Albanian leaders. He created an
office to supervise the PISG's implementation of standards and criticized Albanian officials who
460 See "Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council," S/2004/932.
461 S/2004/932, para 30, 55-57, 61
462 See S/2004/932, Annex II, paragraph 5; http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/moreinfo.htm
http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/docs/Standards ENG new.pdf
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came unprepared to meetings or left technical details to their international counterparts. Several
international and local officials believed that Haradinaj's influence shifted the standards process
from being a primarily internationally dominated process to one with greater local
involvement.463 However, in March 2005, Haradinaj was indicted by the ICTY for war crimes
and stepped down as Prime Minister after only approximately 100 days in office. Bajram
Kosumi was appointed to replace him as Prime Minister. While many feared that Haradinaj's
indictment would lead to violence, Kosovo remained calm. Albanian elites recognized that the
international community's perspective toward independence had shifted and that further violence
risked undermining international support.464
In late 2005, Eide led a comprehensive review of the standards process and issued a
second report. While Eide observed that implementation of the standards was "uneven", he
recommended commencing status negotiations.465 The UN then appointed Martti Ahtisaari as a
Special Envoy and began the status negotiations. At the beginning of the talks, Ahtisaari even
told Serbia's leadership in Belgrade that Kosovo's independence would be the inevitable result
of the negotiations. 4 66 While the UNMIK remained careful not to publically state that the
independence of Kosovo was inevitable, many UNMIK officials believed that it was. This belief
was heightened since many UNMIK officials took part in the status negotiations and helped
design new institutions for an independent Kosovo. Furthermore, for many UNMIK officials, the
establishment and strengthening of Kosovo's institutions only made sense if Kosovo was going
to become independent. Finally, Albanians, who constituted a clear majority of the population,
4 6 3 Interviews with former UNMIK officials and local officials, Pristina, December 2009, January 2010.
4 6 4 ICG, "Kosovo after Haradinaj," Europe Report No. 163, 26 May 2005, 24; King and Mason, Peace at Any
Price, 212-213; Perritt, The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 82-84.
465 "Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,"
S/2005/635, 2-5.
4 6 6 James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (I. B. Tauris, 2009), 28; Perritt, The
Road to Independence for Kosovo, 120.
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had made it clear that they both supported independence and would violently oppose continued
467Serbian sovereignty.
The international community, however, remained divided about Kosovo's independence.
Five countries from the Contact Group - the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy -
composed a group called the Quint that generally supported independence. Russia, the other
member of the Contact Group, remained Serbia's main ally, and continued to oppose Kosovo's
independence. The Quint, led by the US, believed that if Kosovo's institutions ensured the
continued rights of minorities in Kosovo, other more skeptical countries might be encouraged to
accept Kosovo's independence. The Quint therefore pressed UNMIK to work harder to build
stronger institutions to protect minorities while UNMIK was still in place. The Quint, supported
by Ahtisaari, also sought to use the status negotiations to convince Kosovo Albanians to accept a
restructured international administration that would continue to supervise Kosovo's institutions
after independence.4 68
Implementation of Standards during Status Negotiation
The commencement of status negotiations provided Kosovo Albanians with a clear narrative
about how implementing the priority standards would lead to greater international support for
independence. UNMIK's priority standards focused largely on providing Serbs with greater
public services, increasing the power of minority-dominated municipalities, and increasing the
representation of minorities in Kosovo's institutions. While the Albanian political elite would not
have agreed to these measures without international pressure, they were willing to implement
them as a condition for independence. These measures posed little threat to Albanian elites'
informal networks, which were largely centered on central institutions and Albanian-dominated
467 Interviews with a several former UNMIK officials, Pristina, winter 2010. See also Perritt, The Road to
Independence for Kosovo, 170.
468 Ibid., 119-140. Interviews with a several former UNMIK officials, Pristina, January 2010.
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municipalities. UNMIK's reports provide a record of slowly, but steadily, improving institutions
related to protecting minorities. The Assembly approved a variety of priority standards related to
the use of languages, media, public services, transportation, electricity, municipal governance,
and other measures.4 69 The implementation of standards was especially rapid when the
international community proposed a relatively small number of changes with a clear deadline.470
UNMIK also had some success implementing the non-priority standards, which were
associated with the EU accession process. Over the course of 2006, Kosovar, UNMIK, and EU
authorities worked together to develop a European Partnership Action Plan (EPAP), which
specified the actions necessary to make progress with Kosovo's EU accession process. Many of
the outstanding standards and specific actions from the KSIP were included in the 122-item, 135-
page EPAP, which was released in August 2006. Unlike the KSIP, local officials participated in
the creation of the EPAP and supported its implementation. The overarching reason for greater
acceptance of the EPAP was that it was no longer linked to the politically untouchable issue of
independence. The PISG had also developed greater capacity to react to complex and
bureaucratic intemational demands.47
While Albanian participation in the standards process improved, Serbs boycotted
Kosovo's institutions. 7 Indeed, the lack of Serb participation became one of the primary
impediments to achieving greater implementation of the priority standards. Many of the
standards dealt with minority recruitment and participation in government, which meant that the
Albanian-dominated government depended on active Serb participation to meet these standards.
469 See especially S/2007/134, page 8.
470 In June 2006, the Contact group proposed 13 priority areas, which were largely implemented by the government.
UNMIK, "The Kosovo Standards Process 2003-2007," 5-6; S/2007/134, 8-9.
471 Interview with former member of the Standards Implementation office, Pristina, January 2010. UNMIKIPISG,
"Kosovo Action Plan for the Implementation of European Partnership 2006," August 2006, (Available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/eu/docs/EPAP 9 August 2006 eng.pdf, access January 2, 2012);
472 See, for example, S/2006/45, paragraph 18; S/2007/134, paragraph 22.
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The government had difficult with minority recruitment and was forced to lower hiring standards
to ensure adequate minority representation.7 UNMIK's reports eventually began to note that
Serb lack of participation was to blame for Kosovo's limited implementation of particular
standards, rather than Albanian intransigence. These observations frustrated Serbia and its allies,
especially Russia, and heightened the perception that UNMIK was biased in favor of Kosovo's
independence.47
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence
By late 2007, the status negotiation process had stalled. The Kosovo Albanian authorities would
only accept an agreement that granted independence, while the Serbian authorities would not
accept any such agreement. Still, Ahtisaari's team, with the help of UNMIK, developed a plan
for post-independence Kosovo. Ahtisaari's plan specified the creation of a restructured
international administration, which would retain executive authority to ensure that the Kosovo
continued to meet international standards, especially with regard to the rule of law and protection
of minorities. According to the plan, UNMIK would cease to exist after a 120-day transition
period, at which point a new organization, the International Civilian Office (ICO), would take
over supervision of the international administration.
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Under the threat of a
Russian veto, the Security Council did not accept Ahtisaari's plan or Kosovo's independence.
Kosovo's leadership, however, agreed in the Declaration of Independence to abide by the
requirements contained in the Ahtisaari plan. Without any action by the Security Council,
however, UNMIK continued exercise executive power in Kosovo under resolution 1244.
UNMIK, however, downsized its operations and effectively ceded power to Kosovo's
47 Interview with former member of the Standards Implementation office, Pristina, January 2010
474 Interview with former UNMIK official, Pristina, December 2009.
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institutions. Two new organizations, an EU-led rule of law mission (EULEX) and the
International Civilian Office, took over the international supervision and reform of Kosovo's
institutions.
Conclusions
Table 4.2: Kosovo Standards before Status Reform
Preferences Improvements in:
Human rights and Organized crime and high level corruption Overall function of state
multiethnicity I
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Statement of Improvements High Low UNMIK cannot commence status
benchmarks in institutional negotiations, so hopes to improve
functions institutions
Response to Improvements High Low Failure: Partially Confirmed:
benchmarks in institutional Kosovo elites seek greater Elites attempt
functions authority and clearer evaluation nationalist outbidding.
of standards. UN creates Transfer Limited
Council but does not set date for implementation with
evaluation uncertain threat
Specification Kosovo High Nation- Failure: Confirmed:
of KSIP Standards alist UN sets date for evaluation, Standards threaten
Implementation goals further specifies demands in nationalist goals.
Plan KSIP. KSIP is not implementable. Public protest occurs.
Kosovo leaders begin to provoke
protest against UNMIK. Riots
break out March 2004.
Eide Report "Priority High Low Success: Confirmed:
Standards" Violence leads to international Protest blocks reform,
reevaluation of strategy, Weaker forces weaker
demands through priority demands.
standards
Implement- "Priority High Low Success: Confirmed:
ation of Standards" Beginning of Status Negotiations, Unity combined with
demands Generally good implementation lack of threat leads to
after riots of Priority Standards except lack greater
of Serb participation in implementation
government I _I
The Standards before Status process was a rational attempt to improve Kosovo's institutions
within UNMIK's political constraints. It largely failed. UNMIK could not overturn the
fundamental desire of the Albanian majority in Kosovo to achieve independence. UNMIK tried
to respond to Albanian complaints about the standards process by making its demands more
specific, but the effort was counterproductive since it revealed that UNMIK's goals were
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effectively unlimited. Albanians' frustration with the lack of progress on standards, and hence
unwillingness of the international community to grant independence, led to the riots of 2004.
These riots forced the UN to reevaluate its strategy in Kosovo, and recognize that it was
necessary to weaken demands and begin status negotiations. Once UNMIK's demands were
more clearly linked to international recognition of Kosovo's independence, the implementation
of the standards accelerated.
The Standards before Status reform closely conforms to the expectations of the theory
and offers substantial support for the theory's claims (see Table 4.2). The reform effort
demonstrates several mechanisms and sub-mechanisms specified by the theory. Public protest
occurred once the demands threatened nationalist goals and forced the international community
to weaken its demands. The new demands did not threaten nationalist goals or informal
networks, so with unity, they were fully implemented.
The reform effort also discounts the alternative explanations. First, the reform effort
questions the efficacy of international authority, resources, and technical proficiency. UNMIK
had supreme authority in Kosovo. Though the standards prior to 2004 were not perfect, they
largely represented bureaucratic best practices. Nevertheless, UNMIK's effort to implement the
standards largely failed and therefore demonstrates that international authority and expertise
cannot trump the local political context. Second, the support of key donors was not sufficient to
implement the standards. The EU and the United States were steady supporters of the standards,
but their demands did not trump concerns about independence. Third, there was little evidence of
the existence of moderate parties with alternative political views. All major parties sought to
associate themselves with independence and competed in their opposition of UNMIK leading to
the riots.
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V. Electoral Reform under UNMIK
As a means to establish interim democratic institutions, UNMIK's mandate included holding
elections. Responsibility for elections was under Pillar III of UNMIK, the OSCE Mission in
Kosovo (OMIK). OMIK attempted to implement the international community's preferences,
which included free and fair elections, the election of moderate parties, the participation of
Serbs, and the eventual transfer of authority to locally run institutions. The OSCE had run
elections in Bosnia and many of its decisions in Kosovo were guided by "lesson learned" from
Bosnia, including delaying general elections as well as adopting a modest approach for
encouraging the election of moderate and multiethnic parties. Overall, the reform would be
partially successful. OMIK conducted elections that were widely viewed as free and fair,
moderate Albanian parties were sometimes elected, and local electoral institutions were
established. However, Serbs only rarely participated in elections.
The theory only partially explains the trajectory and outcome of the electoral reform.
Since authority over elections was delegated to OMIK, unity was high. Outside of the conduct of
free and fair elections, OMIK generally made limited demands for reform, so the threat of the
demands was low. The theory predicts full success, while only partial success was observed.
Furthermore, the mechanisms of the process were sometimes different from the mechanisms
specified by the theory. The conduct of elections and the transfer of authority to local institutions
did follow the specified mechanisms of the theory. The election of moderate Albanian parties
and the participation of Serbs in elections, however, were determined by domestic trends within
Kosovo and the rest of Serbia rather than by the activity of the international administration.
4 7 OMIK's responsibilities would be "strengthening the capacity of local and central institutions and civil society
organizations, as well as promoting democracy, good governance and respect for human rights." S/1999/779, para
79.
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The case study proceeds in five parts. The first part describes the origins of the
international administration's preferences for elections and codes the key variables. The second
part describes the development of rules for the municipal elections in October 2000. The third
part describes the first Kosovo-wide elections in 2001. The fourth part describes several
subsequent developments in electoral institutions, including a debate about the open and closed
lists and the transfer of authority to local institutions. A fifth part concludes.
Origins of UNMIK's Efforts at Election Reform
Although the context and purpose of the elections in Kosovo would be guided by the overall
negotiation about political status, as described in the previous reform efforts, the technical
conduct of elections still had the potential to influence the development of politics in Kosovo.
The international community had four preferences with regard to elections in Kosovo.
First, OMIK sought to hold elections that were recognized internationally and locally as free and
fair. The running of elections was a legal and logistical challenge that involved specifying the
rules for the elections, monitoring, and supervising the campaigns, and then actually holding the
election. If elections were not viewed as legitimate, the UNMIK and the elected leaders would be
discredited. Free and fair elections were therefore of primary importance, since a variety of other
objectives depended on the legitimacy of locally elected leaders.
Second, OMIK sought to encourage Serb participation in elections. OMIK's initial
mandate included bringing "about mutual respect and reconciliation among all ethnic groups in
Kosovo" and establishing "a viable multi-ethnic society where the rights of each citizen are fully
and equally respected." 476 This preference for multiethnicity follows the belief in human rights
described in the theory and led OMIK to have a preference for integrative over consociational
institutions. However, OMIK quickly realized that cross ethnic voting was unlikely in Kosovo.
4 7 6 OSCE, Decision No. 305, 1 July 1999, (available at http://www.osce.org/pc/28795 (accessed April 25, 2012).
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Since Serbia and Russia were both OSCE members, OMIK was particularly attentive to the
position of Serbs in Kosovo and primarily sought to ensure Serb participation in elections. 7
Third, the mission sought to encourage the election of moderate Albanian parties.
UNMIK was suspicious of the parties emerging from the KLA, especially PDK, given their
association with violent nationalism and alleged connections with organized crime. The LDK
was seen as a pacifist, popular, and more moderate alternative. 47 8 The AAK was seen as a
possibly useful counterweight to the popularity of the PDK, even though its leader Haradinaj had
close links with the KLA. The international community also favored smaller moderate Albanian
parties, such as the ORA party led by Vetton Surroi. 4 79
Fourth, later in UNMIK's administration, the international community sought to
gradually transfer authority over elections to local institutions. Because of status concerns, the
international community was willing to retain authority over elections in Kosovo for longer than
in other societies. But given the cost of running elections, and long run desirably of locally-run
institutions, UNMIK attempted to transfer authority as soon as was practical. The creation of an
"independent, representative and multi-ethnic Central Election Commission," was included in
the Standards, although it was not made a priority standard in 2004. Even as local institutions
took over responsibility for running elections, the quality of elections remained critical, so
international advisors and monitors remained present.480
477 Andrew Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society. The
Kosovo Assembly Elections of November 2001," Electoral Studies 24, no. 3 (September 2005): 439-442; Tansey,
Regime-Building, 130-1.
478 Perritt explains that the international community's "goals were peace and a multiethnic government, no matter
how much that slowed economic development and the emergence of local institutions. Towards that goal, Rugova
[the leader of LDK] was a better bet than anyone from the KLA." The Road to Independencefor Kosovo, 154;
Tansey, Regime-Building, 118.
479 Tansey, Regime-Building, 118; King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 120-121. Interviews with international
officials local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
40 Interviews with OSCE and other international officials, Pristina, Winter 2010. UNMIK, "Standards for Kosovo
(with Priority Standards Indicated)" (available at
http://www.unniikonline.org/standards/docs/StandardsENG-new.pdf, accessed January 9, 2012), 5.
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Throughout the election reform, the international administration was unified in its
demands. Authority over elections had been largely delegated to OMIK, though the SRSG
retained final authority. One international participant emphasized that OMIK was largely in
control of election policy and did not have to negotiate its demands with other organizations.
OMIK's connection with the rest of the mission was limited to a weekly meeting, and while the
SRSG did occasionally make rulings relevant to elections, his decisions were closed guided by
advise from OMIK.4 '
The threat of OMIK's demands was generally low. Indeed, OMIK's overriding concern
was simplicity and stability. Even though having elections was tied to independence, the specific
election rules had little meaning for its achievement. Specific electoral rules did have the
potential to make it hard for specific parties to win elections. Such rules would be equivalent to a
threat to informal networks. 8 However, while some of OMIK's proposed rules did have
consequences for the parties' vote shares, none of its proposed rules had the potential to
significantly weaken any of the major parties. OMIK's ambition later in the mission was further
diminished by the decreasing international staff, from approximately 1500 in 2004 to 150 in
2007 to 24 in 2009.48 I therefore code the threat of the reform as low. Hence, given low threat
and high unity, the theory predicts successful implementation of international demands.
Municipal Elections of 2000
OMIK decided to delay general elections (also called "Kosovo-wide elections") and hold
municipal elections first for several reasons. First, a key "lesson learned" from Bosnia was that
rapid elections tend to enfranchise nationalist parties. The OSCE was concerned that
48 Interview with international officials, Pristina, Winter 2010.
482 See the electoral reform in Bosnia for an explanation of why such demands threaten informal networks rather
than nationalist goals.
483 Interview with local analysts and international officials, Pristina, Winter 2010. See also Taylor, "Electoral
Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society."
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immediately after the war nationalist Albanian parties closely associated with the popular KLA
would be victorious. OMIK was also concerned that rapid general elections would imply
independence. By holding municipal elections first, the OMIK hoped to focus on local-level
governance and thereby deemphasize the political status of Kosovo and encourage greater Serb
participation. Finally, OMIK had concerns about the technical challenges of quickly holding
general elections. Holding municipal elections first would give OMIK time to gain experience
working in Kosovo and develop its electoral infrastructure.484
In early 2000, negotiations began about rules for the municipal elections. UNMIK created
the Central Election Commission (CEC), which was largely made up of local representatives, but
was chaired by the head of the OSCE. The CEC negotiated two major issues - the proposed
electoral system and whether there would be open or closed party lists.
The CEC favored a proportional representation (PR) system. The head of OMIK wrote
that "the selection of the proportional system encouraged a more moderate political climate,
prevented the formation of a bi-polar reality and assured small and minority parties of achieving
some representation without needing a large share of the votes." 485 The OSCE further argued that
proportional representation (PR) was the only technically feasible system given the lack of
reliable census data.4 86 The PDK and LDK opposed the PR electoral system in favor of a first-
past-the-post voting system. As the two largest parties, they hoped to eliminate the smaller
competitors. The PDK spokesman even threatened to boycott the elections. In July 2000,
Kouchner, the SRSG, stuck with the CEC proposals despite the objections of PDK and LDK.
484 Tansey, Regime-Building, 118, 122-4, 130-1; Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of
'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society," 440; Brand, Development ofKosovo institutions, 24-28.
48s Quoted in Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society," 441.
48 Tansey, Regime-Building, 132. ICG, "Elections in Kosovo: Moving Towards Democracy?," Balkans Report No.
97, 6 July 2000, 4.
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While PDK and LDK did have a preference for a different electoral system, the choice of PR was
hardly threatening to their dominance in Kosovo. 4 87
There was also disagreement about whether to have open or closed party lists, an issue
that would reappear several times in the future. In closed list systems, voters can only select their
preferred party. The parties submit a list of candidates prior to the election and, depending how
many votes the parties receive, a different number of candidates from the list are elected. In an
open list system, voters can reorder candidates from the party's list. OMIK's initial preference
was for a closed list system, largely for the sake of simplicity. Without a stable voter registry
prior to the elections, verifying a candidate's credentials would be difficult. However, based on
the desire of representatives from the major political parties, OMIK adopted open lists for the
municipal election. OMIK also ruled that one-third of the positions throughout the list be
reserved for women.488
The municipal elections were held in October 2000. There were a number of irregularities
in the election, including attacks against LDK members. As OMIK had expected, the credentials
of some 100 candidates were impossible to verify and the candidate list was still being finalized
only hours prior to the election. Nevertheless, the elections were generally viewed as legitimate
by local and international authorities. The three main Albanian parties, LDK, PDK, and AAK,
dominated the elections by together winning a total of 93% of the vote. The major surprise of the
municipal election was the impressive performance of LDK, which won a total of 58% of the
votes cast and a majority in 22 municipalities.4 8
487 Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society," 443; Tansey,
Regime-Building, 132. ICG, "Elections in Kosovo," 4-5.
488 Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society," 442-443, 448.4 8 9 Ibid., 442-4, 448. ICG, "Kosovo: A Landmark Election," 9-10; Central Europe Review, http://www.ce-
review.org/00/39/kosovonews39.html; OMIK Press Release, "Decisions by Kosovo Election Complaints and
Appeals Sub-Commission," 19 October 2000, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/53005.
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LDK's victory stemmed from domestic political conditions rather than the behavior of
the international administration. LDK retained the strongest political organization throughout the
country and the influential older generation of Kosovo Albanians was still largely loyal to LDK.
Also, only a small percentage of Albanians had actively participated in the KLA and many
believed that the KLA veterans did not have the education or experience necessary to rule the
territory. Finally, the electorate was soured by the period of violence and attacks against LDK
immediately after the war.490
While the international administration encouraged Kosovo Serb participation, the Serbs
boycotted the elections. Observers cited the Serbs' refusal to accept the loss of the war and
Milosevic's continuing influence. Given the boycott and low turnout, UNMIK appointed Serbs
to municipal councils in northern Kosovo. While UNMIK considered holding subsequent
municipal elections in these areas in 2001 to confirm its appointees, UNMIK did not do so
because it was afraid that nationalist parties would dominate the elections.49
The municipal elections partially achieved international objectives - they were generally
viewed as free and fair, the moderate LDK party was elected, but few Serbs participated.
However, the theory provides only limited insight. Locals opposed international demands even
though they were not particularly threatening. With the exception of the quality of the election
itself, UNMIK's achievements and failures were largely unrelated to its demands or unity.
November 2001 Kosovo-Wide Elections
Holding Kosovo-wide elections depended on the promulgation of the Constitutional Framework,
which did not happen until May 2001. Nevertheless, soon after the municipal elections, OMIK
490 Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 154-156; King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 116. ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark
Election," 9.
491 ICG, "Elections in Kosovo," 18-20. Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 28-29. Central Europe Review,
http://www.ce-review.org/00/39/kosovonews39.html
205
began to discuss the rules for the Kosovo-wide elections. OMIK hoped to encourage the election
of small and minority parties and to simplify the election logistics. The size of the Assembly was
fixed at 120 members and the electoral system would remain PR. There were two key
contentious issues - the district structure and whether to have open or closed lists. 492
OMIK considered two plans for the district structure, either multiple districts or a single
district. In the multiple district system, 30 members of the Assembly would be elected from each
of the municipalities, 60 would be elected from Kosovo as a whole, and 30 would be reserved for
minorities. In the single district system, all of the non-reserved seats would be elected from the
whole of Kosovo. Although the three main Albanian parties preferred multiple districts, OMIK
decided on a single district for several reasons. First and foremost, having a single electoral
district was simpler. Due to continuing refugee returns and the obligation to allow refugees to
vote in their pre-conflict homes, a multiple district system would make the registration and
voting process significantly harder. Also, OMIK was concerned that multiple districts would
solidify the regional fiefdoms of the different parties. Finally, since some municipalities were
quite small, there were concerns that seats in the Assembly would be out of proportion to the
number of votes. The OSCE agreed that a single electoral district had the disadvantage of
weakening the connection between the members of the Assembly and local voters. Still, they
believed that the parties would retain the incentive to select candidates from diverse regions. 493
The second major issue was whether to keep the open lists from the municipal elections
or to have closed lists. OMIK preferred closed lists, largely for the sake of simplicity. Open lists
required complicated ballots, which were costlier and had the potential to decrease the secrecy of
the ballot if voters needed to ask for help. OMIK also believed that closed lists would provide
492 Taylor, "Electoral Systems and the Promotion of 'Consociationalism' in a Multi-Ethnic Society," 446.
493 Ibid., 448-9. ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 5.
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parties with an incentive to include candidates from across Kosovo. As with the municipal
elections, parties were required to include one woman in every group of three candidates over the
first two-thirds of the list. With closed lists, the gender quota would be far more restrictive,
which led parties to object that Kosovo was being held to standards "imposed by international
officials which are not applied in Western democracies and which Kosovo is allegedly
unready."4 94 Over the objections of the major parties, OMIK instituted a closed list system with
the gender quotas.
The major Albanian parties accepted the election rules despite disagreeing with OMIK's
choices. While the parties did prefer multiple districts and open lists, OMIK's choices were not
specifically targeted at any of the major parties and did not substantially threaten their ability to
win votes. The parties sought to accelerate the transfer of power from UNMIK to locally elected
officials and knew that insisting on open lists or other changes would have delayed the
elections.495
OMIK's final concern was whether or not Serbs would boycott the election. The ICG
writes, "Among all the contentious issues in the run-up to the election, the greatest amount of
political energy on the part of the international community was devoted to the question of
whether the Kosovo Serbs would participate." 496 UNMIK had made a number of efforts to
encourage Kosovo Serbs to vote, especially overrepresentation in the Assembly. Serb
participation was not determined by the electoral rules, but by the overarching political dialogue
between Belgrade and UNMIK. Serbs felt that voting in the election would legitimate the
Albanian-led Kosovo government. Kosovo Serbs also continued to be troubled by attacks on
returning refugees and the lack of freedom of movement. By not voting, they hoped to more
494 Ibid., 450-451. ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 5.
495 Ibid. [Taylor 450-451] ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 5.4 96 Ibid, 13.
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effectively express their displeasure with UNMIK's administration. However, on November 3,
2001, an agreement between Belgrade and UNMIK that enabled Serbs to vote in the election.
The agreement stated that the new Kosovo institutions would not have the power to determine
Kosovo's status and noted the need to improve the quality of life for the Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo
Albanian leadership rejected the agreement and were frustrated that they were not consulted.4 97
Figure 4.1: Vote Shares of Major Parties in Selected Elections
Oct-00 Nov-01 Oct-04 Nov-07 Dec-10
Municipal Kosovo- Kosovo- Kosovo- Kosovo-
wide wide wide wide
Elections were held on November 17, 2001. Again the results were dominated by the
three major Albanian parties, which together captured almost 80% of the vote, though a Serb
coalition party participated and won 11% of the vote. LDK continued to have a plurality of votes,
46.3% to PDK's 25.5% and AAK's 7.8%.498 As the theory expects, nationalist goals played a
prominent role in electoral campaigns. All of the parties campaigned largely on their wartime
record and there was little differentiation amongst the parties on policy. 4 99
4 97 1bid, 13-18.
4 9 1bid, 8.
4" King and Mason describe in depth the various parties' campaigns, including the tendency towards personalist
politics and attempts to associate itself with independence: "At a rally in Klina, Rugova stated the [LDK's] core
position: 'As you know, we declared independence in 1991 and we have built our state for more than ten years.
Therefore we ask for the official recognition of Kosovo's independence by the United States, the EU and the
international community'... The PDK and AAK emphasized their war records, often in rallies where AK-47s were
enthusiastically fired off into the sky .. .The PDK was most critical of the Constitutional Framework, which Thaci
argued 'will hold hostage the aim of the people of Kosovo, which is political independence'... Ramush Haradinaj,
leader of the AAK, distinguished himself from Thaci's PDK by not only avoiding political issues like his rivals but
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The international administration largely achieved its objectives in the 2001 elections. The
elections were agreed by international and local monitors to be free and fair, the more moderate
LDK continued to be successful, and Serbs widely participated. However, the achievement of
international objectives had little to do with the international demands related to elections. While
the international administration overruled the parties on closed lists and a single district for all of
Kosovo, neither of these rules had a major impact on the outcome of the elections. The theory
only partially explains the success of this stage of the reform effort.
Subsequent Elections under UNMIK
OMIK continued to supervise elections after 2001 with mixed success. OMIK seems to have
been guided more by a desire for simplicity and stability than for major reform. OMIK based its
decisions for electoral rules largely on the preferences of the major parties, which ended up
weakening smaller moderate parties. Serbs continued to boycott major elections because of
continuing concerns about Kosovo's status. 500 Finally, OMIK was also partially successful at
transferring authority to local institutions, though the quality of elections appears to have
declined as local institutions took over greater authority.
Prior to the 2004 Kosovo-wide elections, a coalition of 300 NGOs called Reform 2004
advocated for changes to the electoral system including open lists and multiple voting districts.
Reform 2004 sought to encourage greater regional representation and to "democratize" the
actually declaring his party to be 'above politics'...Haradinaj told a rally 'If anyone asks you why you think that the
AAK is the best, I would ask you not to say that we are patriots because we are all patriots and we all love Kosovo.
Say that the AAK works more than other parties, that AAK members wake up earlier than members of other parties
and that they will do more for you than the others. I can say that personally I work more than Thaci and Rugova.'
Peace at Any Price, 120-1. See also ICG, "Kosovo: Landmark Election," 8-12. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army,
155-158.
500 The Chief Executive of the CEC Secretariat observed in OMIK's newsletter: "All-inclusiveness was my main
concern and by that we meant participation of all ethnic groups in the elections, in particular participation by the
Kosovo Serbs. Me and my deputy, Mr. Bogoljub Staletovid did our best to ensure that all-inclusiveness becomes a
reality. And, I believe that from the operational aspect we managed to achieve this, despite the fact that we are not
happy with the extent of Serb participation." Hence, technically there was the ability for Serbs to vote although few
chose to. Hasan Sopa, "We did our best - Interview with Adnan Merovci," Details, Vol. 8, Ed. 4, December 2004, 9.
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internal functioning of the major political parties. While Reform 2004 submitted plans in
September 2004 for changes in the electoral rules, the OSCE refused to implement the changes
in the 2004 elections because of time and budget constraints. One Reform 2004 member claimed
that the OSCE did have the budget to implement the new rules, but that it would have been more
expensive and time consuming. He noted that US advisors favored the new rules, but continued
to support a closed list for the sake of stability. The 2004 elections therefore used similar
electoral rules as the 2001 elections. 501
The overall results of the 2004 elections were also similar to the 2001 elections. The three
major parties retained similar shares of the vote, with LDK taking 45%, PDK 29%, and AAK
8%. Vetton Surroi, a writer and intellectual favored by the international community, created a
new political party called ORA that only took 6% of the vote. A coalition of LDK and AAK was
formed, with Ramush Haradinaj becoming Prime Minister.s52
After the 2004 elections, the debate on electoral rules continued. Reform 2004 organized
public protests in February 2005 to encourage the OSCE to revise the electoral rules for
subsequent elections. Women's groups argued in favor of open lists, even though the change
would decrease the number of female MPs, with the hope of increasing the transparency and
accountability of political parties. OMIK downplayed its own role in the process, with one
representative claiming that "Civil society had representatives in the election working group and
they were certainly consulted, as the OSCE is only an administrator, not the decision maker." 03
OMIK eventually yielded and implemented open lists for subsequent elections.
501 Interview with Reform 2004 member, Pristina, December 2009. See also Tansey, Regime-Building, 133.
502 ICG, "Kosovo After Haradinaj," 13-20
503 Nicole Farnsworth, "Kosovo: Pressure Grows for Reform," IWPR, 21 February 2005. Lynne Alice, "The UN's
Global Gender Agenda and Post-Conflict Reconsturction: The Implementation of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325 in Kosovo," in Christine Eifler and Ruth Seifert, Gender Dynamics and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction (Peter Lang, 2009), 59-60.
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The major Albanian political parties had begun to recognize the consequences of the
reform and blocked the establishment of multiple electoral districts. Without multiple electoral
districts, the impact of open lists was limited, as voters were less likely to recognize the names of
candidates from different parts of Kosovo. OMIK also adopted a 5% minimum threshold for
receiving seats in the parliament because of the preferences of the major parties. Hence, while
Reform 2004 was successful at getting its main demand for open lists accepted, it did not achieve
its overall goals. OMIK accepted rules that effectively weakened small moderate parties.
In 2007, the Kosovo Albanian political system shifted decisively in favor of PDK, which
received 34% of the vote. LDK remained seriously divided following the death of Rugova in
January 2006 and received only 23% of the vote. A new party, AKR, led by Behgjet Pacolli, a
wealthy businessman living in Switzerland, received 12%. AAK, despite the indictment of its
leader Haradinaj by the ICTY, received 10% of the vote. The moderate ORA gained only 4% of
the vote, and therefore did not gain any seats in the parliament because it failed to meet the 5%
threshold. The 2007 elections happened shortly before the unilateral declaration of independence
and a coalition of PDK and LDK, with Thaci as Prime Minister, was formed and led Kosovo into
independence.
Beginning with the 2004 elections, OMIK began to transfer authority to local electoral
institutions - the CEC and its operational arm the CEC Secretariat. The CEC had certain
responsibilities in the 2004 elections, including running field operations, certifying political
parties, and verifying the credentials of election observers. However, OMIK continued to
504 Interview with Reform 2004 member, Pristina, December 2009. KIPRED, "Analysis of Elections: Trends and
Lessons Learned," Prishtina, February 2008, 6-7, 42-43; KIPRED, "Reforming the Electoral System of Kosova,"
Prishtina, June 2005.
505 KIPRED, "Analysis of Elections: Trends and Lessons Learned," 29-36. ICG, "Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint
for Transition," Europe Report N* 188, 6 December 2007, 7.
211
manage the voters' list and the counting of votes. 506 The CEC supposed to run the 2007
elections, with the OSCE providing only monitoring and advice. However, the OSCE stepped in
to provide substantial assistance. Following the declaration of independence, the OSCE
continued to provide assistance for elections. 507 Several analysts noted that elections under the
CEC were more prone to corruption and manipulation than the OMIK-run elections. In
particular, there were serious allegations of fraud in the 2010 elections. 08
The CEC Secretariat was unable to fully take over elections due to two problems. First,
as one OSCE elections official explained, there was a conflict between the tactical requirement
of ensuring free and fair elections and the long-term objective of building effective electoral
institutions. The overriding incentive for the international community was to ensure free and fair
elections, which made OMIK step in to provide support. Every time OMIK provided support
however, an opportunity for improving the self-sufficiency of the CEC was lost. Second, unlike
in Bosnia, the CEC staff was not recruited from former OSCE employees. Instead, the CEC staff
was newly recruited as Kosovo civil servants. While there were political advantages from this
choice, the CEC was perceived to be substantially weaker than the OSCE. In particular, low
salaries made it difficult to recruit the best personnel.5 09
Conclusions
The OSCE's administration of elections in Kosovo was partially successful. The trajectory and
outcome of reform only partially aligns with the theory's predictions. With the exception of
506 Interview with OSCE official, Pristina, January 2010. Alexandre Benz and Karin Marmsoer, "The CEC
Secretariat - a success story," Details, Vol. 8, Ed. 4, December 2004 1-2.
507 Interview with OSCE official, Pristina, January 2010. Drew Hyslop, "Kosovo: Inheriting a rich legacy of
electoral expertise from the OSCE," OSCE Magazine, March-April 2008, 18-2 1.508 In particular, in two municipalities with strong ties to PDK, there was 94% and 87% turnout, compared with a
national average of 48%. See Paul Lewis, "Kosovo Election Fraud Suspicions Undermine PM's Victory Claim,"
The Guardian, December 13, 2010, sec. World news, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/13/kosovo-
election-fraud-claims. Interviews with local and international analysts, Pristina, December-January 2010.
509 Interview with an OSCE official and local and international analysts, Pristina, January 2010.
212
running free and fair elections, the achievement of international preferences was not driven by
the unity or demands of the international administration. OMIK tended not to make aggressive
demands to encourage multiethnic institutions and instead issued demands based on simplicity
and stability. Many of the outcomes related to elections were driven by domestic politics in
Kosovo and Serbia rather than the interaction between international officials and local elites.
Table 4.3: Kosovo Electoral Reform
Preferences Free and fair Serb participation in Moderate and small party Creation of Kosovo
elections I elections 9 representation election institutions
Phase of reform Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
2000 Municipal Free and Fair High Low Partial Success: Partially Confirmed:
elections elections, PR and open list rules. Outcome is as
Serb LDK does better than UNMIK desired
participation, expected, largely because (except for Serb
Limit PDK's of Kosovo politics rather boycott) but LDK
power than international pressure. success has little to do
I Serbs boycott. with electoral design
2001 Kosovo Free and fair High Low Success: Partially Confirmed:
wide elections elections, UNMIK imposes closed Outcome fulfills
Serb lists and a single district international
participation, over the major parties' preferences, but
Limit PDK's objections. Serb mechanisms are only
power participation. partially correct.
LDK does well. Parties
I campaign on nationalism.
Subsequent Free and fair High Low Partial Success: Not Confirmed:
period elections, Serb boycott. Debate over Demands for reform
Serb open/closed lists, CEC from NGOs, not
participation, takes over gradual international
Transfer of authority, generally free administration.
authority to local and fair elections but some Mechanisms differ
institutions irregularities with CEC from theory.
takeover I
While the electoral reform does not directly confirm the theory, neither does it offer
evidence in support of competing explanations. First, the authority of the international
administration played little role in securing success. Oisin Tansey examines the electoral reform
in Kosovo and argues that it demonstrates the extensive authority of international
administrations. He writes, "even if negotiation and consultation are pursued, international
administrators are in a position to draft their own measures and, when domestic agreement is not
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forthcoming, to impose the solutions that best suit their preferences." 51 0 I argue that while
Tansey is correct that the international administration did impose its decisions in the case of the
electoral reform, it was able to do so because its decisions had little impact on local elites.
UNMIK was able to overrule the parties' objections because it challenged them only on minor
issues that posed little threat. Second, the case study offers evidence against arguments related to
democratization and moderate parties. LDK, even though it was identified as a moderate party,
campaigned on nationalist goals. Furthermore, institutionalization did not encourage greater
moderation. Indeed the incumbent parties managed to manipulate the structure of electoral
institutions to protect themselves, which demonstrates how hard it is for international
organizations to build institutions that will elect moderate parties.
VI. Police Reform by UNMIK
The maintenance of peace and security and the establishment of the rule of law were essential
elements of UNMIK's mandate. Though international military and police forces were initially
responsible for these tasks, UNMIK hoped to transfer responsibility to a locally recruited police
force. Indeed, UNMIK was broadly successful at establishing and maintaining law and order in
Kosovo and in creating a locally recruited Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The KPS was one of
the only multiethnic institutions in Kosovo. By 2006, it had taken over day-to-day policing
operations, was generally well respected, and was effective at dealing with everyday crime.
However, despite repeated attempts by the international administration, neither the international
police nor the KPS were able to address politicized crime such as interethnic violence, organized
crime, or high-level corruption. I therefore judge police reform to be a partial success.
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5 1 0Tansey, Regime-Building, 133.
Existing accounts attribute the relative success of the policing effort to the existing level
of development in Kosovo, the scale of international investment, and the use of good
bureaucratic procedures.m While these arguments do provide context and help explain the
relative success in setting up the KPS, they fail to explain the consistent failure to address
politicized crime. I argue instead that the relationship between international unity and the threat
of demands to informal networks best explains the trajectory of the reform effort.
The case study proceeds in six parts. First, I describe the origin of the police reform effort
in Kosovo and explain the coding of the key variables. Second, I trace the international efforts
related to policing in the initial post-conflict period, including the establishment of law and
order, the creation of the UNMIK Police, and the standup of the KPS. Third, I describe the
development of the police up to March 2004. Fourth, I examine the performance of the police in
the March 2004 riots. Fifth, I trace the reform of the police following the riots up to the
declaration of independence in February 2008. A sixth part concludes.
Origins and Goals of Police Reform in Kosovo
According to resolution 1244, UNMIK's mandate required "Maintaining civil law and order,
including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international
police personnel to serve in Kosovo."5 12 Two different organizations within UNMIK had
responsibility for different elements of the policing effort. First, the UNMIK Civilian Police
(UNPOL) was responsible for actually policing the territory, as well as supervising the locally
recruited KPS. The second organization was the police school, which was run by the OSCE
511 Jeremy M. Wilson, "Law and Order in an Emerging Democracy: Lessons from the Reconstruction of Kosovo's
Police and Justice Systems," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605, no. 1 (May
1, 2006): 152-177; Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 123-134. A variety of
international officials and local analysts shared the general assessment of the police as effective at dealing with basic
crime but ineffective with regards to politicized crime. They predominately cited the use of good bureaucratic
procedures by the OSCE for positive outcomes. Interviews with former OSCE officials and local analysts, Pristina,
January 2010.
512 UN resolution 1244 (1999), paragraph Ii.
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Mission in Kosovo. The OSCE's responsibility in Kosovo included elections, democratization,
and institution-building - the police school fell under the institution-building effort. UNMIK's
pillar system meant that while both UNPOL and the OSCE police school fell under the
responsibility of the SRSG, in practice they were largely autonomous.51
UNMIK adopted a three-phase plan for police reform in Kosovo. In the first period, since
UNPOL would be slow to deploy, KFOR was to take responsibility for basic security. In the
second phase, UNPOL would take over responsibility from KFOR, and international police
would deploy throughout Kosovo. At the same time, UNMIK would begin to develop the KPS.
In the third phase, UNPOL would begin to gradually transfer authority to KPS "once properly
trained and selected local police in sufficient strength are available." UNMIK would retain
formal executive authority and remain present in a mentoring and advising role.1 In effect,
there would be three main organizations responsible for public security, with an implicit rank
order of capabilities - KFOR, UNPOL, and then the KPS.515
The international community had three main preferences relevant to policing in Kosovo.
First, the overriding objective was the maintenance of stability and basic law and order. The
prevention of violence was the overriding objection of the intervention and necessary for the
achievement of any other goals. Second, the international community sought to build a Kosovo
police force that could take over policing from UNPOL. The new police force should be
multiethnic and meet basic standards of democratic policing, including respect for the rule of
513 Seth Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order After Conflict (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2005), 31-2, 35-6.
UNPOL was initially part of Pillar II, which was responsible for Civil Administration. In May 2001, the pillar
system was rearranged, with Pillar I becoming the Police and Justice pillar, and UNPOL became part of Pillar I. The
OSCE Mission in Kosovo was Pillar III of UNMIK. Interviews with former OSCE officials, Pristina, January 2010.5 1 4 UNMIK Police Annual Report 2002, (Available at http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/reports/Police%20
Report%202002%20-%20Book.pdf, accessed January 4, 2012), 3; S/1999/779, paragraphs 61-65.
m Interviews with international officials and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010. A fourth organization was the
Kosovo Protection Corps, which did not have a formal mandate for providing security. ICG, "An Army for
Kosovo?" Europe Report No. 174, 28 July 2006, 12.
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law. 516 Third, the international community sought to address three types of politicized crime in
Kosovo - interethnic violence, high-level corruption, and organized crime. These crimes were
politicized since they were associated with the war and often perpetrated by individuals with
close associations with the major political parties. For the international community, preventing
and punishing these politicized crimes was critical to establishing the rule of law in Kosovo and
integrating the territory into the larger European community.51 7
These preferences and the demands associated with them were not threatening to
nationalist goals but were threatening to elites' informal networks. Independence required the
support of the international community, which was at least partly contingent on the rule of law in
Kosovo. Hence, the establishment of law and order, the creation of a capable and responsible
police force, and the prevention and prosecution of politicized crime were all compatible with,
and even necessary for, independence.
However, these goals challenged the incumbent parties' informal networks in two ways.
First, the major Albanian political parties sought the recruitment of their supporters into the new
police force. The successor parties of the KLA, PDK and AAK, had close associations with KLA
veterans and needed to ensure that veterans were recruited into state institutions.5 18 Second, all of
the major Albanian parties allegedly made use of politicized crime to maintain their own power.
While interethnic violence was not in itself helpful to maintaining power, many individuals who
committed such crimes were closely connected with the various parties. Furthermore, all of the
516 David Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 19-20.
517 Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, 28, 32-33; O'Neill, Kosovo, chap. 7; Brand,
Development ofKosovo Institutions, 41-45. S/1999/799, paragraph 60-65. Interviews with international officials,
Pristina, Winter 2010.5 1 Interviews with OSCE officials, Pristina, January 2010; ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?," 2-18; Brand,
Development of Kosovo Institutions, 41-43.
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parties were purportedly engaged in corruption, smuggling, and other illegal activities. 519 Third,
the parties sought to control the activities of the police. Many of the leaders were socialized in
former Yugoslavia, in which there was a perception that it was acceptable for the ruling party to
use the police as a tool to maintain its own power.2
The international administration was unified about the content of its demands throughout
the police reform. One potential source of disagreement was the division between the OSCE and
UNPOL. In interviews, OSCE officials, former UNMIK officials, and local analysts noted that
while there was a separation between the two organizations, both organizations largely agreed on
overall demands. Authority over the police school was fully delegated to the OSCE, while
UNPOL retained authority over policing operations, including training in the field. Interviewees
focused their critiques on different organizations' internal problems rather than inter-
organizational coordination. However, there were cases when tactical coordination failures led to
serious problems, especially during the 2004 riots.52
Initial Post-War Period and the Establishment of the KPSS
As discussed above, the immediate post-war period of the summer of 1999 was highly chaotic
with substantial violence against Serbs and between Albanian political factions. UNMIK sought
to establish its own authority, create law and order, and begin to establish local security
institutions. However, UNMIK was challenged by the presence of informal policing structures
and by efforts of Albanian political parties to gain control over the new police institutions. By
late 2001, UNMIK had largely achieved its objectives of establishing law and order and creating
the foundation for a depoliticized indigenous police institution.
519 See especially Stefanova, "Fighting Organized Crime," 259-269; Pugh, "Crime and Capitalism in Kosovo's
Transfonnation," 117-122. Interviews with local analysts and international officials, Pristina, January 2010.
20 See Thorsten Stodiek, "The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans," Center for
OSCE Research, Working Paper 14, Hamburg, 2006, 9, 14. Interviews with international officials and local analysts,
Pristina, Winter 2010.
521 Interviews with OSCE, EULEX, and UNMIK officials and local analysts and officials, Pristina, Winter 2010.
218
While UNMIK did expect the slow deployment of UNPOL, and KFOR had partial
responsibility for establishing peace and security, the absence of international police still
seriously hurt UNMIK's objectives. Bernard Kouchner called the failure to deploy more
international police a "scandal," and UNMIK was heavily criticized in the local media. 2
UNPOL was initially authorized a maximum of 3125 international police officers and later a
maximum of 4700. There were very few international police officers deployed during June and
July 1999 and only 1100 were deployed by September 1999. It took until December 2000,
eighteen months after the start of the mission, for more than 4000 international police officers to
be deployed. The first of ten formed Special Police Units, expected to provide riot policing, only
arrived in April 2000.523
The slow arrival of UNPOL enabled informal policing structures associated both with
Albanians and Serbs to maintain control. These groups engaged in activities ranging from
unofficial roadblocks to the torture and murder of political opponents. 2 4 KFOR did have an
extensive intelligence gathering capability, and did identify individuals suspected of crimes such
as smuggling or inciting violence. However, the evidence was generally not admissible in court,
and UNPOL had difficulty coordinating with their KFOR counterparts.525
By late 2000, basic security had improved. The deployment of increasing numbers of
UNPOL was one factor, but the increasing acceptance of UNMIK by key Albanian political
groups was probably more significant. In September 1999, the Kosovo Protection Corps was
established, which would employ many former members of the KLA. In December 1999, the key
522 King and Mason write, "Local newspapers published weekly figures of international police on the ground
compared to the number promised. The number of police became the yardstick for measuring the gap between the
international community's promises and its actions." Peace at Any Price, 55-6.
523 The failure to rapidly deploy police to Kosovo was largely due to bureaucratic issues within the UN and the slow
contributions of member states. O'Neill, Kosovo, 100. See also Perito, Lone Ranger, 194-205. ICG, "The Policing
Gap: Law and Order in the New Kosovo," Balkans Report N* 74, 6 August 1999, 6-9.5 2 4 Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 43; Dziedzic, "Policing from Above," 40-41.525 Perito, Lone Ranger, 187-88. ICG, "The Policing Gap," 3-6.
219
Albanian elites accepted the establishment of an UNMIK-led interim government and began to
buy-in to the institutions UNMIK was creating. Indeed, UNPOL in particular municipalities
began to coopt preexisting informal policing structures. 26
The quick establishment of the KPS and the OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School
(KPSS) also facilitated the development of basic law and order. The KPSS was widely
acknowledged by a variety of scholars, international officials, and local analysts as one of
UNMIK's major successes. The first group of 176 cadets was inducted into the KPS in
September 1999, and by September 2001 the school had trained 4106 members of the KPS,
including 356 ethnic Serbs. The school was widely praised for the high quality of training, which
ranged from basic procedures to specialized skills. The successful recruitment and training of
Serbs, which would make the police one of the only multiethnic institutions in Kosovo, was also
unique. While the school was run by the OSCE, UNPOL mentored KPS officers after their
graduation and regularly participated in trainings at the school.52 7
Kosovo Albanian elites sought to obstruct the creation of a police force that was
independent of existing informal networks and political influence. The KLA sought to have the
entire KPS recruited from former KLA members, and according to several interviewees PDK
members sought to gain influence within the organization. Over 19,500 applicants applied for
positions within the KPSS in September 1999. However, only three of the first 200 members of
the force were former KLA members, as UNMIK sought to create a depoliticized organization.
After significant pressure and protest from PDK, however, UNMIK backed down and agreed
526 Brand, Development of Kosovo Institutions, 12-14, 43.
527 Brand observes that "The development of the Kosovo Police Service and the Kosovo Police Service School has
been one of the few outright successes of the international presence in Kosovo so far, due mainly to the efforts of the
OSCE-run police school in Vushtrri and the professional attitude of the local cadets." Ibid., 43-44. See also Stodiek
"The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans," 18-25; O'Neill 109-114. Perito, Lone
Ranger, 190-192. Also interviews with OSCE and UN officials and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
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that 50 percent of the positions within the KPS would be guaranteed to former KLA members.12 8
The OSCE continued to ensure the recruitment of qualified personnel by vetting applicants with
their neighbors, and even according to one account, with the PDK's intelligence service.
Furthermore, the OSCE ensured that members of the former Yugoslav police were also included
in the KPS, even though many Albanians perceived them to be collaborators with the Serbian
regime.5 29
Even partial success by the OSCE and UNMIK at limiting the influence of informal
networks was impressive, and local perceptions of the KPS became quite positive. UNPOL
gradually began to include KPS in its operations, and by fall 2000 KPS began to conduct patrols
on their own and made arrests. In mid-2001, the planned size of the KPS was increased from
5300 to 6000, and UNPOL developed a plan for transitioning from UNMIK to the KPS by
2006. Violence and serious crime substantially diminished through 2000 and 2001, and by
2001 Kosovo had become a "more normal" policing environment.5 3'
UNMIK was successful in meeting some of its objectives by establishing law and order
and establishing the KPS. However, during the period from 2000 to 2001 the intemational
administration was not able to effectively prevent or prosecute interethnic violence. The case of
an attack in February 2000 on a UNHCR bus transporting Serbs in Mitrovica is particularly
telling. The bus was struck by an anti-tank missile, which killed three and wounded several
others. In response, Serbs in Mitrovica burned UNMIK and UNHCR vehicles. Revenge attacks
528 O'Neill, Kosovo, 111; Perito, Lone Ranger, 191. Stodiek, "The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police
Forces in the Balkans," 19.
529 Interviews with former UNMIK and OSCE officials, Pristina, Winter 2010. The international administration
recruited candidates "on the basis of stringent standards for selection" and "conduct[ed] ongoing screening and
background checks." UNMIK Annual Police Report 2002, 3.5 3 Dziedzic, "Policing from Above," 50; O'Neill, Kosovo, 113-4. UNMIK Police Annual Report, 45. Interviews
with former UNMIK and OSCE officials, Pristina, Winter 2010.
' UNMIK Police Annual Report 2001, 3, 56-57. The UN regularly argued that Kosovo's crime rate was lower than
that of many large cities in America.
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by both Serbs and Albanians continued into the spring. KFOR was able to determine the likely
perpetrators and UNPOL arrested three Albanians for the attack. However, the prosecution failed
because much of KFOR's intelligence was inadmissible in court and one of the three suspects
escaped from KFOR detention. 3
The weakness of the judiciary also contributed to the failure to address interethnic
violence or other types of politicized crime. UNMIK created a newjudiciary in late 1999 that
was dominated by Albanian lawyers who had not worked since 1989, and there were disputes
about the set of relevant applicable law. Furthermore, Albanian lawyers and judges were
reluctant to prosecute attacks by Albanians against Serbs.m
Figure 4.2: Police Officers in Kosovo
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From 2002 to 2004, there were substantial improvements in the KPS, and law and order was
largely maintained. However, the police remained unable to effectively prosecute high-level
532 UNMIK Police Annual Report 2001, 25-26. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 59-62; Perito, Lone Ranger,
215-216. ICG, "UNMIK's Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica" Balkans Report N* 131, 3 June
2002,3-4.
m On the applicable law issue see O'Neill, Kosovo, 109; King and Mason, Peace atAny Price, 62-63. On the
problem of ethnic bias King and Mason write, based on interviewing a senior UNMIK prosecutor, "Even if
[Albanian members of the judiciary] managed to suppress whatever bias might naturally result from such trauma,
many Albanian jurists feared negative social and professional consequences if, in the words of extremists, they
'went easy' on Serbs or seriously prosecuted former KLA fighters described as 'war heroes'. More direct
intimidation took the form of phone call from powerful figures or actual threats of bodily harm to the judge or his
family." Ibid., 64-65.
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corruption and interethnic violence. Hence, police reform effort verifies the theory's predictions
of partial success, given international unity and a threat to informal networks.
UNMIK began to transfer additional authority to KPS from 2002 to early 2004. By July
2002, there were more KPS officers than UNMIK officers. In 2002, UNMIK promoted 206
officers to management positions, ranging from Sergeant through Colonel. UNMIK began to
hand over executive authority to KPS in certain locations in late 2002, with UNMIK police
remaining present as monitors and advisors. KPS also began to deploy police to volatile Serb-
majority areas, including northern Mitrovica. While in the most volatile Serb areas the local
police were monoethnic, there were 18 communities where multiethnic police patrols occurred.
The crime rate and occurrence of interethnic violence substantially diminished in 2002 and
2003. 53
Throughout 2002 and 2003, UNMIK also attempted to arrest individuals responsible for
interethnic violence, some of who were also believed to be significant figures in organized
criminal networks.sss Many of the individuals that UNMIK sought to prosecute, however, were
key leaders within the KLA, and remained closely associated with the KLA successor parties -
PDK and AAK. The arrests did not threaten the achievement of independence but did threaten
PDK and AAK's informal networks. The theory predicts that PDK and AAK would try to
escalate protests, that the mass public would not join protests, that LDK would oppose the
protests, and that because of international unity the demands would be partially implemented.
5 3 4 UNMIK Police Annual Report 2002, 3-9; S/2004/71, para 19-24; Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order After
Conflict, 49-54.
m King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 144-5. See for example one UN report from April 2003: "There were
developments in six cases involving Kosovo Albanians accused of ethnic extremism, organized crime or war crimes.
District Court panels convicted two high-ranking former KLA members of committing serious crimes against other
Kosovo Albanians. One former KLA commander was arrested for illegal possession of a large amount of weapons,
and he is also suspected of involvement in terrorism. A war crimes trial began in the case of a former KLA zone
commander, who is also reputedly a major organized crime figure. A terrorism trial commenced in the case of two
Kosovo Albanians accused of leading an ethnic Albanian extremist group that advocates the armed insurrection in
the Albanian-majority area of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." UN S/2003/421, para 23.
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The pattern of arrests, public discourse, and protest throughout 2002 verify the theory's
predictions. In January 2002, three former KLA members, including a KPS member and a party
secretary in PDK, were arrested for war crimes. The arrests sparked a protest of approximately
5000 people who were mainly ex-KLA members or other hardliners.5 36 After arrests continued in
August 2002, PDK and AAK attempted to escalate protests by invoking nationalism in order to
force the international administration to cease investigating war crimes. PDK and AAK officials
called the arrested individuals "slaves of the current rulers of Kosovo [i.e. UNMIK]" and stated
that UNMIK was "holding political prisoners and devaluing the liberation struggle."53 7 The
LDK, on the other hand, opposed the protests. Rugova stated, "We are determined to build a
democratic state in Kosovo, and therefore we must respect the values that will lead us along that
path." The LDK also did not vote for a PDK-supported resolution that opposed UNMIK's
investigation of war crimes. Although one protest near the Decani monetary injured 50, protests
remained small in scale and dominated by ex-KLA members and other individuals closely linked
with PDK and AAK. By late August, the United States had joined the rest of the international
community in speaking out against the protests, and insisting that final status could not be
achieved unless war crimes were fully investigated, both by the ICTY and UNMIK. Given
international unity, and the failure to provoke more widespread public protests, Thaci backed
down from public opposition and observed, "all those who have violated the law must not think
that their participation in war will give them immunity before judicial bodies."53 8
PDK and AAK were therefore ultimately unable to use public protest to block UNMIK's
effort to prosecute politicized crime. Still, they were able to block UNMIK's efforts through
516 David Mullins, "UN Crime Crackdown Provoked a Backlash by Kosovo Albanian Radicals," Balkan Crisis
Report, no. 317, February 13, 2002.
3 7 ICG, "Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo" Balkans Report N*134, 12 September 2002, 21;
rben Qirezi, "Kosovo: UN Facing Backlash", IWPR Balkan Crisis Report N*361, 23 August 2002.
5 3 8 Anamari Repic, "Free-For-All," Transitions Online, 16 September 2002. "BETA Views 'Turmoil' in Kosovo
Following Arrest of Former KLA Members," Belgrade BETA in English, 21 August 2002.
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private obstruction. Efforts to prosecute ex-KLA members were stymied by the assassination of
key witnesses and by bias within the judiciary. 539 Given their cultural and linguistic constraints,
international police and prosecutors had difficulty fully penetrating the Kosovar informal
networks. 4 0 One ICG report observed, "The three political parties have essentially consumed the
government, divvying up and factionalising the ministries, subjecting government to their
patron-client networks."54 UNMIK did make some limited progress, such as making arrests for
drugs and smuggling and improving the criminal code. Despite the continuing success at
maintaining basic security and improving KPS, the failure to deal with politicized crime
demonstrates the partial success of police reform.
Police Response to March 2004 Riots
As described above, there were major riots in Kosovo in March 2004. Unlike earlier protests, the
riots were driven by a threat to the key Albanian nationalist goal - independence. In particular,
the UN's Standards before Status reform implied that Kosovo was in an indefinite holding
pattern and would not reach independence. UNMIK's failure to transfer additional responsibility
to KPS was part of the critique, but was not the central issue. While the police reform did not
start the riots, the riots did test the strength and effectiveness of the police forces.
Overall, the performance of international and local security organizations during the riots
5 39 One UN report observed "The problem of ethnic bias, both actual and perceived, is deeply rooted in Kosovo and
is one of the main reasons for the presence of international judges and prosecutors. They are also indispensable to
fight organised crime, as Kosovo local judges are vulnerable and susceptible to undue pressures." UNMIK Pillar I,
"Presentation paper," July 2003, (Available at www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/PillarI Report Jul03.pdf
accessed January 6, 2012), 13. King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 144-5.
540 One former translator in Skenderaj observed "they were trying to investigate some cases that were reported in our
area. But it was hard because everybody knew-it was clear to everybody that they couldn't investigate so easily
because they were working there most probably for two months or something. When the KPS got engaged, more
cases were solved." Arthur Boutellis, "Interview with Faton Hamiti," Oral History Program, Innovations for
Successful Societies, (http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/oralhistories/iew.xml?id=218 accessed
Decmber 16), 3. See also Stodiek, "The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans," 32-
33; Perito, Lone Ranger, 224-231; King and Mason, Peace atAny Price, 141-146. Interviews with international and
local officials, Pristina, Winter 2010.
541 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 34.
542 Stefanova, "Fighting Organized Crime," 262, 266, 269, 272-4.
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was weak, though some individuals and organizations did respond effectively. The three main
security organizations - KFOR, UNPOL, and the KPS - all had similar objectives of preventing
violence, but failed to tactically coordinate their efforts. In addition to the specific weaknesses of
particular organizations, this tactical disunity led to the overall poor response to the riots.
KFOR's response to quell the violence was uneven and it distrusted the other security
organizations, especially the KPS. There were several examples of KFOR failing to protect
communities or individuals close to its deployed troops.543 French KFOR in Mitrovica also
"treated CIVPOL and KPS as best as impediments," according to one ICG report. Based on
rumors of escalating riots, KFOR ordered CIVPOL and KPS to leave their headquarters and burn
it down.54 4
UNPOL's reaction to the riots was perceived as incoherent and weak. Analysts blamed
the incoherence of UNPOL on its multinational structure and the international police officers'
short deployment times. While some UNPOL officers did respond well to the riots, others
remained in their police stations, or relied on KPS to defend them against the rioters.54 5
The KPS's reaction to the riots was also mixed.546 There were accounts of Albanian KPS
officers joining the riots and even throwing petrol bombs, while in other locations KPS
prevented Albanian rioters from attacking Serbs. Many KPS officers felt that they were
disrespected by the international administration. One officer observed "If this blows up again and
the internationals treat us like they are doing now, then KPS officers will simply throw away
54 Human Rights Watch, "Failure to Protect," 21.
44 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 19-22.
5 45 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 20; Human Rights Watch, "Failure to Protect," 24-26.54 According to the Human Rights Watch's account, "Some KPS officers performed with great courage and
professionalism during the crisis, working tirelessly to protect or evacuate Serbs from their homes and doubtlessly
saving lives. Many other KPS officers stood by passively, refusing to take steps to protect ethnic Serbs and other
minorities, or participate in their evacuation. In a number of cases, KPS officers showed a bias against minorities,
arresting Serbs or Ashkalis who tried to defend their homes while ignoring the criminal actions of Albanian rioters.
Some KPS officers took an active part in the violence, allegedly participating in the burning of homes in Vucitrn,
Obilic, and Kosovo Polje." "Failure to Protect," 22.
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their uniforms."5 47 KPS officers felt as if they alone had the ability and resolve to stop the riots,
but were not trusted to do so.
After the Riots until Independence
The riots came as a major surprise to the international community. As part of a larger change in
policy, UNMIK began rapidly transferring responsibility over the police to local authorities. The
outcome of these efforts was similar to the earlier police reform efforts. Law and order was
maintained but the KPS was not much more capable of dealing with politicized crime than
UNPOL had been. Concerns about politicized crime remained present and led to major EU-led
rule of law mission following the declaration of independence.
The international community reformulated its overall political strategy, including its
policy towards the police, following the riots. Eide's first report articulated the international
community's conclusions about the riots, and what changes ought to be made in UNMIK's
approach. Eide noted that a lack of coordination between KFOR and UNPOL had significant
negative consequences during the riots and urged closer coordination. While Eide recognized
that UNMIK, rather than PISG, would continue to retain overall authority over the police, he
urged the transfer of substantial power to the KPS, noting that "The KPS leadership is generally
of high quality and the personnel are well trained. Ways should be found for KPS to take more
control of its activities in regular operations." UNMIK had been reluctant to transfer authority to
the KPS prior to the riots because of concerns that any significant transfer would imply that
Kosovo was independent. Eide's report explained that not transferring authority had failed both
tactically and strategically. Tactically, KPS would have been better able to respond to the rioters
than UNPOL or KFOR. Strategically the failure to transfer responsibility exacerbated Albanians'
5 4 7 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 22, 40-41.
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frustration with UNMIK's continued administration of Kosovo.s 8
A new leader of UNPOL, Kai Vittrup of Denmark, was appointed to execute the new
strategy. As reported by King and Mason, Vittrup recognized that the UNMIK policing effort
had lost legitimacy during the riots, and "adopted a three-pronged reform programme. First was a
system for responding quickly and effectively to any sign that riots were about to repeat
themselves. Second was community policing and improving the image of the police, particularly
among minorities. Third was making local KPS officers, not CivPol, the main face of
authority."5 4 9 Vittrup sought to counter UNPOL's pre-riot tendency to undervalue the
engagement with Kosovar society. Vittrup received death threats from Albanian organized
crime, which was one sign of the threat of the new strategy to informal networks.550
Beginning in 2005, UNMIK began turning over authority to local institutions.5 5 A
number of individuals were promoted to senior leadership positions and by early 2006 KPS was
running day-to-day operations in all municipalities excluding Mitrovica. UNPOL remained
present, but took on mainly an advisory or monitoring role. 552 In December 2005, UNMIK for
the first time issued regulations governing the KPS and specifying regulatory powers for the
PISG. A police inspectorate was created to verify that the KPS was meeting its objectives and to
conduct investigations into disciplinary offences. UNMIK created two new ministries to oversee
the police and justice institutions, although executive authority remained with UNMIK.55 3
54 S/2004/932, quote from paragraph 38. See also paragraphs 17-19, 33-37.
549 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 197.
"
0 http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=9749
551 See UNMIK Press Release, "Kosovo: SRSG presents plan for transfer of police and justice competencies to the
PISG," 19 July 2005, UNMIK/PR/1393.552 Interviews with international officials, Pristina, Winter 2010. ICG, "Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition,"
Europe Report N*170, 17 February 2006, 6.
"
3 UNMIK Regulation 2005/53, "Amending Unmik Regulation No. 2001/19 on the Executive Branch of the
Provisional Institutions Of Self-Government In Kosovo," 20 December 2005; UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, "On the
Framework and Guiding Principles of the Kosovo Police Service," 20 December 2005; Police Inspectorate of
Kosovo, "Annual Report 2007," Pristina, 2008; UNMIK Regulation 2005/54, section 9.
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Finally, an Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) was completed in 2006 and made suggestions
about the post-status governance of Kosovo's security institutions.554
One international official argued that the transfer was at a "breakneck" speed. In his
view, while UNMIK had been too reluctant to transfer authority before the riots, after the riots it
paid too little attention to the quality of the resulting police. Other officials observed that the
promotions were based on favoritism by UNMIK rather than education or expertise, and that the
new institution had weak bureaucratic practices, such as poor management of the vehicle fleet.5
Interviewees also believed that political parties, especially PDK, were increasingly able to exert
influence on the KPS. Many local analysts argued that the problems in policing stemmed from
556UNMIK's lack of planning and reluctance to hand over control to KPS.
Eide's second report, in October 2005, observed KPS's continuing limitations and was
more circumspect with regard to transferring power. He wrote, "The work the KPS has
undertaken in relation to common offences within one ethnic community is increasingly
respected by the community." However, "Combating serious crime, including organized crime
and corruption, has proven to be difficult for the KPS and the justice system. It is hindered by
family or clan solidarity and by the intimidation of witnesses as well as of law enforcement and
judicial officials. For serious inter-ethnic crime, the law enforcement record is also weak. Far too
few serious crimes are ever brought to justice."557 Eide argued that an international security
presence remained essential for dealing with these politicized crimes.
Throughout the rest of UNMIK's administration, the KPS remained effective at basic
"
4 Cleland, Welch, A.; Kondi, S; Stinson, D; Von Tangen Page M (eds), Internal Security Sector Review Kosovo,
Pristina: UNDP, 2006. Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review, xiii-xxi
"" One Kosovo police officer observed that historically "it was not possible for someone to get a rank of captain
before they had university education. Now we have colonels with secondary education." Arthur Boutellis,
"Interview with Reshat Maliqi," 24 July 2008, Oral History Program, Innovations for Successful Societies,
(http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/oralhistories/view.xml?id=220 accessed December 16, 2011), 11.
556 Interview with international police officials and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
"1 S/2005/635, para 36.
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policing but unable to address more politicized crimes. Public opinion towards the police
remained quite positive. The population believed that KPS was one of the least corrupt
organizations in Kosovo, and except for a period in early 2007, more than 70% of the population
was satisfied with the KPS. International police and prosecutors had been largely unable to
address the complex informal networks within Kosovo and effectively prosecute corruption and
organized crime. While KPS officers were more able to understand these informal networks,
they had low salaries and little overtime, and any investigation of politicized crime meant putting
themselves and their families in danger. Kosovar police therefore had little incentive to address
the high-level corruption or organized crime, despite the demands of the international
administration. 559
An incident in February 2007 would seriously diminish the public perceptions of
UNPOL. During an anti-international administration demonstration, two individuals were killed
and dozens were wounded.560 It was later determined by that the deaths had been caused by
rubber bullets fired at protestors by Romanian UNMIK Special Police. The incident, and the
failure by UNMIK to fully investigate and punish the UNPOL responsible for the incident, led to
55 8 A survey in June 2007 found that KPS were much less likely than other organizations to demand bribes. Forum
for Civic Initiatives and Saferworld, "Policing in Kosovo," February 2008, 16; Early Warning Report 17, April-June
2007, USAID/UNDP, 15; Early Warning Report 19, January 2008, USAID/UNDP, 17. See also other Early
Warning Reports, available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/?cid=2,4; and Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies
and Democratic Institutions," 126-133.
559 On example is the failed attempt to prosecute corruption surrounding the LDK leadership, as explained in a
February 2006 ICG report: "UNMIK had planned to clear away the network that surrounded President Rugova and
emanated from his security chief, Rame Maraj, before it set up the interior ministry, but did not. Initially spurred by
the dossiers of alleged evidence the PDK handed it in March and April 2005, UNMIK established a police task force
to investigate corruption and organised crime in the high echelons of the PISG. Deliberately setting a target for
investigators, policing and justice chief Jean Dussourd told a newspaper to judge him by results before the end of
September 2005 but the anticipated high-profile arrests did not materialise. While the police commissioner
expressed bemusement at the attempt to decree results, Dussourd in frustration replaced his justice department chief.
UNMIK is now embarked on an improbable parallel process: a countdown to handing joint control of the KPS to an
interior minister largely chosen by Maraj, and continuing attempts to gather enough evidence to break up the LDK's
racketeering and kickback network with arrests. 'We always knew it would be like this', remarked an UNMIK
police and justice official." ICG "Kosovo: The Challenge of Transition," 6.
5 6 0 Albin Kurti, the leader of the Vetevedosje organization that had organized the protest, was detained by UNMIK.
Amnesty International later questioned his prosecution by the international administration as political motivated. See
http://news.amnesty.org.au/news/comments/7098/ (accessed December 9, 2011).
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significant distrust of international policing that would continue after the declaration of
independence.5 '
Conclusion
Table 4.4: Kosovo Police Reform
Preferences Law and order Transfer to an effective Reduce and prosecute politicized crimes,
multiethnic local police force including interethnic violence, organized
crime, and high-level corruption
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Initial post-war Law and order, High Informal Partial Success: Confirmed:
period Create UNMIK networks KFOR initial police Creation of
(to November police, begin to force, UNPOL soon institutions, but little
2001 (CF establish local secures presence, prosecution of
elections) police force begins school politicized crime
Late 2001-Early Law and order, High Informal Partial Success: Confirmed:
2004 Transfer to networks Gradual transition and Informal networks
multiethnic growth of local police. and private
local police, KPS takes over obstruction lead to
Address increasing role in partial
politicized patrol and implementation.
crime investigation. Failure Pattern of protests in
to prosecute politicized 2002 consistent with
crime mechanisms
Riots March Maintain law High, Informal KFOR distrust Riots reveal
2004 and order, but networks UNPOL and KPS, continuing problems
Prevent tactical UNPOL fails to fully with KPS, failure to
interethnic disunity deploy, some KPS transfer power
violence, members join riot
Involve KPS
After the riots- Law and order, High Informal Partial Success: Confirmed:
Independence Transfer to networks Transferred Informal networks
multiethnic responsibility to KPS and private
local police, and maintained law obstruction block full
Address and order. implementation.
politicized Continuing failure to
crime deal with politicized
crime.
5 6 1 The rapid departure of the Romanian police contingent in March 2007 prior to the completion of the investigation
was particularly problematic. The report does note that determining and prosecuting the individuals responsible
would have been difficult "The available eye witness testimony and film footage likewise could not provide any
clear and unambiguous evidence as to which police officer(s) fired the fatal shots...it is acknowledged that there is a
likelihood that - in the general melde of the disturbance - an officer would not know if he had struck a particular
person and, if he did know, would be unlikely to admit this during examination by the Public Prosecutor. Without
clear and unambiguous evidence from an independent source, the Public Prosecutor was unlikely to create the basis
for a prosecution for homicide." See Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, "Annual Report 2007," 35-46. Interviews with
local elites and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
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The police reform in Kosovo was partially successful, and followed a similar pattern,
throughout UNMIK's administration. UNMIK was able to provide law and order and transferred
increasing authority to the KPS. The Kosovo police became viewed as one of the least corrupt
and efficient police force in the region.562 However, both UNMIK and the KPS were unable to
prosecute politicized crimes including corruption, organized crime, and interethnic violence.
Despite repeated attempts to address the prevalence of these crimes in Kosovo, concerns about
politicized crime remained present throughout 1999 to 2008 and led to a large EU Rule of Law
mission after Kosovo's declaration of independence.
The case study of police reform confirms the theory's prediction of partial success and
demonstrates the expected mechanisms. Despite the separation between the OSCE and UNPOL,
the international administration remained unified about its demands throughout the reform effort.
To be sure, there were a number of incidents of tactical disagreements, especially in the case of
the 2004 riots, which did have negative consequences. The international administration sought to
ensure the maintenance of law and order, to create a democratic local police force, and to address
politicized crimes. These demands threatened informal networks since Albanian political parties
had close connections with organized crime and used corruption and patronage to secure their
position. The threat to informal networks enabled the local elites to privately obstruct
international demands and to be unable to rally public protest.
The main conventional explanation for the success of police reform highlights effective
bureaucratic procedures, especially with respect to the police school. Skendaj notes that the
police did not receive significantly more funding than other bureaucracies and instead attributes
the success of police reform to the police's insulation from politics. He claims that the insulation
of the police from politics stems from international officials learning lessons from Bosnia,
5 6 2 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 123-134.
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paying careful attention to recruitment and training of police officers, and using good
bureaucratic procedures.s6 3 Skendaj's claims, as well as similar arguments by interviewees, focus
mainly on the effectiveness of the police school. The police school was undoubtedly one of the
more successful efforts in Kosovo. I would argue that a necessary condition of its success was
international unity, which enabled the OSCE to take responsibility for the school, and to
effectively monitor and improve the KPS. Furthermore, Skendaj's argument does not explain the
limitations of the police in Kosovo. The KPS were unable to deal with politicized crimes, since
the prosecution and prevention of these crimes threatened local elites informal networks.
VIL Creation and Reform of the KPC
The creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was largely successful. The international
community sought to avoid future violence by demobilizing the KLA and incorporating the ex-
combatants into a semi-military successor that did not imply the independence of Kosovo. At the
same time, the Kosovo Albanians sought the creation of an army that would secure independence
in the future. The KPC was effectively a compromise in which both sides interpreted the
mandate of the KPC differently. For the international community, the KPC was a civilian civil
protection force that would work on natural disasters and reconstruction. For the Kosovo
Albanians, the KPC was the successor to the KLA and an army-in-waiting for an independent
Kosovo. The success of the reform effort depended in large part on these differing
interpretations. NATO also chose a limited set of goals with regards to the development of the
KPC by not attempting to replace the ex-KLA members within the organization. This meant that
the threat to informal networks was low. Hence, given the unity of the international
administration, the reform effort confirms the theory's prediction of success.
563 Ibid., 143-150, 170-171.
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The KPC case study proceeds in four parts. The first part describes the origin of the KPC
and explains the coding of the key variables. The second part examines the creation of the KPC
and the period up to early 2004. The third part considers the performance of the KPC during the
riots and the development of the organization up until the declaration of independence. A fourth
section concludes, and notes that while the reform was successful, serious weaknesses within the
KPC remained.
Origin and Goals of the Creation of the KPC
With the departure of Serb forces from Kosovo in early June 1999, the KLA rapidly moved into
positions of authority. However, the KLA had always been a highly decentralized organization,
and the leadership exercised only limited control over the various KLA-associated groups.
Furthermore, there were many individuals that claimed association with the KLA despite not
having fought in the war.564 There were only an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 KLA members during
the war, but by November 1999 more than 25,000 Kosovo Albanians had registered as
combatants. 565
Resolution 1244 required the demobilization of the KLA and other armed Albanian
groups and made KFOR responsible for the demobilization.566 On June 20, 1999, the KLA
leadership came to an agreement with KFOR on an "Undertaking of demilitarisation and
transformation by the UCK [KLA]." In addition to specifying a 90-day timeline for the
demobilization of the KLA, the document also stated that "the international community should
take due and full account of the contribution of the UCK during the Kosovo crisis." As such, the
KLA would "propose individual current members to participate in the administration and police
5
"Perritt explains that "Everyone who had fought, and thousands who had not, made sure to get fatigue jackets and
hats, and sew 'UCK' patches on them." The Road to Independence for Kosovo, 153.5 6 5 Alpaslan Ozerdem, "From a 'Terrorist' Group to a 'Civil Defence' Corps: The 'Transformation' of the Kosovo
Liberation Army," International Peacekeeping 10, no. 3 (2003): 85; Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 153; Brand,
Development of Kosovo Institutions, 24, 43.
5 6 6 UNSC resolution 1244 (1999), 9b.
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forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have developped
[sic]." Furthermore, the international administration would give consideration to "the formation
of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard.", 67 This "Army" came to be the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).
The international community had three main preferences with respect to the KPC: the
maintenance of peace and security, the demobilization of the KLA, and the creation of a force
that included KLA veterans but did not imply Kosovo's independence. The overriding purpose
of the international intervention in Kosovo was the prevention of future violence. The
demobilization of the KLA was essential for ending the war, but the international administration
was concerned about what the ex-combatants would do after the KLA was disbanded. There
were fears about the creation of a "Kosovo Taliban" or other insurgent forces in Kosovo
following the end of the war.568 International officials hoped that by creating an official
organization, the ex-combatants would have a future in the society and be less likely to engage in
violence. However, because of the recognition of Serb sovereignty in resolution 1244, the new
force could not imply the independence of Kosovo. Consequently, the creation of a standing
army for Kosovo or similar organization was out of the question.569
At the same time, the creation of a successor organization to the KLA was politically
sensitive among Kosovo Albanians. The creation of an army was seen as a critical step towards
independence. Furthermore, many Kosovo Albanians, especially those within the KLA, believed
that the KLA was victorious and had eamed the right to become an army. If the international
community had insisted that Kosovo was part of Serbia and could never have its own army,
567 NATO, "Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation by the UCK." June 20, 1999,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docuia990620a.htm (accessed December 14, 2011). See also Ozerdem, "The
'Transformation' of the KLA," 81.
5 6 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Kosovo Protection Corps Training Program (Pristina, 2004),
31-33.5 6 9 ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?," 6-8; King and Mason, Peace atAny Price, 57-58.
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Kosovo Albanians' nationalist goals would have been threatened. However, Kosovo Albanians
understood that independence might not happen immediately and were willing to accept that the
eventual army might first have another name."57
The key problem therefore was to create an organization that would not imply Kosovo's
independence, yet would satisfy Albanian concerns. The creation of the KPC dealt with this
dilemma by ensuring that the international community and the Kosovo Albanians had radically
different views of the KPC. For the international community, the KPC was a strictly civilian
organization. Regulation 1999/8 in September 1999 mandated the KPC as "a civilian emergency
service." Its tasks included disaster response, humanitarian assistance in isolated areas,
demining, and rebuilding infrastructure. The KPC was forbidden "any role in law enforcement or
the maintenance of law and order."5 71 For Kosovo Albanians, the KPC was essentially an army-
in-waiting. In Albanian, the word used for "Protection" translated more as "Defense," which
made the KPC sound far more like an army. Furthermore, the KPC had military ranks and
fatigues, a patch that was only slightly different from the outlawed KLA emblem, and
maintained a similar organization as the KLA.572 The only missing element of an army was
equipment, since the KLA had officially turned in their weapons to KFOR. However,
570 Interviews with international officials and local analysts, Pristina, January 2010. Ceku explained that "One part
[of the KPC] will become part of the police, one part will become civil administration, one part will become the
army of Kosovo, as a defence force. And another part will form a political party." ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?,"
17; ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?," 1-2, 6-7.571 UNMIK Regulation 1999/8, "On the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps," 20 September 1999, 1.1-2.5 72 Agim Ceku, the Commander in Chief of the KPC writes, "Kosova also has the KPC, which the local population
see as the future defense force and it already has an almost military structure, a military look, and it thinks like an
army and it lives like one and has the vision to become an anny." "Security Forces: A Segment in the Status
Negotiations," Helsinki Monitor 16, no. 4 (2005): 315. See also ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?" 6-10; ICG,
"An Army for Kosovo," 12-16.
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rearmament was expected to be relatively straightforward, because many believed that the KPC
maintained arms caches and had access to the black market.5 7 3
While the international community was aware of the ambiguity and varied
interpretations, they made pains to publically insist that the KPC was a civilian organization. One
international official acknowledged that the mandate was "irrelevant," emphasized that the
central purpose of the organization was for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
Furthermore, the international administration was well aware that the organization was seen as
an army-in-waiting, though international officials took pain not to say so publically. "4 While the
demobilization agreement did include the word "Army," the international administration could
also insist "in lawyerly fashion" that there was no direct link between the KPC's mandate and the
KLA demobilization agreement. 5 The establishment of the KPC as a civilian organization
therefore posed little threat to Kosovo's independence and met the limitations of the international
community.
The creation of the KPC did have the potential to threaten informal networks, although
KFOR would not select demands that would prove threatening. The PDK and AAK political
parties had close associations with the members of the KLA, and needed to ensure their future
employment. Indeed, before Ramush Haradinaj created the AAK he was a senior officer in the
KPC. Many of the senior officers in the KPC had allegedly participated in smuggling and other
criminal enterprises prior to and during the war and maintained close links with organized crime
"3 Recall that the KLA armed themselves largely through arms smuggling. A number of arms caches were found
over the course of UNMIK's administration. See for example BBC News, "Kosovo peacekeepers find arms cache,"
28 August, 2002, http://Inews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2220633.sti. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army, 120-125.
574 Ozerdem, "The 'Transformation' of the KLA," 91-93. ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?" 6-8; Interviews with
former UNMIK and NATO officials, and local analysts, Pristina, Winter 2010.
57 5 ICG, "An Army for Kosovo," 13.
237
after the end of the war.sy6 KFOR could have chosen an aggressive strategy of replacing
individuals within the KPC who engaged in violence or who were accused of organized crime,
but as I explain below, KFOR chose a more limited strategy to limit the risk of violence and
protest.
According to Regulation 1999/8, UNMIK would have final authority over the KPC,
while KFOR would be responsible for KPC's day-to-day activities. In practice, the commander
of KFOR, known as COMKFOR, would run the organization with little interference from
UNMIK. Over the course of UNMIK's administration of Kosovo, KFOR would adopt a
relatively limited set of objectives for the KPC, especially when compared with UNMIK's
objectives for the police. To be sure, international officials within KFOR and UNMIK had more
ambitious goals, including creating a more multiethnic force, the prosecution of individuals for
interethnic violence, and more effective reconstruction activities. However, the prevention of
violence took priority over these more extensive objectives, at least in the eyes of KFOR. While
reforming the police, UNMIK tended to try to prosecute individuals who had committed crimes
during the war or continued to have close connections with organized crime. KFOR would
instead use its extensive intelligence network to gather information and then informally use its
influence with the KPC leadership to remove malefactors from the organization or change the
organization's practices. While many international officials within UNMIK were frustrated by
the limited change in the KPC, KFOR retained authority and ensured a unified set of demands.577
Establishment of KPC to Early 2004
During the initial period, KFOR was successful at demobilizing the KLA and establishing the
KPC. The international administration did remove certain officers within the KPC for interethnic
576 See especially ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?" 7-10. Mason and King claim that KPC members "were
involved in illegal trade in prostitutes, cigarettes, fuel, weapons and appliances," Peace at Any Price, 59.
m Interviews with former NATO and UNMIK officials and local analysts, Pristina, January 2010.
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violence and participation in the insurgency in Macedonia. Nevertheless, KFOR's efforts to
dramatically change the KPC were limited, as KFOR's predominant goal was stability and the
avoidance of violence. The theory's prediction of success, given low threat and high unity,
would largely be confirmed.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) took the lead in identifying and
screening individuals to join the KPC. By November 1999, more than 25,000 individuals had
registered as ex-combatants. After testing and screening, IOM presented a list of 13,739
members to a joint commission of UNMIK, KFOR, and KPC who selected the final members.
The size of the force was limited to a total of 5052 members, of which 3052 would be active duty
members and 2000 would be reservists. 500 positions were allocated to civilians and
578
minorities.
The KPC was effectively the direct successor of the KLA. The vast majority of the
members were drawn from the KLA, and the KLA leaders, who went on to form the PDK and
AAK, handpicked the senior officers. The military force associated with the LDK, the FARK,
only had a few members recruited. Furthermore, the structure of the KPC closely followed the
structure of the KLA at the end of the conflict. In particular, the KPC was composed of six
Regional Training Groups (RTGs) that closely followed the regional zone structure of the KLA.
Finally, the KPC continued to have a highly decentralized command structure. During the war,
the different KLA zone commanders coordinated strategy through occasional meetings but
operated largely independently. Similarly, the different RTGs had substantial autonomy,
although the central headquarters did set common standards. KFOR reinforced these tendencies
1 7 Ozerdem, "The 'Transformation' of the KLA," 85; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Kosovo
Protection Corps Training Program, 16-17.
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by appointing units from different nations to train different RTGs, which led to substantial
variation in the capabilities of the various RTGs.57 9
While the KPC received extensive training on civil defense tasks, the actual
reconstruction role was not the main purpose of the organization. In February 2000, the IOM
launched a major KPC Training (KPCT) program to train the new recruits for their new duties.
While training for civil protection tasks was included, the training focused instead on keeping the
KPC members busy, educating them about human rights, and encouraging the force to stay
within the limits of its mandate.58 0 Furthermore, KPC members rarely mentioned the civil
defense role when interviewed about why they joined the organization and were far more likely
to cite their desire to be a part of the future army of Kosovo. The members of the KPC were
frustrated by the lack of military training and inconsistencies across the different RTGs, but
accepted KFOR's efforts because they saw them as consistent with the eventual formation of an
army.58 1 Finally, the KPC was often undersupplied with equipment for fulfilling its
reconstruction role and a 5000-person civil defense organization was decidedly uneconomical
since Kosovo's entire population was only 2 million people.m582 King and Mason write, "tasks
found for [the KPC] tended to be more mundane, from fixing plumbing to clearing roads. They
refused many of these tasks, on the grounds that they were not suitable for a victorious army. In
the end, 'most of them just ended up drinking coffee all day. "583
579 ICG, "What Happened to the KLA?," 6-10; ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 12-17.5 8 0 Criticisms of the IOM program include that there was also no training assessment program and the IOM reported
the effectiveness of its programs based on how many man-hours were devoted to the training, rather than the final
capabilities of the KPC members. Some training was clearly directed at increasing the size of the curriculum. For
example, all members received training in firefighting, for example, even though only a small percentage would go
on to be firefighters. Ozerdem, "The 'Transformation' of the KLA," 86-88; International Organization for Migration
(IOM), Kosovo Protection Corps Training Program.
5 8 1 Interviews with former NATO official and local analysts, Pristina, January 2010.5 8 2 Ozerdem, "The 'Transformation' of the KLA," 92, 94-95.
5 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 59. See also Ozerdem, "The 'Transformation' of the KLA," 95.
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The KPC quickly developed a reputation as a hard-line Albanian nationalist force that
had associations with political violence and organized crime. A newspaper article in 2000 cited a
confidential UN report accusing the KPC of "criminal activities - killings, ill-treatment/torture,
illegal policing, abuse of authority, intimidation, breaches of political neutrality and hate-
speech."5 84 Illegal detentions and beatings were also noted in several sources.585 However, the
UN and KFOR were reluctant to aggressively prosecute KPC members for fear of threatening
stability within Kosovo. Mason and King make this argument extensively, citing interviews with
KFOR and UNMIK officials who "worried privately that challenging Albanian militants would
provoke them to turn against KFOR itself." They cite another UN official who claimed that "the
judiciary was not allowed to work independently. The reason, he said, was that NATO and UN
officials feared they 'would put their lives at risk' by acting against former members of the rebel
group." 5 86 US officials responded to the arrest of KPC members for murder by saying "these
arrests do not in any way reflect badly on the KPC and its important role in Kosovo."587 US
officials were willing to accept some level of criminal activity by the KPC to limit the likelihood
of a backlash against the international community.
Later, KFOR did take some measures to remove individuals accused of violence, but only
in a limited fashion. In July 2001, five KPC officers were suspended after they were accused of
participating in the Albanian insurgency in Macedonia, although it was widely believed that
participation in the insurgency was more widespread. Violence against ex-FARK members was
also largely unprosecuted. In April 2003, a KPC regional spokesman, and member of the
Albanian National Army (ANA), blew themselves up in a botched attempt to bomb a railway
5" John Sweeney and Jens Holsoe, "Revealed: UN-Backed Unit's Reign of Terror," The Observer, March 12, 2000.
585 O'Neill, Kosovo, 118, 120.
586 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 59-60, 99.
587 O'Neill, Kosovo, 121.
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bridge. KFOR began a more aggressive inspection regime and demanded that Ceku hand over a
list of suspected officers. Though he only handed over one name to KFOR, Ceku "reportedly
sent strong internal messages that there was no room for the ANA in the KPC," and 70 officers
subsequently resigned. KFOR investigated a further 54 and suspended 12 of those officers.588
KFOR was far more willing to use its intelligence network and influence with Ceku to make
changes in the KPC, rather than using legal or formal institutional means to reform the
organization.
While there were requirements for the KPC included in the Standards before Status,
UNMIK had generally low expectations about the ability of the KPC to meet the standards. The
standards relevant to the KPC specified that the organization would only perform tasks within its
(non-security) mandate, would have better disciplinary standards, and would make progress
recruiting minority members. Prior to 2004, there was indeed little progress on the standards
related to the KPC. For example, although ten percent of places within the KPC were reserved
for minorities, few Serbs were willing to join the organization and minorities represented only
4.9 percent of the KPC in July 2004.589
The international administration did meet its goals, including maintaining overall peace
and security, demobilizing the KLA, and creating a new organization that incorporated the ex-
KLA members but did not imply independence. The achievement of these goals stemmed first
from delegating control over the KPC to KFOR and thereby achieving unity of effort. More
importantly, however, the reform succeeded because of the limited nature of the goals. The
international administration cleverly constructed a compromise by which the KPC would neither
threaten nor imply independence. Furthermore, the international administration was concerned
sa' ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 20-21.
5 8 9 ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 14; UNMIK, "Standards for Kosovo," 15.
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about connections with violent nationalist organizations and organized crime, but adopted
limited demands for reform. Local elites therefore accepted the international administration's
vision for the KPC and did not obstruct the reform effort.
March 2004 Riots to February
The next stage of the reform effort followed the riots of March 2004. The KPC behaved well in
the riots and thereby improved its reputation among the international community. However, the
future of the organization depended on the outcome of the status negotiations. No coherent future
plan for the organization could be made until it was clear whether the KPC would become an
army for the newly independent Kosovo. The international administration continued its limited
and unthreatening demands for the KPC. The international administration's demands were
largely implemented, but the KPC began to stagnate.
The KPC was one of the few organizations in Kosovo to have performed well in the riots.
While the KPC was explicitly forbidden any role in public security according to Regulation
1999/8, several US KFOR units called upon KPC during the riots. The KPC help disband mobs
in Ferizaj, Gjilan, and Prizren, though in other locations they were ordered to stay in their
barracks. 590 As a result of the KPC's behavior during the riots, KFOR commanders and other
international officials' opinion of the KPC improved. 591
Following the riots, however, the strength of the KPC began to erode. While KPC
members remained committed to the organization as an army-in-waiting, the international
community was unable to commit to the KPC's future so long as Kosovo's status remained
uncertain. Less funding was available for training and construction projects. The KPC also had
excessive numbers of senior officers, and was described as "the biggest former officer support
s90 ICG, "Collapse in Kosovo," 23-24.
591 The ICG quotes KFOR official "The KPC is the only organisation that did not fail in March 2004...only
afterwards [we] started to understand the role of the KPC in Kosovo." "An Army for Kosovo," 21.
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scheme in the Balkans."5 92 While the international administration sought to modernize the KPC,
any major decision hinged on the determination of Kosovo's future status.
Nevertheless, the KPC was one of the most successful institutions at meeting the revised
priority standards.s93 Priority standards focused on compliance with the rule of law and the
representation of minorities within the organization. In particular, minority representation
improved to 6.7% in July 2006 because of a major recruiting campaign and some reduction in
standards for minority KPC members. The KPC also expanded construction projects in Serb
areas. Nevertheless, Serbs remained suspicious of the organization, explaining to one American
"the KPC is for us what al-Qaeda is for you."5 94
Public perceptions of the KPC in surveys also improved. Among Albanians, the KPC was
the most popular security organization in Kosovo, with between 78.4 and 96.4% of the Albanian
population satisfied with the KPC's performance. Among Serbs, only 5% of the population was
satisfied with the KPC's work in June 2007.595 In several interviews, Albanian analysts credited
the KPC's local development work for its popularity. While this might be true among some Serb
communities, the popularity of KPC remained closely connected to its identity as an army-in-
waiting. 59
Conclusion
The establishment of the KPC closely met international preferences, so according to the theory
the reform effort should be judged a success. Peace and security was largely maintained, since
with the exception of a few incidents, the ex-KLA members contributed to the provision of
security rather than encouraging violence. The KPC incorporated the ex-KLA militants while not
592 Quote from international official, ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 15.
593 UNMIK Press Release 1556, "KPCDG congratulates KPC on efforts to reach out to ethnic minorities," 31 May
2006.
594 ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 19.
595 Early Warning Report 17, April-June 2007, USAID/UNDP, 17.
596 Interviews with local NGO leaders, Pristina, January 2010. See also ICG, "An Army for Kosovo?," 18-19, 29-30.
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threatening or implying independence. Local elites were encouraged to participate in the reform
because of KFOR's influence, and were willing to accept the international administration's
demands because these demands did not threaten nationalist goals or informal networks. This
case study therefore verifies the predictions of the theory and demonstrates the mechanisms
specified therein.
Table 4.5: Creation and Reform of the KPC
Preferences Avoid violence Demobilize KLA Create security force that does not imply
e I9 independence
Phase of reform Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
Formulation of Demobilize High Potentially Success: Confirmed:
KPC KLA and high, but KPC created. Civilian Careful framing of
create new low after protection organization to demands avoids
force that does KPC internationals, army-in- provoking local
not imply created waiting to locals opposition
independence
1999-early 2004 Create KPC as High Low Success: Confirmed:
civilian KPC recruited and Organization is well
organization, trained. Some work on established and meets
avoid violence civilian protection tasks. international
Some participation in objectives
crime and violence, but
minimal international
prosecution
2004 Riots- Create KPC as High Low Success: Confirmed:
Independence civilian Positive role in riots Continued
organization, improves image. implementation of
avoid violence Stagnating organization. international demands
Best fulfillment of
Standards
The KPC still had many critics. Interethnic violence and organized crime were rarely
fully investigated and when they were, members who perpetrated these crimes were at most
forced to resign. While I argued above that the perception of the KPC as an army-in-waiting was
beneficial for the reform effort, it naturally made many international officials uncomfortable.
Although the KPC did not directly imply Kosovo would be independent it was highly suggestive.
It was difficult to recruit Serbs and there was little real expectation that such an organization
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could be truly multiethnic. While not threatening informal networks may have reduced the risk
of a backlash, it left many suspect individuals in a position of power.
These critiques of the KPC are certainly valid. But they fail to recognize that the central
purpose of the KPC was to incorporate the KLA, a guerilla rebel army, into a civilian
organization. KFOR was attentive to this central purpose. There is often pressure for more
ambitious demands that are more in line with human rights and bureaucratic practices. The
success of the KPC reform effort demonstrates that nationalist goals and informal networks are
real constraints on reform. In some highly politicized reform efforts, only when demands are
limited can the central preferences be implemented.
VII. Creation and Reform of Customs
The Kosovo customs institution has been cited by many observers as one of the most effective
state institutions in Kosovo. It collected approximately 70-90% of Kosovo government's revenue
from 2000 to 2007 and was widely viewed as depoliticized and efficient in comparison with
other institutions in Kosovo and other customs services in the region.597 The Kosovo customs
reform is also the poster child for the argument that effective bureaucratic procedures can build
strong institutions. Elton Skendaj argues that the customs service followed "best practices in
public administration" and that its success was due to "insulation from political interference and
promotion of a public service ethos." 598
This section agrees with the claim that the customs reform was successful, but provides a
different explanation. I argue instead that the success of the customs reform is due to the
597 UNMIK Online http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (accessed January 19, 2012); Rakia Moalla-Fetini,
Kosovo: Gearing Policies Toward Growth and Development (Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund,
2005), 75. Interviews with Kosovo customs officials, local analysts, international officials, Pristina, January 2010.5 9 8 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 125,160.
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relationship between international unity and the limited threat to local elites' interests. The
international demands for customs and taxation were narrowly focused on revenue, rather than
on stopping smuggling or otherwise threatening local elites' informal networks. While local
elites would have preferred to have gained greater control of the custom service, as they did with
domestic taxation institutions, they benefited from the collection of revenue. International unity
enabled proper bureaucratic procedures to be used in building the customs service, which led to
the practices Skendaj observes. The customs reform effort thereby provides deep insight into the
relationship between the international administration and local elites. Institution building is
successful when it acknowledges and strengthens incumbent elites' power and when unity
enables effective policy-making by international officials.
This section proceeds in four parts. The first part explains the origins of the UNMIK
Customs Service, including the post-war economic conditions and the preferences of the
international administration. The second part describes the creation and initial efforts of the
UNMIK Customs Service. The third part traces later developments of the customs service up to
independence. A fourth part concludes.
Post-War Economic Context and the Origins of the UNMIK Customs Service
In the immediate post-war period, governance within Kosovo broke down. The Yugoslav trade
and customs regime ceased to function when Serbian troops left Kosovo in June 1999. Except for
some random checks for arms and hazardous materials by KFOR, there were no customs or
border checks until September 1999. Traders transported goods into Kosovo with no restrictions.
In the same period, armed groups, some of whom were associated with the KLA, began to extort
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money for imports, fuel distribution, and other goods. There was no effective taxation by a
central authority.599
Resolution 1244 made no specific mention of the collection of government revenue in
Kosovo. However, it was widely recognized that Kosovo would need a source of revenue to fund
government expenditures. The international community's main preference for revenue therefore
was the rapid establishment of a simple, neutral, and effective taxation system. While the major
donors were willing to fund some amount of Kosovo's budget for a limited period of time, they
were unwilling to fund large deficits over the long term. It was therefore critical that a simple
system be rapidly established in order to limit donor's expenditures. International officials also
sought to ensure that Kosovo's taxation system should be in line with international best
practices, which meant the creation of neutral trade regime that did not bias the economy.600
The solution to this problem was the creation of a tax system based on border taxes.
There was little internal production following the war. Imports rapidly grew in size, since
Kosovars had funds from remittances and international support. Border taxes were simple to set
up and reflected the practices of many developing countries. The need to collect border taxes
therefore led UNMIK to establish a customs service. UNMIK would later adopt additional goals
with respect to customs and revenue, including the prevention of politicization, corruption, and
fraud within the customs service; the transition to non-border taxation; and the transfer of control
to Kosovar officials.
The establishment of a customs service supported nationalist goals, since the Kosovo
institutions required some sustainable source of revenue and the customs service might
599 Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 148; Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 23.600 Saumya Mitra, Kosovo: Economic and Social Reformsfor Peace and Reconciliation, World Bank Technical
Paper no. 509 (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2001), 59; Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic
Institutions," 150-151; The Questfor Viable Peace, 229. See also S/1999/799, paragraph 111-2.
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eventually be transferred to the new independent state. There was a potential threat of the new
taxation system to the major Albanian parties' informal networks. During the war, the KLA had
reportedly engaged in smuggling to import arms and gather revenue. The parties that emerged
from the KLA, PDK and AAK, allegedly remained linked to smuggling activity. 60 ' Later, the
smuggling of oil became an increasingly prominent element of all three major political parties'
financing. Oil had a relatively high excise tax, which made smuggling particularly profitable.
International officials and local analysts believed that each of the major parties were engaged in
oil smuggling, though some disputed the relative importance of smuggling for the parties'
finances. Finally, each of the political parties sought to ensure the recruitment of individuals
within their informal networks into the customs service. Politicization and penetration of the
customs service would ensure jobs for political allies and facilitate criminal activity by the
parties' informal networks.602
International unity was high since authority over customs was largely delegated to Pillar
IV of UNMIK. While there were relatively few international officials within the UNMIK
Customs Service, these officials had effectively full authority over administering the
organization, hiring and firing staff, and setting policy. One senior local customs official stated
that there was informal understanding that customs would be delegated to the British officials,
which led to the adoption of a largely British structure for the customs service. Local and
international officials both emphasized that delegation was critical for the success of the customs
603
service.
601 Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 148; Brand, Development ofKosovo Institutions, 23. Interviews with
former UNMIK Customs Officials, Pristina, January 2010.
602 Interviews with former UNMIK Customs officials, Pristina, January 2010.
603 Interviews with former UNMIK Customs official and Kosovo Customs Service official, Pristina, January 2010.
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UNMIK's main goals were the collection of revenue rather than attacking the role of
informal networks, so it made few demands that threatened informal networks over the course of
the reform. One account observes, "UNMIK's initial focus was on efficient revenue collection
and not on the constriction of illegal revenue flow to obstructionists. The primary concern was
ensuring that revenues would not be diverted by carelessness, incompetence, theft, or
corruption."604 Hence, the customs administration would seek to limit smuggling as much as
possible, but it did not have the resources or intention to fully prevent it. The main concern about
corruption and patronage was inside the customs administration, where corruption could prevent
revenue collection. While later efforts did widen the collection of customs, they failed to
substantially threaten oil smuggling or other core political interests. Given international unity,
the theory predicts full implementation of international demands.
Initial Post-war Period and the Establishment of the KCS
Regulation 1999/3 established a border taxation system that came into force in September 1999.
The tax system included three types of taxes collected at the border: a 10% uniform customs
tariff, a 15% sales tax, and excise taxes on particular items. Since the sales tax was levied after
the 10% tariff, the effective tax rate on most goods was 27% percent of value. However, many
goods, including anything imported by international organizations or NGOs, many food
products, and medical products and pharmaceuticals were exempt from the customs and sales
tax.
The UNMIK Customs Service was mandated to collect new taxes. Although the UN
originally imagined recruiting international customs officials, a British official with experience
in Bosnia urged the recruitment of local officials under an internationally administered service.
The fear was that international officials would have been unable to effectively operate and that
604The Quest for Viable Peace, 230.
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there would be limited local acceptance of the international customs service.605 Consequently,
when the customs service was created, 37 Kosovar employees were recruited. Initially, these
officials were unpaid, which gave them a significant incentive to engage in corruption. This
policy, in the view of one participant, meant that the organization began with a legacy of
corruption that it would have to work hard to counter.606
The legality of the customs tax was somewhat complicated due to Kosovo's status under
resolution 1244. Since collection of taxes at international borders is typically reserved to the
sovereign state, the Kosovo government could not run its own customs service. The customs
service therefore had to be under the direct administration of UNMIK, which made it the first
ever customs service run by the UN. Furthermore, UNMIK did not establish customs posts on
the border with Serbia, for fear of implying that Kosovo was independent. Eventually, the
UNMIK Customs Service successfully argued to the Security Council that there were other
examples of countries with multiple customs zones, including China and, perhaps more
relevantly, Serbia and Montenegro.607
The customs service was highly effective at its key goal of collecting revenue. The
UNMIK Customs Service quickly established border posts along the Macedonian border, which
was the source of most imports. Taxes collected at the border reached 121.5 million euros in
2000 and 243.4 million euros in 2001. However, tax evasion and smuggling were common.
Border posts were few in number and easily evaded by experienced traders. There were a variety
6 0 5 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 153-4.
606 Interview with former UNMIK Customs Official, Pristina, January 2010.
607 Ibid.
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of ways for tax evasion, including Serbia's preferential trade agreement with Macedonia and the
exemption for NGOs. 0
Subsequent Developments
Following the establishment of the UNMIK Customs Service and the border tax regime, UNMIK
pursued several other goals. These goals included improving the tax code and collection of taxes
at the border, shifting the tax burden away from border taxes to domestic taxes, preventing the
corruption and politicization of the customs service, and transitioning the customs service to
Kosovar control. With the exception of the creation of domestic tax institutions, these demands
posed little threat to local elites' informal networks. Consequently, with the exception of failing
to create strong domestic tax institutions, the international administration was largely successful
with the remainder of its demands.
In 2000 and 2001, the prominence and ease of tax evasion led UNMIK to try to broaden
tax collection. Tax points were first established on the Montenegrin boundary in 2000, though
the mountainous terrain and limited resources made it possible for tax evasion to continue.609
With the fall of the Milosevic regime, sanctions on Serbia were removed, and trucks could easily
bypass paying taxes by entering Kosovo directly from Serbia. In 2001, UNMIK attempted to
deal with this problem by establishing customs posts on the border between Kosovo and Serbia
Kosovo Serbs protested the customs posts as they implied the relative independence of Kosovo
and led them to be taxed double on goods coming from Serbia. By spring 2001, a compromise
6 0 8 Recall that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which included Serbia and Montenegro, existed until 2003, after
which the country was renamed the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro seceded in 2006. Mitra,
Kosovo, 60-67; Moalla-Fetini, Kosovo, 75. Interviews with Kosovo Customs official and former UNMIK Customs
Official, Pristina, January 2010.
609 A 2001 World Bank report describes the border crossing: "The office in Site 1 is a van with a small table inside.
A marked police SUV with two policemen parked on the other side of the road provides security. This may not be
inadequate [sic] if two or more traders collude to avoid customs.. Dirt roads ... offer opportunity to enter the
UNMIK territory without customs clearance." Mitra, Kosovo, 66.
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was reached by which Serbia avoided double taxation and the customs posts were called "tax"
rather than "customs" posts. 610
UNMIK also attempted to widen the tax burden by increasing domestic taxation. The
intention was to remove the distortions associated with the collection of all taxes at the border.
During 2000, a hotel and restaurant tax was created and excise taxes were extended to local
production of goods, though collection of domestic excise taxes did not begin until 2003. In
2001, the sales tax was switched to a value added tax (VAT). The VAT included larger domestic
firms, though most of the taxes were still largely collected at the border. In 2003, a wage-
withholding tax was introduced. 611
However, domestic taxation remained weak, reaching only 27% of revenues in 2007.612
The collection of domestic taxes was delegated to the PISG in 2001, but the institution was
reportedly corrupt and ineffective. One international official argued that the political parties
prevented the strengthening of domestic taxation in order to maintain the border tax regime and
the associated high profit margins from smuggling. However, some local analysts disputed the
importance of oil smuggling revenue for the political parties and questioned whether the
emergence of weak domestic tax institutions was intentional on the part of local elites.613
The UNMIK Customs Service was largely successful at avoiding internal politicization
and corruption. To address the initial problem of unpaid officers, the customs service established
several policies that prevented the penetration of the customs service by local elites' informal
networks. Only individuals under 35 years of age, with a secondary education, who spoke either
German or English were eligible for recruitment. The Director-General of the customs service,
610 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 133-135.
611 Moalla-Fetini, Kosovo, 52-58.
612 By comparison "In Southeastern Europe in the early stages of transition [taxes collected at the border] counted
for 6.2%, as opposed to the very high share in Kosova of 83.4%." Riinvest, "Kosova Budget System - Policies And
Sustainability," June 2003, 27.6 1 3 Interviews with former UNMIK customs official and local analysts, Pristina, January 2012.
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an international official, retained full authority over hiring and firing. Customs officials only had
one-year contracts, which facilitated firing officials suspected of corruption without a criminal
investigation. An UNMIK inter-pillar human rights working group viewed the policy of one-year
contracts as a potential human rights violation. However, the UNMIK Customs Service justified
their policy on the grounds that customs was a unique institution that needed full authority to
prevent internal corruption.614 Skendaj writes that the customs followed best practices in its
recruitment policy, training programs, and promotions, which ensured that the customs service
was insulated from politics. 615
Collaboration with former smugglers also strengthened the customs regime. In one
widely repeated anecdote, Lluka, a major alleged smuggler of cigarettes, approached the customs
service. Lluka proposed several measures to improve the customs service's ability to prevent
smuggling, including having an initially small tax on cigarettes and moving customs posts nearer
to the Montenegrin boundary. The changes would enable established smugglers to secure the
trade in cigarettes and block the competition.616
As with other institutions in Kosovo, the 2004 riots had a profound effect on the customs
service. Prior to the riots, the customs service was largely ethnically integrated, in part because
UNMIK recognized that ethnic integration made corruption more difficult. However, Serb
customs officials were in danger during the riots and had to be evacuated. Following the riots,
the customs service ceased to be ethnically integrated. The customs service in the north of
Kosovo became dominated by Serb officials and acquired reputation for corruption. 617
614 Interview with former UNMIK Customs Service official, Pristina, January 2010.6 1 5 Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 150-160.
616 King and Mason, Peace at Any Price, 146.
617 Interview with former UNMIK Customs Service official, Pristina, January 2010.
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Following the riots, the customs service also began to transfer increasing authority to
local officials. In April 2007, a local official was appointed as the Director General, although he
was still part of UNMIK and reported to the SRSG through Pillar IV. International officials
remained present in an advisory and monitoring role. NGO surveys, as well as my own
interviews, confirmed that the customs service remained effective, transparent, and relatively
free of corruption and patronage. Going into independence, the customs service was believed to
be one of the strongest institutions in Kosovo.618
Conclusion
Table 4.6: Kosovo Customs
Preferences Generate revenue with a simple neutral Avoid political penetration and corruption of the
taxation system I customs service
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Establishment Specify tax High Potential Success: Confirmed:
of Customs system; threat to UNMIK Customs Focus on revenue rather
Administration establish informal established as locally than preventing
customs service networks recruited organization; smuggling boosts
begins collecting effectiveness
border revenue
Developments Generate High Low Success: Confirmed:
to 2005 revenue; Shifts in tax structure, Continued focus on
gradually shift including adoption of revenue limits threat to
away from VAT. Shift towards informal networks.
border compliance, but still International unity
collection weak compliance enables service to prevent
political penetration
Later Generate High Low Success: Confirmed:
developments revenue; Continuing Continued focus on
gradually shift improvements in revenue limits threat to
away from monitoring. Other informal networks.
border sources of tax International unity
collection; shift collection remain enables transfer to local
towards local weak. Local authority and avoids
leadership authorities take over. political penetration
The customs reform effort represents one of the more successful institution-building efforts by
UNMIK. The customs service fulfilled its primary role of gathering revenue, was relatively
618 Interview with former UNMIK Customs Service official and Kosovo Customs Service official, Pristina, January
20 10; Skendaj, "Building State Bureaucracies and Democratic Institutions," 13 9-140.
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uncorrupt and transparent, and was successfully transferred to local leadership. The reason for
the success of the reform effort was the unity of the international administration and the limited
threat to local elites' informal networks. The reform effort demonstrates how delegation led to
unity, which in turn enabled UNMIK to monitor the customs institution, to execute policies that
encouraged the development of an autonomous and accountable institution, and to fulfill the
broader goals for the reform effort. At the same time, the success of the customs reform
depended on the reform's limited objectives. Local elites developed an interest in the strong
functioning of the customs service both because they depended on the revenues raised and
because the customs service did not attack their informal networks based on smuggling.
Furthermore, I argue that the customs reform does not demonstrate that bureaucratic best
practices are sufficient for successful reform. While the use of good bureaucratic procedures was
clearly important, I argue that it did not determine the success of the reform for two reasons.
First, the development of bureaucratic procedures depended on international unity, which was in
turn related to the delegation of authority to Pillar IV and the selection of effective leadership.
Second, the ability of UNMIK to use effective bureaucratic procedures within the customs
service depended on the cooperation of local elites. Elites recognized that the demands related to
customs did not threaten nationalist goals or informal networks and in certain ways the reform
would secure their power. If alternative demands that threatened informal networks had been
selected, the reform is unlikely to have been so successful, even with similar use of bureaucratic
procedures.
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IX. Conclusion
Theory Testing
This chapter sought to test the theory by examining the international administration of Kosovo
from 1999 to 2008. The chapter traced six critical reform efforts by the international
administration related to representation, security, and revenue. The chapter also demonstrates
that the international administration in Kosovo supports the assumptions in the theory. UNMIK
had extensive executive powers and a state-building mandate. International officials believed in
spreading human rights and in the effectiveness of bureaucratic procedures. Local elites
campaigned on nationalist goals and had close associations with informal patronage and
corruption networks. The major parties reacted to reform based on their concerns with nationalist
goals and informal networks. Because of the international administration's hierarchical structure,
international unity for each of the reform efforts was high.
Table 4.7: Theory Testing
Reform Confirm Theory? Unexplained events
Basic Political Confirm Temporary UNMIK leadership was essential for independence, so low
Institutions threat and success.
Standards Confirm Implementation depends on threat to nationalist goals. After the standards
before Status ceased to be achievable, riots occur, blocking reform. Post-2004 demands
cease to threaten nationalist goals, which increases implementation
Elections Partially Confirm Partial success despite unity and low threat, observed mechanisms only
match theory for certain demands.
Police Confirm Threat to informal networks leads to an effective KPS, but an inability to
prevent and prosecute politicized crime
KPC Confirm Creation of security force that does not imply independence, successful
given limited demands that did not threaten informal networks
Customs Confirm Customs collects revenue, avoids obstruction by not attacking smuggling,
unity enables customs service to avoid corruption
The chapter is highly supportive of the theory. Five of six reform efforts confirm the
mechanisms and predictions specified by the theory (See Table 4.7). To be sure, the theory
cannot explain the precise events, given its parsimony, but the overall trajectory of each of these
reform efforts strongly supports the theory's claims. In the case of electoral reform, however, the
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theory was only partially relevant. OMIK adopted a modest approach, based on its experience in
Bosnia and avoided threatening nationalist goals or informal networks. Objectives related to
elections, however, were only partially achieved and the mechanisms specified by the theory
were only relevant to a few of the demands.
Policy Implications
The international administration in Kosovo is often taken as an opportunity for learning lessons
about institution building. However, the applicability of Kosovo to other societies may be limited
by its unique political status. Indeed, the dispute about Kosovo's future status was perhaps the
primary limitation of the international community's institution-building efforts in the society.
While there are other countries with disputed sovereignty, Kosovo had a unique history given its
status within former Yugoslavia, the specifics of resolution 1244, and the establishment of an
international administration to address its disputed independence.
Nevertheless, there are elements of UNMIK's experience in Kosovo that are more widely
relevant. First, the chapter demonstrates how UNMIK's unified and hierarchical structure
facilitated international unity and led to greater success. UNMIK's pillar system enabled the
delegation of efforts to separate organizations without creating competition between them.
Second, the chapter shows the limits of formal authority for building strong state
institutions. UNMIK's mandate included effective sovereign authority over Kosovo. However,
UNMIK did not have sovereign power, since its policies were ultimately subject to elite
reactions and popular sovereignty. In particular, the riots demonstrated that UNMIK's preferred
Standards before Status policy was infeasible and had to be changed. Furthermore, the above
account of UNMIK demonstrates that it is difficult if not impossible for an international
administration to use its authority to engage in widespread institutional change prior to elections.
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Even before general elections, local elites exerted extensive influence on UNMIK's decision-
making and limited its freedom of action. "Institutionalization before liberalization" is not a
feasible strategy and may provoke a backlash.
Third, the chapter demonstrates the continuing strength of nationalist goals and informal
networks. For example, Steiner hoped to convince the Kosovo Assembly in 2002 to use its
authority to address economic and social problems. However, the importance of independence in
Kosovo politics meant that Albanian elites focused their energies on outbidding each other and
passing resolutions beyond the technical authority of the Assembly. Furthermore, local elites
depended on their associations with informal networks. Political parties adapted their wartime
resources to the post-war period, and reacted to protect these resources from international reform
efforts. The chapter repeatedly demonstrates that local elites act to protect their own political
power over fulfilling international standards, even when the international community has
overwhelming leverage and political authority.
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Chapter 5
Institution Building in East Timor: Welcome to the Terra Nuius
"U.N. officials in Kosovo used to refer to the bombed-out territory they administered as 'the empty shell.'
Then many of them were moved to East Timor, the U.N.'s latest hardship case, where they discovered the
true meaning of emptiness... Yet today this impoverished island is the laboratory for what is known at the
United Nations as 'nation-building.' The U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) is
not just helping the new country's government-it is that government."
-James Traub619
"The unprecedented powers to be assumed by the UN attracted the very type of individual who would be
intoxicated by that thought. The mission itself was corrupting, even for individuals who were not already
pursuing power for its own sake. Put in a certain structure and context, foreign staff exhibited colonial-style
behaviour. The economic disparity was so great, the local people were so weak, it was difficult to resist the
temptation of superiority (thus, chalking up to the angry scholars of racism their point). Many felt that the
Timorese could not be relied on, that they lacked skills and were not ready for self-government, that the
UN should stay and its personnel could keep theirjobs for longer. Some officials even attempted
methodically to prevent the participation of Timorese in the transitional government of the country. They
wanted to wield unfettered their newfound authority and spend the hundreds of millions of dollars
committed by the world's donors."
-Jarat Chopra620
"We are witnessing another phenomenon in East Timor, that of an obsessive acculturation to standards that
hundreds of international experts try to convey to the East Timorese, who are hungry for values:
democracy (many of those who teach us never practised it in their own countries because they became UN
staff members); human rights (many of those who remind us of them forget the situation in their own
countries); gender (many of the women who attend the workshops know that in their countries this issue is
no example for others); NGOs (numerous NGOs live off the aid 'business' to poor countries); Youth (all
those who remind us of this issue know that in their countries most of the youth are unemployed...)"
-Xanana Gusmao, "New Year's Message," 31 December 2000621
On August 30, 1999, a "popular consultation" was held in East Timor622 to determine whether
the territory would remain part of Indonesia and receive greater autonomy or would become
independent state. Approximately 78.5% of voters selected independence, after which pro-
autonomy militias, backed by the Indonesian military, engaged in violence. Approximately 1400
people were killed and 70% of East Timor's already limited infrastructure was destroyed. An
estimated 500,000 people were displaced, including 150,000 forcibly moved to western
619 "Inventing East Timor," 74.
620 "Building State Failure in East Timor," Development and Change 33, no. 5 (November 2002): 981.621 Available at http://www.etan.org/et200la/january/01-06/0lxanan.htm (accessed February 14, 2012)
622 The present name of the country is Timor-Leste, which is Portuguese for East Timor. I use the name East Timor
for consistency, since this this was the initial name of the territory when the UN mission first began. Timorese here
refers to the people of East Timor rather than of the entire island. For more discussion on these issues, see
Kingsbury 2009, x.
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Timor.623 An international military force, led by Australia, intervened within several weeks and
prevented further violence. According to the negotiations prior to the consultation, in the event of
a vote in support of independence, the UN would temporarily administer East Timor. However,
the UN had not planned for the mission, since Indonesia was concerned that any such planning
would prejudice the vote. Given the limited time for planning, the UN applied the same
framework as it had for the recent operation in Kosovo.624 The UN Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET) was created and would have full sovereign government over East
Timor until May 2002.
For many international officials and observers, East Timor represented a laboratory for
state building. In addition to authority, the mission also had experienced leaders and extensive
resources, which together the technical perspective suggests should lead to successful state
building. Within a relatively short time the UN had brought thousands of personnel to East
Timor. Many senior officials had extensive experience in previous missions, although some of
the recruits were perceived as unqualified. In addition to approximately $1.3 billion in UN
assessments to fund UNTAET, $518 million was spent on reconstruction and development,
which made East Timor one of the highest aid recipients per capita among post-conflict
625
countries. The country was relatively small, with only approximately one million people. For
some, the destruction of the war meant that the country presented an empty land, or terra nullius,
with few existing institutions. The UN hoped that East Timor would become a positive test case
and demonstrate its ability to build strong institutions.
623 On the violence following the referendum, see "Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council," 4
October 1999, S/1999/1024.
624 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change - East Timor" (Conflict Security &
Development Group, March 2003), para. 8-16, 23-28,
www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/.../Peace4Timor_10_3_03.pdf; Astri Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders:
Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor," International Peacekeeping 8, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 1-20.6 2 5Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, 109-110.
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As in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, institution-building efforts had only mixed success.
UNTAET was able to build representative institutions and to transfer power to a democratically
elected government. The main failure of the mission was in building security institutions.
Weakness in the accountability and effectiveness of the military and police eventually led to
violence in April and May 2006.
The theory offers significant insight into the trajectory of all but one of the key reform
efforts in East Timor. The success in building representative institutions was driven by high
unity and demands that accorded with nationalist objectives. The failure of the police and
military reform was driven by private obstruction from local elites' informal networks. The
theory offers less insight for the effort to create sustainable revenue for East Timor, since local
elites truly owned that reform effort and the international administration did not make demands
of them.
The chapter proceeds in eight sections. The first section provides political context,
including East Timor's struggle for independence; the structure, mandate, and ideology of
UNTAET; and Timorese domestic politics. A second section introduces the case studies and
describes the sources used. The third through seventh sections describe reforms undertaken by
UNTAET, including the transition to independence, elections, military, police, and revenue
reforms. The eighth section concludes by evaluating the theory's predictions in East Timor and
suggesting policy implications.
I. Conflict, Intervention, and Local Politics
This section describes the political context of the international administration in East Timor. It
first briefly discusses the history of East Timor prior to the independence referendum in 1999. It
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then discusses UNTAET's mandate, structure, and ideology. Finally, it discusses local politics in
East Timor during the UNTAET period.
A Long Struggle for Independence - Historical Context
Following World War II, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony, while the rest of the island
of Timor became part of Indonesia. 626 In 1974, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal began the
process of decolonization in East Timor. A violent conflict broke out between three parties
supporting different political outcomes for East Timor. The first party was Fretilin, 627 which had
a Marxist-Leninist political philosophy and supported full independence. The second was the
more conservative UDT, which supported continued links with Portugal. The third was the small
Apodeti, which supported integration into Indonesia. At the same time, Indonesia, led by
President Suharto, developed plans for the invasion and annexation of East Timor. UDT,
encouraged by Indonesia, launched a coup in August 1975. A short but violent civil war began,
in which Fretilin was largely victorious. Fretilin took control of the capital, Dili, and declared
independence in November. Indonesia then invaded and occupied East Timor. Australia and the
United States accepted the invasion, apparently for the sake of maintaining good relations with
Indonesia and preventing the spread of Communism. 628
Indonesia annexed East Timor and ruled for the next twenty-four years. Falintil (Forcas
de Defesa de Timor Leste), Fretilin's armed wing, resisted Indonesia's occupation through an
armed insurgency. By 1989, the Indonesian military had largely put down the rebellion and
626 For a longer history of East Timor see Damien Kingsbury, East Timor: The Price ofLiberty (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), chap. 2, 3; Clinton Fernandes, The Independence ofEast Timor: Multi-Dimensional
Perspectives - Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism, The Sussex Library of Asian Studies
(Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2011); James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, 3rd ed.
(Double Bay, N.S.W., Australia: Longueville Books, 2003).
6 2 7 Fretilin is the Portuguese acronym for the Revolutionary Front for and Independent East Timor. The party was
initially called ASDT - the Timorese Social Democratic Association. Fretilin is also often capitalized.
628 For more details, see Kingsbury, East Timor: The Price ofLiberty, 43-50; Andrea Katalin Molnar, Timor Leste:
Politics, History, and Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010), chap. 4; Dunn, East Timor, chap. 4-10.
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forced Falintil underground. 629 Nevertheless, the exiled Fretilin leadership, as well as a growing
international solidarity movement, sought independence for East Timor.630 The independence
movement emphasized the brutality of Indonesia's rule over the territory, especially following
the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in which the Indonesian military opened fire on a crowd of
unarmed protestors.631
The politics of the resistance movement would have consequences for East Timor after
independence. By 1981, Xanana Gusmao had emerged as the leader of Falintil. Although
Gusmao was captured in 1992 and imprisoned, he developed a reputation "as a visionary leader
and extraordinarily effective guerilla commander." 632 Many Timorese wanted to be part of the
independence movement, but were reluctant to join Fretilin because of its Marxist politics and
history of violence during the 1975 civil war.633 In order to present a united front to the
international community, a new umbrella resistance group was formed, which was initially called
the CNRM, and later renamed the CNRT. The group encompassed all parties supporting
independence. Falintil was also dissociated with the political party Fretilin and became a non-
634partisan army. Several other important leaders of the independence movement emerged, such
as Jose Ramos-Horta who, with Bishop Carlos Belo, won the Noble Peace prize in 1996 for their
efforts towards "a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor. "635
In the late 1990s, a series of circumstances brought about the end of the Indonesian
occupation and a transition to independence through UN administration. Suharto, the leader of
Indonesia, began to lose power. The Indonesian military, which had never been completely under
629 Kingsbury, East Timor: The Price ofLiberty, 56. See also Chega!: The Report of the Commission for Reception,
Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste Executive Summary (CAVR), 2005), 43-153.6 3 0 Fernandes, The Independence ofEast Timor, chap. 4-5; Dunn, East Timor, chap. 11-12.
631 Kingsbury, East Timor: The Price ofLiberty, 60-65.63 2 Dunn, East Timor, 274.
633 Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 126-127.
634 Dunn, East Timor, 274-5; Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor, 82-83, 109.
635 See http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/laureates/1996/index.htnl (accessed April 21, 2012).
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civilian control, became frustrated by the corruption and nepotism of the Suharto regime. The
international community also increased their criticism of Indonesia's human rights violations in
East Timor.636 The 1997 Asian financial crisis weakened Suharto's regime and led to his
downfall in May 1998. Suharto's successor, B.J. Habibie, struggled with major economic
problems in Indonesia in addition to the escalating international pressure to address the situation
in East Timor. Following extensive negotiations with Portugal and the UN, Habibie signed the 5
May Agreements, which called for a "popular consultation" in which the people of East Timor
would vote on whether to become an autonomous region of Indonesia or to become independent
following temporary administration by the UN.637 Habibie and his advisors apparently believed
East Timor would vote for autonomy and recognized that continued occupation of the territory
weakened Indonesia's reputation abroad. The Indonesian military, on the other hand, was dead
set against Timorese independence.638
The UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was created on June 11, 1999 to organize
and conduct the "popular consultation." The situation for the vote was not ideal. The Indonesian
military639 believed that it still had sufficient leverage to compel a vote for continued integration
in Indonesia. To this end, the military backed pro-autonomy militias, which engaged in threats,
selective attacks against pro-independence supporters, and occasional indiscriminate violence.640
Despite the security problems and repeated warnings from UNAMET, the registration and vote
6 3 6 Femandes, The Independence ofEast Timor, 115-124, 145-163; Dunn, East Timor, 333-339.
6 3 7 Kingsbury, East Timor: The Price ofLiberty, 65-7 1; Fernandes, The Independence ofEast Timor, 164-182.
6 3 8 James Dunn writes, "President Habibie may have had no strong feelings about East Timor, but to his military
commanders, especially Kopassus officers, it was hallowed ground. Thousands of Indonesian lives had been lost in
the twenty-four year campaign to crush the Falintil resistance." East Timor, 341-342.
639 Some of the Indonesian-backed militia forcefully recruited Timorese, which was one reason for the population
displacement before and after the referendum. Chega!, 84. For details on the recruitment of the militias, see
Geoffrey Robinson, "If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010), 99-109; Dunn, East Timor, 342-350.
640 John R Ballard, Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East
Timor (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 36-49; Chega!, 99-106; Dunn, East Timor, 339-352.
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went ahead, and the consultation was held on August 30, 1999.641 Several very tense days
followed, after which the UN announced that with high turnout the population chose
independence with 78.5% of the vote. Pro-autonomy militias, without little opposition and some
support from the Indonesian military, 642 initiated wide scale violence in a "scorched earth"
campaign.643
In response to the violence, extensive negotiations began between Habibie, the UN, and
various states, including Australia, Portugal, the US, the UK, and Japan. The UN Security
Council, with the agreement of President Habibie, authorized the deployment of an Australian-
led multinational force called INTERFET. INTERFET had approximately 8000 soldiers and a
mandate to "restore peace and security in East Timor. "644 The force deployed on September 20,
and rapidly restored basic security in the whole of East Timor. At the same time, the UN began
to plan a mission to take over temporary administration of East Timor. The Indonesian
parliament voted to approve the results of the popular consultation on October 20. On October
25, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1272 which established UNTAET to
temporarily govern East Timor prior to the territory's independence.645
641 Note that East Timorese leaders were in support of continuing the vote despite the risks. Martin and Mayer-
Rieckh, "The United Nations and East Timor," 127-131, 133.
642 Dunn explains, "much is known about the TNI's [the Indonesian military] commanding role in relation to events
in East Timor from April to September. At most of the major killings TNI officers were present, in some cases
playing a leading role. TNI troops openly assisted militia attackers. During the Liquiga attack, for example, they
obligingly hurled tear gas grenades into the church. During the Suai massacre Kopassus Colonel Sediono stood
outside the church in uniform, carrying an M16 and, according to witnesses, he was giving orders... In the past the
TNI had often used paramilitary groups to spearhead the attacks, and this technique was apparent during the wanton
killing of hundreds of East Timorese in August and September 1999." East Timor, 352-3. See also Robinson, If You
Leave Us Here, We Will Die, 162-184.
6 4 3 The Report of the CAVR notes, "The comprehensive 'scorched earth' tactics employed by the TNI and the
militia groups after the Popular Consultation, marked by threats of violence, killings, mass forced deportations and
the destruction of public and private buildings throughout Timor-Leste, caused the bulk of the population to become
displaced, either internally or externally." Chega!, 44-46, 68-70, 84-85. Quote page 85. See also UN S/1999/1024.
644 UN resolution 1264 (1999). See Ian Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot,
and International Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 103-114.
645 Ballard, Triumph ofSelf-Determination, 84-98; Dunn, East Timor, 360-362.
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International Administration in East Timor
This section demonstrates that UNTAET fulfills the scope conditions and assumptions of the
theory. In particular, UNTAET had executive power and a state-building mandate, a unified
hierarchical structure, and believed in spreading human rights and in the effectiveness of
bureaucratic procedures. UNTAET also had several unique dysfunctional characteristics,
including insufficient time for planning, an internal UN headquarters dispute, and a belief in the
absence of existing institutions in East Timor.
Although the 5 May Agreements stated that the UN would supervise East Timor's
transition to independence in the event that the Timorese voted for independence, Indonesia had
insisted that the UN could not plan for such a mission, as doing so would prejudice the outcome
of the referendum. Astri Suhrke writes, "ideally, the UN needed six months to prepare a multi-
purpose mission like UNTAET... in fact, planning for UNTAET was completed in about one
month."64 6 One DPKO officer observed that planning for UNTAET was "planning with no time
to plan." The UN's planning capacity was further diminished by the reduction of professional
staff within UN headquarters and by the requirements of several large ongoing UN missions in
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and Lebanon. 647 Recruitment was also slow, because only "one
person in DPKO was assigned the task of hiring all civilian staff for the mission."648
At the same time, there was a dispute within UN headquarters about who would lead the
planning effort. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) had run UNAMET and was
"virtually the custodian of the Secretariat's knowledge about East Timor."649 Given their
experience, knowledge, and consultation with Timorese leaders, DPA and UNAMET officials
646 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders."
647 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," 15-16.
648 Ibid., para. 165.
649 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders," 6.
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sought to participate in the planning for UNTAET. However, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) had jurisdiction over large post-conflict operations, and ignored DPA's
request for a joint planning mission. Kofi Annan resolved the disagreement by putting DPKO in
charge of planning and giving it instructions to coordinate with DPA. Nevertheless, DPKO
largely ignored DPA. DPKO developed its own perspective of East Timor as a terra nullius, or
empty land, which "need[ed] to be invented from scratch." 650
DPKO's takeover of the planning process and the limited time for planning would have
serious consequences for UNTAET's conduct. First, UNTAET would not recognize the CNRT
as the legitimate local authority. CNRT was seen within East Timor, and by DPA, as a coalition
of all East Timorese parties that could be treated as broadly representative. DPKO, however, saw
CNRT as one political faction and believed that that official recognition of CNRT "would
amount to political favourtism and encourage corruption." 651 This policy stemmed from DPKO's
experience with traditional peacekeeping missions, in which the standard policy was for the
mission to be impartial with respect to the local authorities.652 Second, DPKO adopted standard
models from other missions, most notably Kosovo. Many DPKO staff had worked on Kosovo
and, given the short time frame, were told to "rejig" the Kosovo plan for East Timor. 653 Senior
UN officials, most notably Lakhdar Barahimi, criticized the application of the plan from Kosovo
to East Timor. They claimed that international administration was unnecessary in East Timor
6 50 Ibid 6,20 (fn 30); Traub, "Inventing East Timor."
651 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders," 11.
652 Suhrke observes, "a long-established institutional perspective in the UN that allowed for only two kinds of
representative authorities: sovereign governments and factions. In so far as the CNRT was not a sovereign entity, it
was relegated to the conceptual category of 'faction' and treated accordingly (the pro-Indonesian integrationists
being another faction)." Ibid., 6-10. See also, Martin and Mayer-Rieckh, "The United Nations and East Timor,"
133; Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight," 85; Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 272-275.
653 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 23, 28. Chesterman "East Timor in Transition: From
Conflict Prevention to State-Building." Power writes that "UN Staff who felt sidelined joked that Security Council
Resolution 1272 was a 'delete Kosovo, insert East Timor' resolution." Power, Chasing the Flame, 300.
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since there were Timorese officials who were capable of running the country."64 Third, DPKO
did not coordinate well with planning efforts by other intemational organizations, most notably
the Joint Assessment Mission by the World Bank, UNDP, and several other organizations.655
UNTAET's mandate was specified in resolution 1272 and explained in more detail in the
Secretary-General's report of October 4, 1999. The mission's mandate and structure was similar
to that of UNMIK, but simplified due to the absence of the status problem and the presence of
fewer international organizations. UNTAET would be "endowed with overall responsibility for
the administration of East Timor and [...] empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration ofjustice."656 Both the Secretary-General's report and
Resolution 1272 encouraged "consultation and cooperation with the people of East Timor." 657
Nevertheless, the mandate gave effective full sovereign control to the SRSG and did not specify
the measures by which the East Timorese would take over authority from UNTAET. Observers
described the mandate as unprecedented, and one critic wrote, "The organizational and juridical
654 Power writes that Brahimi declined to become SRSG of the mission on these grounds. She writes that he told
Annan "I know nothing about Kosovo or Timor, but the one thing I'm absolutely certain of is that they are not the
same place," and joked to Vieira de Mello, "Sergio, instead of you being the dictator and Gusmao your adviser, why
don't you make GusmAo the dictator and you be the adviser?" Power, Chasing the Flame, 300, 302.
655 The Joint Assessment Mission would come to radically different conclusions from DPKO and propose working
with existing Timorese institutions rather than starting from scratch. The King's College report explains, "DPKO
seems to have wanted to maintain an arm's-length relationship with the Bank." "A Review of Peace Operations,"
para. 24.
656 UNTAET's mandated tasks were "(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of
East Timor, (b) To establish an effective administration; (c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
(e) To support capacity-building for self-government;(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development." UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999), paragraph 1-2.
657 The Secretary-General's report explained "The effectiveness of UNTAET will rest on its ability to perform its
duties in close consultation and cooperation with the people of East Timor, as it will have to exercise its authority on
their behalf. In this context, the establishment of a permanent dialogue with representatives of the East Timorese
people will be essential. Pending the holding of elections, the Special Representative will establish advisory bodies
at all levels to ensure the participation of the East Timorese in the governance and administration of the territory.
UNTAET will operate on the principle of capacity -building and maximal use of existing structures, institutions and
human resources." "The Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor," 4 October 1999, UN
S/1999/1024, para 30.
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status of the UN in East Timor is comparable with that of a pre-constitutional monarch in a
sovereign kingdom."658
UNTAET had a unified structure similar to that of Kosovo, with some simplifications. In
particular, there were not separate international organizations subordinated to the SRSG. Instead,
the UN would run all of component pillars. The SRSG was dual-hatted as the "Transitional
Administrator" and had full authority over the mission. Under the office of the SRSG there were
three pillars. The first pillar was "governance and public administration," which included
creating sustainable state institutions for East Timor, judicial affairs, civilian police, economic
development, elections, and district administration. While the district administrators were in
practice the executive authority in much of the country, they were several levels removed from
the SRSG in the bureaucracy. The second pillar was "humanitarian assistance and emergency
rehabilitation," which was responsible for all aspects of the substantial humanitarian response.
The third pillar was the "military component," since unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo the military
was under the command of the SRSG.659
Sergio Vieira de Mello was selected for the key role as the SRSG. Though he had no
expertise in East Timor, Vieira de Mello had worked in many previous UN missions such as
Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Vieira de Mello explained his vision of the UN's role in a
briefing to the Security Council in February 2000: "... our mission is to work not so much as the
interim administration appointed to govern but as co-architects, along with the East Timorese, of
a national administration that will serve the country long after UNTAET's departure." A native
Portuguese speaker, he would also develop a close relationship with the Lusophone elite who
were rapidly returning to the country.
6 58 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," 29.
659 See UN S/1999/1024, paragraphs 38-77. For commentary, see King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations,"
28-30; Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 275-290.
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While the internal disagreement between DPA and DPKO, "was real and damaging," 660
to the mission, UNTAET would generally have high unity. The hierarchical structure of the
mission, combined with Vieira de Mello's leadership, would ensure all elements of UNTAET
would agree on its demands. Vieira de Mello also had the trust of UN headquarters, and despite
661
occasional disagreements was able to prevent the outward appearance of disunity.
UNTAET officials also generally believed the ideology described in the theory. First,
UNTAET sought to spread human rights. Resolution 1272 and the Secretary-General's report
emphasized human rights and a human rights office was created that directly advised the SRSG.
The human rights office focused on the post-referendum violence, though the Secretary-
General's report also highlighted concerns about child and gender-related provisions of the
human rights treaties.
Second, international officials believed in the effectiveness of formal procedures and
sought to encourage the new institutions in East Timor to follow good bureaucratic practices.
The bureaucratic ideology reinforced the view that East Timor was a terra nullius, since it led
international officials to disregard existing informal institutions.6 6 2 Given the terra nullius,
UNTAET believed it could establish its preferred bureaucratic institutions by building the
country from the ground up. James Traub, for instance, writes that the UN "sent out a kind of A-
team of international technocrats" who attempted to build East Timor's institutions from
scratch.663 Astri Suhrke echoes Traub's assessment and emphasizes that the UN's attitude and
6 6 0 Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight," 86.
661 See especially Power, Chasing the Flame, 328-336.
662 The King's College report observes, "In addition, politically, for almost all the incoming UNTAET senior
officials, East Timor was terra incognita, an unfamiliar political landscape full of potential pitfalls in which it was
necessary to tread warily. Many of them also assumed that in political terms it was also a terra nullis [sic],
politically an empty quarter, which it most certainly was not." "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 296.
[emphasis in original]
663 Traub describes one of the technocrats, Hans Strohmeyer. Strohmeyer's job "is both to invent a Timorese legal
system and to help devise a body of laws for this embryonic country .. .it was Strohmeyer who talked about the
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approach alienated the Timorese.664 Jarat Chopra, a scholar who was appointed to the UN's
district administration, was high critical of the UN's assumption of terra nullius and its
bureaucratic tendencies. 665 He described several examples of "UNTAET's preoccupation with
control at the expense of the local community's involvement in government" and observed, "The
defensive brand of bureaucratic 'force protection' employed by UNTAET was not an effective
approach to establishing a credible new government or preparing the Timorese for full
independence." In Chopra's opinion, "The UN's internal bureaucracy is too rigid for dynamic
operational environments, and blocks the necessary psychological and organizational shift from
managing missions to leading countries." 666 The tensions between the real or imagined lack of
Timorese capacity and the UN's bureaucratic ideology would appear repeatedly throughout the
institution-building efforts described below.
UNTAET was extensively criticized for its organizational and ideological limitations, but
these flaws in themselves rarely prevented the achievement of successful reforms. Indeed, it
'empty shell.' He had served in Kosovo with Vieira de Mello and described the difference between the two missions
by saying, 'In Kosovo, we had judges, lawyers, prosecutors; the trouble was finding one who didn't have a Yugoslav
past or a Serbian collaborator past. Here you don't have a single lawyer."' Traub quotes Strohmeyer observing that
"you can tell that they [the local elites] feel subjected to our collective brain power." Traub notes that Ramos-Horta,
the Timorese Noble Prize winner, was frustrated by the international officials' perspective and stated, "We have
some very senior people. The idea that they should be assisting the Civ. Pol. is like asking me to be an assistant to
one of these junior UNTAET people; it is stupid and insulting." Traub, "Inventing East Timor," 82-85.6 6 4 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders," 6-18.6 6 5 Chopra observes that the terra nullis perspective hailed from two factors: "The first was a blind ambition borne
of bitter experience in Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The disarray of disparate international actors - divided
amongst themselves amidst resilient warlords in the area of operation - was to be overcome by unifying the
intervenors under a single political authority. Underlying causes of conflict were to be tackled by taking control of
their political source and fundamentally transforming its dynamics. By taking power actually on the ground, it could
then be transferred to a newly minted state machine and its head and its officials. ...The second factor was
malevolence on the part of international officials. The unprecedented powers to be assumed by the UN attracted the
very type of individual who would be intoxicated by that thought. The mission itself was corrupting, even for
individuals who were not already pursuing power for its own sake. Put in a certain structure and context, foreign
staff exhibited colonial-style behaviour. The economic disparity was so great, the local people were so weak, it was
difficult to resist the temptation of superiority (thus, chalking up to the angry scholars of racism their point). Many
felt that the Timorese could not be relied on, that they lacked skills and were not ready for self-government, that the
UN should stay and its personnel could keep theirjobs for longer. Some officials even attempted methodically to
prevent the participation of Timorese in the transitional government of the country. They wanted to wield unfettered
their newfound authority and spend the hundreds of millions of dollars committed by the world's donors." Chopra,
"Building State Failure in East Timor," 981.
666 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," 30, 33, 35.
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appears that on sufficiently important issues, UNTAET was forced to rationalize its demands,
which helped enable success. Nevertheless, UNTAET's weaknesses, such as the terra nullius
belief, were still damaging to political development in the country.
Local Politics
The achievement of independence was perhaps the most important political issue in East Timor.
The struggle for independence had been underway since the mid-1970s and independence was
broadly popular within the society. Furthermore, with the arrival of INTERFET, pro-autonomy
militias had largely fled and so there few if any remaining supporters of integration with
Indonesia left in the country. Indeed, nearly all of the political elite had participated in some way
in the struggle for independence and would campaign based on their wartime role. The CNRT
was initially a unified organization, but splits rapidly emerged, many of which were based on
preexisting divisions within East Timor's society. 667
Prior to the independence referendum, the CNRT leadership was largely in favor of a UN
mission. The leadership believed that the CNRT would govern East Timor while the country was
under the UN's supervision, rather than the UN governing East Timor directly. CNRT officials
met in Melbourne and Darwin in April and October 1999 to discuss their plans for the future.
They submitted a proposal for the creation of a seven member Transitional Council that would
become UNTAET's partner. In this framework, UN supervision would continue for a period of
approximately five to ten years. As discussed above, DPKO largely ignored their proposal, in
large part because DPKO planners considered CNRT to be one political faction, rather than a
broadly representative umbrella organization.66
6 6 7 Dunn, East Timor, 336-9; Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 187-188; Martin, Self-
Determination in East Timor, 62-64.6 6 8 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders," 9. Randell Garrison, "The Role of Constitution-Building Processes
in Democratization," IDEA, 2005, 9.
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Two of the main leaders of the independence movement remained especially influential
in the post-conflict period, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta. Indeed, during the initial
period, UNTAET apparently believed that if it had the approval of both Gusmao and Ramos-
Horta, there was sufficient local acceptance of a particular policy. 669 Gusmao was the leader of
the clandestine movement and the president of CNRM/CNRT. In 1981, Gusmao was one of the
only two surviving members of the Central Committee of Fretilin who remained in East Timor
and he became the Commander in Chief of Falintil. Fretilin had alienated many Timorese during
the 1975 civil war, and many individuals were suspicious of its Marxist ideology. Gusmao
engaged in several efforts to broaden the independence movement beyond Fretilin. In 1982,
Gusmao created the CNRM in order to encourage the participation of the Catholic Church and
other individuals who did not want to be under the Fretilin's leadership. To encourage greater
unity and participation in the armed resistance, in 1987, Gusmao separated Falintil (the armed
wing) from Fretilin (the party) and resigned from Fretilin. These actions, however, created a
divide between Gusmao and the rest of the leadership of Fretilin, especially Mari Alkatiri.
Through Gusmao's leadership, CNRT remained unified throughout the independence struggle,
with even Alkatiri joining CNRT in 1997. However, many Fretilin leaders remained opposed to
Gusmao, and following independence, Gusmao would become Fretilin's main political
adversary.670
Ramos-Horta was one of the founding members of Fretilin. He won the Noble Prize for
his long efforts as the representative of East Timor's independence movement at the UN. Ramos-
6 6 9 Interview with former UNTAET officials, Dili, Summer 2009 and 2010.
670 See Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 126-128, 149-151, 172. Also Dennis
Shoesmith, 'Timor-Leste: Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System', Asian Survey, 43:2, 2003.
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Horta was highly critical of the UN's administration in East Timor and argued that Timorese
should play a larger role.67'
The other key political actor in the post-conflict period was the political party Fretilin. In
August 2000, Fretilin split from CNRT under the leadership of Mari Alkatiri.672 While Gusmao
might have personally been the most popular leader of the independence struggle, many
Timorese recognized Fretilin as the party that was most responsible for independence. After the
popular consultation, Fretilin rapidly developed a strong grassroots political network throughout
the country.673 Fretilin also drew from a wide range of Timorese leadership, including
individuals within Falintil, exiles in Mozambique and other Lusophone countries, business elites,
and youth leadership.674 While Fretilin began as a socialist party, and many continued to oppose
the party on those grounds, Fretilin abandoned its Marxist ideology in 1982. After 1999, the
party became a broader nationalist party, with conservative, pragmatic, and authoritarian
tendencies. The party's leadership appeared to believe that Fretilin was the only legitimate ruling
675party in East Timor. Fretilin allegedly engaged in a number of activities to intimidate voters
and physically attack opposition parties. 676 In writing the constitution, Fretilin's view was that
671 Jos6 Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga ofEast Timor (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1987);
Power, Chasing the Flame, 299, 309.67 Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 172.
6 7 3 Tanja Hohe explains: "Fretilin was again consolidating its influence at the grassroots as a result. It started to
spread its presence throughout the country, establishing structures on all administrative levels. From January 2001
onwards, a census of all Fretilin supporters and elections for party, youth and women representatives was conducted
in every hamlet, village, sub-district and district up to the national level. Soon Fretilin had a party network covering
the entire country. The position of CNRT village representatives, who had so far been bound in a working
relationship with UNTAET, were now in some cases challenged by their Fretilin counterparts on the local level, who
requested UNTAET to recognise them as local leaders instead of the CNRT representative."6 7 4 Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 219-240.
675 See especially Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the
Need for Inclusive Governance," Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (2006): 575-596; Dennis Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste:
Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System," Asian Survey 43, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 231-252.6 7 6 Guterres gives several examples of Fretilin's threats. During the 2001 campaign, "Leaders of FRETILIN even
demanded that the people vote for them or risk being wiped out." Later, in early 2005, "supporters of FRETILIN in
the subdistrict of Uato Lari assaulted and destroyed houses of PSD leaders. The most recent case took place in the
village of Bucoli, district of Baucau, in which FRETILIN members in that village ransacked the secretariat of
Partido Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia Timorense, UNDERTIM (National Unity Democratic of
275
"compromise is not 'a sign of rationality and good will but a signal of weakness and lack of
resolve."' 677 Finally, following their loss in the 2007 elections, Fretilin officials insisted that the
opposition parties' victory was not legitimate.678
The leadership of East Timor was drawn from a relatively small portion of the
population, which meant that key elites had known each other for a long time and that politics
was often based on personal rivalries. Francisco Guterres observes that nearly all of the Timorese
elites were drawn either from descendants of Portuguese mestizos or the children of liurai (the
traditional rulers). 679 Furthermore, many of the key leaders, including Gusmao, Alkatiri, Lu Olo,
and Rogerio Lobato gained their position based on their role in the founding of Fretilin and the
early struggle for independence.
All of the major political actors used informal networks to secure their power, with many
of these networks originating from the war. Gusmao, for example, retained close associations
with Falintil members who were eventually incorporated into the new East Timorese army.
Fretilin had a more varied base, since the party had a number of leaders with different areas of
support. Some individuals, such as Rogerio Lobato, drew on associations with disgruntled
Falintil veterans. Other members of Fretilin had particular regional bases of support, especially
in the eastern part of the country. The legacy of the clandestine networks enabled elites to
continue to organize influential informal networks. The density, opacity, and importance of
informal networks meant that for all reforms of large organizations, such as the police or
military, there was a potential threat to informal networks, which I evaluate on a case-by-case
basis.
Timorese Resistance Party), an opposition party and burnt the party's flag." Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of
Democracy in East Timor," 197, 230.6 77 TIid 203.
67 8 Gunn, "Timor-Leste in 2009."
679 "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 110.
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II. Sources and Methods
The remainder of the chapter examines five reform efforts undertaken by the UN in East Timor:
the establishment of basic representative institutions, elections, the establishment of the police,
the establishment of the military (F-FDTL), and the creation of the petroleum fund. Though most
of the reform efforts took place under UNTAET, in the case of the police and military reforms,
successor missions also played a role after East Timor's independence in 2002.
I examine these reform efforts because they fit the scope conditions of the theory. Each of
the reform efforts was relevant to security, representation, or revenue. The international
administration had executive power and their demands were conditional for political progress,
which in the case of East Timor meant the turnover of authority to Timorese officials. I selected
the specific reform efforts I examine here by surveying the literature and confirming the choices
with area experts and local officials. Naturally, there are a number of reform efforts that were
important for the political development of East Timor that I do not cover here, including justice,
land reform, education, and health.
The reform efforts below draw on three types of sources. First, I conducted a total of two
months of fieldwork in East Timor in July to August 2009 and in August 2010. I did 43
interviews with a variety of international and local officials and analysts. The interviews were all
conducted in English. English was not as widely spoken in East Timor among local officials as it
was in Bosnia or Kosovo. However, I was successful at gathering a wide range of opinions from
different political parties. I also spoke with officials who had participated in UNTAET or
successor missions. Second, I relied on written primary sources, including UN documents,
regulations, and press releases. Third, I made use of a variety of secondary sources cited below.
There are a number of excellent academic theses written in Australia on UNTAET and later UN
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missions.680 I also refer to two systematic evaluations of UNTAET, including a 144-page report
on UNTAET issued by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King's College and a
debrief of UNTAET by the UN Institute for Training and Research. 68' Finally, for background
and information about specific reform efforts, I used a range of books, articles, and NGO reports.
III. Representative Institutions and Independence
UNTAET's effort to establish representative institutions in East Timor and bring the country to
independence was largely successful. UNTAET was criticized, however, for failing to transfer
authority soon enough to Timorese officials, for establishing overly centralized institutions, and
for failing to address the society's low level of development. Regardless, UNTAET largely
achieved its goals - East Timor had multi-party elections in August 2001 and officially declared
independence on May 20, 2002.
The theory both predicts the generally positive outcome and offers insight into the
limitations of the effort to establish representative institutions. While internal divisions within
the UN did lead to early disagreements about the planning process, once UNTAET deployed it
was largely unified in its demands because of its hierarchical structure and strong leadership.
Furthermore, UNTAET's goals did not threaten the fundamental nationalist goal of
independence or elites' informal networks. The theory therefore correctly predicts the
implementation of UNTAET's demands. However, UNTAET's tendency towards formal
bureaucratic processes and its failure to recognize existing Timorese authority led UNTAET to
be criticized for being autocratic and for creating an overly centralized government.
680 See for example Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor"; Bu Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors:
The Development of the East Timorese Police 1999-2009" (Australian National University, 2010); Jennifer
Drysdale, "Sustainable Development or Resource Cursed? An Exploration of Timor-Leste's Institutional Choices"
(Thesis (PhD), Australian National University, 2007).
681 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations"; Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons.
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This case study proceeds in six sections and in some regards provides context for the
subsequent reform efforts. The first section explains UNTAET's goals for building
representative institutions in East Timor and discusses the coding of key variables. The second
section discusses UNTAET's initial governance effort, from November 1999 to June 2000, and
outlines how growing criticism from local elites led UNTAET to begin to "Timorize" its
administration. The third section describes the period of the first East Timor Transitional
Administration (ETTA) and the development of a timeline for Timorese independence. The
fourth section examines the second ETTA and the drafting of the constitution. The fifth section
considers UNTAET's legacy and concludes.
Political Context and Goals
UNTAET's goals for the mission were only partially articulated in resolution 1272 and the
Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General's report explains that UNTAET "would need
to be responsible for the administration of the territory of East Timor during its transition to
independence," and that "it is envisioned that the process will take two to three years."68 2
However, the mandate and plan for the mission were largely adapted from UNMIK in Kosovo,
where the future status of the territory was uncertain. The planning documents therefore did not
clearly specify how UNTAET would transfer authority to the Timorese or bring the country to
independence. 83
Nevertheless, it is clear that UNTAET officials, especially Vieira de Mello, clearly
understood that their mission was to build an independent country with strong institutions. I
specify three relevant goals. First, UNTAET sought to effectively administer East Timor,
including fully controlling the territory, providing basic government services, and establishing
6 8 2 UN S/1999/1024, para 27.6 83 Vieira de Mello observed, "There was no instruction manual attached to the mandate." Quoted in Kingsbury
2009, 80.
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some level of the rule of law. 684 Second, UNTAET sought to bring East Timor to independence.
While UNTAET had no specific process in mind, it was clear that at a minimum, independence
would require a constitution and elections.685 Third, UNTAET sought to create institutions that
would endure after its departure and ensure a basic standard of governance, rights, and prosperity
in the future. Hence, the mission would not be considered successful unless East Timor could
provide a basic level of services to its citizens and become a responsible member of the
686international community after the conclusion of UNTAET.
Several accounts of the mission emphasize the extent of UNTAET's objectives. As
Vieira de Mello later observed, the mission was the UN's opportunity to "practice what it had
been preaching" in terms of democratization and state building.687 As James Traub writes in
Foreign Affairs, the mission would answer the question of whether the UN can "foster political
stability, economic development, and reliable and responsive democratic institutions" in post-
688conflict societies. UNTAET's success therefore hinged on its effectiveness in building stable
and just representative institutions.689
The East Timorese leaders were frustrated by UNTAET, but did not view UNTAET's
goals with respect to representative institutions as a threat to nationalist goals or informal
networks. East Timorese leaders had consulted with UN DPA and the World Bank for several
684 See UNSC resolution 1272 (1999), 2b.
685 The Secretary General's report specified to implement its mandate, UNTAET would have "To assist the East
Timorese in the development of a constitution; [and] To organize and conduct elections and build the institutional
capacity for electoral processes." UN S/1999/1024, para 29 e, f.
6 8 6 Resolution 1272 states that UNTAET's mandate is "to assist in the development of civil and social services; ...to
support capacity-building for self-government; to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development."
687 Power, Chasing the Flame, 303, 305.6 8 8 Traub "Inventing East Timor," 88.
689 Interviews with ex-UNTAET officials, and representatives from various local parties, Dili, August 2009 and
20 10. Vieira de Mello does write, "Clearly, we cannot succeed, in the time allotted us, with many of the tasks laid
out in resolution 1272 (1999) the creation of an effective administration; the development of civil and social
services; the establishment of conditions for sustainable development and so on." Rham-Azimi and Chang,
UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, 99.
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months and were surprised that the UN had created an international administration that would
rule directly. Samantha Power reports that Gusmao was "livid" about the extent of UN authority,
while Ramos-Horta observed, "Imagine a transition in South Africa, where Mandela wasn't
given the ultimate authority. Imagine if some UN official were given all the power and told it
was up to him whether he felt like consulting Mandela or not." 690 Nevertheless, the Timorese
leadership recognized that UNTAET's intention was to relatively quickly bring the country to
independence. UNTAET's efforts to build representative institutions therefore posed low threat
to nationalist goals. To be sure, the Timorese leadership would push for progress toward
independence and would sometimes outbid one another on criticizing UNTAET's autocratic
tendencies. However, as soon as Timorese elites were included in UNTAET's administration,
criticism of UNTAET rapidly diminished. Finally, the establishment of representative
institutions posed little threat to informal networks since UNTAET's reforms focused largely on
formal institutions. The institutions UNTAET sought to build would not impact Timorese
leaders' informal networks, since these networks could be incorporated into the new formal
institutions.
International unity about demands was high throughout the reform effort because of
UNTAET's unified structure and Vieira de Mello's leadership. Given UNTAET's unified
structure, the main source of disunity was between UNTAET and UN headquarters. While there
were complaints about UN headquarters' interference with the mission, especially on issues of
funding, there were few major political disagreements. Vieira de Mello had a long and
distinguished record within the UN and had extensive autonomy.691 Vieira de Mello was also the
690 Power, Chasing the Flame, 300-301; Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders," 15-16; Rham-Azimi and
Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, 28-29, 56-57, 105-109.
691 One DPKO official observes, "In my experience the relationship between UNTAET and Headquarters was the
most sensible and most productive of any of the Missions that I have been involved with. UNTAET and SRSG
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SRSG of UNTAET throughout the entire transition period, which gave him greater control.
Indeed, critics of UNTAET focused on the centralization of power rather than international
disunity.692
Given high unity, and a low threat to nationalist goals and informal networks, the theory
predicts successful implementation of the demands. The establishment of representative
institutions in East Timor would follow these predictions. The reform effort consisted of the
progressive establishment of new governing bodies that incrementally transferred increasing
authority to Timorese officials, eventually culminating with independence.
Initial Period
The UN Security Council passed resolution 1272, which established UNTAET, on October 25
1999. INTERFET, the Australian-led military intervention, had been deployed since September
20, and the situation in East Timor was rapidly evolving. Gusmao had returned to Dili on
October 21 and quickly began to give speeches emphasizing the achievement of
independence. 693 Vieira de Mello did not arrive until November 16 - a full two months after the
initial INTERFET intervention. During this time there was no official government, though in
reality Fretilin and traditional authority structures retained control and influence.
Vieira de Mello recognized the need to consult with Timorese elites and he met with
Gusmao soon after arriving. Vieira de Mello agreed with Gusmao that CNRT would be the UN's
main interlocutor, but insisted that the arrangement could not be publically acknowledged prior
to elections. Vieira de Mello shared DPKO's concern that supporting CNRT would be seen as
Vieira de Mello had enormous freedom of action." Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons,
229.6 9 2 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," 30-31. See also Gorjao, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor," 318.6 9 3 Gusmao stated, "They tried to kill us. But we are still here, crying and suffering but still alive. We will rebuild
our Homeland. Nothing can stop us." Sarah Niner, Xanana: Leader ofthe Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste
(North Melbourne, Vic.: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009), 210.
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favoritism for one particular faction, even though there was no coherent pro-autonomy political
establishment following the referendum.694
For the first weeks of the mission, there was limited political development, since
UNTAET was focused on restoring security and establishing its own organization.695 By early
December 1999, however, Vieira de Mello had established initial representative institutions
through regulations 1999/1 and 1999/2. These regulations specified UNTAET's demands for the
initial period: securing UNTAET's authority and maintaining a purely consultative role for
Timorese officials. Regulation 1999/1 established the legal framework for the rest of UNTAET's
tenure: "All legislative and executive authority with respect to East Timor, including the
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNTAET and is exercised by the Transitional
Administrator." Regulation 1999/1 also required any individual exercising public office in East
Timor to abide by a number of internationally recognized human rights treaties. Finally,
regulation 1999/1 specified the applicable law in East Timor. Indonesian law prior to October
1999 would apply, though laws that conflicted with the recognized human rights treaties would
be null and void.696 Regulation 1999/2 created the National Consultative Council (NCC), which
was initially envisioned as the main means of Timorese involvement in UNTAET's
administration.697 The NCC's entire function was advisory. The body had fifteen seats, including
four UNTAET officials, seven CNRT members (selected largely by Gusmao), three
representatives from pro-autonomy factions, and one representative from the Catholic Church.
694 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 294; Tansey, Regime-Building, 69-72.695 Gojao, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor," 318.
6 9 6 UNTAET Regulation 1999/1. All UNTAET regulations, daily briefing and press documents cited below are
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetN.htm (accessed April 21, 2012).
697 The NCC was "the primary mechanism through which the representatives of the people of East Timor shall
actively participate in the decision making process during the period of [UNTAET], and through which the views,
concerns, traditions and interests of the East Timorese people will be represented." UNTAET Regulation 1999/2,
para 1.2
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Timorese officials were generally unsatisfied with the NCC, especially with the advisory
role of the Council. Timorese officials' objections lead to a "crisis of legitimacy" for UNTAET -
local elites began to argue that the UN would never incorporate the Timorese into the
government and that the country would indefinitely continue as an UN autocracy.698 Despite
Timorese officials' criticism of UNTAET, the NCC approved all of UNTAET's proposed
legislation, indicating that their distrust of UNTAET was limited.699 Vieira de Mello's decision
to prioritize consultations with Gusmao also began to have political consequences. According to
interviewees, most decisions during the initial period were settled privately between Gusmao and
Vieira de Mello "over coffee."7 00 Fretilin, as well as NGO groups and Falintil members, began to
protest the NCC's limited membership, since they believed that representatives on the body were
close allies of Gusmao. However, UNTAET had intentionally limited the membership of the
NCC to facilitate rapid decision-making. 701 Finally, observers criticized other elements of
UNTAET's administration, including its difficulty recruiting staff at a sufficient rate, dispersing
money to the Timorese government, and failure to address unemployment. A public
disagreement between the World Bank and UNTAET over the Community Empowerment and
Local Governance Project also damaged UNTAET's reputation.7 02
UNTAET only began to address Timorese concerns about representation at the Tibar
703Conference in May 2000. Vieira de Mello proposed two options for "Timorization," a
698 Tansey, Regime-Building, 78-79.
699 Joel C Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor," NYUJournal of
International Law & Politics 33 (2000): 1120.
700 Interviews with Fretilin officials and former UNTAET officials, Dili, July 2009.
701 See Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1119-1121, 1124-1126; Gorjao, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor," 317-318; Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East
Timor," 187-188; Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor," 991; King's College, "A Review of Peace
Operations," para. 297.7 02 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," 30-31; Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1125-1126.
703 One Fretilin representative observed that they had pushed UNTAET for more representation for 6 to 7 months,
but that the Tibar conference was the first movement towards Timorese authority. Interview with Fretilin official,
Dili, July 2009.
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"technocratic" or "political" model. The technocratic model would involve gradually recruiting
Timorese officials into the UNTAET administration. The political model would involve the
creation of a "co-government" between UNTAET and the Timorese - a new, enlarged
consultative council would be established and Timorese officials would be appointed to ajoint
cabinet. Timorese officials accepted the political proposal. Timorese participants complained that
UNTAET took credit for the co-government plan "as though it was a UN initiative; but it was
what we had been asking for all along."704 It is notable that some UNTAET officials criticized
the increased participation of Timorese based on the argument that UNTAET's mandate was to
govern rather than to hand over authority.705
For the first six months of the mission, UNTAET was too absorbed in dealing with the
post-conflict crisis to plan for the later transition. After the Tibar conference, UNTAET began
rapidly transitioning to Timorese authority and moving the country towards independence.
Table 5.1. Chronology of key events
Event Date
"Popular Consultation" - referendum on East Timor's independence August 30, 1999
INTERFET enters country following violence September 20, 1999
UN resolution 1272 (1999) creates UNTAET October 25, 1999
SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello arrives November 16, 1999
National Consultative Council created December 2, 1999
Formation of 1" East Timor Transitional Administration July 14, 2000
Election of Constitutional Assembly (CA) August 30, 2001
Official Independence Ceremony May 20, 2002
The First East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA)
Following the Tibar Conference, UNTAET established the first East Timor Transitional
Administration on July 14, 2000, in which for the first time Timorese officials would participate
"as equal partners" in governing the country. Regulations 2000/23 and 2000/24 created the
704 Interviews with international and local officials. See UNTAET, "East Timor Update," May-June 2000,
(http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/untaetPU/ETupdateMGE.pdf, accessed February 29,
2012), 5; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 298-299.
705 Power, Chasing the Flame, 329-330.
285
Cabinet of the Transitional Government and the National Council, respectively. Although
Timorese officials would play an increased role, the SRSG retained full authority and both
bodies were still directly accountable to him. 7 06 The cabinet was comprised of four Timorese
officials and four international officials. Gusmao was largely able to choose the ministers and
selected two Fretilin members to join the cabinet.707 The National Council (NC) was composed
of 33 East Timorese representatives from a wide range of civil society groups. The NC would
become a "proto-parliament" with expanded powers to amend and initiate legislation, although
the SRSG still had final authority to overrule the NC.708
At this juncture, the CNRT began to splinter along the pre-war divisions between Fretilin
and Gusmao. Fretilin, led by Alkitiri, believed itself to be the rightful ruling party of East Timor
and was also the only political party with strong, countrywide local networks. Alkatiri became
increasingly frustrated with Gusmao's influence with Vieira de Mello and felt that Fretilin was
being ignored by UNTAET. Consequently in August 2000, claiming that it was acting "for the
sake of democracy," Fretilin formally withdrew from CNRT and began to campaign as an
independent party.709
In mid-2000, Vieira de Mello briefed the UN on the minimal requirements for East Timor
to achieve independence, and by late 2000 UNTAET accelerated the process towards
746 For a simplified organizational chart, see Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 190.
Gutuerres 190.
707 An UNTAET press release listed the new cabinet members, "The four international cabinet members are: Deputy
SRSG Jean-Christian Cady, responsible for the portfolio of Police and Emergency Services; Judge Gita Honwana-
Welch, responsible for Justice; Peter Galbraith responsible for Political Affairs and Michael Francino responsible for
Finance. The four Timorese cabinet members are: Judge Ana Pessoa, in charge of Internal Administration; Joao
Carrascaldo, responsible for Infrastructure; Father Filomeo Jacob, responsible for Social Affairs and Mari Alkatiri,
in charge of Economic Affairs." UNTAET Press Release, 17 July 2000. All UNTAET regulations, daily briefing
and press documents cited below are available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetN.htrn (accessed April 21, 2012). See also Tansey,
Regime-Building, 73-74.
708 See UNTAET Regulation 2000/24. Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1127-1128.
709 Interview with Fretilin advisor, Dili, July 2009. Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor,"
172.
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independence. UNTAET backed a short timeline for independence both to accelerate its own
exit, and based on the belief that Timorese officials should make the decisions about the country.
In December 2000, Gusmao, with the urging of Vieira de Mello, proposed the timeline for
independence to the NC. The timetable specified that there would first be an election of the
Constituent Assembly (CA), which would write the constitution, and then an election of a
parliament that would lead the country after independence. The elections of the CA were
scheduled to occur on August 30, 2001, the two-year anniversary of the "popular consultation."
The NC objected that there had been insufficient time to consider the timeline. Nevertheless,
under the threat of Gusmao's resignation, the NC approved the draft timeline. There were
substantial public negotiations of the timeline in January 2001. Church leaders opposed the
timeline, and the CA elections, since they feared that the Timorese voters would not understand
what they were voting for. Ramos-Horta agreed, arguing that there should be more time for
Timorese institutions to develop. Fretilin, however, believed that it would dominate elections and
supported the timeline."0 The UN proceeded to organize elections for the CA in August 2001, as
explained in the election reform effort below.
Despite the increased role of the Timorese in the government, the first ETTA was subject
to many of the same criticism of the NCC. Timorese officials remained unsatisfied with
UNTAET's continued authority. Gusmao's New Year's address, quoted at the beginning of the
chapter, demonstrates his frustration with the UN's continuing administration. Four of five
ministers within the Transitional Cabinet (Ramos-Horta did not agree) wrote in a letter to Vieira
de Mello, "We continue to be used as a justification for the delays and confusion in a process
which is outside our control. The East Timorese Cabinet members are caricatures of ministers in
710 See King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 300-304; Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1130-
1131; Randall Garrison, "The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization" (International IDEA,
2005), 11-12; Tansey, Regime-Building, 83-85.
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a government of a banana republic. They have no power, no duties, nor resources to function
adequately." 71' One account by Timorese participants noted that "The East Timorese started to
have a role, and some East Timorese became ministers... However, in terms of policy, the East
Timorese did not have any power. It turn out that sometimes the East Timorese only became
interpreters for the internationals."712 Fretilin and other parties also continued to protest
UNTAET's continued close relationship with Gusmao. One radical party, the CPD, criticized
Gusmao's "privileged position" and demanded immediate independence.713
Second ETTA and the Drafting of the Constitution
Fretilin was widely successfully in the CA election winning 55 of 88 seats. A second ETTA was
created, with a new cabinet based on the results of the elections and solely composed of
Timorese officials. Fretilin's success in the election meant that it dominated the new cabinet.
Under the second ETTA, Timorese officials were effectively in charge of the government,
although the SRSG retained final legal authority and certain key positions were reserved to
international officials.714
The key effort during this final period of UNTAET's administration was the drafting of
the constitution. Fretilin used its power to dominate the drafting process and develop a
constitution that would benefit Fretilin in two ways. First, Fretilin attempted to limit the extent of
public consultation about the constitution. In March 2001, Fretilin blocked a measure in NC
creating national and district constitutional commissions. In response, Gusmao resigned from the
NC and UNTAET overruled the NC's objections. Thirteen commissions were created, one for
711 Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1130; Tansey, Regime-Building, 81.7 12 Joao Saldhana and Marcelino Magno in Rham-Azini and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, 163.
71 Tansey, Regime-Building, 84.
7 14 InteIviews with local and international officials, Dili, July 2009. See also Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET:
Debriefing and Lessons, 90, 163; Tansey, Regime-Building, 91; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations,"
62-63.
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each district, and organized public hearings about the constitution. Nevertheless, Fretilin largely
ignored the report of the commissions.715
Second, Fretilin used its majority in the CA to draft a constitution that it believed would
favor its future electoral success and political control. Tansey writes, "Although five separate
draft constitutions were presented to the Assembly by five different parties, Fretilin's position
ensured that debate was soon centered on its own document." 716 Fretilin used a draft constitution
that was initially written in Melbourne in 1998 and was based in part on the Mozambique
constitution. The draft constitution gave the prime minister extensive powers, limited the ability
of the courts to check the parliament and the prime minister, and created a weak president. The
reason for these measures was that Fretilin believed that Gusmao would win the presidency
while Fretilin would continue to win a large share of votes in parliamentary elections. 7 Hence,
Fretilin wrote the constitution to secure its own power in the future, rather than to secure
democracy.
Gusmao, Bishop Belo,718 and a number of smaller political parties complained about the
constitution writing process and urged greater consultation with the communities. Fretilin did
agree to an additional consultation period of one week. The CA divided into thirteen groups to
consult with the districts and a report with 45 recommendations was submitted to the CA, of
which only four were accepted. On March 22, 2002, the constitution was then approved by a
vote of seventy-two in favor, fifteen against, and one absent. According to Regulation 2001/2,
715 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 317; Tansey, Regime-Building, 92-95.7 1 6 Tansey, Regime-Building, 94-95.7 17 "FRETILIN ... forced through constitutional measures by which the prime minister gained far more power than
the president, an office which was commensurately reduced to a ceremonial role. This action stemmed mainly from
the fierce political rivalries that were brewing between FRETILIN leaders and Xanana Gusmao." Guterres, "Elites
and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 200-205.
7 Belo was particularly concerned with two articles, "one explicitly adopting the separation of church and state and
the other mentioning divorce. Both of these references were removed." Garrison, "Constitution-Building Processes,"
20.
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sixty votes were required to approve the constitution, so the constitution was ratified.719
Following the ratification of the constitution, an election was held in April 2002 for the President
of East Timor. As expected, Gusmao won a clear majority of 87% against the only opponent,
Xavier do Amaral. East Timor formally gained independence on May 20, 2002.
While Regulation 2001/2 limited the CA's authority to drafting the constitution, in April
2002 the CA voted to transform itself into the new parliament.72 0 The decision required reducing
the size of the body, since the CA had 88 members while the parliament only had 65.
International officials who participated in the civic education program noted that they had clearly
instructed the voters that the CA's only purpose was to write the constitution and that a new
election would be held to select the first parliament. Interviews with representatives of different
parties revealed strikingly different interpretations of this event. Fretilin representatives
attributed the decision to UNTAET and argued that it would have been logistically infeasible to
have another election. An official in an opposing party argued that the decision to convert the
CA into the first parliament was fundamentally undemocratic and set a bad lesson that leaders
can "ignore rules and promises when convenient." He discounted the idea that UNTAET had
made the decision to abandon the additional election.72
719 Ibid.; Tansey, Regime-Building, 96. UNTAET Regulation 2001/2, para 2.2.
720 The King's College report explains, "The tight timetable also virtually excluded the possibility of a separate
UNTAET-supervised parliamentary election before independence. This as good as ensured that the Constituent
Assembly would become the post-independence Parliament, an outcome that Fretilin majority in the Constituent
Assembly endorsed." "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 304. Nevertheless, the voter education publicized to
the electorate that they were only electing a body to decide the constitution rather than to be the first parliament.
Guterres explains, "[In the view of the opposition parties], the transformation of the Constituent Assembly into a
national parliament without any referendum amounted to a severe manipulation of constitutional procedures that
unfairly advantaged FRETILIN. There had been no prior agreement that the CA should do anything more than write
a constitution." "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 204.
721 Interviews with Fretilin representative, local official, and former UNTAET officials, Dili, July 2009.
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Conclusions and Critiques of UNTAET
Table 5.2: Representative Institutions and Independence
Preferences Effective administration Create process leading to independence, Create conditions for
of East Timor including running elections and writing the effective governance after
constitution independence
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Initial Period UNTAET High Low Success: Confirmed:
Nov 1999- authority, Create NCC and largely Unity enables effective
June 2000 basic effective governance, but governance, though some
security, increasing criticism about problems from late planning.
Timorese in UN autocracy. Gusmao as Timorese public protest for
advisory main interlocutor legitimacy leads to greater
role role.
1" ETTA Approval of High Low Success: Confirmed:
June 2000 to timeline, run Pressure for timeline from Relationship between unity
Aug 2001 elections, Gusmao leads to and threat lead to Timorese
NC acceptance. UN priorities acceptance. UN bureaucratic
guide timeline. incentives evident.
2nd ETTA Write High Low Success: Confirmed:
Aug 2001- constitution, Fretilin wins elections Nationalist rhetoric in
May 2002 Transition to based on wartime role, campaigns, self-interested
Timorese takes over government, elites, use of informal
leadership writes constitution for networks to achieve goals.
own benefit. Gusmao as
weak President.
Independence Effective High Low Success: Confirmed:
governance Centralized government Local elites use centralized
without similar to UN UN government for their own
UNTAET administration benefit
By and large, UNTAET was successful at building representative institutions in East Timor.
UNTAET established its own authority, held elections, transferred power to Timorese elites, and
brought the country to independence. The theory largely explains the success of the reform
effort. UNTAET's demands aligned with nationalist objectives and did not threaten elites'
informal networks. Elites at times opposed UNTAET's administration based on nationalist
rhetoric, but in the end supported the reform process because they recognized that UNTAET
supported independence. Elites consistently manipulated the reform process to strengthen their
political strength in the future. Finally, intemational unity enabled UNTAET to establish
necessary conditions for achieving independence.
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Despite the relative success of the reform effort, several criticisms of UNTAET's efforts
on representative institutions do indicate the underlying limits of state building by international
administrations and question the technical perspective. First, several interviewees claimed the
government UNTAET created was inappropriately centralized. Following independence, the
structure of the East Timor government closely mirrored UNTAET's highly centralized and
bureaucratic structure. 2 The problem was that East Timor was relatively rural and had few
qualified officials to take over the many positions in the central government. Indeed, a
longstanding complaint about UNTAET was that it had paid too little to district administration.
Consequently, the UN's tendency towards bureaucratization and formal procedures had
produced a top-heavy government that was inappropriate for the target society.m
Second, the government after independence had limited bureaucratic capacity. This
critique, however, demonstrates UNTAET's bureaucratic objectives and some officials'
misunderstanding of Timorese society. One UN official extensively criticized ineffective
bureaucratic procedures in the Timorese government:
"office systems across government were generally not well developed... poor
management of the flow of paper in Ministerial offices worked against a whole-of-
government approach to decision-making and a capacity to track implementation of
decisions or to follow up action. While such systems are in themselves elementary, good
administration is dependent on effective information flow and management."
She also noted "the need to re-engineer a bureaucratic culture which, under the Indonesian
administration, was characterized by the acronym KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism)."7 24
Hence, from this perspective, informal processes were inappropriate and dangerous for East
Timor's development. East Timorese officials, however, were not able to take over a complex
722 One interviewee explained that the only difference with the structure of the government before and after
independence was that the former was in English and the later was Portuguese. Former UNTAET official, Dili, July
2009.
723 Interviews with international and local analysts, Dili, July 2009 and July 2010.7 2 4Rham-Azii and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, 89.
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Westem-style bureaucracy and did not share the UN's concern. The question is whether the
international community ought to insist on high standards of governance, or whether getting East
Timor to a regionally comparable level of governance should be instead be the objective.
Third, a central critique of UNTAET is that it was too slow to transfer authority to local
elites. This critique was offered both by local elites and by international officials. Indeed, Vieira
de Mello writes:
"We should have moved more briskly in bringing national partners on board from the
very beginning in a more truly substantive fashion. While our consultation (and desire to
do so) in these early days was genuine, our approach towards achieving that failed truly
to bring in the Timorese on all aspects of policy formulation and development. The
strategy we eventually developed and implemented (in short the two-phased devolution
of executive power through the First and Second Transitional Governments) was, I think,
the right one: we just had to feel our way, somewhat blindly, towards it, wasting several
months in doing so."725
The critics of UNTAET are probably correct that the mission was unnecessarily autocratic at its
outset.7 26 However, the critiques fail to recognize that in relatively short order UNTAET
acknowledged Timorese complaints. If UNTAET had too quickly handed over authority to
Timorese officials, no doubt UNTAET would have been criticized for too readily accepting poor
governance by yielding to Timorese officials.
Fourth, UNTAET failed to create Westem-style multiparty democracy. Jarat Chopra
writes, "The purpose [of UNTAET] was to rebuild the country and to take control politically to
break with the past. UNTAET did not take control in real political terms, however, and any kind
of transfer of authority has been to a party [Fretilin] that took power by itself during the
transition, replicating precisely what international administrations had been intended to solve."727
Indeed, the next reform effort, on elections, explains how Fretilin was able to protect itself from
721 Ibid., 19.
7 2 6 Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor"; Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight."
7 2 7 Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor," 996.
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challenge by the international community. Chopra is correct that the international community
could not create a fundamental political break from the past or to encourage the election of a
moderate party. This failure demonstrates the fundamental limitations of the international
community's ability to reform post-conflict societies, however, rather than some deficiency of
UNTAET.
IV. Elections under UNTAET
"The history of the Third World is repeating itself: the leader of the resistance will end up
as president, even if he is not up to the task; guerrilla commanders will be generals and
politicians will strive to become ministers. All because we were the heroes; all because
we worked hard, suffered more than others! If this were to happen, it would be an outrage
to the whole meaning of our struggle, the whole meaning of the sacrifices made by our
people. It would be a betrayal!"
-Xanana Gusmao, 1999 New Year Address728
Running elections was essential for transferring authority to Timorese representatives and
achieving independence. Some international officials within UNTAET, however, had
preferences beyond technically well-run elections - they sought to construct a democratic society
along Western lines. To pursue these this more ambitious goal UNTAET initially planned a voter
education effort almost entirely run by international officials. After a backlash from NGOs and
other Timorese elites, UNTAET backed down and adopted an education program that
incorporated Timorese officials and had less transformative goals. The elections were eventually
held in August 2001, and while the poll was declared to be free and fair, observers questioned
whether the elections were truly democratic. There was highly limited understanding of the
purpose of the election among the population and parties campaigned mainly on their role in the
struggle for independence. The subsequent presidential election was also ruled to be free and
fair. Xanana Gusmao, as was widely expected, won a large majority of the vote.
728 Quoted in Niner, Xanana, 219.
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The theory largely explains the outcome of the electoral reform. The initial UN civic
education program threated local elites' informal networks by potentially weakening their
connections with the voters. Even though the program probably would not have been effective,
Timorese officials blocked it. In the subsequent civic education programs and elections,
UNTAET focused on the technical administration of elections, which was largely successful
since it did not threaten the local elites' informal networks. The reform effort also supports
several theoretical assumptions - elites campaigned on their achievement of nationalist goals and
used informal networks to gather additional support and attack opponents.
The case study proceeds in five parts. The first part introduces the electoral reform and
codes the relevant variables. The second section explains the origins and failure of the initial
civic education program. The third section explains the conduct of the CA elections with a focus
on the campaign. The fourth section describes the presidential election. A fifth section concludes.
Origins ofthe Preferences for Electoral Institutions
Resolution 1272 and the Secretary-General's report did mention that UNTAET would need to
run elections, but provided little insight into the timing or purpose of the elections. Hence, while
it was clear that elections in East Timor would have to meet certain standards, there were few
other firm guidelines.
UNTAET would pursue two sets of goals with regard to elections. First, UNTAET
sought to conduct elections that were recognized as free and fair. As in other societies, elections
had to meet this standard to ensure the legitimacy of the new government. Second, UNTAET
hoped to establish a functioning democracy in East Timor. The precise nature of this goal was
unclear, although certain characteristics were in clear violation. In particular, campaigns that
focused on nationalist goals, personalism, clientalism, and so forth did not meet this goal.
295
International officials apparently hoped to create an electoral system composed of moderate
parties similar to that in Western countries.729 As in the previous reform effort, UNTAET was
unified because of its hierarchical structure and effective leadership.
The threat of international preferences to Timorese elites varied from a threat to informal
networks to low threat. Independence was effectively guaranteed by resolution 1272, by the
specification of the timeline towards independence, and by the mere existence of elections for a
body to write a constitution for an independent East Timor. However, there was a potential threat
to informal networks if the reform would weaken political parties' informal connections with the
electorate. By contrast, simply holding free and fair elections was not threatening to the parties,
since it would enable them to use their networks and gain power.
Initial Civic Education Program
In mid-2000, prior to the development of the specific timeline for elections and independence,
UN officials began work on a civic education program. Unlike voters in Bosnia and Kosovo, the
East Timorese had little experience with elections or democracy - indeed the August 1999
popular consultation was many voters' first election. UNTAET's initial civic education program
therefore sought to employ intemational officials throughout East Timor to broadly educate
voters about the meaning of democracy and human rights. The program had a budget of $7
million and included goals related to "political education, basic rights and democratic
elections, 7 30 International officials who participated in UNTAET claimed that the program was
poorly conceived. For example, the program included a large budget for posters and other printed
material despite the fact that much of the target audience was illiterate. Indeed, a survey
7 2 9 Interviews with international officials, Dili, July 2009, August 2010. See also Tanja Hohe, "'Totem Polls':
Indigenous Concepts and 'Free and Fair' Elections in East Timor," International Peacekeeping 9, no. 4 (2002): 69-
88; Chopra, "Building State Failure in East Timor," 996-7.
7 30 UNTAET Daily Briefing, 19 September 2000. All UNTAET regulations, daily briefing and press documents
cited below are available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetN.htm (accessed April
21, 2012).
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conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in March 2001, which was used to design
the later civic education that was actually deployed, observed, "While Tetum is widely used and
Indonesian widely understood, people feel most comfortable speaking their local languages,
many of which are not written languages. The oral transmission of civic education messages will
be very important." 731 One interviewee described the proposed civic education program as an
attempt to "proselytize democracy" and gave the program as an example of how intemational
officials did not understand the political context of East Timor.
The civic education program was not stopped because it was poorly designed, however.
Instead, the program was blocked by the opposition of the NGO Forum, a group of more than
400 NGOs, and by other local elites. The NGO Forum objected to UNTAET's lack of inclusions
of, and consultation with, Timorese officials. 3 For Timorese elites, the dominance of
international officials would not only have made the program ineffective and wasteful, but also
threatened elites' informal networks with their constituents. For example, voters might have been
taught to select candidates based on Western conceptions of democracy. Based on Timorese
objections, the program was delayed from its initial start in October 2000 and renegotiated. A
new civic education program was launched in March 2001, only five months before the elections
for the CA were to be held. Because of the delay, the subsequent program was criticized for
being too short to accomplish its goals. 734
7 3 National Democratic Institute, "'Timor Loro Sa'e Is Our Nation:' A Report on Focus Group Discussions in East
Timor," March 2001, (Available at http://www.ndi.org/node/12766 (accessed April 21, 2012)), 8.
732 Interviews with international officials, Dili, July 2001.
7 3 3 Beauvais, "Benevolent Despotism," 1132. Interviews with NGO Forum leader and former UNTAET officials,
Dili, July 2009.
7"4 Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight," 94-95; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 305, 319;
Curt Gabrielson, "The First Election: Nation Building in East Timor," Institute of Current World Affairs (November
1, 2001): 5.
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Conduct of the CA Election
In March 2001, UNTAET promulgated Regulation 2001/2 specifying the legal framework for
the CA election. As explained above, the CA was mandated to write the constitution. Eighty-
eight members would be elected to the CA - thirteen from each of the districts, and seventy-five
from the country at large. The UN had initially favored electing all members from the entirety of
the country, for the sake of maximizing participation from different political parties. Fretilin,
however, believed that it would receive at least a plurality of votes in many jurisdictions and
successfully lobbied for the inclusion of some type of majoritarian voting system in the
districts.7 m5 An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was created to oversee the election,
including registering parties, managing the voter list, supervising the campaigns, and
adjudicating any electoral irregularities. The activity of the IEC was widely commended by a
number of observers. Since many members of the NC, the parliamentary body of the first
Transitional Government, were also participating in the election, the body was dissolved in July
2001 as well. 36
Sixteen parties would register and contest the CA. Some Timorese leaders sought to
prevent parties that had campaigned against independence from being included in the election.
UNTAET sought to ensure the widest possible participation, so did not prevent parties that had
supported autonomy from registering, but did insist that all parties make written declarations
asserting their intention to proceed with independence. 3 CNRT, the umbrella group supporting
7 3 5 Tansey, Regime-Building, 86-7.73 6 Goldstone, "UNTAET with Hindsight," 94-95; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 305.
UNTAET Regulation 2001/2;
73" First, the parties agreed that they were running "for the purpose of nominating candidates for election to a
Constituent Assembly to prepare a constitution of an independent and democratic East Timor," rather than for
integration back into Indonesia. Second, all representatives agreed that they would "continuously reside in East
Timor for at least three (3) months prior to the date of the election, and that they are habitual residents of East Timor
as defined in an UNTAET Regulation on civil registration," which prevented militia members residing in West
Timor from participating. Regulation 2001/2, Section 22; Tansey, Regime-Building, 89-90.
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independence, was officially dissolved in June 2001. Gusmao, as the former leader of CNRT,
remained neutral in the CA election, though he traveled across the country and urged people to
participate peacefully in the election. Many parties that contested the election emerged out of
CNRT. Several parties that had initially been created in the 1970s were reformed, including
Fretilin and UDT. Several newer parties were also created, including Partido Democratico (PD),
which drew its support from a mixed group of intellectuals, resistance leaders, and participants in
clandestine youth networks; and Partido Social Democrata (PSD), which was formed as a new
centrist party by former UDT leader Mario Carrascalao and drew much of its support from
former civil servants.73 8
Analysts criticized the campaign on several grounds. First, many participants noted that
the Timorese electorate had little understanding of the purpose of the election. The concept of
electing an assembly to write a constitution was difficult to explain to a largely illiterate
population with little experience with democracy. Sarah Niner writes, "As the UN and NGOs
carried out civic education programs to familiarize people with new election processes one thing
became clear: people did not understand the reason for the election - many commented that they
had already voted for CNRT with Xanana as President during the 1999 ballot." 739
Second, observers were frustrated that parties campaigned largely on their role in the war
rather than on substantive policy issues. Their observations confirm the theory's expectations
that parties in post-civil war elections will campaign largely on the nationalist achievements
rather than by differentiating themselves on particular policy measures. Tanja Hohe demonstrates
this clearly in the case of the 2001 elections. She notes that "party programmes were a minor
7 3 Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 194-195; Hohe, "'Totem Polls'," 71-73;
Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste," 242.
7 3 9 Niner, Xanana, 220; Gabrielson, "The First Election," 5-7.
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aspect of the election campaign," and instead, "the historical resistance fight was a detailed and
elaborated feature of the campaign." For example, she writes,
"The PD started campaigns by calling up clandestine fighters onto the stage with their
code names. The PSD leaders described their personal connections to the resistance fight
and called out family members they had lost. The content of the Fretilin campaign was
virtually exclusively based on the independence movement. Fretilin went as far as
demanding that 'people should not vote for themselves but for the ones that fell in the
struggle'. This call was very powerful. Ancestral sanctions in case of human
misbehaviour are a dreaded fear amongst the population. Voting for a dead person
therefore becomes a duty!"7 4 0
Hohe's discussion of the campaign is part of a larger argument that the 2001 election was a
"totem poll... rooted in the manipulation of indigenous values, symbols and the history of the
resistance fight" rather than a true democratic election.741
Third, as Hohe demonstrates, the basic concept of multiparty democratic elections was in
some ways incompatible with traditional Timorese culture. Hohe notes that traditional leaders
gain legitimacy based on the approval of ritual authorities, who validate the leaders' ancestry.
Elections, which are based on popular approval rather than the existing hierarchical relationships,
do not convey the same legitimacy.74 Furthermore, political opposition had different content in
traditional Timorese society. Hohe explains that according to the preexisting local concept of
opposition, "Opposed elements must be in a hostile/violent relationship with one another or they
74 0 Hohe, "'Totem Polls'," 76. An election observer, Curt Gabrielson, writes, "I attended a rally for Fretilin in a
small village near Dili. The fiery speeches went on and on. Who bled for East Timor? Who died in the mountains for
24 years defending East Timor? Who will lead East Timor to a strong and proud future? FRETILIN! The main
thrust was clearly emotional, and not at all related to Fretilin's platform. Vague promises were made, different
speakers were called on to say approximately the same things, and the other parties, ASDT especially, were
slammed and slandered. These campaigners seemed to have been taking lessons directly from the politicians in the
United States. Meanwhile, ASDT pointed out on many occasions that Fretilin did not have a monopoly on dying for
the cause: over 200,000 East Timorese died in the occupation. Our neighbor Pedru is an avid ASDT supporter,
originally from Maubisse, and read me from an info sheet put out by ASDT. The party writer described do Amaral
as divinely chosen in addition to intelligent beyond the imagination, and put forth ASDT as the one tine path to an
independent East Timor." Gabrielson, "The First Election," 4.
741 Hohe, "'Totem Polls'," 70.
742 Hohe also notes that local elites attempted to explain democracy to the population "through the Tetum term bii
boot [big mat]. The reference was to woven grass mats that traditional elders sit on when they meet to discuss
problematic issues." Ibid., 78, 81-82.
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must be reconciled in a blood or marriage tie." Consequently, "If one hamlet supported Fretilin,
its enemy-neighbor hamlet had to join another party to reaffirm the conceptual dualism."
Interviews with analysts confirmed that particular hamlets had selected their political affiliation
based on traditional enmity rather than the particular platforms or leadership of the parties.
Finally, many Timorese perceived political unity as essential to lasting peace. Some Timorese
believed that political opposition would lead to violence, while others claimed, "we are all
Fretilin here, there is nothing else," to avoid violence. 74
Observers and analysts particularly criticized Fretilin for using its informal networks
during the campaign, as some of its tactics were clearly incompatible with international
conceptions of democracy and human rights. These tactics were connected with Fretilin's
overarching belief that it was the only legitimate party in the country. First, Fretilin effectively
threatened communities that did not select it. Anthony Smith explains,
"Fretilin spokespeople regularly talked of dasa rai (sweeping the ground clean)-a
phrase notoriously associated with the genocidal actions of the Indonesian army in the
1970s-in order to describe what the party planned to do to its opponents... The three
international electoral experts who made up the Independent Electoral Mediation Panel
issued a statement calling the use of dasa rai a 'disturbing form of apparent verbal
harassment.' Senior Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri then accused the panel of 'intellectual
dishonesty,' and charged that its real aim was to save the other parties from total defeat
and humiliation." 7 44
Second, one participant in the civic education program claimed that the Fretilin members of the
program used their position to campaign for Fretilin. Although these behaviors were against the
electoral rules, UN officials were reluctant to remove Timorese officials. 745 Third, Fretilin
designed its campaign to take advantage of local traditional culture. For example, Fretilin
officials referred to younger parties as "still breast-sucking," which according to Hohe
741 Ibid., 81-82.
744 Anthony Smith, "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation," Journal ofDemocracy 15, no..2 (2004):
151; Hohe, "'Totem Polls'," 77.
745 Interviews with former UNTAET official, Dili, July 2009 and August 2010.
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"emphasizes the connection to values of fertility and femaleness, the opposite of political
authority." 746
The election was held August 30, 2001. Given the absence of violence, the election was
widely held to be free and fair. While Fretilin did not meet its pre-election predictions of four-
fifths of the vote, it did win a clear majority of 57.4%. As discussed above, Fretilin's majority
enabled it to effective control the CA. The PD came in second place with only 8.7% of the vote.
Some interviewees claim that the relative success of Fretilin took UNTAET by surprise, and led
it to more extensively include Fretilin officials in the second Transitional Administration
cabinet.747
Presidential Election
Following the election of the CA and negotiation of the constitution, there was a subsequent
election for the President of East Timor. While Gusmao was widely viewed as the most popular
and likely candidate for president, he initially insisted that he was not interested in the office.
Nevertheless, given the encouragement from Vieira de Mello, Bishop Belo, and Ramos-Horta
among others, he agreed to run shortly before the CA elections in August 2001.748 According to
several accounts, Gusmao's only opponent in the election, Xavier do Amaral, ran only so that
there was a democratic alternative. While support for Gusmao was so widespread that the result
appeared largely predetermined, Fretilin nevertheless campaigned against Gusmao. Alkatiri
explained, "because of [Gusmao's] opposition to Fretilin, Gusmao could no longer claim to be a
national leader." Alkatiri stated that he would cast a blank ballot and urged Fretilin supporters to
7 4 6 Hohe, "'Totem Polls'," 77.
74 7 Ibid., 80; Smith, "East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation," 149. Interviews with international
officials, Fretilin officials, and local analysts, Dili, July-August 2009.
74 8Niner, Xanana, 218-219.
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do the same or vote for Amaral. 749Nevertheless, Gusmao was elected with 82.7% of the vote in
April 2001. The elections went quite smoothly and were certified as free and fair. Power writes
that Vieira de Mello told his head of elections, "Thank you for the most boring elections of my
life."750
Conclusions
Table 5.3: Electoral Reform
Preferences Free and fair elections Achievement of human rights
Phase of reform Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
Initial civic Teach High Informal Failure: Partially Confirmed:
education program democracy networks UNTAET creates Desire for human rights leads
Mid 2000-March and human wasteful program to demands threatening to
2001 rights; dominated by local elites. Reform blocked
preparation international officials in part because of threat to
for CA with vague content. informal networks and in part
elections NGO Forum objects, because of too little
forcing UNTAET to consultation with Timorese
change program. officials
CA Campaign and Civic High Low Success: Confirmed:
Election March education Campaigns focus on Weakened international
2001-August 2001 program, nationalist goals. demands focus on technical
party Fretilin threatens elections. Parties' activities
registration, voters, manipulates accord with theory
free and fair traditional culture, and
elections focuses on wartime
achievements. Wins
elections.
Presidential Elect High Low Success: Confirmed:
Election president Gusmao wins, Fretilin Unity enables free and fair
January-April 2002 opposes Gusmao. elections
Uneventful elections.
The electoral reform effort was a partial success and largely confirms the theory's predictions.
UNTAET was initially driven by its belief in human rights to select an inappropriate civic
education program that was heavily opposed by local elites. During the campaign for the CA,
parties largely referenced their association with nationalist goals and used their connection with
informal networks to gain votes. Although Fretilin did not completely dominate the election, it
749 Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste," 243; Guterres, "Elites and Prospects of Democracy in East Timor," 196-198.0 Power, Chasing the Flame, 336; Shoesmith, "Timor-Leste," 243.
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won a sufficient majority of the votes to enable it to control the CA and the constitution-writing
process. Both the CA and the presidential elections were technically sound and were ruled free
and fair. UNTAET was not to implement its broader goals of building Western-style democracy
in East Timor.
The election reform is also a striking example of the need for careful and independent
research on post-conflict state building. Much of the literature on the CA election, especially
documents written by international organizations, ignores the limitations of the electoral reform.
The report by UNTAET's Office of Public Information, for example, states,
"The election results - a large but not sweeping victory for Fretilin and a respectable
showing by a handful of other parties - attest to the informed basis on which people
voted. An overwhelming victory by Fretilin would have signaled that the electorate voted
out of blind loyalty and had little knowledge of other viable options. The results suggest
the opposite, an informed voter population that was well aware of its options., 7 5
This account does not reflect the actual meaning of the election within Timorese society.
Furthermore, accounts of the civic education program obscure the program's limitations.m
Finally, the electoral reform demonstrates the difficulty of building democracy in post-
conflict societies. It is likely that no matter what UNTAET did, the democratic standards of the
elections would have limited. UNTAET could not dramatically alter the political culture of East
Timor or compel Fretilin and other parties not to reference the war. UNTAET was almost
inevitably subject to criticism for failing to achieve its objectives in the electoral arena.
7 5 1 UNTAET Office of Communication and Public Information, "East Timor Constituent Assembly Elections 30
August 2001: Public Information Strategies and Activities," Dili, October 2001, (available at
www.un.org/peace/etimor/electionreport.pdf (accessed March 8, 2012)), 8.
752 The official UN debriefing, for example, explains, "The success of the elections showed the East Timorese that
the vote could be both secret and safe. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) played a critical role in both voter
education and voter turnout, as well as in the overall preparation and conduct of the electoral operations. The low
rate of invalid votes reflected the political maturity of the people and, in the end, the success of voter education
programs. It was highlighted however, that at the initial stages, voter education and communication of information
to the districts/rural areas could have been better. For instance, during the elections for a Constituent Assembly,
polls revealed that some people though they were actually electing a President, although this too was eventually
corrected through voter education efforts." Rham-Azimi and Chang, UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, xxxii.
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V. Military Reform by UNTAET and Successor Missions
The UN sought to build a defense force in East Timor in order to help maintain peace and
security. Their effort was only partially successful. UNTAET had initially intended not to create
a military in East Timor. However, due to strong nationalist support for Falintil, the armed group
that had fought East Timor's independence, UNTAET agreed to create a new military recruited
largely from Falintil veterans. However, strong informal networks led to politicized recruitment,
weak civilian oversight, and neglect. The result was a military that was not ruled by law and
contributed to violence in 2006.
The theory partially explains the trajectory of the reform effort. The presence of wartime
informal networks explains many of the major problems in the military, including the friction
between the military and veterans' groups, the choice of weak leadership in the defense ministry,
and the development of tensions between soldiers from the east and west part of the country.
Indeed, the threat of the reform to informal networks most directly led to the weakness of the
military and eventually contributed to the outbreak of violence in 2006. International unity,
however, was less influential in the reform effort. Inattention and poor decision-making on the
part of the international organizations, rather than disunity, contributed to the limited success of
the reform effort.
This section proceeds in four parts. The first part describes the status quo with regards to
Falintil in 1999, the development of the international preferences and plan for F-FDTL, and
codes the relevant variables. The second part describes the initial creation of the F-FDTL,
recruitment of ex-Falintil members, and the accompanying security problems. The third part
describes the largely unsuccessful efforts by successor missions to UNTAET to develop the F-
FDTL. The fourth part concludes.
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Status Quo and Plan for F-FDTL
Falintil was a highly politicized organization in East Timor. Its history from the civil war played
a major role in the trajectory of its development in the post-war period. Falintil was initially
founded in August 1975 as the armed wing of Fretilin, and fought in the bloody civil war that
immediately preceded Indonesia's invasion. Although Falintil for a time put up effective
resistance against the Indonesian forces, by 1981 the organization was largely decimated.
Xanana Gusmao took command of Falintil and significantly altered its political orientation.
Several leaders, Commanders Mauk Moruk, Ologari Aswain, and Kilik Wai Gai opposed
Gusmao's leadership and decision-making, especially his attempt to negotiate a cease-fire with
Indonesia in 1983. These individuals apparently attempted to lead a revolt of Falintil against
Gusmao, but the effort failed. While these individuals either surrendered to Indonesia,
disappeared, or were killed, their followers retained influential followings in East Timor,
especially Mauk Moruk's younger brother, known as L-7.75 In 1987, Gusmao delinked Falintil
from Fretilin and began a "policy of resistance based on upon National Unity, rather than
founded simply upon Fretilin partisanship."754 Falintil would become the "true 'military arm of
the Maubere People' and not just the guerrillas of Fretilin." 7" Gusmao recognized that Fretilin
was distrusted because of its Marxist ideology and sought to create a wider basis for the
resistance movement. However, many Fretilin members, including future Minister of Interior
Rogerio Lobato, believed in the Marxist orientation of the party and they did not want to
abandon leadership of the pro-independence movement.7 s6 Gusmao and his close associates,
including his Deputy Commander Taur Matan Ruak, took over command of Falintil. In 1992,
7" Edward Rees, "Under Pressure: FALINTIL-Forgas De Defesa De Timor Leste Three Decades of Defence Force
Development in Timor Leste 1975-2004" (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, April 2004),
42-43.
7"4 Ibid., 40.
7"5 Niner, Xanana, 111.
756bid., 111-119.
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Gusmao was arrested and imprisoned in Jakarta but remained the political leader of the
resistance. At this point, Ruak took effective command of Falintil, although "Falintil had been
reduced to a mere 150 men and some 60 weapons."75 7
During the run up to the May 1999 "popular consultation," the Indonesian military was
heavily opposed to Timorese independence. The Indonesian military armed pro-autonomy
militias, though these militias retained no official association with the Indonesian military.
UNAMET recognized the threat that the militias posed and demanded that they be disarmed.
However, the Indonesian military stated that it would not take action to disarm the pro-autonomy
militias until Falintil had been disarmed. Gusmao then agreed to the voluntary and unilateral
cantonment of Falintil and by August 12, Ian Martin, the commander of UNAMET writes,
"Falintil achieved their final cantonment, declaring to the visiting MLOs [UNAMET military
liaison officers] a disposition of 260 guerrillas at Uai Mori [Viqueque district], 70 at Atalari
(Baucau), 153 at Poetete (Emera), and 87 at Aissa (Bobonaro)." 758 While the Indonesian military
did subsequently disarm some pro-autonomy militias, the militias remained well armed and
would go on to perpetrate major violence after the referendum. 759
Once the violence began, Falintil's ranks swelled to approximately 1500 to 2000, and
there was increasing pressure to fight the pro-autonomy militias. However, Gusmao insisted that
Falintil not engage the militias, based on the theory that the Indonesian military was encouraging
the militias to engage in violence in order to provoke a Falintil response that would create the
illusion of a civil war rather than solely pro-autonomy militia-provoked violence. Observers
7 5 7 Rees, "Under Pressure," 44; Dunn, East Timor, 336-337.
758 Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 72-73.
759 On the role of the militias and their relationship with the Indonesian military, see especially Dunn, East Timor,
342-353.
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were generally impressed at Falintil's discipline during the entire crisis. Once INTERFET
arrived, Falintil moved all of its personnel to a central cantonment at Aileu. Caroline Hughes
writes, "INTERFET's rules of engagement called for the 'disarming of armed elements,' which
they interpreted to include FALINTIL." Consequently, INTERFET treated Falintil as just
another armed group, even though Falintil had fought for independence and had wide support
among East Timorese. Falintil insisted on remaining armed within its cantonment, which
INTERFET eventually accepted.76'
On UNTAET's arrival, there was little clear idea of what to do about Falintil. UNTAET's
only clear preference at the beginning of its mission was to avoid violence. Because of the
dispute within UN headquarters, UNTAET had been rapidly planned and its leadership had
limited understanding of Falintil's role in East Timor, and remained suspicious of the
organization. 762 The Secretary-General's report urged UNTAET to pursue disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), but did not specifically mention Falintil. While
UNTAET recognized that the pro-Indonesia militias posed the main threat, it was also concerned
with the possibility of Falintil leaving its cantonment and provoking violence.763 Initially, as
explained below, UNTAET sought to disband Falintil and not create Timorese military, but later
in the mission the international community clearly expressed preferences for the creation a new
Timorese military force out of Falintil, and for the new military to abide by the constraints of
law. UNTAET was a hierarchically organized mission, under the clear leadership of Vieira de
Mello, so was relatively unified about its demands.
7 6 0 Michael Geoffrey Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 48-49; Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor, 97.
761 Hughes, Dependent Communities, 114-115.
762 Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders"; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 47-49.
763 UN S/1999/1024, para. 75.
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The key nationalist goal, independence, was largely assured. UNTAET's initial plan to
avoid creating a military did provoke some concern among Timorese elites, however. Falintil
had long fought for independence, and had strong support among the Timorese population. Any
attempt to disband the organization would provoke significant public opposition. One Timorese
interviewee observed that while it might be objectively preferable not to have military, Falintil's
importance in fighting for independence meant that it would have been politically infeasible to
disband the organization.764
Once UNTAET decided to create a military out of Falintil, the potential threat to
nationalist goals was eliminated. However, the specific nature of the creation of the military
posed an almost inevitable threat to informal networks. There remained major intemal divisions
within Falintil relating to the disagreement in the 1980s between Gusmao and the factions of
Falintil who preferred to retain a strong connection with Fretilin. According to Edward Rees,
Falintil's main commanders in 1999 were "Gusmao loyalists," and the effective commander of
Falintil, Taur Matan Ruak was a long-time associate of Gusmao. Gusmao's allies would end up
selecting many of the recruits for the new military, as explained below, which ensured that F-
FDTL retained linked to Gusmao. However, other Falintil veterans opposed Gusmao and
retained separate associations with other Timorese leaders. The limited selection of veterans for
F-FDTL meant there were a large number of individuals who believed they deserved ajob in the
government for the role in the fight for independence. The creation of the military was highly
politicized, and inevitably had consequences for the informal political networks of Fretilin,
Gusmao, and other Timorese elites.76s Furthermore, any effort to limit elite control over the
7" See especially Rees, "Under Pressure," 1-5. See also Hughes, Dependent Communities, 115; Power, Chasing the
Flame, 311. Interviews with Timorese and international officials, Dili, July 2009 and 2010.
765 The development of the informal networks are explained in more detail below. See especially Rees, "Under
Pressure," 44-55.
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military by instituting the rule of law would provide an additional threat to elites' freedom of
action.
Given high unity and a threat to informal networks, the theory predicts partial success.
Indeed, UNTAET would be able to create a military, but the existing informal networks would
weaken the development of the institution.
Cantonment ofFalintil under UNTAET and Formulation ofPlan for F-FDTL
Initially, UNTAET sought to maintain peace and security by disbanding Falintil. Power writes
that Vieira de Mello believed that supporting Falintil would intimate pro-autonomy voters.
Indeed, CNRT's policy up until 1999 had been that Falintil would cease to exist once
independence had been achieved. UNTAET's desire to disband the organization also stemmed it
part for its general suspicion of armed rebel groups and lack of knowledge about Falintil's
history. In several incidents, armed members of Falintil left their cantonment, which provoked
incidents with UN and Australian peacekeepers.766
Though Timorese leaders at first considered the not having a military, for nationalist and
external security reasons, they eventually insisted that a new military be created and recruited out
of Falintil.767 Local elites particularly cited the historic role of Falintil and the need to combat the
militia incursions from West Timor. One interviewee observed that Falintil saw themselves, and
were seen by the rest of the country, as "custodians of independence." In his speeches, Gusmao
766 Power, Chasing the Flame, 311-2; Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 80-81; Hughes, Dependent
Communities, 114-115.767 The Report of the Secretary-General on July 26, 2000 (S/2000/738, para 58) explains, "It was not originally
envisaged that East Timor would have armed forces, except for security personnel associated with the police.
Initially, CNRT supported this view, bearing in mind the country's limited resources. CNRT has changed its
position and now advocates the establishment of a national security force, initially based on members of FALINTIL.
East Timor will, of course, be free to decide this matter after independence. However, CNRT leaders regard the
establishment of such a force as a necessary element in the transition to independence so that East Timor is able to
guard its borders when UNTAET leaves."
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emphasized the role of Falintil in the struggle for independence and complained that they should
not be "encaged like chickens."768
UNTAET was also driven to take action because of the increasingly volatile situation in
the Aileu cantonment. Gusmao loyalists and other factions of Falintil had never been in close
quarters for an extended period of time. The conflict between the factions was exacerbated by the
very poor living conditions within the camp. Donor organizations were prohibited from
providing support to Falintil because of rules preventing support for armed organizations.
Hughes writes, "FALINTIL soldiers went hungry and malaria and tuberculosis became rife in the
camp. 769Due to the political rivalry and poor conditions, approximately 700 Falintil veterans
left the cantonment, including L-7 and his men,7 70 and by June 2000, Gusmao stated that Falintil
was "almost in a state of revolt."77 '
It was at this point that UNTAET developed a plan for the creation of the new defense
force. UNTAET and CNRT requested King's College, London to conduct a review of options for
the creation of a new military. In November 2000, UNTAET and CNRT approved of a plan to
create a military with 1500 active duty soldiers and 1500 reservists. This plan was selected
largely because it was the most affordable. 2 650 members of "older but none the less physically
fit Falintil with exemplary records" would be selected to join the first battalion of the new force.
The remainder of the Falintil veterans would be demobilized and reintegrated into the society
768 Power, Chasing the Flame, 311; Hughes, Dependent Communities, 115. Interview with UN official, Dili, August
2010.
769 Hughes, Dependent Communities, 115-116.
7 7 0 Elle Sette (L-7), born Cornelio Gama, was purged from Falintil after his brother joined a coup attempt against
Gusmao in the 1984. Elle Sette went on to form "a cult-like organization, Sagrada Familia," based around Baucau.
ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," Asia Report N*120, 10 October 2006, 3.
771 Rees, "Under Pressure," 44-47; Desmond Ball, "The Defence of East Timor: A Recipe For Disaster?," Pacifica
Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 14, no. 3 (2002): 176.
77 Ball, "The Defence of East Timor," 177-179.
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through the Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP). 3 An independent Office of
Defence Force Development (ODFD) was established to help build the new force. The ODFD
was led by Roque Rodrigues and staffed by internationally funded and appointed military and
civilian defense experts. 7 4
Creation of F-FDTL
UNTAET issued Regulation 2001/1 on January 31, 2001, which created a new defense force and
specified its mandate. UNTAET thereby made two new demands for defense reform - the
creation of a defense force and its obedience to law. Regulation 2001/1 specifies "The mission of
the Defence Force consists of: providing for the military defence of East Timor, its people and its
territory; and providing assistance to the civilian community at the request of the civilian
authorities during natural disasters and other emergencies." The regulation also proscribes the
defense force from "matters linked to internal public order, police issues or social conflicts,"
except in times or "war or defense emergency."775
On February 1, 2001, a ceremony was held in which Falintil was officially disbanded and
the F-FDTL was officially created. The recruitment process for the F-FDTL had begun in
November 2000 and had largely been completed prior to February 2001. Rees describes the
process of the creation of F-FDTL in detail and emphasizes the role of informal networks in the
creation of the new military. Falintil had never been formally organized, and there were many
individuals who claimed to be members of Falintil even though they had not served in many
years. He notes that the senior leaders of Falintil had secured the authority to determine who
would be permitted to join the F-FDTL "in exchange for their cooperation in retiring the
"7 The FRAP was funded by the World Bank, USAID, and Japan and run by IOM. Rees, "Under Pressure," 12-13,
47; Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 81.
"74 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 61; Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 77.
7 7 UNTAET Regulation 2001/1, Sections 2 and 16.
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majority of FALINTIL." He claims that Gusmao loyalists within Falintil therefore dominated the
selection process, and excluded Fretilin leadership and their supporters. In particular,
"The Falintil Commanders who were admitted to the F-FDTL form a cadre of GusmAo
and Taur Matan Ruak loyalists. These Commanders hold a highly personalized sense of
allegiance to Gusmao, their former Commander, and President of the republic. Of those
FALINTIL, commanders and otherwise, who were excluded from F-FDTL there is a
sizable minority who have an acrimonious relationship with Gusmao and the F-FDTL
High Command. Many of these individuals find a political home both historically, and
recently, with elements of FRETILIN."
Consequently, UNTAET's decision to choose Gusmao its key interlocutor resulted in the
selection of a defense force with strong ties to Gusmao.7 76
Given the high unemployment in the rest of the country, former Falintil members who
were not recruited into the F-FDTL were in a particularly difficult situation. The FRAP was
intended to provide support for these individuals, but the identification of recipients of the
program was politicized in much the same way as the recruitment to F-FDTL.77 7 Rogerio Lobato,
the first Falintil commander, attempted to use this situation to his advantage by creating a power
base of resentful veterans. During the CA election campaign, Lobato claimed that Fretilin would
develop "a new concept" for the defense force that would help the disgruntled veterans. Lobato
also created the Association of Ex-Combatants 1975 (AC75), which competed with other
veterans' organizations that had ties to Gusmao. The AC75 had links with informal armed
"political security groups," such as the L-7's Sagrada Familia and the CPD-RDTL. Rees writes,
"While most [political security groups are] politically oriented, others have more criminal
motivations. They rapidly became focal points for anti-UN, anti-UNPOL and anti-F-FDTL
776 Rees, "Under Pressure," 47-49.
777 Ibid., 48; Ludovic Hood, "Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004," International Peacekeeping 13,
no. 1 (2006): 72.
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rhetoric and political activism." Rees emphasizes that these groups did not find political
representation with the mainline Fretilin leadership, including Mari Alkatiri and Lu Olo. 7 78
Timorese elites' informal networks also weakened governance at the cabinet level.
Rogerio Lobato sought to join the Fretilin government formed after the CA election, but was
rebuffed. Lobato then began to organize greater numbers of alleged Falintil veterans. Marches in
May 2002 "were a thinly veiled threat by Lobato that he could mobilise large numbers of men if
he was not given a share of political power." 779 The Fretilin government decided Lobato "was a
lesser threat inside the government than outside of it" and made Lobato the Minister of Internal
Administration with control over local government and the PNTL. 7 80 The head of the ODFD,
Roque Rodrigues, an early Fretilin member who had fallen out with Lobato while in exile 78 1 was
selected as Secretary of State for Defense. Aside from international observers, Rodrigues was the
only civilian charged with overseeing the F-FDTL and initially had no staff or resources."
The development of the defense force under UNTAET achieved the basic international
objectives. Peace and security was maintained and a new defense force was created. Prior to
independence, training began for the approximately 600 members of the F-FDTL recruited from
Falintil. F-FDTL also began to recruit individuals less than 21 years of age. The broader effort to
ensure that the new force abided by the constitution remained uncertain, and the international
community remained concerned about the development of security institutions. Hence, after East
7 7 8 Rees, "Under Pressure," 50. ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 4-5. On the political security groups see
especially James Scambary, "Anatomy of a Conflict: The 2006-2007 Communal Violence in East Timor," Conflict,
Security & Development 9, no. 2 (2009): 267-270.
7 7 9 Rees, "Under Pressure," 50-51.
780 ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 5.781 Niner, Xanana, 28. Rees call Rodrigues "an old political sparring partner" of Lobato and writes "Lobato and
Rodrigues were both on a mission seeking foreign assistance/recognition when Indonesia invaded Timor Leste in
December 1975. [They] lived in exile in Mozambique and Angola during the Indonesian occupation of Timor Leste
and fell out subsequent to Lobato's 1983 conviction for diamond smuggling in southern Africa." "Under Pressure,"
51.7 82 Rees, "Under Pressure," 11, 51.
314
Timor achieved independence on May 20, 2002, the UN gave UNTAET's successor mission, the
UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET), a strong mandate for continuing to reform
the defense force.783
Development of F-FDTL After Independence
UNMISET was mandated to provide external defense, reform the F-FDTL, and gradually
transfer responsibility over external defense to the F-FDTL. The UN remained concerned about
militia attacks from West Timor, but believed that the risk of militia incursions would gradually
diminish. The peacekeeping force would gradually downsize from 8950 in May 2002, to 2780 in
July 2003, with a complete withdrawal of peacekeepers by June 2004.78
The ODFD, which had run all aspects of the creation of the defense force under
UNTAET, continued to provide technical assistance after independence. Even though the ODFD
was quasi-independent, it had closely coordinated with UNTAET and had the support of the
SRSG. ODFD had uncertain status under UNMISET, however, and "ODFD officers were forced
(despite donor support for their cause) to spend considerable time negotiating with the
UNMISET political leadership and civilian bureaucracy to secure basic office support such as
telephone lines and access to the UN hospital."78 5 However, ODFD's ability to support the
development of defense policy and civilian oversight was limited.
There were several major problems in the development of the F-FDTL from 2002 to
2006, which together contributed to the violence in 2006. The first problem was the tendency by
the F-FDTL to illegally become involved in internal security problems. Interviewees described
the F-FDTL's perspective as similar to the militaries of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian
78 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 82; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 63-64.
S/2002/432, para 23-25.
784 See Secretary-General's report of April 17, 2002, S/2002/432, para 87-95.
785 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 71; Rees, "Under Pressure," 13-14.
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countries - the F-FDTL saw themselves as a more competent version of the police. The
constitution, however, specified that the police would be responsible for internal security while
the military would be responsible for external defense and "shall not intervene in political
matters." 86 Despite these legal constraints, there was generally strong public support for the F-
FDTL playing some role in public security.787
The second problem was the weakness of civilian oversight. UNTAET had no formal
oversight over the nascent F-FDTL and did not train Timorese civil servants in administering the
defense force. Rodrigues had no staff and, according to interviewee, was "incompetent and
dangerous" due to his failure to address simple complaints by F-FDTL soldiers related to issues
such as leave, housing, and food. Furthermore, Ludovic Hood writes that "The National
Parliament's Committee B for National Security and Defence was, and continues to be, ill-
prepared and powerless to effectively monitor the security sector, given not only the governing
[Fretilin] party's commanding majority in the legislature, but also the MPs' and secretariat's
inexperience in security sector oversight."78 8
Related to the problems of civilian oversight and tendency to undertake internal security
functions, the F-FDTL had very weak defense policy planning. The basic mission of the
organization was underspecified and had little to do with where the F-FDTL was stationed or
what the soldiers did. Following the constitution, the F-FDTL was supposed to be responsible for
external defense. However, the organization was not stationed, trained, or prepared to assume
this mission. Most prominently, the main external security threat came from militia incursions
786 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Section 146-148. See also Rees, "Under Pressure," 6-11.
787 One farmer from Bobonaro observed, for example, "In my opinion the main task of F-FDTL is to provide
security for the people East Timor from the Eastern to Western end of the country, apart from helping the people
when they are in trouble. F-FDTL should be responsible to counter internal and external threats. External defense to
defend against foreign threats - aimed at disturbing the nation's stability, while internally they have to be alert of
potential enemies lurking among the people, and this demands cooperation with CIVPOL." Ibid., 15-16.7 88 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 72-73; Rees, "Under Pressure," 11-12, 57-58, 62-64. Interview with
international official, Dili, August 2010.
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from West Timor. The F-FDTL, however, was not stationed in a position where it could
adequately respond to the threat, since the entire force was based in the east of the country. 89
While the international community, especially Australia, sought to strengthen the F-FDTL and
enable them to take over security, Australia was also concerned that stationing F-FDTL along the
border would increase the possibility of conflict between Indonesia and East Timor.790
The problems of the unclear F-FDTL mission and its inability to address internal security
were demonstrated in an incident in 2003. Following riots in December 2002, F-FDTL began to
assert its role in internal security. In January 2003, an attack in Atsabe (Emerra district) led the
F-FDTL to deploy. The attack appeared to be linked to the Colimau 2000 militia, which included
a diverse range of "Falintil veterans, poor rural farmers and youth."79' The F-FDTL's conduct
called into question the competency and effectiveness of the organization. Somewhere between
59 and 90 people were arrested and held without charges, and all but three were later freed.
International analysts, including Amnesty International, criticized the behavior of the F-FDTL
especially with regard to its lack of respect for the rule of law. The failure of the F-FDTL to
respond effectively to the militia led to the creation of the Police Reserve Unit (URP) within the
PNTL.792
The third problem was the antipathy between the factions of the security forces, which
was often connected to overarching political divisions. The first such division was between the
789 From 2002 to early 2006, the First Battallion, which was composed of ex-Falintil members, was stationed in the
far eastern province of Lautem. In early 2006, the First Batallion moved to its new base in near Baucau, which is
still in the eastern part of the island. The Second Battalion, composed of newly recruited soldiers, is based in
Metinaro, which while more centrally located, is still far from the Indonesian border. Rees, "Under Pressure," 29-
32.
79 Rees explains that Australia's overriding interest in avoiding conflict between East Timor and Indonesia lead it to
oppose stationing the F-FDTL on the border, although Australia is also the largest trainer and funder of the F-FDTL.
Ibid., 59-61.
791 Scambary, "Anatomy of a Conflict," 270.
7 92 Rees, "Under Pressure," 20-21; Scambary, "Anatomy of a Conflict," 270. ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's
Crisis," 6ffn26. "Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste"
(hereafter Report of Commission of Inquiry), Geneva, 2 October 2006, para 29.
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F-FDTL and the PNTL. Among many Timorese, especially those who fought in Falintil, the F-
FDTL was perceived as the defenders of freedom while the PNTL were collaborators with the
Indonesian authorities. Although only a relatively small number of PNTL officers were recruited
from the Indonesian police, the POLRI, as the next case study explains, the PNTL remained
linked with the POLRI in minds of many East Timorese.793
The second division was between the F-FDTL and other veterans' organizations. There
were demonstrations associated with "fringe Fretilin veterans groups" in opposition to the F-
FDTL in August, November, and December 2002. Note that these groups were also anti-PNTL,
although their nominal leader, Lobato, was the head of the ministry that supervised the PNTL.794
The third division was between the "easterners" and "westerners" within the F-FDTL.
Opposition to Indonesian rule and support for Fretilin was greatest in the eastern part of the
country. F-FDTL disproportionately recruited ex-Falintil members from the eastern part of the
country, especially with respect to the officer corps. In 2001, easterners were 56% of F-FDTL as
a whole, compared with 85% of the officer corps. Many newer recruits were from the western
part of East Timor. Following the 2006 violence, many analysts argued that the differences
between eastemers (lorosae or Firaku) and westerners (loromonu or Kaladi) had become an
effectively ethnic cleavage that led to violence. 9 Some attributed major political significance to
the division and claimed the cleavage was a "major impediment to the potential for creating a
793 Interviews with Fretilin MP and advisor, Dili, August 2009. See also Rees, "Under Pressure," 52-53; Hood,
"Security Sector Reform," 64.
79 4 Rees, "Under Pressure," 51-55.
795 Sven Gunnar Simonsen claims the distinction has been around since the 1940s and writes, "Stereotypes describe
Lorosae as volatile, vocal, confident, entrepreneurial, and strong characters, whereas Loromonu are seen as more
stable, passive, quiet, and calm." Simonsen, however, emphasizes that the distinction had little political meaning
prior to 2006 and "that it would be a mistake to view it in primoridal terms." Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Role of
East Timor's Security Institutions in National Integration - and Disintegration," The Pacific Review 22, no. 5
(2009): 578. See also ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 6.
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unified nation centered on state institutions."796 Such claims exaggerate the social and political
significance of the division, which played little if any divisive role prior to 2006. There were
political divisions within East Timor, some which did tend to vary along regional lines, but the
regional division was not in itself significant.797 For example, in the extensive Commission for
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CAVR) report, there is no mention of the East-West
division. Many analysts and officials emphasize that they had heard nothing about this cleavage
until 2006.798
The main consequence of these problems within the F-FDTL was the development of the
petitioners, which became the catalyst for the violence in 2006. In late 2002, complaints about
the treatment and recruitment of westerners in the F-FDTL began to emerge. One key problem
was that the First Battalion's base was in the far eastern district, so soldiers from westem
districts had a difficult time going on leave and making it back to the base on time, especially
given East Timor's poor road networks and transportation infrastructure. Squalid conditions in
the F-FDTL's barracks also worsened discipline. In December 2003, 42 soldiers, mainly
westerners, were discharged for disciplinary problems related to absenteeism. After an F-FDTL
attack on a police station in August 2004, a presidential commission issued a report urging
changes in the F-FDTL, but little was done. Resentment, worsening living conditions, and
79 Selver B. Sahin, "Building the State in Timor-Leste," Asian Survey 47, no. 2 (April 2007): 258-9.
797 Dwight King offers a highly problematic analysis of the importance of the East-West division in the CA election:
"If the districts are grouped into these two geographical regions, and simple unweighted averages are calculated
from the percentages ... FRETILIN averaged 67% in Firaku and 46% in Kaladi. ASDT averaged 3% in Firaku and
13% in Kaladi. The differential between the two regions is much smaller for both the PD and PSD. We can infer that
this regional cleavage influenced voting support for FRETILIN (higher in Firaku) and for ASDT (higher in Kaladi)."
There is little reason to believe that Timorese individuals identity as Easterners or Westerns led them to vote for the
particular parties. Instead, parties had support bases that varied across the regions, and that variation led to the
observed differences in the vote. There was little mention of the apparent ethnic division in other sources, written
during the election, about the political importance of being from the East or West. King does write that the Firaku-
Kaladi division is "one possible starting point for searching for lines of potential political difference," rather than
claiming the division is strongly ingrained in the society. "East Timor's Founding Elections and Emerging Party
System," Asian Survey 43, no. 5 (October 1, 2003): 753.
7 9 8 Simonsen, "The Role of East Timor's Security Institutions in National Integration - and Disintegration," 578;
Chega!. Interviews with intenrational officials, analysts, and local officials, Dili, July-August 2009 and 2010.
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inaction by the government, especially Roque Rodrigues, the Secretary of State for Defense,
continued throughout 2005.799
In January 2006, 159 soldiers, drawn from across the military, petitioned Gusmao as the
President and F-FDTL's supreme commander. They listed 28 points of complaint, largely to do
with discrimination against westerners in recruitment, promotion, and treatment. Although
Gusmao urged the F-FDTL commander, Taur Matan Ruak to respond, the F-FDTL was in the
process of a long planned move of the First Battalion from Lautem to Baucau. Ruak claimed that
he was too busy to meet with the petitioners, and no response was made to the petitioners until
February 2. Discussion between Ruak and the petitioners did not alleviate the problem, however,
and hundreds of soldiers abandoned their barracks, leaving their weapons behind. Gusmao and
several other officials met with 418 petitioners on February 8, contrary to the wishes of Ruak,
and established a commission to investigate the petitioners' complaints. The commission also
failed to address to concerns of the petitioners, who claimed that the commission was biased
since it contained officers whom the claims were against. The petitioners were given leave on
February 17 but did not return. On March 16, Ruak dismissed 594 individuals, approximately
40% of the total force. While Alkatiri supported the dismissal, Gusmao opposed it in a speech on
March 23. Gusmao noted that the dismissal of so many individuals from the organization would
indicate that the F-FDTL was discriminating against westerners and were indicative of larger
problems in the organization. By mid-April, the petitioners' protests had escalated into major
violence. 00
The development of the petitioners was most prominently due to the weakness in the
overall defense institution, especially with regard to civilian oversight. Interviewees emphasized
7 9 9 ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 5-6; Rees, "Under Pressure," 32-33. Interviews with international
officials, Dili, August 2009 and 2010.
goICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 6-7; Report of Commission of Inquiry, para 33-36.
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that the complaints could have been dealt with, especially with regard to issues of living
conditions and absenteeism by westerners due to insufficient time for leave. However, the
Timorese defense institution repeatedly failed to address these concerns, more because of
incompetence rather than bias.80'
Conclusion
Table 5.4: Creation and Reform of the F-FDTL
Preferences Maintain internal and external Create defense force Defense force abides by
security | constraints of law
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Cantonment Prevent High Informal Success: Confirmed:
of Falintil Falintil from networks, Initially uncertain International unity, combined
1999-Late becoming Falintil has outcome for Falintil. with strong support for Falintil,
2000 security some Growing instability leads to creation of an army.
threat association within cantonment.
with Negotiation of three
nationalism options for new
military force.
Creation of F- Prevent High Informal Partial Success: Confirmed:
FDTL under Falintil from networks Internal Falintil Informal networks lead to
UNTAET becoming process to decide recruitment of Falintil, resulting
February security future members of problems from recruited veterans
2001- May threat; force. Gusmao and Eastern dominated force
2002 Create supporters dominate
defense selection process and
force Eastern basing for the
force. Creation of
hard-line Fretilin
insurgents.
Development Maintain High Informal Partial Success: Partially confirmed:
of F-FDTL internal and networks Continuing conflict Informal networks lead to F-
under external between F-FDTL FDTL weakness. But, problems
UNMISET/ security; veterans and others. on international side stem from
UNOTIL Defense Weak control by poor leadership and inattention
May 2002- force abides ministry. Unregulated rather than disunity
2006 by involvement of
constraints military in domestic
of law security.
The creation of the F-FDTL was only partially successful. While UNTAET did create a defense
force, the institution had serious weaknesses. In particular, the F-FDTL had an unclear mandate,
80 The criticism of Roque Rodrigues's performance as Secretary of State for Defense was particularly strong.
Interviews with international official and analysts, Dili, August 2010.
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weak civilian oversight, and a poor relationship with other veterans. These problems, combined
with the various divisions among the security forces were largely responsible for violence in
2006, as described below.
The theory largely, but not fully explains the trajectory of F-FDTL development. The
outcome of the reform, partial success, confirms the overall prediction due to high unity and
threat to informal networks. Many of the problems within the F-FDTL developed through the
mechanisms specified by the theory. Although UNTAET had initially intended not to create a
Timorese military, the importance of Falintil to the achievement of independence led to the
creation of the F-FDTL and incorporation of the Falintil veterans. Informal networks within
Falintil also led to the creation of a force that was closely connected to Gusmao and enabled
Lobato to support the creation of armed groups of ex-veterans. Finally, informal networks within
the government contributed to the weak civilian oversight of F-FDTL and the failure to attend to
the concerns of westerners within F-FDTL.
However, there are several elements of the case study that do not reflect the theory's
predictions. Most importantly, the failure of the international administration to address the
problems in the military did not stem from disagreement about demands. Instead, the problem
was that neither UNTAET nor UNMISET appeared to take leadership over military reform.
While reducing the size of the peacekeeping force was a priority, Australia and other donors
failed to strengthen the F-FDTL sufficiently to take over responsibility for security. The
international administration was also limited by a broader unwillingness to support the creation
of military organizations. UNTAET had always been hesitant about the creation of the F-FDTL,
and the UN remained reluctant to arm weak state institutions. One international official claimed
322
that international organizations saw military reform as "dirty." 8 02 The problem therefore was
lack of effort and complacency by donors, rather than disunity.
VI. Police Reform under UNTAET and Successor Missions
The creation of a police force in East Timor was one of the most problematic reform efforts by
UNTAET and its successor missions. The UN fell under particular criticism because the police
force came to be seen as a source of insecurity rather than a provider of law and order. After the
end of UNTAET, the police were involved in a series of incidents that questioned their
adherence to democratic standards and the rule of law. Most problematically, formed police units
played a major role in the violence of 2006. Indeed, the perception that the UN had failed to
build a sufficiently strong police institution led to a new mandate for police and security sector
reform after 2006.
Certain elements of the reform effort were successful, most notably the creation of formal
policing institutions, so the UN's effort with respect to policing is coded as a partial success.
Nevertheless, the failures in the police reform effort were particularly damaging. The theory
offers the most insight with regard to how informal networks incentivized local elites to prevent
the construction of strong policing. Rogerio Lobato's actions present a clear demonstration of the
effectiveness of private obstruction. He developed informal networks within the police and
among veterans, undermined the international community's formal demands, neglected the
development of the police, and provoked violence between the police and military. Although the
international administration was unified, it failed to monitor and punish noncompliance. The UN
made a series of mistakes unrelated to unity, including poor recruitment of international police
8 02 Interview with international official, Dili, August 2010.
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officers, and failing to take into account the longstanding antipathy between the Indonesian
police (POLRI) and the supporters of independence.
The case study proceeds in five parts. First, it describes the international community's
preferences for policing and codes the key variables. Second, it describes the initial period of
policing under UNTAET and the creation of the East Timor Police Service. Third, the case study
traces the trajectory of the police reform after independence up until the 2006 riots. It describes
various signs of the weakness of the police institution, including the riots in December 2002, the
creation of formed police units, and negative impact of informal networks. Fourth, the case study
discusses the violence of April and May 2006 and the role of the police in starting the violence.
The fifth part concludes.
Origins and Goals ofPolice Reform in East Timor
Resolution 1272 and the Secretary-General's report mandated UNTAET to ensure basic law and
order and to rapidly establish a "credible, professional and impartial East Timor police
service.",o3 The goals of the international community, therefore, were threefold. First, the
overriding priority was the maintenance of basic internal law and order. Without some provision
of security, the mission and subsequent efforts would have clearly failed. The Secretary-
General's report called for 1640 UN Civilian Police (UNPOL or CIVPOL) to be deployed to
maintain law and order in the short-term. Second, the international community sought to create a
police force that would take over responsibility after East Timor declared independence.
Creating a police force would require recruiting, training, and equipping the new police force.
Third, the international community sought to build a police force that met international standards
for democratic policing. While the Secretary-General's initial report only emphasized "credible,
professional and impartial," subsequent documents make clear that the international community
03UN S/1999/1024 para 57-59; UNSC resolution 1272.
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had higher expectations for police. Indeed, the plan for UNMISET stated that the East Timor
Police Service ought to be able to "provide all basic police functions, including crime prevention
and detection, traffic police, crowd management and community policing, and to attend to the
special needs of vulnerable persons and victims of domestic violence in particular." Resolution
1410, which established UNMISET, emphasized that human rights principles would play an
important role in strengthening the security sector. Since East Timor was an opportunity for the
UN to demonstrate its ability to build strong institutions, it had high standards, especially for the
key institutions such as the police.804
UNTAET was unified about the demands it made to local elites. The mission had a
hierarchical structure as well as effective leadership. UNPOL was under the direct authority of
the SRSG, under the governance and public administration component. Hierarchical organization
continued under UNMISET, with UNPOL continuing to operate under the direct authority of the
SRSG. Still, international organizations and officials made other types of errors. Most
prominently, UNPOL officers were criticized for having short deployments, for limited relevant
language or mentorship skills, for lack of respect for Timorese police, and for coming from
countries with questionable police practices (such as Ghana or Zimbabwe). To be sure, UNPOL
was subject to these criticisms in a number of missions. Nevertheless, these problems limited
UNPOL's efforts to strengthen the East Timor police. 805
The international community's goals with respect to police reform were mainly
threatening to local elites' informal networks. The creation of a police force was clearly
necessary for the achievement of independence, so there was no threat to nationalist goals. On
804 S/2002/432 pam 82; UN resolution 1410 (2002), para 2-5. Interviews with UNPOL officers and international
analysts, Dili, July-August 2009-2010.
805 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 63-64; Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 69; Eirin Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement:
Creating and Maintaining a Police Service in a Post-Conflict Society -- Problems and Pitfalls" (Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003), 14-15. Interviews with UN police officials, Dili,
August 2009.
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the other hand, East Timorese elites had extensive informal connections within the police. The
networks were by and large not associated with particular political parties, but relied on
806individual connections. For example, Rogerio Lobato developed an extensive network within
the police of veterans and other fringe Falintil members. Other elites retained links to individuals
within the Timorese police, in some case based on long-standing connections from the war.
Policing was also highly politicized, with the Minister of Internal Administration - Lobato -
playing a major role in police operations. Establishing the rule of law and bringing in practices
from Western countries would substantially weaken the influence of elites in the behavior of the
police, which would undermine their ability to maintain power.
Given high unity, and a threat to informal networks, the theory predicts partial
implementation of international demands. It expects that international unity will enable the
international administration to monitor and punish elites for not implementing international
demands. The theory further predicts that elites will use private obstruction to block, including
accepting formal demands while preventing their implementation, cultivating personalist
networks within the institution, or simply ignoring international demands.
Initial Period and Development of East Timor Police Service by UNTAET
Following the violence in September 1999, the intervention by the Australian-led INTERFET
quickly reestablished basic security in East Timor. Although UNTAET's mandate began in
October, INTERFET retained responsibility for security through February 2000. Two elements
of UNTAET then took over from INTERFET - the UN peacekeeping force (PKF) and the
UNPOL. The PKF was large reconstituted out of INTERFET, with approximately 70% of forces
remaining in their position and changing "to UN blue headdress."80 7 While INTERFET had a
8 06 Interview with international official, Dili, August 2009.807 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 67.
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UN mandate, it was led and organized by member states. The PKF, on the other hand, was
constituted by the UN and responsible to the SRSG. The greatest threat that the PKF faced was
militia incursions from West Timor, which continued through 2000 before diminishing in
number through the next year. 80
UNPOL was intended to take over responsibility for internal security and quickly
establish policing and the rule of law. UNPOL were mandated a maximum of 1640 police
officers, including two 120-officer rapid reaction units and a 150-officer border/marine unit. The
UN initially intended not to arm the UNPOL, but following several incidents of civil unrest, all
UNPOL were authorized to carry side arms.8 09 Although UNPOL were generally successful in
achieving their limited goal of maintaining law and order, they faced three major criticisms.
First, CIVPOL was criticized for their slow deployment. UNPOL was initially established with
400 international police officers in January 2000. By July 2000, 1270 total police had deployed.
These officers were particularly slow to deploy from Dili to rural districts and subdistricts -
indeed the failure of UNPOL to move beyond the capital would become an ongoing complaint
810
throughout the UN's time in East Timor. Second, there were several criticisms of UNPOL that
echoed complaints about UN policing in other missions. According to reports and analysts,
UNPOL had limited local language skills and understanding of Timorese culture, were not
consistent in their application of the law, had insufficient training, and were recruited from
countries with poor human rights records.8 1' Third, Major General Michael Smith, the deputy
8 011 Ibid., 68-71.
809 Indeed, the Secretary-General's report specified that UNPOL "will carry side arms on law enforcement duty
when deemd necessary by the Police Commissioner." After civil unrest in Dili in February 2000, some UNPOL
began to carry side arms, and by April 2000 all UNPOL were authorized to carry side arms. The UN remained
hestitant about armed foreign security forces, which was initially an impediment to the visit of the Indonesian
President in 2002. UN S/1999/1024, para 59; Ibid., 74-75. Interview with ICG analyst, Jakarta, July 2010.
810 King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 73-79.
81 Ibid., para. 76. The report also notes (para. 75), "a number of officers who did not meet minimum language,
driving or firearms requirements had to be repatriated. The slow procurement of equipment, in particular vehicles
327
commander of the PKF, criticized the police for their inability to consistently coordinate with the
PKF. A joint planning center proved to be ineffective and ad hoc planning groups were formed
when necessary.
UNPOL quickly recognized it did not have sufficient personnel to be an effective police
force, and in February 2000813 began to recruit Timorese to the Police Assistance Group (PAG).
The PAG, which grew to include 800 officers, was recruited from former members of the
POLRI. The POLRI had a generally poor reputation among Timorese, especially those who had
fought for independence, due to their record of using torture and generally poor adherence to
international human rights standards. UNTAET's press statement announcing the recruitment to
the PAG emphasized,
"the Police Assistance Group is an interim arrangement. They are not members of
CIVPOL [UNPOL] neither of the future East Timorese Police Force. They will not have
powers to arrest, but will provide assistance and advise to the CIVPOL officers on
aspects of the community structure and the local culture relevant to law and order
enforcement. They will also provide, with their experience, information on traditional
patterns of criminal behavior."814
Nevertheless, the individuals that participated in the PAG were "given a head start" and many
rose to leadership positions within the new force. 1
At the same time as it recruited former POLRI members to deal with the immediate
security situation, UNPOL began the longer process of recruiting and training a Timorese police
service. UNPOL began distributing applications for the new force in January 2000 and in March
and communications equipment, further delayed their deployment outside Dili to the districts and sub-districts. By
August 2000, the majority of remote sub-districts did not have a permanent police presence, and as late as February
2002 UNPOL had only 299 vehicles for over 1,400 officers." See also Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 68-69.
812 Smith and Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor, 75-76.
83 The program officially began in March 2000, but initial recruitment occurred in February. See UNTAET Daily
Briefing Notes, February 7, 2000.8 1 4 UNTAET Daily Brief Notes, February 7 2000.8 1 5Della-Giacoma, "Police Building in Timor-Leste," 5. See also Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 9-11.
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the first training class of fifty police officers had entered the policing college. Four major
issues with the recruitment and training of the police were identified. First, recruitment and
training was based on Western technocratic criteria for policing, which were perceived as
inappropriate to East Timor. The recruitment standards and interview process emphasized the
experience, education, age, and ability to perform well in a Western style interview process. 817
UNPOL thereby effectively favored candidates who would work best with them (such as through
knowledge of English)818 rather than candidates who would be the most appropriate for East
Timor. The training itself was carried out in English and Portuguese and translated into the local
languages. The translators were in limited supply and of mixed quality." 19
Second, the training was also perceived to be too brief and ineffective. The training
course was only three months long for new recruits and one month for ex-POLRI members.
While the academy-based training appeared to cover critical subjects such as human rights and
firearms use, observers noted that the human rights training was not applied to practical
situations, and the firearms training covered technical skills such as safe handling and target
816 UN Daily Briefing Notes, 28 January 2000 and 27 March 2000.
817 Specifically, the requirements were that the police were "of good character and a resident of East Timor, not less
than 18 and not over 35 years of age; able to speak, write and understand one or more of the languages of East
Timor, pass the required physical and medical tests; pass a selection interview." Eirin Mobekk criticisizes the
interview process in depth: "The questionnaire was culturally western. It contained questions that the candidates had
difficulty answering due to this bias. This led to unease in the candidate. This was found to be the case especially in
relation to questions regarding identifying personal strengths and weaknesses, being a team player and using
initiative. By using a culturally western questionnaire it reduced the quality of the interview and diminished the
possibility for the candidates to show their abilities... The point summary chart underlined the western bias. The
candidate received point scores for age, languages, work experience, as well as, the interview and fitness test. The
candidate would receive three points for knowledge of English and three points for knowledge of three other
languages; English not being the national or the official language of East Timor. This was not a reflection of needs
of the PNTL." UNTAET Regulation 2001/22, para 16.3; Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 8-9.
"
1 Hood notes that "the selection system was heavily biased towards those who spoke some English - the value of
this in an East Timorese police officer is dubious when less than one per cent of the population has any command of
the English language." Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 64.
819 Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 72; Ronald West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Justice and Security Reform in
East Timor," ed. Charles Call (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), 322.
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practice rather than when the weapons should be and should not be used.820 Following the
academy-based training, officers were deployed to the field. Hood writes that the field-training
program "was an uneven affair: there was no coherent, structured strategy, and the programme
was essentially dependent on the quality and motivation of the CIVPOLs stationed in the PNTL
cadet's home district."82'
Third, the police recruits were improperly vetted. In the initial recruitment process,
UNPOL took suggestions from CNRT, which enabled future political parties to establish strong
informal connections within the police. Later, when UNPOL had adopted a more standardized
recruiting system, vetting and evaluation took place in Dili. The final list of candidates was
posted in subdistrict police stations and villagers were encouraged to inform UNPOL if any
candidates should not be accepted. The major problem was that there were highly limited
interactions between UNPOL and villagers. UNPOL officers had limited language skills and
UNPOL officers were rarely present in many villages. When UNPOL officers were present, they
mainly interacted with local leaders. There were allegations of corruption in the recruiting
process, and local elites were able to secure their position by establishing informal networks in
the post-independence police force. 822
Fourth, the recruitment of ex-POLRI provoked resentment against the police. As of June
2002, only 350 members of the police service were ex-POLRI, which amounted to
approximately 20% of the force at independence. Nevertheless, they had an outsized influence.
The commander of the new force, Paulo Fatima Martins, for example, was a former POLRI
officer. Ex-Falintil or young members of the clandestine movement were especially frustrated by
820 Amnesty International, "The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: A New Police Service - A New Beginning,"
30 June 2003. See also "Report of the Joint Assessment Mission carried out by
The Government of Timor-Leste, UNMISET, UNDP and Development Partner Countries for the
Timor-Leste Police Service" (JAM), Dili, November 2002, 5.6.1.821 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 64.
822 West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money," 322-323, 334-5; Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 7-8, 10-11.
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the selection of the POLRI, since they sought jobs in the police force. Certain Timorese political
elites, especially Rogerio Lobato, encouraged their frustration. Even seven years after
independence, one Fretilin MP emphasized that the police were not to be trusted because they
had been recruited out of the POLRI.8" Furthermore, the POLRI received only a one-month
abbreviated training course, with a focus on the use of firearms and human rights. The training
was perceived to be insufficient to change the ex-POLRI's perspective on policing. Finally, the
poor vetting process made many suspicious of the ex-POLRI in the police force.82 4
Although the security situation in East Timor remained relatively stable under
UNTAET's administration, UNPOL was not successful in achieving its broader goals of creating
the rule of law. The greatest limitation was that UNPOL had a very limited presence in rural
districts and subdistricts. Hence, in most of East Timor, the chief of the village remained in
charge of policing and security, and the traditional systems ofjustice remained intact. Ronald
West quotes one chefe de suco (village chief) in Viquque district saying, "I am responsible for
security here. Nobody can go past me to the police."8 25 UNPOL adopted a plan for "community
policing," but, as Mobekk writes, community policing meant "anything from getting closer to the
community to letting the community police themselves with limited involvement by the police
force." 826 Where UNPOL were present, they interacted primarily with the village chiefs, and
even relayed complaints from residents to the village chiefs to be dealt with using traditional
systems ofjustice. The problems of policing were compounded by the failure of UNTAET's
formal justice systems. 827There were extremely limited resources for trials, international judges
823 Interviews with Fretilin MP and international anlysts, Dili, August 2009.
824On the recruitment of POLRI, see West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money," 323, 334-335; Wilson, "Smoke and
Mirrors," 72; Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 9-12.
825 West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money," 336.
826 Quoted in Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 71. See also Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 22-24.8 2 7 According to Moebekk, there was "simply not enough resources or possibilities to deal with all crimes in the
judicial systen" Mobekk, "Law-Enforcement," 26.
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had difficulty communicating with Timorese, and there was limited knowledge about the
applicable law. 28 Justice according to one account remained "the weakest of East Timor's state
structures.829
International officials were aware of the limitations of the police reform effort under
UNTAET and developed a strong two-part mandate in this area for the successor mission,
UNMISET. First, UNMISET would continue to have executive policing powers after
independence. Second, UNMISET would be charged with mentoring and training the Timorese
police, in preparation for turning over full authority. The mission would initially call for 1250
international police following independence, which would be downsized to 100 officers, mainly
in advisory positions, by January 2004.830
UNTAET's effort to build a police force was limited both by failings among international
officials and by the difficult of local conditions. On the international side, the key problems
included a lack of long-term planning, the failure to recruit suitable UNPOL officers, and a lack
of local knowledge. These factors led to the recruitment of the POLRI and the inability of
UNPOL to effectively recruit and train local officials. Analysts attribute UNTAET's failure to
plan to a disagreement between the UNDPA and UNDPKO described above. 831 While better
828 West, "Lawyers, Guns, and Money," 330-339.
829 Edith Bowles and Tanja Chopra, "East Timor: Statebuilding Revisted," in Building States to Build Peace
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 287.
"' S/2002/432, para 79-86; UN Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002), para 2-3.
831 The King's College report blames the problems of policing on UNPOL's failure to develop a long term plan for
institutional development: "UNTAET initially focused on personnel recruitment and training while neglecting the
development of the ETPS as an institution and the handover process from UN to East Timorese control. The failure
was a direct result of inadequate strategic planning and institution-building know-how at the UN Secretariat and
mission level. UNPOL was left to its own devices to set up an administrative and budgetary framework for the
ETPS. Lacking the necessary expertise in institution-building, strategic planning and budget development (in
democratic countries, these activities are usually performed by civilian administrators), UNPOL has produced an
institution that is unsustainable and weak. All these factors have contributed to the slow development of the ETPS,
and the current situation of a continued UN executive mandate in a sovereign country. UNTAET would have
benefited from an early independent study on policing options. In addition to technical police expertise, when the
mandate includes police development responsibilities, UNPOL requires civilian experts with project management,
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planning might have led to some improvements, it probably would not have led to the
recruitment of different international police officers, so international disunity in the planning
process does not explain the reform's failure. On the local side, the complexity of East Timor's
existing society made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the international community to
rapidly construct a police force that would establish the rule of law as in Western countries. The
strength of existing traditional policing and judicial measures meant that UNPOL had little
influence in much of the country. Part of the weakness of the police stemmed from the negative
impact of informal networks on recruitment, although misuse of power by political authorities
was only a small part of the story. Hence, while the theory provides some insight into the
trajectory of police reform under UNTAET, not all of the mechanisms specified were observed,
so the theory is only partially confirmed.
Development of PNTL Under UAMISET
Following independence, the East Timor Police Service became known as the Police Nacional
de Timor-Leste (PNTL)832 and UNMISET continued the effort to reform the police. Its major
goals were to maintain basic law and order and strengthen the rule of law. UNMISET, however,
was not successful in these goals. There were several incidents of violence related to the poor
police performance from 2002 to 2004, the police continued to violate basic standards of
democratic policing, and most problematically, the police play a major role in the violence in
2006. The same issues that had prevented reform under UNTAET continued to play a role under
UNMISET. Poor recruitment and lack of expertise continued to plague UNPOL. However, the
major cause for the failure of the reform was the threat of the demands to elites' informal
administrative, donor mobilisation, human rights and institution-building skills." "A Review of Peace Operations,"
para. 101.
832 Hood notes that "The lack of emphasis on institutional development was manifest in the failure to develop a clear
long-term vision and mission for the PNTL, including in the maladroit attempts at identity formation: the police
service had three names in the space of a few months in 2002: the East Timor Police Service (ETPS), the Timor-
Leste Police Service (TLPS) and finally the PNTL." Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 65.
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networks. Local elites, most notably Rogerio Lobato, used informal obstruction to block reform
and even weaken the adherence of the police to law. In combination with the development of the
F-FDTL petitioners described above, the weakness of police directly led to the violence in 2006.
The precise activities of UNMISET with respect to policing were specified by the Timor-
Leste Police Service Development Plan, which was developed in early 2002. PNTL officers
would increase from about 1800 in May 2002 to a total of 2830 officers. UNMISET would retain
overall authority over policing, with the PNTL commander reporting to the UNPOL commander.
The hope was that UNPOL would engage in on-the-job training of PNTL officers while they
were engaging in executive policing. At the same time, international advisors would be
appointed to key ministries to engage in capacity building. However, only a handful of
international officials and UNPOL were appointed based on their knowledge of the country or
experience in building a police force.833
The main problems with the police organization and the extant UNPOL effort were
described in a series of reports issued in early 2003, especially the Joint Assessment Mission
(JAM) report and the King's College report. These reports identified the main problems within
PNTL, including the problems with planning, the poor training of police, and the lack of clear
rules and standard operating procedures. These reports also identified problems within the
international community, especially with regard to a lack of planning and short deployments of
834under qualified UNPOL. The JAM observed that the overarching problem within the PNTL
was "limited management capacity" and urged the creation of an "institutional strengthening
83 JAM, 4.7-8; Ibid., 65-67.
834 See JAM, Section 5,7; King's College, "A Review of Peace Operations," para. 85-106; Wilson, "Smoke and
Mirrors," 75-81.
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working group for the TLPS [PNTL]."3 These observations fit into the theory's description of
the bureaucratic ideology, since the JAM effectively criticized the absence of formal procedures
and developed a formal procedure to solve the problem.
Following the JAM's recommendations, an Institution and Capacity Building (ICB)
Committee was created and was closely managed by the Deputy SRSG's office. 836 UNMISET
began to make demands for a variety of changes designed to improve adherence of the PNTL
and overarching institution to formal rules. These demands, as stated in the JAM report, would
be to develop "standardized national records management and field training programmes," to
improve training curriculum," to "approve and disseminate a TLPS Code of Conduct," to
"develop a police manual," and to "Review policies and procedures to provide an impetus for the
consolidation and dissemination of standardised policies to all parts of the TLPS at this important
stage of institutional development."8 37 The focus of UNMISET's efforts, therefore, was on
strengthening the bureaucratic capacity of the police.
Hood blames UNMISET's failure to reform the PNTL on poor bureaucratic practices and
leadership, specifically "inadequate planning and deficient mission design, unimaginative and
weak leadership, [and] negligible East Timorese 'ownership.' 8 38 Ownership, for Hood, appears
to mean consultation with Timorese elites. While it is certainly true that UNMISET continued
8 3 5 In full, the report explains, "The JAM recommends that there be established an institutional strengthening
working group for the TLPS [PNTL]. This group should be led by the TLPS with membership determined by the
GoTL [Government of Timor-Leste]. Consideration should be given to representation from other justice sector
agencies, key government departments (such as MoPF [Ministry of Planning and Finance]), civil society and the
community. UNPOL should have a representative on the working group to provide police technical advice. To
support this working group, an appropriately qualified and experienced institutional strengthening technical adviser
should be engaged for a period of at least 12 months. Further provision should also be made for shorter term inputs
from at least three other technical advisers in the areas of human resources management, finance and logistics."
JAM, 37.
836 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 67-67.8 7 JAM, section 7.
838 Hood writes, "While UNTAET deserves criticism for the aforementioned shortcomings, UNMISET deserves
harsh censure for its handling of police development in 2002-2004." Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 65,68. Note
that Hood was a Programme Officer for the JAM report.
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with several poor practices, most especially recruitment of unqualified UNPOL officers, Hood is
incorrect that better bureaucratic practices would have been sufficient to achieve success. Indeed,
local elites played an active role in the failure of police reform because they perceived a threat to
their informal networks and used private obstruction to block the reform. While not all of
UNMISET's demands were feasible, the adoption of formal procedures would have weakened
the influence of powerful local elites over the nascent policing institutions.
Local elites reacted to the demands by privately obstructing the reform in several ways.
One example is that PNTL officers appeared to participate in the international reform effort in
order to gain equipment and resources, while at the same time ignoring international calls for
changes in procedures. During the JAM, PNTL officers consistently responded to international
queries by seeking more equipment.8 39 The JAM report therefore emphasized that the
international community paid too much attention to the equipment requirements of the police and
urged more attention to police procedures. Despite the report's emphasis on rules and
procedures, it nevertheless concludes with a 16-page appendix of required resources totaling
$4,158,096. Hence, in order to secure greater Timorese participation in their reform effort,
international officials continued to supply equipment, but had more difficulty altering Timorese
police practices."4
The best-documented and most destructive examples of private obstruction were the
actions of Rogerio Lobato, who was the cabinet member in charge of the police initially as
Minister of Internal Administration and later as the Minister of Interior. Lobato established
839 "During every meeting in Districts and with other Units the JAM was given lengthy equipment lists. Many of
these appeared to be trying to replicate UN equipment while others were extremely unrealistic 'wish lists.' The
development of service-wide standards, policies, records and procedures is even more critical in view of the limited
budget capacity. Any decisions on materials will need to be made within an agreed and sustainable policy
framework. The expectations of the TLPS members have been raised to standards which cannot be met and this will
have to be explained and demonstrated as part of the development of resource management capacity." JAM, section
5.7.40 JAM, 65-82. Interviews with international officials and analysts, July-August 2009 and 2010.
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"parallel chains of command" and "secured a particular kind of personal loyalty" through
favoritism of officers from the western part of the country. 841 Accounts of the PNTL make clear
that there was only a very limited sense of professional loyalty to the organization. Lobato also
undermined the police organization, by criticizing the police for recruiting ex-POLRI. Recall
further that Lobato had been cultivating his relationship with ex-Falintil members and criticized
F-FDTL for failing to recruit Falintil veterans. Finally, according to several accounts, Lobato's
neglect of the police institution was highly destructive. The minister played a direct operational
role in policing and institutional reform. His main accomplishment appeared to be the creation of
armed formed police units loyal to him, rather than adhering to the rule of law. 842
On November 28, 2002, Gusmao gave a speech urging Lobato's resignation "on the
grounds of incompetence and neglect."843 Several days later, major riots broke out, which were
probably partially instigated by Lobato, and resulted in "the complete breakdown of law and
order" in Dili. Two protestors were killed, the Prime Minister's house was burned, and
approximately seventy arrests made.844 The police's actions were criticized as alternating
between the use of excessive force and inaction. Apparently at the height of violence, "PNTL
officers were seen hiding in the principal govemment offices, the Palacio Governo, where they
841 Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 86.8 4 2 Bowles and Choprs write, "Lobato contributed to the fragmentation of the PNTL, as well as tensions between
east and west, by promoting police officers from the west and fostering client-patron relations with circles of
officers personally loyal to him. Further, there was little development of the Ministry of Interior as an institution and
neglect of ministry responsibilities other than the police, such as civil security and disaster relief." Bowles and
Chopra, "East Timor," 296. Interviews with international analysts, Dili, July-August 2010.
84' Gusmao stated, "November 28th 2002 is celebrated, with a feeling of grief because of the problems in Uatu-Lari,
the problems in Dili, the problems in Ualili and Baucau, the problems in Same and Ainaro, the problems in Ermera
and Liquica and the problems in Suai and Maliana. Unfortunately, it seems that by creating problems, one can rise to
become a Minister, and these same people, after becoming Ministers, only know how to increase existing problems.
Some weeks ago, I swore in another Vice-Minister of Internal Administration, and I urged that Ministry to start
rigorously solving, the problems that affect the stability and security of our country. The fact is that these problems
have been accumulating. If independence belongs only to FRETILIN, I have no comments to make. If independence
belongs to all of us, to all the Timorese, I seize this opportunity to demand of the Government to dismiss the
Minister for Internal Administration, Mr. Rogdrio Lobato, on the grounds of incompetence and neglect." Quoted in
Rees, "Under Pressure," 53.
844 The deaths were investigated by UNMISET in UNMISET, "Executive Summary of Investigations of Police
Response to Riots on 4 December 2002," 14 November 2003.
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were attempting to dispose of their uniforms so that they could not be identified as police."8 4 5
While the initial riot began because of an arrest of a student, Rees explains, "anti-government
political actors/groups 'hijacked' the riot and launched attacks against the Prime Minister's
residence, among other politically sensitive sites."846 In effect, Lobato had simultaneously
weakened the police and started the riots.84 7 This was the first of several incidents in which
Lobato encouraged the development of conflict between the police, veterans, and military in
order strengthen his own personal power.
Following the F-FDTL's actions in Atsabe in January 2003, Lobato took advantage of the
weakness of the F-FDTL to create new police units that would further worsen the relationship
between the police and military. Lobato initially created three formed police units, the Border
Patrol Unit (BPU); the Rapid Deployment Service, which was later renamed the Police Reserve
Unit; and the Special Police Unit (SPU), which was designed to be in charge of crowd control in
the cities and later renamed the Rapid Response Unit (UIR). These units were heavily armed
with semi-autonomic and automatic weapons. Since F-FDTL was attempting to become the
foremost provider of security, major tensions quickly developed between the F-FDTL and the
various formed police units. 848
Lobato also played a role in undermining UNMISET's attempt to change formal practices
within the PNTL and ministries. East Timorese leaders played little role in the JAM process.
Lobato, with the support of Alkatiri, disbanded the ICB Committee, which was intended to
implement the JAM's recommendations.84 9
845 Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 82.
846 "Under Pressure," 54.
847 See ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 5.48 Rees, "Under Pressure," 23-24; Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 82-84. On the formed police units, see ICG,
"Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste's Police," Asia Report N*180, 3 December 2009, 3.
849 Hood, "Security Sector Reform," 66-67.
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In May 2004, UNMISET transferred full executive policing authority to the PNTL.
UNMISET continued until 2005, with a more limited mandate to provide capacity building. In
May 2005, UNMISET was replaced by the UN Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL), which had a
similar but scaled down mandate.850 Unfortunately, the PNTL remained weak. Legislation was
passed in 2004 specifying the structure and role of the PNTL as well as creating disciplinary
regulations. 851 However, this legislation created no effective oversight over the police. Indeed,
the Minister of Interior, Lobato, retained "operational control" and final authority over the police
force. While the police commissioner could recommend dismissals or other actions against
members accused of violations, only the minister could carry out those actions. Furthermore,
according to one analyst, the PNTL commissioner was undermined by the extended period of
international executive power. While the PNTL commissioner had nominally been in command
since 2002, the UNPOL commander exercised authority, and the PNTL commander's power had
gradually eroded.8 52
Indeed, there remained serious concerns with police abuse after the Timorese police took
over executive control in 2004. A Human Rights Watch report in April 2006 detailed a number
of incidents of police abuse. The report makes clear that the police were beating and intimidating
citizens who had committed no crimes, were committing crimes themselves, and were acting
with consistent impunity. The specific incidents of police abuse included brutality, arbitrary
detention, excessive use of force (including the use of firearms), torture of prisoners, and rape. 853
850 UN News Center, "UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste comes to an end," 19 May 2005.
8 5 1 Prior to this point, UNTAET regulations were still in force. Bowles and Chopra, "East Timor," 295-296.8 52 Della-Giacoma, "Police Building in Timor-Leste," 5-6; "Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the
Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor," Human Rights Watch 18, no. 2 (C) (April 2006): 13-15.
853 The report provides a variety of accounts of police abuse, none of which were investigated. Ibid., 16-37.
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The accounts make clear that the various UN missions failed to establish a police institution that
followed the rule of law.
The technical perspective of institution building believes that with proper institutional
practices and sufficient resources success is possible. Hood, for example, identifies extensive
problems with UNMISET that led to the failure of the police reform. While some of these
problems are no doubt real, it is unlikely that even if Hood's recommendations were fully
implemented police reform would have been fully successful. Indeed, one of Hood's key
recommendations was greater Timorese "ownership" over security sector reform. The above
section demonstrates that the minister nominally in charge of the police was intentionally
undermining its reform through private obstruction. Greater "ownership" would have therefore
had little positive impact. The implication is that there are inherent limits to police reform posed
by the relationship between international demands and the structure of political authority in post-
conflict societies. When reform threatens the informal networks local elites use to maintain their
political power, they will undermine reform.
Violence and Disintegration of Police in April-May 2006
The violence between factions of the police and military in April and May 2006 was a direct
consequence of the earlier failure of police reform. As discussed in the military reform section
above, in March 2006, a group of approximately 600 petitioners were dismissed from the
military. After President Gusmao criticized the petitioners' dismissal in a speech on March 23,
there was limited violence against easterners in Dili, with approximately seventeen houses
5 4 On the weakeness of the police institution at the time, see also Wilson, "Smoke and Mirrors," 84-86; Bowles and
Chopra, "East Timor," 294-296.
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burned. The situation then calmed for several weeks, until April 24, when the petitioners began
demonstrations in front of the main government building. 855
On the fourth day of the protests, April 28, the situation escalated. To address sporadic
fighting and increasing tension among the protestors, there were efforts to deploy several
different security units. There were clear problems in the chain of command and coordination
between different police organizations, however. Only limited numbers of the specially trained
riot police (UIR) were deployed, along with six military police officers (part of F-FDTL), and
some ordinary uniformed police. The protesters quickly overran the police and entered the
government building. According to the UN Commission of Inquiry, Lobato soon arrived at
PNTL headquarters "wearing a flak jacket and in a highly agitated state, yelling "kill them all."
The PNTL signed automatic weapons and 2,000 rounds of ammunition to Lobato, who
apparently used these weapons to arm his civilian supporters. After the petitioners dispersed
from the government building, there were skirmishes between the protesters and the UIR and F-
FDTL. Five people were killed and approximately 100 houses destroyed.856
Over the next month, conflict continued between factions of the police and military. The
conflict between easterners and westerners became more prevalent. For example, Major Reinado,
the head of the military police, deserted on May 3 with several military police officers and
members of the UIR. Reinado asserted that he did not "want to be a part of the (army) that shot
westerners," though according to the ICG, he did not witness the east-west violence he claimed
8" The ICG notes that World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz visited East Timor during this period and observed,
"The bustling markets, the rebuilt schools, the functioning Government - and above all the peace and stability -
attest to sensible leadership and sound decisions." "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 7-8.
856 Report of Commission of Inquiry, 24-29, quote 26.
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to have seen. For the next several weeks, various Timorese leaders attempted to negotiate
between the various groups and end the violence. 857
Following a shootout between Reinado's group and F-FDTL soldiers, violence returned
in late May. A number of different groups of civilians were armed and began to engage in
violence. Several allegations were made that Gusmao, Alkatiri, and other political elites were
directly involved in provoking the violence, though none of these allegations were confirmed.
The crisis came to a head on May 25 with a gun battle between the PNTL and F-FDTL at the
PNTL's headquarters. F-FDTL soldiers surrounding the building open fired on an unarmed
column of the police who had surrendered under a UN flag. Following the incident, the PNTL
virtually disintegrated within Dili.858
Over the course of the crisis, approximately 1650 houses were destroyed and
approximately 150,000 persons were displaced to IDP camps. The East Timorese leadership
requested international support from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal on May 24.
These countries soon deployed military and police to help reestablish security in Dili.859
In the wake of the crisis, Alkatiri resigned as Prime Minister in June, and Ramos-Horta
was sworn in. To address the security problem in East Timor, the UN created a new mission, the
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). UNMIT had a mandate to "support the
Government by maintaining law and order through the provision of executive policing as may be
necessary throughout the country... and in initiating a phased reconstitution of PNTL."8 60 U
officials recognized that previous missions had failed to build an effective police force. They
as7 ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 9-10. See also Report of Commission of Inquiry, 29-31.
8ss For a detailed account of the incident, see Ibid, 33-37. See also ICG, "Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis," 11-13.
859 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, August 8, 2006 para 10. The statistics on the
violence are from Report of Commission of Inquiry, 42.
860 See Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, August 8, 2006, Paragraphs 56-70. See also
International Crisis Group, "Resolving Timor-Leste Crisis," p. 18-19. Interviews with senior UN officials, Dili,
Summer 2009 and 2010.
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believed that by reestablishing executive authority over the police, the UN could build an
effective and democratic police force from scratch.
Conclusions
Police reform by UNTAET and its successor missions represents one of the most problematic
state building efforts in East Timor. UNTAET did manage to establish basic law and order and a
new police force, albeit without making a major difference in the practice of policing and justice
in much of the country. However, the key effort of ensuring that the police followed the rule of
law was a failure and violence returned in 2006 because of the weakness of the police force.
Despite more than four years of UN executive control, the PNTL remained the perpetrators of
major abuses. The failure by UNMISET is particular troubling, since UNMISET had significant
resources and was aware of the problems of UNTAET.
The theory offers significant insight into the reform effort, although it ultimately can only
partially explain the trajectory. The theory offers the greatest explanatory power with regard to
informal networks. Local elites' private obstruction of police reform had a major negative impact
on the development of the police force. The presence of informal networks meant that even if
international organizations had acted according to the best practices suggested in the literature,
Lobato would still have been able to block reform and the police would have remained weak.
The theory is less persuasive with regards to international unity. Both UNTAET and
UNMISET were unified about their demands, but unity did not enable either organization to
convince local elites to implement their demands. Both organizations were plagued by the
recruitment of rapidly rotating UNPOL with inappropriate skills. For UNMISET, part of the
problem was that was that UNMISET's executive authority was limited to executive policing.
UNMISET could not make political progress conditional on successful reform, since it had to
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hand over authority in May 2004 regardless of how much reform had actually happened. Nor
could UNMISET remove senior Timorese officials who were blocking reform. Consequently,
Timorese elites were able to wait out UNMISET and obstruct reform.
Table 5.5: Police Reform 1999-2006
Preferences Maintain internal law and order Create police force Police force follows rule of law
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Initial period Establish High Low Success: Partially Confirmed:
1999 basic law Slow deployment of Disunity within UN headquarters
and order, UNPOL. Recruitment partially responsible for lack of
create police of POLRI. Security planning, but slow recruitment
force reestablished largely endemic to UN efforts.
by PKF.
Creation of Establish High Informal Partial Success: Partially Confirmed:
ETPS Aug basic law networks Recruitment of Outcome correct, but mechanisms
2001-May and order, POLRI provokes only partially relevant Informal
2002 create police opposition from networks are important, but
force; police Fretilin and others. failure of international
force Limited effective organizations caused by poor
follows rule training. Mixed recruitment and planning, which
of law UNPOL quality. was only partially attributable to
Lobato controls international disunity.
elements of PNTL
Development Establish High Informal Failure: Partially Confirmed:
of PNTL basic law networks Abuses by police Informal connections with various
under and order, force, especially elites, especially Lobato,
UNMISET police force December 2002. undermine police force. Unity is
May 2002- follows rule Creation of formed not the cause of weakness of
2004 of law police units. Conflict international organizations.
between police and
military. Major
uninvestigated police
abuses. Weakness of
police leads to 2006
riots.
VII. Revenue in East Timor - Oil Treaty and Sovereign Wealth Fund
East Timor's main potential revenue source was the oil and gas resources between East Timor
and Australia. The effort to develop these resources is the key reform effort related to
government revenue.861 The reform effort consisted of negotiating with Australia to secure a
larger share of these resources and creating a petroleum fund to invest the money. This reform
861 Interviews with international officials, Dili, July-August 2009 and 2010.
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effort had a significantly different structure than the framework proposed by the theory.
International officials did not make demands to local elites. Indeed, Timorese elites and
international officials cooperated in the treaty negotiations and in the development of the
petroleum fund. Furthermore, following UNTAET, Timorese officials largely took over
leadership of the reform process. The reform effort was largely successful. East Timor gained a
substantial share of the oil and gas revenue and created a petroleum fund, which gave the country
a strong foundation for encouraging economic development in the future.
The theory provides little insight into the process, trajectory, or outcome of the creation
of revenue institutions in East Timor. Nevertheless, examining this reform effort provides an
important insight into institution building - it shows how under certain circumstances local elites
can lead the institution-building process. These efforts demonstrate a better conception of the
commonly used term "local ownership" and show an alternative route to successful state
building.
The reform effort below proceeds in five parts. The first part discusses the background of
the reform and the applicability of the theory. The second part considers the negotiation of the
Timor Sea Arrangement by UNTAET and briefly summarizes the negotiations between East
Timor and Australia about the revenue for the Greater Sunrise field. The third part discusses the
creation of the Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund. A fourth part concludes.
Background on Petroleum Resources
There are substantial oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea, which lies between East Timor and
Australia. While several petroleum fields lie geographically closer to East Timor, Australia has
claimed control of the seabed up to the Timor trough, which would imply Australian control over
the oil and gas resources.
345
Figure 5.1: Map of petroleum resources 862
Following Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, Indonesia and Australia negotiated the
Timor Gap Treaty. The treaty created a Zone of Cooperation, in which three different areas
would be divided between the countries. In Area A, revenue would be split 50/50, in Zone B
90% would go to Australia and 10% to Indonesia, and in Zone C 90% would go Indonesia and
10% to Australia. The East Timor independence movement insisted that Australia had negotiated
with a criminal regime and that both countries were in effect stealing East Timor's resources.
Nevertheless, prior to the "popular consultation," Australia gained assurances from Timorese
862 http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/easttimor/fsmaritime_arrangements.html (accessed April 21, 2012)
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leaders, including Gusmao, that they would continue the treaty's terms upon East Timor's
independence. 863
In February 2000, soon after UNTAET's arrival, an Australian delegation sought to gain
UNTAET's approval to substitute East Timor for Indonesia in the existing treaty. UNTAET staff
argued that the treaty was unfavorable to East Timor, and that according to international law,
East Timor should have a greater share of the petroleum revenue. In the Exchange of Notes on
10 February 2000, UNTAET agreed to continue the terms of the Timor Gap Treaty during
UNTAET's mandate, but insisted that a new treaty would have to be negotiated between East
Timor and Australia over the disbursement of the resources. 864
UNTAET and East Timorese elites shared an interest in increasing East Timor's share of
the petroleum revenues. Power writes that "Vieira de Mello knew that UNTAET would be
considered a failure if it did not manage to persuade the Australians to return what rightfully
belonged to the Timorese." Furthermore, the petroleum revenue had the potential to triple East
Timor's GNP and make the country financially independent.86 5 UN headquarters, possibly based
on pressure from Australia, urged Vieira de Mello not to negotiate on behalf of the Timorese
since, "It will be for East Timor, as an independent nation, to define its national interest." Vieira
de Mello insisted that UNTAET was responsible for pursuing East Timor's interests and
8 6 3 Paul Cleary, Shakedown: Australia's Grab for Timor Oil (Crows Nest, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 2007), 38-49.8 6 4 Ibid., 50-55.
8 6 5 Peter Galbraith, at the time the head of UNTAET Political Affairs, explains, "No industry is more important to
East Timor than petroleum. Let me give the scale of its significance. East Timor's annual recurring budget is $45
million. $45 million to pay for teachers' salaries for 400,000 school children; $45 million to pay the salaries for
3000 policemen, $45 million to maintain 3,500 kilometres of paved roads; $45 million to operate an airport and port;
$45 million to cover the expenses of a small army to deter new aggression and militia infiltrations; $45 million to
cover the costs of government. The Bayu-Undan liquids project currently underway will generate $100 million a
year for East Timor by the middle of the decade. A gas pipeline could increase the government take to $150 million.
Laminaria and Buffalo operating under Australian license, but in an area to which East Timor has a compelling
claim to the continental shelf, could generate up to $1 million a day - $365 million a year for East Timor as current
oil revenues. Imagine what this means to a country where every building was burned to the ground, where there are
70 students for every teacher, where teachers have no opportunity to develop further their skills."
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emphasized the importance of unity between UNTAET and East Timor in the negotiations.866
The Timorese leadership also clearly understood the importance of the resources for the
country's financial future and repeatedly insisted that nearly all of the resources below the Timor
Sea belonged to East Timor. They also regarded the Timor Gap Treaty as a continuing symbol of
867Indonesia's occupation, and sought to invoke their rights as an independent state.
Contrary to other reform efforts, the international and local goals for the reform were
therefore aligned. There was no threat to nationalist goals, since an independent East Timor
would require money to spend. There was no threat to informal networks, since greater revenue
would enable Timorese elites to support all government activities, both formal and informal.
Since the international administration was negotiating in cooperation with the Timorese elites,
the structure of the reform effort is significantly different from other reforms. Consequently, the
theory makes no clear predictions for the reform effort. Indeed, the trajectory of the reform effort
would be determined by a variety of other factors, none of which aligned with the stated
alternative explanations.
Negotiation of Timor Sea Arrangement
Following the Exchange of Notes in February 2000, UNTAET and international donors
established the Timor Sea Office, which would support East Timor in the negotiations with
Australia.86 8 In March 2000, UNTAET informed Australia that it was prepared to negotiate the
treaty on behalf of East Timor.
8*Vieira de Mello wrote, "These gains should not be jeopardized by an eleventh-hour lack of unity on the part of
East Timor and the United Nations, particularly if this were to become public, which, as we all know, is regrettably
a risk within the United Nations." Power, Chasing the Flame, 335-6.
867 Alexander J Munton, "A Study of the Offshore Petroleum Negotiations Between Australia, the U.N. and East
Timor" (Thesis (PhD), Australian National University, 2006), 105,
https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/47992.
868 See, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, "Final Evaluation: The OTI Program in East Timor," February 2003,
18, 21; Cleary, Shakedown, 53-54.
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Many observers criticized Australia for aggressively negotiating with East Timor. Several
international officials noted that Australia had significantly greater level of development and that
the resources would mean a great deal more to East Timor than they would to Australia. One
Australian lawyer working for UNTAET observed, "As an Australian citizen I was appalled by
my country's leadership and their effort to stick their snouts in the trough of this country we'd
liberated. They were talking about Australia's generosity. As welcome as InterFET was, it's not
a gift when there's a heavy price attached."8 69 Australia also attempted to undermine the UN
negotiating team by apparently attempting to have Peter Galbraith removed and to convince UN
headquarters to not permit UNTAET to negotiate on behalf of the Timorese. 70 Paul Cleary
provides one example of Australia's negotiating tactics in an account of a meeting in November
2002:
"Downer [Australia's Prime Minister] pounded the table as he bluntly warned that
Australia could leave all of the Timor Sea resources in the ground until it got is way: 'We
don't have to exploit the resources. They can stay there for 20, 40, 50 years.' Towards the
end of the meeting, Downer warned Alkatiri that he had no time for his 'brinkmanship.'
Downer said he was a captive of his western advisers and in need of a tutorial in
politics."87'
While Australia remained committed to supporting East Timor's independence, Australia hoped
to maximize its share of the oil and gas revenues.
Negotiations between UNTAET and Australia began in October 2000 and continued
through July 2001. In July 2001, an agreement known as the Timor Sea Arrangement was
reached. The Arrangement applied only until East Timor became independent. Following
8 6 9 Peter Galbraith also writes, "East Timor is a desperately poor country. Australian children go to school in
classrooms connected to the Internet. East Timorese schools don't have electricity; thanks to the Indonesian
organised orgy of violence, many still do not have roofs. Neither Mari Alkatiri nor I can bring back East Timor a
treaty that would give East Timor less economic benefit than that which it is entitled under international law. This
does not simply mean a share of the revenue, but also the ability to design and implement a tax and petroleum
regime suited to East Timor's particular circumstances." Peter Galbraith, "East Timor's Rights in the Timor Sea,"
Maritime Studies, no. 118 (June 2001): 1-5; Cleary, Shakedown, 58.870 Cleary, Shakedown, 53.
871 Ibid., 82.
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independence, the Arrangement would have to be approved by East Timor and would become
the Timor Sea Treaty. The Arrangement created a Joint Petroleum Development Area was
created out of Area A in the Timor Gap Treaty. The other areas specified in the Timor Gap
Treaty were eliminated. Both sides insisted that the Arrangement was without prejudice to
permanent maritime boundaries, which had yet to be negotiated.8 72 The Timor Sea Treaty was
signed in May 2002 by both Downer and Alkatiri.8 73
Following independence, negotiations continued over several issues related to the
petroleum resources. The first set of negotiations focused on the unitization of the larger Greater
Sunrise oil and gas field - that is, how much of the field was in the JPDA. The Timor Sea Treaty
required that both sides ratify a separate International Unitisation Agreement regarding the
Greater Sunrise field. An initial IUA specified that approximately 20% of the Greater Sunrise
field was within the JPDA, so East Timor would have approximately 18% of the revenue
associated with the field. While this IUA was signed in April 2003, it was not ratified by the
respective parliaments. A second set of negotiations then began, which culminated in the treaty
on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS). CMATS gave East Timor 50%
of the revenue from the Greater Sunrise field, and delayed determination of the sea boundary.
Although some Timorese NGOs criticized the Fretilin government for giving away too much,
East Timor did increase its petroleum revenue from approximately $8.4 billion to $24 billion
over the course of the negotiations.
872 Ibid., 58-61; James Cotton, "From 'Timor Gap' to 'Timor Sea'," AQ: Australian Quarterly 75, no. 2 (March 1,
2003): 28-29.
87 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, "The Timor Sea Treaty," Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties Report 49, November 2002, Canberra, 4-5.
874 On the negotiations, see Cleary, Shakedown, 79-23 9. Oil estimates are based from page 235. See also La'o
Hamutuk, "Submission to the Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties," 13 June 2003; La'o
Hamutuk Bulletin, "Issue focus: CMATS Treaty with Australia," Vol. 7, No 1: April 2006,
(http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/bulletinv7nl.html accessed March 27, 2012.
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Creation of Petroleum Fund
While the treaty negotiations increased East Timor's government revenue, it did not by itself
ensure a long-term sustainable income. The petroleum reserves were expected to run out within
several decades, leaving the East Timor with few other economic resources. The solution to this
problem was the creation of a petroleum fund. The fund would invest revenue and help ensure
that the country would save enough for future generations.
By 2005, the Fretilin government had successfully created a petroleum fund closely
modeled after the Norwegian Petroleum Fund that fulfilled these requirements. East Timor did
gain assistance from other countries, especially Norway. Surprisingly, however, the creation of
the petroleum fund is perhaps the most "locally owned" reform studied in this dissertation. Local
elites, most notably Mari Alkatiri led the process and set the objectives, and even specified the
scope of international assistance. Indeed, the petroleum fund would not have been as successful
without Timorese leadership.
The creation of a petroleum fund was initially discussed in 2001 to 2003. Alkatiri, as
head of the first ETTA, formally requested assistance from Norway in developing East Timor's
petroleum sector and creating a fund to manage the revenue. In 2002, an IMF team advised East
Timor to develop a petroleum fund along the lines of the Norwegian model. The Norwegian
model specifies a petroleum fund that essentially a government savings account. Revenue that
accumulates in the petroleum fund is invested, while government expenditure remains controlled
by the parliament. Hence, for the fund to effectively save money for the future, the parliament
must exercise restraint and limit current spending.87 5
875 IMF, "Democratic Republic of Timor Leste: 2003 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report," 27 June, 2003, 12-14;
NORAD, "Final report of Phase 1 of the project: Assistance in developing the management of the petroleum sector
in Timor-Leste 2002 - 2008," May 2009, 39-40; Drysdale, "Sustainable Development or Resource Cursed?," 82.
Interviews with Norwegian advisor and Fretilin official, Dili, August 2010.
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Following independence, the Fretilin government, with assistance from international
advisors, began drafting legislation in 2003 and 2004. Interviewees emphasize that the Prime
Minister, Alkatiri, had a strong role in the drafting process. Alkatiri declared his intention to use
a "Norway Plus" model for the petroleum fund, which involved adopting the Norwegian model
with some improvements such as greater transparency and parliamentary approval for removing
money from the fund.876 In October 2004, the government began public consultation on the
petroleum fund. Alkatiri stated, "Our aim is that the Petroleum Fund will be a tool that can
contribute to the wise management of Timor-Leste's petroleum resources, to the benefit of both
current and future generations." Public consultation lasted for six months and discussed many of
the key issues related to the petroleum fund that would later become controversial. The law was
passed unanimously by the parliament in June 2005.877
The law and consultation explained the purpose, structure, and investment strategy of the
petroleum fund. First, the purpose of the fund was to address the risks to petroleum wealth. The
public consultation paper notes that petroleum can enable poverty, corruption, and
unrepresentative government. Alkatiri further explained, "Experiences from other countries show
that petroleum wealth can easily become a curse instead of a blessing. In order for Timor-Leste
to ensure the petroleum resources are well managed, it is important that people are well informed
and that we can establish a strategy with as broad an agreement as possible." Second, as in
Norway, the structure of the fund meant that ultimately parliament was responsible for saving for
the future. The Petroleum Fund Law requires that the parliament be informed about the estimated
sustainable income (ESI) from the fund. While this information might inform parliament's
8 7 6 NORAD, "Petroleum Sector in Timor-Leste," 7. Interviews with Norwegian advisor and Fretilin official, Dili,
August 2010.877 Prime Minister Media Relase, "Timor-Leste government launches public consultation on Petroleum Fund," 18
October 2004, (http://www.pm.gov.tp/fund.htm accessed March 28, 2012). See also Drysdale, "Sustainable
Development or Resource Cursed?," 84.
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decision, nothing in the Petroleum Fund Law formally restrained the parliament. Indeed, the
consultation paper emphasizes that there may be good reasons for the government to spend more
than the ESI to build physical infrastructure or human capital. The government would have to
decide on the wisdom of particular investments and on the limits of the country to absorb capital
investment. Excessive spending had the potential to lead to inflation rather than greater
development. Third, the fund would be invested in low-risk foreign assets. There were limited
opportunities for investment in East Timor, and investing abroad would reduce the potential for
inflation or asset bubbles. While the fund was initially entirely invested in US Treasury bonds,
the law did permit ten percent of the fund to be invested in other liquid foreign assets with higher
yield after several years. Finally, the law specified mechanisms for the fund to be transparent and
accountable.8 78
Following the passage of the petroleum fund, revenue began to dramatically increase.
Initial estimates were based on oil priced at approximately $50 per barrel. By 2008, oil prices
were over $100 per barrel. Consequently, petroleum revenue increased from $266 million in
2004-2005 to approximately $2.4 billion in 2008. Interviewees insisted that the increase in
revenue was unexpected and that Timorese officials initially had limited understanding of how
much money was available.87 9
Following the violence in 2006 and elections in 2007, the Fretilin government lost power.
A coalition government led by Gusmao and known as the Alliance for Parliamentary Majority
(AMP) took control of the government. Fretilin officials insisted that the new government was
8 7 8 Ministry of Planning and Finance, "Establishing a Petroleum Fund for Timor-Leste," October 2004 (available at
http://www.pm.gov.tp/PF-DiscPaper-Final.doc (accessed March 28, 2012); "Petroleum Fund Law," (available at
http://www.bancocentral.tl/Download/Publications/PetroleumFund Law.en.pdf (accessed March 30, 2012)). See
also Ibid., 81-100.
879 IMF, "Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: 2008 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report," IMF Country Report
No. 08/202; June 2008, 27; Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: 2011 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report,"
IMF Country Report No. 12/24, February 2012, 23; Interviews with international officials, Dili, August 2010.
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illegitimate, since Fretilin won a plurality of votes in the 2007 elections and in their view a
coalition could not be legally formed following the elections. The new AMP government
substantially increased the size of the budget, from approximately $74 million in 2004-2005 to
$341 million in 2008 and $1.3 billion in 2011. The new expenditures went to increased social
benefits as well as a new National Development Plan. Fretilin officials were highly critical of the
new expenditures. They argued that the AMP government was corrupt, that the National
Development Plan was flawed, and that the spending was unsustainable. One Fretilin MP
explained that Fretilin had intended to remain in control of the government indefinitely. Hence,
they would have structured the fund differently to prevent competing parties from being able to
spend the money so easily.880
Conclusion
Table 5.6: Petroleum negotiations and fund
Preferences Sustainable revenue for independent East Timor
through negotiation of more favorable petroleum treaty
Phase of Demands Unity Threat Outcome Theory
reform
Negotiation Greater High Low Success: Not Confirmed:
of Timor Sea share of oil East Timor gets 90% Structure of reform effort does
Arrangement and gas of revenue from not fit theory. Local elites share
January 2000- revenue for JPDA. international officials'
July 2001 East Timor preferences and demands.
Negotiation Greater - Low Partial Success: Not Confirmed:
of Greater share of oil (Limited 50/50 division of Limited international role and no
Sunrise treaty and gas interna- Greater Sunrise field, executive power. Negotiations led
2003-2006 revenue for tional delayed negotiation of by Timorese. Structure of reform
East Timor role) maritime boundary effort does not fit theory.
Creation of Long-term - Low Success: Not Confirmed:
Petroleum sustainable (Limited Creation of petroleum Limited international role and no
Fund income for interna- fund and sustainable executive power. Reform led by
East Timor tional future income Timorese. Structure of reform
Srole) I effort does not fit theory.
8 80 Gunn, "Timor-Leste in 2009," 235-7. IMF reports. Interviews with international analysts and Fretilin MP, Dili,
August 2009 and 2010.
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The effort to create a sustainable revenue source for East Timor does not fit the theory's
framework. International officials did not make demands of local elites, and it was local elites'
actions that were most influential in driving the reform process. The alternative hypotheses
drawn from the literature do not explain the reform effort any better. First, the international
community put very little resources into the reform effort and had minimal authority. Second, the
key donor to East Timor, Australia, was the main adversary in the reform process, rather than
contributing to the reform's success. Third, Alkatiri and Fretilin were not moderate politicians -
indeed, Fretilin exhibited authoritarian tendencies and campaigned largely on nationalism.
Nevertheless, Alkatiri was personally responsible for the successful negotiation of the treaties
and creation of the petroleum fund.
The reform effort indicates that under certain circumstances, local elites may have the
incentive to work for good public policy in absence of the intervention by the international
community. To be sure, local elites are only likely to engage in such behavior if it is clearly in
their interests. The negotiation of a more favorable share of the resources and the creation of a
petroleum fund to save the excess revenue clearly benefited East Timor in the long run. Since
Fretilin believed it would remain in control of the government indefinitely, these institutions also
benefited Fretilin.
The spending of the petroleum fund is like to remain controversial within East Timor, no
matter which party is in the government. One international official observed that many people in
the rural areas were opposed to increased spending for infrastructure, largely because they did
not trust the politicians in Dili and believed them to be corrupt. Indeed, Fretilin repeatedly
criticized the AMP government's National Development Plan. Some of the criticism was likely
due to concern that AMP supporters would benefit more from the plan's spending than Fretilin's
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supporters. It is also difficult to imagine that future governments will be able to reign in spending
once it has been increased.
VIII. Conclusion
Theory Testing
Table 5.7: Theory Testing
Reform Confirm Theory? Unexplained events
Representative Confirm Problems with international unity prior to mission's deployment.
Institutions and Otherwise unity and lack of threat to nationalist goals explains trajectory.
Independence
Elections Confirm Failure of initial civic education program partly due to lack of
consultation with Timorese elites rather than threat to informal networks.
Military Confirm Problems with post-UNTAET missions partly due to poor leadership and
inattention rather than disunity
Police Partially Confirm Threat to informal networks was major problem. Limitations of UNPOL
in terms of recruitment and skills was the main problem among
international organizations rather than disunity.
Revenue Not Confirm Reform effort was locally owned. Elites and international officials
I collaborate so theory's framework does not apply.
This chapter tested the theory by examining UNTAET's institution building efforts in East
Timor and their legacy. The chapter largely supports the theory. There was limited threat to
nationalist goals, although nationalism was influential in guiding the trajectory of several
different reform efforts. Timorese elites' informal networks determined their response to
reforms, and their private obstruction led to failed reform. Although the revenue reform does not
demonstrate the theory's mechanisms, it had a unique structure and was clearly exceptional.
To be sure, other factors beyond the theory did play a role in the trajectory of institution
building in East Timor, including the recruitment of unqualified international police officials,
inattention to key institutions by the international community, and intra-headquarters disunity.
The theory is relatively parsimonious and cannot explain all reform efforts in depth.
Furthermore, none of the alternative hypotheses can consistently explain the observed variation.
881 Interviews with international officials, Fretilin politician, international analysts, Dili, August 2010.
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The authority and resources of the international community were not sufficient to achieve
success in the face of local opposition. Pressure for reform by Australia and other key donors did
not make elites more eager for reform - indeed, Australia was pitted against East Timor in the
revenue reform. Moderate parties were no more likely to accede to international demands.
Timorese elites faced clear incentives to associate themselves with nationalism and they actively
challenged reforms that would threaten their power, even though these actions threatened the
stability of the society.
Policy Implications
The record of UNTAET and successor missions clearly indicates the limits of the technical
perspective. Vieira de Mello and others saw UNTAET as a test case for UN state building - they
believed that it was an ideal place to demonstrate the UN's effectiveness in building institutions
in post-conflict societies. UNTAET had sovereign authority, extensive expertise, and substantial
resources. While UNTAET did achieve some success - including maintaining peace and
achieving East Timor's independence - the violence in 2006 indicated the underlying flaws of
the mission. The Timorese elites had strong informal connections within the police and military
that weakened these institutions and led to the development of the petitioners and the resulting
violence.
Based on the 2006 crisis, the UN reestablished executive control over the police with the
hope of addressing its mistakes. Recreating executive control, however, was unlikely to solve the
problems in the East Timor security forces. This misunderstanding follows from the technical
perspective, since the UN believed that greater authority and resources would be sufficient to
address the problems in the security forces. However, the weakness of these institutions was due
to the particular political circumstances - the recruitment of a select group of Falintil veterans by
357
F-FDTL, the intentional undermining of the PNTL by Lobato, and the failure to address the
petitioners' crisis by the civilian leadership. Greater executive authority only had the potential to
help address the third concern. Indeed, interviewees emphasized that the planning for UNMIT,
the UN mission following the 2006 violence, did not carefully examine the politics behind the
crisis or take seriously the recommendations of country experts.88 2 For example, UNMIT focused
on rebuilding the police throughout the country. However, the crisis had mainly weakened the
police in Dili, and as in early missions, UNMIT would have difficulty exerting authority outside
of the capital.
There are several specific policy implications that come out institution-building efforts in
East Timor. First, there is a clear benefit to longer-term deployment of international officials.
Vieira de Mello was probably more effective than other international officials, in part because he
was the SRSG for the entirety of UNTAET. While he was clearly frustrated by the length of his
deployment in East Timor,8 8 3 it enabled him to gain a deep understanding of the local political
dynamics and to structure the international administration's demands accordingly.
Second, even in societies where there is no remaining ethnic division after the war,
nationalism remains important in post-conflict politics. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the groups that
fought each other in the war remained politically active, which might have explained the
prevalence of nationalist politics in those societies. However, in East Timor, the absence of
powerful pro-autonomy parties did not decrease the importance of the nationalism in politics. All
major parties and leaders won elections in large part based on their wartime records.
Third, there is no society that should be treated by the international community as a terra
nullius. It is certainly true that East Timor was destroyed following the popular consultation and
2 Interviews with international analysts, Dili and Jakarta, August 2010.
883 Power, Chasing the Flame, 319.
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that there were no functioning formal state institutions. However, informal associations remained
operative. Indeed, a variety of longstanding political relationships, some of which went as far
back as the civil war in the 1970s, were influential in the development of Timorese politics. The
international community could not simply start from scratch - its failure to recognize the
importance of existing political relationships led to the failures in state building and subsequently
to violence. Any future efforts at institution building ought to begin with a careful analysis of
existing political factions and institutions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Theory Testing and Policy Implications
The international community is engaged in many efforts to reform state institutions in post-
conflict societies in order to encourage peace, democracy, the rule of law, and economic
development. The prevailing view of state building, which I refer to as the technical perspective,
believes that the international community has the tools necessary to build strong state institutions
and that with sufficient authority, resources, and expertise the international community can
achieve its objectives.
To examine state building, and evaluate the technical perspective and other existing
theories of state building, this dissertation considered institution building by the international
community in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. The international community established
international administrations in these societies, which had executive authority and a state-
building mandate. These international administrations had the greatest authority, resources, and
expertise that the international community could be reasonably be expected to provide, which
makes them crucial cases for the technical perspective. While some reform efforts did improve
state institutions, others failed and left weak institutions, provoked violence, or slowed political
development.
This dissertation explains this variation by providing a theory that describes institution
building as a political process. When international demands threaten nationalist goals, the mass
public in the post-conflict society will protest and thereby prevent reform. When demands
threaten elites' informal patronage and corruption networks, elites privately obstruct the reform,
which prevents implementation unless there is unity within the international administration about
demands. Furthermore, international administrations faced serious constraints. Their belief in
human rights and bureaucracy created unreasonable minimum standards for the institutions they
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sought to reform and prevented them from taking full account of the politics of the post-conflict
society. Disunity between international organizations also enabled local elites to avoid reform by
implementing the weakest demands posed by different organizations.
The theory and empirical findings have three major policy implications for state building
by the international community beyond international administrations. These implications provide
direct insight for international efforts in states emerging from civil war, such as Syria, Libya,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Sudan. First, the international community should better optimize its
demands based on the politics of post-conflict societies. The international community should not
make demands that threaten nationalist goals, since this will provoke a backlash that blocks
reform. Rather, by carefully designing incremental demands for reform, state institutions in post-
conflict societies can be significantly improved. Second, the international community should
structure international interventions to ensure unified demands. When specifying mandates for
international organizations in post-conflict interventions, the international community should
ensure that there is a hierarchy containing the different international organizations deployed and
avoid giving multiple organizations overlapping mandates. Third, the international community
should take measures to increase international officials' knowledge about the target society.
Officials that have long-term engagement in the target society can understand local elites'
incentives better and better optimize international demands.
This concluding chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section examines the record
of institution building in the three international administrations studied in the dissertation. It
discusses the overall testing of the theory, the extent to which the case studies provided evidence
in support of the theory's assumptions and mechanisms, and applicability of the alternative
hypotheses. The second section specifies directions for future research. The third section
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discusses the dissertation's policy implications, not only for ongoing and future international
administrations, but also for any effort by the international community to build state institutions
in a post-conflict society.
I. Empirical Findings
This section evaluates how the empirical record of institution building in international
administrations conforms to the assumptions and predictions of the theory. First, I summarize the
overall confirmation of the theory. Second, I discuss to what extent the political context of
international administrations supports the theory's assumptions, including the importance of
nationalism and informal networks in post-conflict societies, and the character of international
administrations. Third, I discuss specific empirical examples that demonstrate the explanatory
power of each of the mechanisms specified in the theory. Fourth, I discuss several findings that
agree with the general observations of the theory, but do not precisely match the mechanisms
specified by the theory. Fifth, I consider the applicability of the three alternative explanations
raised in the theory chapter.
Overall Theory Testing
Table 6.1: Theory Testin Summary
Stages of Reform Efforts Confirmed Partially Confirmed Not Confirmed
Bosnia 17  4 0
Kosovo 15 4 1
East Timor 8 5 3
Total 40 13 4
Aggregate Reform Efforts 12 4 1
The theory explains the trajectory of many, but not all, of the reform efforts examined within the
dissertation. As shown in Table 6.1, which also appears in the theory chapter, out of fifty-seven
stages of reform, forty fully confirmed the theory, thirteen partially confirmed it, and only four
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did not confirm it. While there may be multiple ways to divide reform efforts into stages, and
some of the coding may be controversial, the summary of the empirical findings provides
substantial support for the theory.
Assumptions
The theory makes several assumptions about post-conflict societies and international
administrations that underlie the mechanisms specified by the theory. For post-conflict societies,
the theory claims that nationalist goals, such as independence and autonomy, are popular and
dominant; and that informal patronage and corruption networks are a vital source of power for
local elites. For international administrations, the theory claims that there is an organizational
ideology that emphasizes human rights and bureaucratic procedures, that there are multiple
organizations comprising the international administration, and that international administrations
have a principal-agent relationship with their supervisor. Since the mechanisms specified by the
theory are based on these assumptions, greater empirical support for these assumptions offers
greater confidence that the theory's causal mechanisms apply to the international administrations.
There is significant evidence from the three chapters on international administrations in
support of these assumptions. In all three societies, nationalism and informal networks were
important in politics during the war. In Bosnia, the three main ethnic groups competing
nationalist goals dominated electoral politics. Bosniak parties campaigned on their ability to
strengthen the state and reduce the power of the entities, while Serb parties campaigned on their
ability to maintain the autonomy and Serb character of the Republika Srpska. Parties competed to
be the strongest defender of their respective nationalist goals, and outbid one another in opposing
reforms that threatened these goals. Similarly, in Kosovo, Albanian parties competed by
referencing their wartime record and ability to achieve the key nationalist goal of independence
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in the future. Furthermore, each of the Kosovo Albanian parties had varying informal networks
that bolstered their political power, including connections with KLA veterans, smuggling
operations, or other groups. In East Timor, elites also campaigned on their connection with the
independence struggle, and used a variety of informal connections, especially with veterans, to
maintain political control.
The empirical record also offers support for the assumptions about international
administrations. First, international officials are committed to human rights, and believe in the
effectiveness and desirability of bureaucratic procedures. In Bosnia, for example, international
officials sought to build multiethnic institutions based on their belief in individual rights rather
than collective rights. In Kosovo and East Timor, international officials insisted on constructing
institutions that used formal bureaucratic procedures, even when it was infeasible. Each of the
international administrations was also divided into multiple organizations. In Bosnia, the
coordination between these organizations was particularly problematic, since there was no clear
hierarchy between them, while in Kosovo and East Timor there was a hierarchy that facilitated
international unity. Finally, each international administration had a principal-agent relationship
with its supervisor. In Kosovo, for example, disagreements between the international
administration and the supervisor sometimes impeded reform efforts.
Causal Mechanisms
Based on the theoretical assumptions, the theory specifies a number of mechanisms and sub-
mechanisms that determine the reform trajectory, as shown in Figure 6.1, which also appears in
the theory chapter. The mechanisms provide substantial insight into institution building in post-
conflict societies. The case studies provided evidence in support of each of the causal
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mechanisms. Here, for the three main causal chains specified by the theory, I discuss examples
from the case studies that particularly demonstrate the explanatory power of the mechanisms.
Figure 6.1: Mechanisms of the reform process
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First, the theory claims that when international demands threaten nationalist goals, there
is a potential for mass public protest, which will block implementation since the intemational
administration is constrained by popular sovereignty. Two reform efforts demonstrate how a
threat to nationalist goals not only prevents implementation, but also may have other negative
effects. First, in the police reform in Bosnia, the international administration insisted on demands
that would have weakened the autonomy and Serb character of the RS. Because of widespread
public opposition to the demands, it was clear that any Serb leader that accepted the reform
would lose an election. Given the extent of Serb opposition, the intemnational administration
eventually backed down and weakened its demands. The failure of the reform effort
delegitimized the international administration in Bosnia and made future reform more difficult.
Second, in the Standards before Status reform in Kosovo, the international administration
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insisted that Kosovo implement a seemingly impossible set of demands in order to progress with
status negotiations. The result was widespread riots with violence against minorities and
international officials. The riots led the UN to recognize that its approach to Kosovo was
infeasible, and to begin status negotiations about Kosovo's independence.
Second, the theory claims that when there is not a threat to nationalist goals, but demands
threaten informal networks, local elites will privately obstruct the reform. However, the theory
predicts that a unified international administration will be able to partially implement its
demands through the use of conditionality, monitoring, and punishment. Two case of police
reform especially demonstrate how informal networks and private obstruction can limit the
effectiveness of reform. In the case of police reform in Kosovo, the international administration
sought to create a new police force and address politicized crimes, including interethnic violence,
high-level corruption, and organized crime. The intemational administration was able to
establish an effective police institution that could address day-to-day crime, in large part because
of international unity. However, neither the UN police nor the new Kosovo Police Service could
address politicized crime, because of the influence of informal networks. Similarly, in the case of
police reform in East Timor, the Minister of Interior's personal networks within the police force
weakened the institution and facilitated violence in 2006. In both of these cases, international
unity enabled certain improvements within the institution, but international officials could not
compel elites to fully implement international demands.
Third, if international demands threaten neither nationalist goals, nor informal networks,
the theory predicts that intemational demands will be fully implemented only if the international
administration is unified. In several cases, international administrations avoided threatening
nationalist goals and informal networks, and were thereby able to fully implement reform. For
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example, in the case of the creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the international
administration accepted an ambiguous name for the organization that in English did not imply
Kosovo's independence, but that in Albanian implied that the organization was an army-in-
waiting - thus preserving nationalist goals. The international administration also did not attempt
to replace ex-KLA members within the organization, which prevented the reform from
threatening informal networks. As a result, the international administration fully achieved its
goals of avoiding violence, demobilizing the KLA, and avoiding implying impendence. While
the KPC reform was more successful than the police reform because of weaker demands, the
police reform did achieve greater improvement in the target institution. The comparison between
these two case studies demonstrate that the international administration can in certain
circumstances make demands that threaten informal networks and still achieve substantial
reform.
Relevant Findings Beyond the Theory's Specified Mechanisms
The theory provided a relatively specific set of mechanisms about the process of institutional
reform. There were several findings in the case studies that are relevant the theory, but which did
not match the mechanisms specified by the theory. Three of these findings are relevant to the
broader applicability and implications of the theory.
First, international institution-building efforts in the immediate post-conflict period -
what some call the "golden hour"884 - were often successful. International administrations in
both Kosovo and East Timor faced significant difficulties in the immediate post-conflict phase.
There was violence, the international administrations were only partially formed, and local elites
remained powerful. Nevertheless, the development of initial representative institutions in both
8 Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order After Conflict, 1; James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An
Insider's View ofIraq's Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Potomac Books Inc., 2007).
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societies was relatively successful, and indeed provides a model for future efforts. The
constraints of the early period forced the international administration to abide by the limited
demands specified by the theory. In particular, international officials were forced to negotiate
with local elites and avoid threatening nationalist goals. Later, once the international
administration was fully established, it had more freedom. Its beliefs in human rights and
bureaucracy then lead the international administration to make more ambitious demands, which
took less account of the politics of the target society, and were more likely to threaten nationalist
goals or informal networks.
Second, the case of revenue reform in East Timor demonstrates that local elites may
sometimes take ownership of a reform effort. Mari Alkatiri, then the Prime Minister and leader
of the Fretilin government, negotiated a greater share of revenue with Australia and established a
petroleum fund to invest the revenue. The term "local ownership" is widely used in the literature,
and is believed to be essential for achieving reform, but it is somewhat unclear what this term
means in practice.8 85 For some, local ownership seems to mean consultation with local elites. In
other reform efforts in East Timor, such as the police reform, there was extensive consultation
with local elites, but continued opposition to international demands. The relative success of the
revenue reform, compared with the police reform, indicates that understanding local ownership
as consultation is problematic. Instead, scholars should identify reforms as locally owned only if
local elites lead the reform effort and would pursue it without international influence. The
dynamics of locally owned reform efforts with this definition are different from reform efforts
described here. Indeed, locally owned reform efforts would be better described by the traditional
8 8 5Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice"; Donais, "Empowerment or Imposition?".
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state-building literature, which focuses on the incentives of elites to strengthen the state based on
issues such as the threat of revolution by the mass public or concerns about inter-state war.8 6
Third, in some cases where demands did not explicitly threaten nationalist goals, elites
were able to use nationalist outbidding to block reform. The theory specifies that a threat to
nationalist goals will prevent reform because of the possibility of public protest. Without a threat
to nationalist goals, the theory claims that elites should at most be able to bluff and will not be
able to public opposition to effectively block reform. However, in the case of the April 2006
Constitutional reform effort in Bosnia, the Bosniak party SBiH blocked a reform that did not
threaten nationalist goals without reference to the possibility of protest. Instead, the SBiH used
nationalist outbidding to justify its parliamentary opposition, and won the next election based on
its actions. The theory appears to be correct that protest is infeasible without a threat to
nationalist goals, but it appears that nationalism may be used to block reform in other ways,
especially in societies such as Bosnia where ethnic conflict pervades politics.
Evaluation ofAlternative Hypotheses
The reform efforts studied provide less support for the three alternative hypotheses. There is only
partial evidence that two of the hypotheses - the presence of authority and resources, and the
demands of key regional organizations or donors - can explain the trajectory of reform efforts.
The third hypothesis, the presence of moderate parties, provides little explanatory power.
First, the record of institution building in international administrations repeatedly
demonstrates that authority and resources are not always sufficient for institution building. Even
Paddy Ashdown, a major proponent of more aggressively using of international authority, admits
that he could not effective impose reforms if the people of Bosnia would publically
8* Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy, Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and
European States, AD 990-1990.
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demonstrate.88 7 The limits of international authority are also demonstrated by the failure of
Miroslav Lajcak, Ashdown's eventual successor, to use the power of the High Representative to
pressure concessions on police restructuring. In Kosovo, the international community's refusal to
progress with status negotiations eventually led to the 2004 riots and concessions from the
international community. In East Timor, local elites' complaints about their lack of inclusion led
UNTAET to increase Timorese participation in the government.
Nevertheless, the provision of international authority and resources is effective in certain
"technical" reform efforts. In such reforms, it was clear to both local elites and international
officials that the reforms would improve the functioning of the target institution, and that the
reform did not threaten local elites' power. Examples of technical reforms include the creation of
tax institutions, in which increased revenue would benefit local elites; the conduct of elections,
which would improve local elites' legitimacy; and day-to-day policing, which was necessary for
basic security. There is therefore evidence that the technical perspective is most relevant for such
technical reforms.
Second, support from key regional organizations or donors was not always sufficient to
achieve reform. As the theory chapter explains, many scholars believe that EU conditionality is
sufficient to achieve reform. The case of police restructuring in Bosnia clearly demonstrates that
fallacy of this claim. EU conditionality could not trump concerns about nationalist goals.
Furthermore, the demands of key donors - such as the United States in Bosnia and Kosovo, or
Australia in East Timor - could not convince elites to implement reform. Support from key
donors did influence local elites in these societies, but were more relevant as a tool for achieving
their objectives rather than a constraint on their behavior.
8 8 7 Ashdown, A Fortunate Life, 352-353.
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This is not to say that external conditionality is never effective. Indeed, conditionality for
accession to the EU and NATO was often helpful for securing reform in Bosnia, and key donors
played an important role in East Timor and Kosovo as well. Conditionality was effective only
when reforms posed some costs but did not threaten elites' political survival. Conditionality also
relied on the presence of international unity. Without international unity, local elites recognized
that they could implement the weakest available demands and still expect political progress.
Third, there is little support for the hypothesis that the international community can
manipulate democratic institutions to encourage the election of moderate elites. The continuing
importance of nationalism in the politics of post-conflict societies consistently led major parties
to campaign based on nationalist achievements. There are also several examples of parties that
the international community supported as moderates, but which became more nationalist in
campaigns and remained reluctant to implement international demands. For example, the SNSD
in Bosnia and the LDK in Kosovo were recognized as moderate parties but did not agree to
intemationally-demanded reforms and in some ways were more nationalistic than their
opponents. Furthermore, political parties can obstruct efforts to build institutions that encourage
moderation prior to elections. Roland Paris's strategy of "institutionalization before liberalization"
is infeasible, since in addition to the longstanding popularity of nationalist parties, the empirical
record demonstrates that local elites can obstruct reforms that are intended to weaken their power.
Moreover, local elites can force more rapid elections by pointing out that delaying election ns is
anti-democratic.
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11. Areas for Future Research
The dissertation has offered a variety of insights for improving our understanding of state
building by the international community. Nevertheless, there are at least three areas that deserve
further investigation.
First, future work should examine other state institutions, such as education, health, and
justice. This dissertation has focused on only a few issue areas, including basic representation,
elections, police, military, and revenue. While these institutions are most essential for the
functioning of the state, other institutions are also important for promoting the rule of law and
economic development. Future work should examine to what extent the theory's framework and
predictions apply to these other issue areas and whether there are major differences between
different issue areas.
Second, future work should study the applicability of the findings of the dissertation to
state building in post-conflict societies where there was not an international administration.
Theoretically, the dissertation may have two different levels of applicability depending on the
nature of the post-conflict society. First, the general framework of studying institution building
as a negotiation between the international officials and local elites may be applicable. However,
the determinants of the reform trajectory may differ from the theory - nationalist goals, informal
networks, and international unity will not explain the reform trajectory in all cases. For example,
many cases of international development efforts may have a framework of this nature, but
different theoretical trajectories. Second, if the theoretical assumptions about the importance of
nationalist goals, informal networks, international ideology, and international unity apply, the
theory's predictions should directly travel to other cases. For example, accounts of institution
building in Iraq and Afghanistan note the importance of informal networks, the presence of a
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similar international ideology, and problems of international disunity in these societies.888 Future
work should examine reforms in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine whether the theory's
predictions do indeed apply.
Third, future work should do more to examine the structure and nature of informal
networks. Because this dissertation considers a broad range of reform efforts in a number of
different societies, its ability to examine informal networks embedded in particular institutions is
limited. Informal networks are more complex, however, and the structure, character, and
durability of these networks may influence the feasibility of reform in other ways.
III. Policy Implications
This work has examined the question of when and how the international community can build
state institutions in post-conflict societies. It examined international administrations because
these are crucial test cases for state building for the technical perspective. The theory's findings -
that state building is limited by the politics of post-conflict societies - are likely to apply beyond
international administrations to other interventions, especially when nationalism, informal
networks, and international ideology influence political development. These factors are clearly
important in societies that have recently experienced civil wars, such as Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. By taking greater account of the importance of local politics, of the danger of
ideology, and of the problems of international disunity, the international community can
significantly improve its ability to assist post-conflict societies. I describe three major categories
888 See, for example, Paris, "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding"; Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006);
Peter Van Buren, We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts andMinds of the Iraqi People (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2011).
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of policy implications and draw out more specific implications for future international
interventions.
Optimize Demands
The theory describes how the politics of post-conflict societies limit the international
community's ability to pursue state building - the international community cannot implement
demands that threaten nationalist goals or, if they are not unified, informal networks. Hence, the
main way to increase the success of reform efforts is to better match demands to the political
constraints of post-conflict society. Making demands that are too weak wastes an opportunity for
reform, while making demands that are too strong prevents reform and may provoke a backlash
that further weakens existing institutions.
The theory provides specific insight into how to optimize demands. First and foremost,
the international community must avoid demands that threaten nationalist goals. Nationalism, the
belief that the nation and the state should be congruent, remains powerful in post-conflict
societies for all of the reasons specified in the theory chapter - nationalism during the war
creates a myth-symbol complex, the ethnic security dilemma provokes continued nationalist
identification, the experience of violence makes the mass public susceptible to emotional appeals,
and local elites manipulate media and education to maintain the importance of nationalism.
Demands that threaten nationalist goals therefore have the potential to provoke widespread
public protest. This public protest indicates that the international administration's demands are
contrary to popular sovereignty and thereby blocks the demands. Making demands that threaten
nationalist goals is therefore counterproductive for the international community's broader goals.
One might ask why the international community would even propose such demands. The
empirical record of intemational administrations provides several such examples. In Bosnia,
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many international officials sought to (re)establish a multiethnic society and to eliminate the
ethnically based political system that the Dayton Agreement created. Many international officials
believed that the ethnically based system was discriminatory, segregationist, and based off of
genocide. Nevertheless, throughout the international administration in Bosnia, the autonomy of
the Republika Srpska remained non-negotiable for many Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Serbs thereby
forced their elite representatives to negotiate accordingly. The international community's goals
of peace, the rule of law, development, and European integration in Bosnia were not served by
its desire to establish a multiethnic society. In Kosovo, the international community also
threatened nationalist goals by attempting to indefinitely delay Kosovo's independence, which
provoked the riots of March 2004. The international community tends to believe it can alter the
content and importance of nationalism in post-conflict societies. This dissertation has
demonstrated that the international community's ability to do so is limited.
Second, the international community should make demands that threaten informal
networks if it is unified. As the theory chapter explained, elites created informal networks during
the war and these networks remain influential in politics following the end of the war. Informal
networks are contrary to the international community's objectives of establishing a democratic
society ruled by law. When the international community is unified, and all international
organizations make consistent demands, the international community can compel elites to
partially implement their demands. This partial implementation is the best the international
community can hope for and has the potential to improve the society in the long term. For
example, in Kosovo, UNMIK established a Kosovo Police Service that could address day-to-day
crime, even though it could not address politicized crime such as interethnic violence, organized
crime, or high-level corruption. Despite its limitations, the Kosovo Police Service had the
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potential to strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo in the long term, and represents the successful
optimization of demands. On the other hand, the international community should not pursue
demands that threaten informal networks if it is not unified. Without international unity in
Kosovo, elite obstruction would have seriously undermined the new police institution.
These implications directly apply to current and future international interventions in post-
civil war societies. In countries where nationalist objectives remain in doubt, such as Bosnia and
Kosovo, the international community should not make any demands that threaten such objectives.
In countries where the deployed international organizations cannot achieve unity, such as
Afghanistan, the international community should not make demands threatening informal
networks. Attacking corruption and patronage, for example, will threaten the incumbent elite and
provoke them to privately obstruct reform and weaken the target institution. Instead, the
international community should seek to reform state institutions to strengthen their ability to
carry out tasks that are mutually beneficial to incumbent elite and the international community,
such as day-to-day policing and revenue collection.
Improve Unity
The theory emphasizes that international unity is essential for achieving successful reform,
especially if there is elite obstruction. One could simply urge international organizations to
engage in better coordination and work harder to come to agreement about demands. Such calls
have been made in the international development literature for several years, but there has been
little improvement in either unity or coordination.189
889 See, inter alia, Knack and Rahman, "Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients";
Laurence Chandy, It's Complicated: The Challenge of Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0922_paris_declarationchandy.aspx; IMaki Aldasoro, Peter Nunnenkamp,
and Rainer Thiele, "Less Aid Proliferation and More Donor Coordination? The Wide Gap Between Words and
Deeds," Journal ofInternational Development 22, no. 7 (October 1, 2010): 920-940.
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The theory chapter observed that unity was most affected by three factors: whether the
international administration is hierarchically or horizontally organized, the ability of the
international administration to delegate responsibility, and the presence of good leaders. The
most malleable elements are creating a hierarchically structured administration, and clearly
delineating tasks to different organizations. When international organizations lack a clear
hierarchy, organizations will tend to compete in order to gain resources and influence. When
international organizations have an overlapping mandate, they frequently develop disagreements
about which demands to make. Avoiding these two problems when designing international
interventions will greatly improve international unity.
While this policy implication may seem obvious, it has not been followed. In Kosovo, for
example, in the post-2008 restructuring of the international administration, the new
administration was less hierarchical and organizations had overlapping mandates. Prior to 2008,
UNMIK was hierarchically organized, and the SRSG had final authority over all decisions the
international administration made. Following 2008, certain international organizations in Kosovo
recognized the independence of the territory while others were neutral about Kosovo's status.
None of the status neutral organizations would follow the leadership of the International Civilian
Representative, whose office officially recognized Kosovo's independence. Multiple
organizations, with fundamental disagreements about their mandates, were therefore making
different demands of some Kosovo institutions. For example, the EU Rule of Law Mission
(EULEX), the OSCE, and the International Civilian Office (ICO) were all responsible for
improving the police institutions in Kosovo after 2008. There were clear overlapping mandates
and no hierarchy between the organizations. The result was unclear demands to local elites and
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the general failure of police reform following 2008. These problems happened despite the
apparent "lessons learned" about disunity in Bosnia.
Improving International Officials'Local Knowledge
The final policy implication is to improve the knowledge of international officials of the society
they are working to improve. Greater understanding of the politics of post-conflict societies will
enable these officials to optimize their demands, in accordance with the first implication
described above. International officials are often selected based on technocratic skills related to
the bureaucracy of international organizations, rather than knowledge about the society they
were trying to build. To improve the local knowledge of international officials, I urge a
fundamental shift in the training, selection, and deployment of international officials away from
quick rotations and general knowledge, towards long-term deployments and deep engagement
with the target society. These suggestions align with those of Rory Stewart, who identifies
certain characteristics of colonial administrations that are worthy of merit. Stewart urges "reform
of 'the corporate culture' of international bureaucracies to allow the recruitment, retention, and
promotion of ... 'a cadre of superior officers who are willing and interested to serve extended
tours out there."'8 90 Two specific measures would be especially productive for achieving this
goal.
First, instead of one-year deployments, officials should be deployed for at least a two-
year period. While this recommendation applies for all levels of international officials, it is most
relevant for senior leadership positions. For example, two of the most effective leaders of
international administrations, Paddy Ashdown and Sergio Vieira de Mello, were deployed in
their positions for three and a half years and two and a half years, respectively. Longer periods of
deployment enable the leaders of international organizations to develop a better understanding of
890 Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, 81-87. Quote from page 85.
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the politics of the post-conflict society and creating stronger relationships with local elites. To be
sure, longer deployments are not a panacea - Ashdown's least successful reform effort came at
the end of his tenure. Nevertheless, they are the best hope for enabling international officials to
understand post-conflict societies and optimize their demands accordingly.
Second, international officials should be selected more for their knowledge of the
relevant society than for possessing general technical or bureaucratic skills. In several reform
efforts, interviewees lamented that international officials had been selected based on their skill at
navigating the international bureaucracy, rather than their substantive knowledge of the society
that they were trying to build. Lack of language skills and cultural knowledge prevented
international officials from understanding the perspective of local officials and from rendering
effective training and mentoring.
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